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  Abstract 
Commonly it is believed that children need to be 16 years old before they have the right to give, or refuse, 
consent to medical, surgical or dental treatment. This is an understandable misconception in New Zealand, 
as the Care of Children Act 2004 provides for children of that age to consent, but is silent on the rights of 
those under 16 years. Yet, in New Zealand, the English House of Lords case of Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority and another, which established that competent children under 16 years may give 
consent, has been followed. Given this uncertainty in the law, this thesis examined: (i) what are children’s, 
parents’ and health professionals’ experiences of the consent processes; (ii) what factors influence 
children’s competence; (iii) how do health professionals assess children’s competence and what criteria, if 
any, do they use; and (iv) how does the law in New Zealand influence the consent processes for children 
seeking healthcare, and are any changes required to the law, legal policy and health professionals’ practices? 
 
This qualitative research focused on the competence of children under the age of 16 years and the consent 
processes within and across different healthcare environments – hospitals, private practices, schools and 
community youth services. It included 59 participants having experience of medicine, dentistry and surgery, 
comprising of: seven children, six parents, seven hospital doctors, six GPs, three hospital dentists, three 
private dentists, two dental therapists, eight nurses and 17 stakeholders.  
 
The research found that there are many interlinking factors influencing the development of children’s 
competence to participate in the consent processes for healthcare, relating to the physical environment in 
which health professionals consult; children’s internal characteristics; their relationships with parents and 
health professionals; and the support they receive. Intertwining to either promote or constrain children’s 
competence are factors such as children’s preferences, experience, maturity, attitudes, values, skills and 
health; parents’ and health professionals’ knowledge, skills and attitudes; and time, privacy, policies, 
guidance and law. Thus, when health professionals assess children’s competence they need to consider 
many factors. Although their processes are organic rather than formal, they all agreed that children’s 
competence can be measured through the level of children’s interest/independence in their health; their 
ability to engage with them and explain details about their health; children’s intelligence and understanding; 
their ability to ask and answer questions; and their development and maturity. Age was found to be a 
misleading indicator of children’s competence. Nonetheless, health professionals’ practices in taking 
consent for children under the age of 16 years is inconsistent, with some relying upon parental consent, 
rather than trusting the consent of competent children. As a result children’s competence may not be 
promoted or respected, and children may fail on occasions to receive necessary and desired health 
treatment. 
 
Recommendations from this study include reviewing professional policies and guidance to ensure greater 
consistency; developing a “toolkit” for health professionals to use to assess children’s competence; 
introducing courses/seminars for children, parents and health professionals to raise awareness and 
knowledge of the law; and amending or introducing a new law to better embed the rights of competent 
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 Chapter 1 
 
   Introduction	
	
The first appointment we had at [X hospital] was with a surgeon in a very small room 
that had three surgeons, well actually, one surgeon and two registrars, three nurses, me 
and Samantha. So there was a bunch of adults, staring down at her, a surgeon looking at 
x-rays and making decisions, doctors often talking across the room at each other and 
definitely talking at adult level, and a child sitting in the middle. (Wilma, mother)1 
 
Samantha was 10-years-old when she was first admitted to hospital with bone cancer in 
her leg. The treatment she was given saved her life, and following three operations, she 
was able to walk again, pain free. However, in that lengthy process how did the health 
professionals and her mother, Wilma, help her understand what was happening? How 
were treatment decisions made, and how was consent obtained? To what extent was 
Samantha supported to participate in those processes, and was she respected as a child 
and a patient, with her own feelings, views, and aspirations?  
 
The issues that these questions raise are the focus of this thesis, exploring how parents, 
health professionals and the law respect and support children’s competence to contribute 
to, and make, health decisions. The research questions underpinning this inquiry are 
aimed at considering micro and macro level, medico-legal policy and practice issues 
about children’s consent. They are as follows: 
  
1. What are children’s, parents’ and health professionals’ experiences of the consent 
processes? 
2. What factors influence children’s competence?  
3. How do health professionals assess children’s competence and what criteria, if 
any, do they use?  
4. How does the law in New Zealand influence the consent processes for children 
seeking healthcare and are any changes required to the law, legal policy and health 
professionals’ practices? 
 
I .  Signi f i cance  o f  Researching Chi ldren’s  Competence  and Consent  
to  Medica l  Treatment 
  
A. The Law 
 
In New Zealand the laws for young people over the age of 16 years and children under 
that age differ for giving, or refusing, consent to medical, surgical or dental 
																																																								
1 See Chapter 8, page 145 where Samantha and Wilma narrate more fully their experiences during their 
research interview for this doctoral study. The names of the children and parents in this thesis are 
pseudonyms to preserve their anonymity and some of the genders of the children have been changed. 
	
	 2	
treatment/procedures.2 Section 36(1) of the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA) gives 
young people the same statutory rights as adults, to either consent to, or refuse medical 
treatment. However, the law for children consenting to, or refusing, medical treatment 
(other than abortion, contraception and other sexual health matters) is more uncertain,3 
as the COCA fails to provide for them. The gap it leaves requires to be filled by other 
statutes, regulations and case law, such as the Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers’ Rights 1996 (Code), the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), 
and the 1986 English decision of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 
and another (Gillick).4 Nevertheless, this is still problematic. Whilst the Code contains both 
a presumption of competence and rights for everyone to consent to, or refuse, treatment, it 
is a regulation under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (HDCA), and as 
such cannot confer a power or right beyond the authority of the HDCA, or alter the 
general law.5 Similarly, there is uncertainty in the NZBORA’s scope of filling the gap left 
by COCA, for although section 11 includes the right of everyone  to refuse medical 
treatment, which presumably also applies to children, this assumption has not yet been 
tested in court.6 Thus, it is necessary to turn to the common law. In 1986 the English 
House of Lords (now Supreme Court) in the landmark case of Gillick decided that 
children with sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable them to understand fully 
what is proposed, have the right to make their own decisions, and can consent to medical 
treatment.7 This was a groundbreaking decision for the rights and autonomy of children. 
It not only recognised their evolving competence, but also challenged the right of parents 
to make decisions for them. Worldwide countries adopted Gillick into their law, and New 
Zealand was no exception, albeit in a rather ad hoc manner.  
 
The most authoritative recognition of Gillick in New Zealand was by the Court of 
Appeal in Re J (An Infant): B and B v Director of Social Welfare (Re J) that involved a three-
year-old whose parents refused to consent to a blood transfusion due to their religious 
beliefs. 8  The Court not only recognised Gillick as applicable in New Zealand, but also 
confirmed that parental rights are never absolute, rather reflecting their responsibilities 
towards their children. Similarly, the High Court in Hawthorne v Cox, subsequent to the 
passing of the COCA, acknowledged consistency between Gillick and COCA of the 
																																																								
2 See abbreviations, page xvii. In this thesis I have abbreviated medical, surgical and dental treatment or 
procedures to “medical treatment.” There is no distinction in the law of consent between them. Also, I 
define ‘young people’ as those aged 16 years and over and ‘children’ below the age of 16 years, although I 
recognise for example the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA), s 8; United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), art 1; and the Children’s Act 2014, s 5(1) define ‘child’ as being under the 
age of 18 years. I make this demarcation due to the distinction in the COCA between the rights of those 
aged 16 years and over and those under the age of 16 years. 
3 COCA, s 38, provides for girls of any age consenting to, or refusing, an abortion, and by repeal of section 
3 of the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977 (the Contraception Act 1977), children of any 
age can obtain sexual health advice and contraception. 
4 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another [1986] 1 AC 112 (HL). 
5 PDG Skegg and Ron Paterson, Health Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuter, New Zealand, 2015) at 239. 
6 See Chapter 3 page 30 where I refer to Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v Liu 11/7/96 HC Auckland 
M812/96 in which the Court indicated that section 11 of NZBORA is not determinative of children 
refusing medical treatment. 
7 Gillick, above n 4 at 113 and 189 per Lord Scarman. 
8 Re J (An Infant): B and B v Director of Social Welfare [1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA). 
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yielding nature of parental involvement in children’s decision-making, as they develop 
and mature. 9 However, the clearest recognition of children’s competence and their right 
to consent was by the Family Court in Re SPO, when it decided that a 15-year-old boy 
could consent to vaccinations, despite his mother’s refusal.10 Yet, despite this recognition 
of Gillick, at three differing levels of judicial authority, an element of doubt remains as to 
the respect courts will give to children’s competence and their right to consent, due to 
the judiciary failing to consistently consider or apply Gillick.11 
 
To gain a deeper understanding of Gillick’s applicability within the New Zealand legal 
system, I have undertaken an international comparison of the laws of Australia, 
England/Wales (England) and Scotland.12 Australia has a close connection to New 
Zealand, while England is the home of Gillick and has long influenced our law, and 
uniquely Scotland incorporated Gillick into statute.13 Differing attitudes and histories 
emerge. The main feature of Australia’s experience is the complexities that developed 
from requiring the court’s approval of children’s competence for non-therapeutic 
treatment, in particular for gender dysphoria. The complexities in English law arose as a 
result of restricting the scope of Gillick, by distinguishing children’s right to consent from 
their right to refuse. In these countries, significant lines of legal precedents developed. 
On the other hand, Scotland has virtually no case law, regulating children’s right to 
consent to medical treatment in the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 (ALCSA). 
While the ALCSA does not specify the right to refuse, Scotland has not distinguished 
this right from that of consent. The generally accepted view of section 2(4) of the 
ALCSA is that it includes both rights.14 
 
Turning to the process and criteria for assessing competence, New Zealand law gives 
little guidance. No universally accepted process or list of criteria exists, although the 
Code and Professional Guidance from health regulatory bodies, such as the Medical 
Council of New Zealand (Medical Council) and Dental Council of New Zealand (Dental 
Council), provide direction on the importance of informed consent. Therefore, this 
research explores how health professionals assess children’s competence and their 
processes for taking consent. 
 
 B. Research 
 
It is important to consider how children’s competence evolves, and is promoted and 
respected in different healthcare environments – hospitals, private practices, schools and 
																																																								
9 Hawthorne v Cox [2008] 1 NZLR 409 at [57] and [61] per Heath J. 
10 Re SPO FC Wellington FAM-2004-085-1046, 3 November 2005. 
11 Chapter 3 considers New Zealand’s application of Gillick in detail. See also Skegg and Paterson, above n 
5 at 241. 
12 Chapter 4. 
13 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, section 2(4). 
14 Kenneth McK Norrie “The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991” 36 (1991) Journal of the Law 
Society of Scotland 434 at 436; Scottish Law Commission “Report on the Legal Capacity and 
Responsibility of Minors and Pupils” (Scot Law Com No 110, 16 December 1987) at [3.77]; See A.B. 
Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie The Law relating to Parent and Child in Scotland (2nd ed, W. Green & Sons, 
Edinburgh, 1999) at 480; John Houston 1996 SCLR 943 at 945. 
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community youth services (healthcare environments), due to there being sufficient 
certainty in the law entitling children to give consent. Children frequently encounter 
situations where they need to consult with health professionals for minor, everyday 
matters, or sometimes for potentially life threatening conditions. Concerning in New 
Zealand are the significant health issues amongst children, for example, relating to 
obesity, 15 asthma16 and cancer.17  
 
My study focuses on two areas: competence and consent; in particular, how children’s 
competence is promoted and assessed, and how consent is obtained. This is the first 
study of its kind in New Zealand that traverses specialist areas of health – medicine, 
surgery and dentistry, and in a range of healthcare environments. Worldwide there is a 
dearth of research focusing on the issue of children giving informed consent to health 
treatment. Most international studies focus on specific health conditions, such as 
cancer,18 or range of health conditions,19 or alternatively, consider only hospital care.20 As 
Kilkelly and Donnelly noted, “little has been done to identify whether children are 
involved in decision-making in the private sector.” 21  In their study therefore they 
recruited a range of health professionals, as I have done. Participating in my study were 
29 health professionals, comprising of six GPs,22 six private and hospital dentists, seven 
hospital doctors/surgeons, eight nurses, and two school dental therapists. While the aim 
of Kilkelly and Donnelly’s study was to explore the extent to which Irish children were 
listened to in the healthcare settings, I took my research one step further, examining the 
processes by which health professionals assess competence and obtain consent. This has 
																																																								
15 Ministry of Health “Obesity Statistics: Child Obesity Statistics” (1 August 2018) <www.health.govt.nz>. 
The New Zealand health survey 2016/2017 found that 12% of children aged two-14 years were obese with 
a further 21% overweight. 
16 Asthma and Respiratory Foundation “Key Statistics” (2016) <www.asthmafoundation.org.nz>. One in 
seven children and one in six adults suffer from asthma. Respiratory disease is New Zealand’s third most 
common cause of death and accounts for one in 10 of all hospital stays.  
17 Kirsten Ballantine and the New Zealand Child Cancer Report Working Group The incidence of childhood 
cancer in New Zealand 2010-2014: A report from The New Zealand Children’s Cancer Registry (National Child 
Cancer Network, Auckland, 2017) at 2. Cancer is the second most common cause of death after road 
traffic accidents for children aged one to 14 years, and it is estimated that one in 500 children will be 
diagnosed with cancer before the age of 15 years. 
18 For example, Tenzin Wangmo and others “Better to know that to imagine: Including children in their 
health care” (2017) 8:1 AJOB Empirical Bioethics 11; Faith Gibson and others “Children and young 
people’s experiences of cancer: a qualitative study using participatory methods” (2010) 47 International 
Journal of Nursing Studies 1397; Robert Ellis and Brigid Leventhal “Information Needs and Decision-
making Preferences of Children with Cancer” (1993) 2 Psycho-oncology 277. 
19 For example Bryony A Beresford and Patricia Sloper “Chronically Ill Adolescents’ Experiences of 
Communicating With Doctors: A Qualitative Study” (2003) 33 Journal of Adolescent Health 172; Bridget 
Young and others “Managing communication with young people who have a potentially life threatening 
chronic illness: qualitative study of patients and parents” (2003) 326 British Medical Journal 305. 
20 For example, Imelda Coyne and others Giving Children A Voice: Investigation of children’s experiences of 
participation in consultation and decision making in Irish hospitals (2006) Office of the Minister for Children, The 
Stationery Office, Dublin at 3; Veronica Lambert, Michele Glacken and Mary McCarron “’Visible-ness’: 
the nature of communication for children admitted to a specialist children’s hospital in the Republic of 
Ireland (2008) 17 Journal of Clinical Nursing 3092 at 3098; Priscilla Alderson Choosing for Children: Parents’ 
Consent to Surgery (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990); and Priscilla Alderson Children’s Consent to Surgery 
(Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993). 
21 Ursula Kilkelly and Mary Donnelly The Child’s Right to be heard in the healthcare setting: perspectives of children, 
parents and health professionals (Office of the Minister for Children, Dublin, 2006) at 2. 
22 One of which practiced in a private practice, school and community youth service. 
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enabled me to compare across and within healthcare specialties and environments the 
criteria health professionals consider when assessing competence, and their processes for 
obtaining consent. In doing so, greater understanding is achieved of how, and to what 
extent, children’s competence is promoted and respected.  
 
At the heart of this small-scale qualitative study were seven children and six parents who 
narrated, and gave their perspectives, on a range of health experiences, involving cancer 
treatment, surgeries, GP and dental consultations, and the public health school 
vaccination programme (vaccination programme). Through their intimate first-hand 
accounts, rarely seen insights emerged of how children were supported and constrained 
in their discussions with health professionals; understanding of their health conditions 
and treatment; contribution to treatment decisions; and in the giving of consent. 
 
Finally, 17 key stakeholders (stakeholders) also contributed to this study. The range of 
their roles was diverse, including advising and training health professionals; policy 
development; and supporting children and their families through lifelong/chronic health 
conditions. Their experiences and perceptions assisted in not only explaining the 
rationale behind some of the consent processes, but also giving valuable insights into the 




Historically, children were viewed as vulnerable and ignorant; and childhood was seen as 
a preparatory phase for adulthood, when children would become competent and 
independent. These views have been challenged by theories. It is now understood that 
competence is not age-related, but instead evolves through participation and ‘scaffolding’ 
from those with more experience.23 Childhood Studies, Sociocultural Theory and the 
Capability Approach support these propositions, which individually and in combination 
advance our understanding of children’s competence and agency. They understand the 
development of children’s competence to be dynamic and relational in nature. The 
Capability Approach builds upon Childhood Studies and Sociocultural Theory by 
recognising that when children achieve capabilities they have the ability and right to make 
decisions according to their views, values, priorities and goals. Together these theories 
provide a comprehensive framework for the proposition that competent children have 
the right and freedom to make health decisions.  
 
 
II .  Personal  Background 
 
Having practiced law in Scotland for 13 years between 1994 and 2007, I became familiar 
with the ALCSA that provides for children of any age to consent to medical, surgical and 
																																																								
23 ‘Scaffolding’ is a term created by David Wood, Jerome S. Bruner and Gail Ross “The Role of Tutoring 
in Problem Solving” 1976 17 J. Child Psychol. Psychiat. 89 at 90 and is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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dental treatment when they are capable of understanding its nature and consequences.24 
In particular, during my role as Principal Solicitor at the Scottish Child Law Centre 
(SCLC) between 2001 and 2006, I was involved in educating, training and advising health 
professionals in the practical application of this provision. I found that despite the ALCA 
being passed in 1991 many were unaware, or held misunderstandings, of its terms and 
implications. Unsurprisingly, I found also that children were even less informed, and at 
times were actively prevented from being made aware of their rights. For example, one 
head teacher cancelled our visit to his school upon learning that we would be informing 
the children of their right to seek medical advice on contraception.  
 
Through the SCLC I began working with children and local authorities to educate them 
on children’s rights, by conducting workshops in schools, writing leaflets, and in one 
local authority, contributing to the redesign of the medical consent form for school 
vaccinations.  
 
Upon relocating to New Zealand, and requalifying as a lawyer and barrister in 2008, I 
became immediately intrigued about section 36 of the COCA, which provides only for 
young people to consent to treatment. Many questions sprung into my mind, such as, 
why is this the position, what is the law for under 16-year-olds, why is Scots Law 
different, and what does this all mean for children, parents and health professionals? 
Thus, I embarked upon this doctoral project part-time in 2013, upon completing the 
Postgraduate Diploma in Child Advocacy at the University of Otago, whilst also 
continuing to work as a family lawyer until 2016, and then subsequently as a legal 
instructor. My aims in undertaking this research were to find answers to those questions 
and to give the participants, particularly children, a voice. My objective was to determine 
whether the current law in New Zealand needs amendment to better respect the 
competence and rights of children to consent, and if so, how.  
 
 
III .  Struc ture  o f  the  Thes is  
 
The two key concepts of this thesis are children’s competence and consent in different 
healthcare environments. Chapter 2 discusses the legal foundation for children giving 
consent to health treatment, by initially considering Gillick, followed by the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the Charter on The Rights 
of Tamariki Children & Rangatahi Young People in Healthcare Service in Aotearoa New 
Zealand (Children’s Charter).25 The processes used by health professionals to recognise 
and assess children’s competence are also set out. Chapter 3 explains the statutory and 
case law in New Zealand governing children’s consent to, and refusal of, medical 
treatment. The legal landscape is complex, comprising several statutes and regulations, 
together with case law that inconsistently considers Gillick. The international legal 
context is then addressed in Chapter 4, where the laws of Australia, England and 
																																																								
24 Section 2(4). 
25 The Children’s Charter implements the UNCRC principles in a healthcare context. 
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Scotland are examined. This international comparison enables the unique development 
of each country’s legal approach to be compared and contrasted, providing 
understanding of their strengths and weaknesses of how they have defined and regulated 
children’s competence and rights to consent to, or refuse, treatment.  
 
Chapter 5 reviews the research literature relevant to issues of children’s competence and 
consent, focusing on the factors that influence the development and demonstration of 
children’s competence to participate in, and provide, consent to health treatment. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines the theoretical basis for the evolution and acquisition of children’s 
competence. The history of childhood is traced to highlight the changing status of 
children over time. The chapter then sets out the theoretical framework I draw upon to 
support children’s evolving competence and their right to consent. This involves 
consideration of Childhood Studies, Sociocultural Theory and the Capability Approach, 
which strongly combine to provide the lens for regarding children as competent social 
actors when contributing to, or making, health decisions.  
 
Chapter 7 outlines the methodology and methods used in this small-scale qualitative 
study with 59 participants. The following four chapters present my research findings.  
 
In Chapter 8, the experiences of the seven children and six of their parents in the 
consent processes are set out. Using their own words, and conveying their feelings about 
treatment processes highlight the real significance of hearing directly from them, as they 
are at the sharp end of medical, surgical, nursing and dental services. Chapter 9 examines 
the various healthcare environments, and the factors within these that either promote or 
constrain children’s competence. The criteria that health professionals consider when 
assessing competence are also considered. Chapter 10 examines the practices and 
attitudes of health professionals in obtaining consent in these healthcare environments. 
Health professionals’ understanding of the current legal framework is then examined in 
Chapter 11, considering also participants’ perspectives on children’s right to consent and 
whether changes to the law on consent are needed. 
 
The thesis concludes in Chapter 12 with a discussion of my findings in the context of the 
law domestically and internationally, current research evidence and theoretical issues. 








 Chapter 2 
Recognising and Assessing Competence 
	
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
Children will encounter situations throughout their lives when they will need medical or 
dental advice. As they develop, mature and become more independent, they are likely to 
take more responsibility for their health, and may wish to consult alone with health 
professionals, or form different opinions from their parents about treatment. Through 
this transition children will develop competence, but what does this term mean, and how 
is it recognised and assessed by health professionals? This chapter lays the foundation for 
defining competence, by considering how children are identified and assessed as being 
competent, or having capacity, to provide consent, in law and in medical practice.26 It 
firstly examines the leading authority of Gillick,27 a landmark judgment establishing the 
right for competent children to consent to medical treatment. Secondly, the chapter 
discusses the UNCRC, which protects and promotes children’s rights to participate in all 
matters that affect them, including those related to their health. Finally, the processes or 
methods health professionals use for assessing children’s competence are considered.  
	
 
II .  Gil l i ck v West  Norfo lk and Wisbech Area Health Author i ty  
and Another   
 
Central to the issues of children consenting to medical treatment and their competence is 
the seminal English House of Lords case of Gillick.28 Gillick arose from a challenge by 
Mrs Victoria Gillick to a circular issued by the Department of Social Security in 1980. As 
the Catholic mother of several daughters, she was concerned that the advice given to 
doctors in this circular, to provide contraception to girls under 16 years, without their 
parents’ consent, would adversely affect their welfare, and also unlawfully interfere with 
parents’ rights and responsibilities.  
 
The Court at first instance rejected her claims on the basis that parents’ legal relationship 
with their children is more accurately described as a responsibility or duty, rather than a 
right.29 As such, giving advice on contraception was not an unlawful interference with her 
parental rights. Moreover, doctors prescribing contraception without parental consent 
was not considered unlawful if the girl “was a normally intelligent girl who was 
																																																								
26 In the context of providing consent, competence and capacity are used interchangeably.  For example, 
see Alison Douglass Mental Capacity: Updating New Zealand’s Law and Practice (The Law Foundation, New 
Zealand, 2014) at viii; Paul S Appelbaum “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment” 
(2007) 357:18 The New England Journal of Medicine 1834 at 1834. The definition of competence is 
further developed in Chapter 5, Literature Review.  
27 Gillick, above n 4. 
28 Chapter 3 considers the statutory and case law in New Zealand in detail.  
29 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another [1984] 1 All ER 365. 
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reasonably capable of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed 
treatment and giving effective consent to such treatment.”30 Mrs Gillick challenged this 
decision, appealing to the English Court of Appeal. The Court, finding firmly in favour 
of the sanctity of parental rights, held that parents’ decisions are prima facie in their 
children’s best interests, and they alone have authority to make them, unless restricted by 
statute or overridden by a court.31 Children were viewed as being incapable of providing 
lawful consent for contraception or abortions, as the law did not recognise their 
decisions.32  
 
On further appeal by the Department of Health and Social Security, the House of Lords, 
by a majority of three to two [Lords Fraser, Scarman and Bridge; dissenting Lords 
Templeman and Brandon], overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision. Now commonly 
known as “Gillick competence”, a child who has sufficient understanding and intelligence 
to enable her to understand fully what was proposed has the right to make her own 
decisions and can consent to medical treatment.33 In issuing the leading judgment, Lord 
Fraser accepted that children must have a degree of control over medical interventions. 
He gained perspective on the issue by setting it in the context of what other 
responsibilities children have in law, such as being sued, giving evidence on oath and a 
girl consenting to sexual intercourse.34 He considered that it would be:35 
 
… verging on the absurd to suggest that a girl or boy aged 15 could not effectively 
consent, for example, to have a medical examination of some trivial injury to his body or 
even to have a broken arm set ... Provided the patient ... is capable of understanding 
what is proposed, and of expressing his or her own wishes, I see no good reason for 
holding that he or she lacks the capacity to express them validly and effectively to 
authorise the medical man to make the examination or give the treatment which he 
advises.  
 
Lord Scarman concurred, outlining the factors that required to be satisfied for children 
to consent: “understand(ing) the nature of the advice” and having “sufficient maturity to 
understand what is involved.”36 However, he expanded upon these by indicating that 
there are wider considerations of “moral and family questions, especially her relationship 
with her parents; long-term problems associated with the emotional impact of pregnancy 
and its termination; and … risks to health of sexual intercourse.”37 A doctor must be 
satisfied that children can “appraise these factors before he can safely proceed upon the 
basis that she has at law capacity to consent.”38  
 
																																																								
30 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another [1984] 1 All ER 365 at 373 per Woolfe J. 
31 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and another [1985] 1 All ER 533 at 557 and 559 per 
Everleigh LJ. 
32 At 540, 547 and 550 per Parker LJ and 554, 556 and 557 per Fox LJ. 
33 Gillick, above n 4 at 113 and 189 per Lord Scarman. 
34 At 169 per Lord Fraser. 
35 At 169 per Lord Fraser. 
36 At 189 per Lord Scarman. 
37 At 189 per Lord Scarman. 
38 At 189 per Lord Scarman. 
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Additionally, the Court gave recognition to children’s increasing autonomy, by 
acknowledging that as a child grows older she becomes increasingly independent and, 
correspondingly, parental authority diminishes. In considering the relationship between 
children’s and parental rights to consent, Lords Fraser and Scarman had slightly differing 
views. Lord Fraser’s viewed parental authority as remaining, but dwindling, as children 
grow older. 39 He postulated that in current times and with social customs it is unrealistic 
to expect that absolute parental authority continue until a child is 18 years of age.40 
Whilst Lord Fraser did not “doubt that any important medical treatment of a child under 
16 would normally only be carried out with the parents’ approval”,41 he did not believe 
that a parent had a right to veto this treatment.42 His concerns, however, lay in both the 
protection of children and the inclusion of parents, believing that doctors should be 
entrusted with discretion to “act in accordance with … what is best in the interests of … 
his patient.”43  
 
Similarly, Lord Scarman focused on the “extent and duration”44 of parental rights, 
acknowledging that while these do not disappear until children reach the age of majority, 
they are derived from a parental duty to protect children, for so long as that is required. 
He said “the common law has never treated such rights as sovereign or beyond review 
and control”45 and described them as “yielding” to competent children’s right to make 
decisions on medical treatment. He also considered that age limits are arbitrary, as they 
fail to recognise children’s individuality and natural development:46 
  
The law relating to parent and child is concerned with the problems of the growth and 
maturity of the human personality. If the law should impose upon the process of 
“growing up” fixed limits where nature knows only a continuous process, the price 
would be artificial and a lack of realism in an area where the law must be sensitive to 
human development and social change.  
 
Thus, the subtlety differentiating the dicta of Lords Fraser and Scarman is that while 
Lord Fraser considered that the doctor has the final say on what is best for children, 
Lord Scarman considered that children could decide for themselves, provided they have 
sufficient understanding and intelligence.  
 
																																																								
39 At 172 per Lord Fraser. 
40 At 171 per Lord Fraser said “It is, in my view, contrary to the ordinary experience of mankind, at least in 
Western Europe, in the present century, to say that a child or young person remains in fact under the 
complete control of his parents until he attains the definite age of majority, now 18 in the United Kingdom, 
and that on attaining that age he suddenly acquires independence. In practice most wise parents relax their 
control gradually as the child develops and encourage him or her to become increasingly independent. 
Moreover, the degree of parental control actually exercised over a particular child does in practice vary 
considerably according to his understanding and intelligence and it would, in my opinion, be unrealistic for 
the courts not to recognise these facts. Social customs change, and the law ought to, and does in fact, have 
regard to such changes when they are of major importance.”  
41 At 173 per Lord Fraser. 
42 At 173 per Lord Fraser. 
43 At 174 per Lord Fraser. 
44 At 184 per Lord Scarman. 
45 At 184 per Lord Scarman. 
46 At 186 per Lord Scarman. 
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Whilst Lord Templeman dissented,47 he also recognised children’s evolving competence, 
growing autonomy, and capacity to consent based upon “the nature of the treatment and 
the age and understanding” of children.48 
In 1986, this decision was groundbreaking, as it established the legal precedent for 
children’s competence to consent to medical treatment being defined in relation to their 
abilities, rather than their age. The judgment was not specific on the factors upon which 
to assess competence, but those distilled involve having the maturity and intelligence to 
understand the nature, consequences, advantages and disadvantages of the treatment, 
and also to think abstractly, such as how their decisions could affect others, in particular, 
their parents. Sadly, however, the progress of, and certainty in, the law since Gillick in 




III .  United Nations Convent ion on the Rights  o f  the  Chi ld 1989  
 
A. Introduct ion 
 
Following two earlier Declarations on the Rights of the Child 1924 and 1959, the 
UNCRC was a further significant milestone in recognising children’s legal status and 
protecting their human rights. By viewing them as “not simply objects of adult concern, 
but … as citizens with rights”,50 it contains 54 articles that can be grouped together into 
three categories of rights: protection, participation and provision (also known as survival 
and development rights).51 Underpinning these rights are four guiding principles: non-
discrimination/equality (article 2); the best interests of the child as a primary 
consideration in matters affecting them (article 3); the right to life and development to 
their fullest potential (article 6); and participation by expressing their views and having 
these considered (article 12). These principles must be respected both in the 
interpretation and implementation of all other rights, as well as rights in themselves.  
 
B. Rati f i cat ion,  Implementat ion and Review 
 
Worldwide, all countries, except the USA (which is a signatory), have ratified the 
UNCRC. The New Zealand Government (the Government) became a signatory to the 
UNCRC on 1 October 1990 and formally ratified it on 6 April 1993, thereby obligating 
																																																								
47 At 201 Lord Templeman based his decision on public policy arguments. He believed that as it was a 
statutory criminal offence for a man to have sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years, and 
consent was not a defence, a girl of this age could not be sufficiently mature to give consent for 
contraception. He doubted that a girl under 16 years of age had the knowledge and understanding of all the 
issues to make a “balanced judgment.” 
48 At 201 per Lord Templeman. 
49 This will be seen in Chapter 3 when examining New Zealand’s laws, and also in Chapter 4 when 
considering the laws of Australia, England and Scotland. 
50 L Cairns, “Participation with Purpose” in E Kay M Tisdall, John M Davis, Malcolm Hill and Alan Prout 
(eds) Children, Young People and Social Inclusion (Bristol University Press, 2006) at 217. 
51 European Commission www.europa.eu. 
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itself to comply with these rights and principles for all children and young people under 
the age of 18 years.52 Ratification of the UNCRC requires the Government and its agents, 
such as judges, health professionals, social workers, police and teachers, to ensure 
compliance with its provisions when making laws and policies, and in decision-making. 
Families who are responsible for children’s day-to-day care are expected also to uphold 
children’s human rights.  
 
In 2004, New Zealand enacted the COCA, which was influenced to a degree by the 
UNCRC. Whilst the COCA gives some respect to children’s participation and protection 
rights,53 it is “still very adult-focused”, particularly when considering children’s right to 
participate in medical decisions, as this still “turns on an arbitrary age, not on their level 
of maturity.”54 
 
Nonetheless, signatories have scope for improving their implementation of the UNCRC 
through reporting and monitoring processes. Each country submits reports every five 
years, examined by the Committee on the Rights of the child (CRC), an internationally 
elected body of independent experts. The CRC then questions Government and Non-
Government representatives attending the review, after which the CRC provides 
observations and recommendations to promote each country’s implementation of the 
UNCRC. New Zealand last reported to the CRC in 2016. In New Zealand, the Ministry 
of Social Development is responsible for the Government’s reporting, and Action for 
Children and Youth Aotearoa (ACYA) leads the non-government reporting. The Office 
of the Children’s Commissioner (OCC) may also report separately. 55  The UNCRC 
Monitoring Group (MG) is responsible for monitoring the Government’s 
implementation of the UNCRC and is convened by the OCC. The MG also includes 
representatives from agencies, such as the Human Rights Commission, UNICEF New 
Zealand, Save the Children New Zealand and ACYA.56 On 21 October 2016 the CRC 
issued its concluding observations on New Zealand’s fifth periodic report, including 
urgent measures to be adopted relating to violence, abuse and neglect; standard of living; 
and children belonging to minority or indigenous groups.57 This review process is child-
centred, as it is without any other compromising considerations, such as those of parents 
or the family as a unit. Further, it provides opportunities for government and non-
government organisations to reflect upon the application of the principles and provisions 
of the UNCRC and focus on how law, policy and practice can improve. The OCC has a 
																																																								
52 Three reservations were entered relating to the non-provision of benefits to children unlawfully in the 
country (article 28), the adequacy of measures to protect children in employment (article 32), and the 
mixing of juvenile and adult prisoners (article 37). 
53 For example, COCA s 6 gives children the right to express a view in matters that affect them, and s 7 
provides for the child being appointed a lawyer. However, even this latter provision is not an absolute right, 
as it is at the discretion of the court whether a lawyer is appointed, rather than it being at the instigation or 
request of the child. COCA s 4 protects children’s welfare and best interests as the paramount concern, 
and s 5 defines the welfare principles upon which to base such decisions. 
54 Bill Atkin “Harmonising Family Law” (2006)37 VUWLR 465 at 479. COCA, s 36 provides for only 
young people over 16 years to have the right to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment. 
55 Office of Children’s Commissioner www.occ.org.nz 
56 Office of Children’s Commissioner www.occ.org.nz 
57 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of New 
Zealand CRC/C/NZL/CO/5 21 October 2016 at paragraph 4. 
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statutory mandate to raise awareness and understanding of the UNCRC in New 
Zealand.58 It does this through working with, for example, Government agencies, to 
include the UNCRC in law and policy, and with those working directly with children and 
young people to assist them to implement the UNCRC into their practices.  
 
Providing useful assistance for organisations and individuals on how best to improve 
practices and policies for better compliance with UNCRC are three models of child 
participation: Hart’s Ladder; 59 Shier’s ladder;60and Lundy’s Model. 61 Hart and Shier’s 
ladders provide a hierarchy of participation, with adults involving children increasingly in 
decision-making, as they move up the rungs; whereas Lundy’s model is dynamic and 
egalitarian. Lundy’s model compartmentalises article 12 of the UNCRC into children’s 
right to express views, and separately their right to have those views given due weight, 
with adults being obligated to provide the appropriate environment for the upholding of 
these rights through four elements: space; voice; audience; and influence. Other rights 
supporting article 12 are contained in the model: non-discrimination (article 2); best 
interests (article 3); guidance (article 5); information (article 13) and safety (article 19). 
These are also responsibilities adults must fulfill to uphold children’s participation rights 
by considering the practical elements of space, voice, audience and influence to best 
promote children’s engagement and uphold the rights of article 12. Common to all of 
these concepts/models are respect for children’s preferences in the degree of their 
participation, and also in the recognition of adults’ roles and responsibilities to support 
children’s participation. 
  
C. Appli cat ion o f  UNCRC to the Health Context 
 
Whilst there is no specific article in the UNCRC providing for competent children to 
give consent for health treatment, there are clear rights and principles that support their 
participation in informed consent processes. Children’s participation is safeguarded 
through article 12 (participation) and article 2 (non-discrimination). Article 12 assures that 
all children have the right to express their views, if they are capable of forming them, in 
all matters that affect them, and further that regard must be given to those views when 
																																																								
58 Children’s Commissioner Act 2003 s 12(1)(d). 
59Roger A Hart Children’s Participation From Tokenism to Citizenship (1992) UNICEF International Child 
Development Centre, Italy at 9-12. The first three rungs of Hart’s ladder are non-participation: 
manipulation, decoration and tokenism. Children have little or no opportunity to form their own views or 
express them and are given little or no choice. They need to understand who sought their involvement, 
appreciate the purpose and the reasons for it, and can contribute freely in a meaningful way. This occurs at 
rung four “assigned but informed’, where although adults control the project by choosing its nature and 
making decisions, children volunteer, understand it and the reasons for their involvement, and have a 
meaningful role. Their contribution increases at level five, ‘consulted and informed’, as their views are 
considered. At level six children share in decision-making with adults, taking more initiative in doing so as 
they move to levels seven and eight. 
60 Harry Shier “Pathways to Participation: Openings, Opportunities and Obligations” (2001) 15 Children 
and Society 107 at 110-115. Shier ‘s ladder has five rungs, omitting Hart’s first three rungs of non-
participation. Moving through the levels, children’s involvement and influence increase, together with 
adults’ responsibilities to support them and share in the process. The minimum requirement for endorsing 
UNCRC occurs after having fulfilled level three. 
61 Laura Lundy “Voice’ is not enough: conceptualising Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child” (2007) 33:6 British Educational Research Journal 927 at 932. 
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decisions are made. A pre-requisite for children being able to form and express their 
views is having adequate information on their wellbeing and health, a right protected in 
article 17. Also supporting their participation is respect for their privacy (article 16). 
Together, these rights mean that all children have the right to contribute to discussions 
and decision-making on health issues. 
 
Supporting these rights is article 5, encouraging parents to provide “in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child appropriate direction and guidance.” 
The legal relationship of parent and child is thus recognised: as children develop 
competence; the degree of parental involvement diminishes.   
 
Children’s protection and provision rights in health are also protected through the 
overarching principle and right of best interests (article 3), together with the right to life 
(article 6) and to receive the highest attainable standard of health and facilities for any 
treatment (article 24). Additionally, the UNCRC clearly respects the role of parents in 
protecting and caring for their children by acknowledging their responsibilities. 62 
Together, these articles promote children’s health and welfare through appropriate 
treatment decisions being made. 
 
These participation and protection rights are not necessarily contradictory, for involving 
children in informed consent processes can meet both children’s right and need to 
participate.63  
 
D. Charter  on The Rights o f  Tamariki Chi ldren & Rangatahi Young People  in 
Healthcare Servi ce  in Aotearoa New Zealand  
New Zealand has recognised the UNCRC in the healthcare context in the Children’s 
Charter. The Children’s Charter is a consensus statement between Children’s Hospitals 
Australasia and the Paediatric Society of New Zealand, implementing the UNCRC by 
reflecting protection, participation and provision principles and rights. It contains three 
underlying principles: children’s best interests are the primary consideration; children’s 
participation is respected; and recognition of the family’s importance to children,64  
together with 11 rights.65 In considering each right, a holistic approach is taken towards 
																																																								
62 See articles 5, 7, 9, 10 and 18. 
63 Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 18. 
64 Children’s Charter at 6. 
65 Every child and young person has a right to: 
1. Consideration of their best interests as the primary concern of all involved in his or her care.  
2. Express their views, and to be heard and taken seriously.  
3. The highest attainable standard of healthcare.  
4. Respect for themselves as a whole person, as well as respect for their family/wha ̄nau and the 
family’s/wha ̄nau individual characteristics, beliefs, tikanga, culture and contexts.  
5. Be nurtured by their parents and family/wha ̄nau, and to have family/wha ̄nau relationships 
supported by the service in which the child or young person is receiving healthcare. 
6. Information, in a form that is understandable to them.  
7. Participate in decision-making and, as appropriate to their capabilities, to make decisions about 
their care.  
8. Be kept safe from all forms of harm.  
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the overall wellbeing of the child (physical, spiritual, family and mental), and the child is 
recognised as both an individual and as part of a family.66 Children’s own assessment of 
their best interests, in line with their capacity, is respected also, in addition to the views 
of their parents and health professionals.67 Children also have the right to participate in 
decision-making, 68  placing responsibilities upon health professionals to effectively 
communicate69 and provide understandable information.70 Although the Charter does not 
have legal status, in the sense that it is neither enforceable nor binding, it is an agreed 
statement of good practice founded on legal principles.  
Thus, it is evident that together Gillick, the UNCRC and the Children’s Charter recognise 
children’s competence and the importance of parents’ roles in supporting their 
participation. Commonly, children will work in partnership with parents,71 but may seek 
greater autonomy from them, as their competence evolves. When this occurs, health 
professionals’ assessment of their competence is of central importance, as it is attaining 
of sufficient competence that gives them the right to consent. 
 
 
IV. Assess ing Competence  
 
A. Introduct ion 
No single test or process exists for assessing competence: 72 
There is no all-purpose test of capacity to give or refuse consent. Even in the specific 
context of medical procedures, the courts have not adopted one test to the exclusion of 
all others.  
 
In fact, some have likened the search for a universal test to a search for a Holy Grail.73 
Nevertheless, toolkits do exist for assessing adults’ decision-making capacities, so could 
these be used or adapted for assessing children’s competence, and if so, are they reliable?  
  
																																																																																																																																																														
9. Have their privacy respected. 
10. Participate in education, play, creative activities and recreation, even if this is difficult due to their 
illness or disability.  
11. Continuity of healthcare, including well-planned care that takes them beyond the paediatric 
context. 
66 Right 1 at 9. 
67 Rights 1 at 9. 
68 Right 7 at 13. 
69 At 13-14. 
70 Right 6 at 12-13. 
71 Ursula Kilkelly and Mary Donnelly, above n 21 at 40-1; Belinda Garth, Gregory Murphy and Dinah 
Reddihough “Perceptions of participation: Child patients with a disability in the doctor–parent–child 
partnership” (2009) 74 Patient Education and Counseling 45 at 50. 
72 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 216. 
73 L.H Roth, A. Meisel and C.W. Lidz “Tests of competence to consent to treatment” (1977) 134 American 
Journal of Psychiatry 279 at 283. 
	
	 16	
B. Toolkits  for  Adult  Competence Assessments 
Capacity toolkits, such as the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment 
(MacCAT-T), are used to assess adults whose competence may be compromised by 
psychiatric conditions.74 They provide a standardised structure to the health professional-
patient consultation, aiming to ensure a comprehensive, but flexible, assessment. For 
adult competence assessments, MacCAT-T is the most universally recognised tool, and is 
internationally regarded as the “gold standard.”75 It measures four aspects of decision-
making:76 
(1) understanding the disclosed information about the nature of the disease and the 
proposed intervention; (2) reasoning in the process of deciding about the proposed 
intervention, with a focus on abilities to compare alternatives in the light of their 
consequences; (3) appreciation of the effects of the intervention (or failure to undergo 
the intervention) on patient’s own situation; and (4) expressing a choice about the 
intervention.  
Taking around 20 minutes to administer and score, the Mac-CAT-T toolkit is of use in 
particularly difficult cases, or ones that are likely to proceed to court,77 rather than being 
of practical daily use.  
In New Zealand, Douglass, Young and McMillan created a toolkit for adult competence 
assessments based on criteria similar to those of Mac-CAT-T:78  
• understand the nature and purpose of a particular decision and appreciate 
its significance for them; 
• retain relevant, essential information for the time required to make the 
decision; 
• use or weigh the relevant information as part of the reasoning process of 
making the decision and to consider the consequences of the possible 
options, (and the option of not making the decision); 
• communicate the decision. 
Its aim is to provide:79 
																																																								
74 Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) (Professional 
Resources Press, Sarasota, FL, 1998); New South Wales Government, Attorney General’s Department, 
Capacity Toolkit (2008) <www.justice.nsw.gov.au>; Capacity Australia “Mini-legal Kits” 
<www.capacityaustralia.org.au/resources/mini-legal-kits>; G Young “How to Assess a Patient’s 
Competence” (2004) 2 New Ethicals Journal 41; H Astell, J Hyun-Lee and S Sankaran “Review of capacity 
assessments and recommendations for examining capacity” (2013) 126 NZMJ 1383; Hawkes Bay District 
Health Board “Performing Capacity Assessments: Information for GPs” undated 
www.hawkesbay.health.nz; Douglass, n 26 at 235. 
75 Douglass, above n 26 at 166. 
76 Imra Hein and others “Feasibility of an Assessment Tool for Children’s Competence to Consent to 
Predictive Genetic Testing: a Pilot Study” (2015) 24 Journal of Genetic Counsel 971 at 973. Likewise, 
MacCAT-CR uses these criteria in the context of clinical research. 
77 Appelbaum, above n 26 at 1837. 
78 Douglass, above n 26 at 238. 
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… a consistent and systematic approach to assessing capacity within the New Zealand 
healthcare setting. It covers: key practice points, how to carry out a capacity assessment, 
and an overview of the relevant law. 
C. Appli cabi l i ty  o f  Toolkits  for  Chi ldren’s  Competence  Assessments 
Arising from the limited knowledge of assessing children’s competence to consent to 
medical treatment, Hein and others evaluated the MacCAT-T tool in the context of 
predictive genetic testing (PGT) in the Netherlands. 80  They aimed to evaluate the 
feasibility of assessing children’s competence using a standardised tool by modifying the 
MacCAT-T and ascertaining whether there were “cut-off ages for competence to 
consent.”81 Participating in the study were 17 paediatric patients between the ages of six 
and 18 years who were eligible for PGT due to their risk of autosomal dominantly 
inherited cardiac disease.82 Experts set a reference standard of competence, assessing 12 
children (71%) as being competent, compared to using the MacCAT-T tool that assessed 
16 children as competent (94%). The experts judged five children as being incompetent, 
aged six, seven, nine and two 11 year olds, whereas MacCAT-T judged all children as 
competent, except one seven year old.83 Hein and others considered that these results 
might demonstrate the limitation of the tool with children younger than nine years,84 but 
thought “individual competence assessment might create an opportunity in exceptional 
cases to allow a competent child under the age of 12 to co-decide over significant 
medical interventions.” 85 Whilst acknowledging that further research on the reliability 
and feasibility of the Mac-CAT-T tool for assessing children’s competence was required, 
they believed that their results showed that children aged 12 years and over were 
consistently assessed as being competent in a complex area of PGT.86 Thus, for children 
aged 12 years and over they recommended a dual consent procedure, including both 
children and parents.87 
The implications of their proposals are that children aged 12 years and over would be 
presumed competent, and those younger presumed incompetent, with the tool being 
used in borderline situations. 88 Although Hein and others strived “to underpin a just age 
																																																																																																																																																														
79 At 237. 
80 Hein and others, above n 76 at 971. 
81 At 973. 
82 At 975. The average age was 10.9 years, with eight children being 10 years and under and nine children 
11 years and over. 
83 At 974-5. 
84 At 976. 
85 Imra Hein and others “Accuracy of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research 
(MacCAT-CR) for Measuring Children’s Competence to Consent to Clinical Research” (2014) 168(12) 
Journal of American Medical Association Pediatrics 1147 at 1151. 
86 At 976. 
87 At 1151. 
88 Imra Hein and others “Informed consent instead of assent is appropriate in children from the age of 
twelve: Policy implications of new findings on children’s competence to consent to clinical research” 
(2015) 16:76 BMC Medical Ethics 1. The legal context may have influenced the researcher, as in The 
Netherlands the age of medical consent is 12 years. Anticipating the question of what happens when there 
are disagreements between children and their parents, the researchers indicate that in the Dutch experience 
such situations are rare, but where unresolved, the child’s consent can be overridden were harm will ensue. 
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for alleged competence” and “an accurate assessment instrument … to substantiate 
competence judgment”,89 they acknowledged that in “the treatment context, there are no 
conclusive age-limits for competence established empirically.”90  
 
D.  Organic  Competence Assessments by Health Profess ionals 91 
 
Competence assessments are an intrinsic part of every clinical interaction,92 occurring 
naturally or organically during conversations with patients. With adults and young people 
a specific assessment is only required if health professionals have some indication of 
decision-making capacity being compromised, due to the presumption of competence. 
However, with children there is no such presumption, and therefore an assessment is 
required in every situation,93 although a formal assessment, such as by a psychologist, 
would only be likely in complex situations.94  
In the context of adult assessments, it is recognised that greater accuracy and consistency 
will be achieved if health professionals are aware of the legal criteria and questions to 
ask.95 Whilst no universal criteria for the assessment of children’s competence exist,96 
when reviewing commentary by health professionals, common factors emerge, some 
relating to the context of assessments, and others to children’s abilities and 
understanding.97  
Firstly, the context of assessments recognises that the child’s situation, environment and 
relationships influence their competence, such as, whether they are in pain or anxious, 
are accompanied by supportive parents and have trusting relationships with health 
professionals.98 Several responsibilities lie with health professionals to enhance children’s 
competence by:99 
1. Creating an environment conducive to consulting, for example by providing privacy or 
allowing the support of a third party;  
2. Sharing information on treatment, options and their consequences tailored to children’s 
developmental levels, such as by breaking down the process;  
3. Giving children time to decide; and  
																																																								
89 Hein and others, above n 76 at 976. 
90 Hein and others, above n 88 at 5. 
91 I have used the term “organic assessment” to define competence assessments conducted in the natural 
course of clinical consultations, without the use of a toolkit.  
92 Appelbaum, above n 26 at 1837. 
93 Ministry of Health, Consent in Child and Youth Health: Information for Practitioners (Ministry of Health, 
Wellington, 1998) at 14. 
94 Vic Larcher and Anna Hutchinson “How should paediatricians assess Gillick competence? (2010) 95 
Archives of Disease Childhood 307-311 at 310. 
95 Appelbaum, above n 26 at 1837. 
96 Pierre André Michaud and others "Assessing an Adolescent’s Capacity for Autonomous Decision-
Making in Clinical Care” (2015) 57 Journal of Adolescent Health 361 at 362 
97 For example, John Pearce “Consent to Treatment During Childhood: The Assessment of Competence 
and Avoidance of Conflict” (1994) 165 British Journal of Psychiatry 713. 
98 Mike Shaw “Competence and consent to treatment in children and adolescents” (2001) 7 Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 150 at 152. 
99 Larcher and Hutchinson, above n 94 at 309. 
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4. Engendering a supportive and understanding relationship, within which children can 
express their views, values and reasons.  
Through this engagement a trusting partnership can develop, unlocking children’s 
understanding and decision-making capabilities:100 
… if viewed as partners, minor adolescents often display “hidden abilities,” that is a 
much better gauge of their situation than adults would otherwise anticipate. This is 
especially true when the young person has a chronic disorder with which he has learned 
to live and thus is capable of making good decision in an autonomous way.  
The environment of medical consultations provides the foundation for children to 
develop and demonstrate their competence. Crucially, children’s understanding, maturity, 
intelligence and decision-making abilities relate to the specific health decision, rather than 
in a global sense: 101 
Formal assessment of competence requires examination of how a young person deals 
with a particular decision rather than the application of standardised tests, but some 
analysis of the young person’s capacity to understand and assess risks is essential. … 
[C]ompetence is both task-specific and context-dependent.  
Although assessment of these factors can occur naturally through conversation, being 
aware of specific questions that children must understand will assist the assessment, such 
as:102  
• What is the illness/condition and what are its effects? 
• What treatments/investigations are necessary and why? 
• When does this need to be done? 
• What does the treatment mean to me, and how will it affect my life?  
• What happens if I do not have the treatment? 
• What are the alternatives and their effects? 
• What are the practical consequences for me and my family, on school and 
friends? 103 
This final question appears to be aimed at assessing children’s cognitive development of 
their capacity for abstract thinking and their maturity, as it involves their perceptions of 
themselves, how their decisions could affect others and is future focused,104 including 
having a sense of time.105  However, there needs to be clarity upon what is required to 
																																																								
100 Michaud and others, above n 96 at 363. 
101 Larcher and Hutchinson, above n 94 at 310. 
102 At 309.  
103 Similar questions are suggested in Ministry of Health, Consent in Child and Youth Health, above n 93 at 14: 
does the patient understand why they need the intervention; does the patient understand what the 
intervention involves and what it is for; does the patient understand the probable benefits and risks and 
what the alternatives are? 
104 See Chapter 2 page 9. This is similar to the wider considers given by Lord Scarman in Gillick, above n 4 
at 189.  
105 Pearce, above n 97 at 714: “The central issue concerns the child’s stage of cognitive development. In 
order to give valid consent, children must have reached the stage of maturity where they have a clear 
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meet these criteria and their implications, such as, whether children only need to show 
their ability to consider the impact upon their family, but can still make independent 
decisions, rather than requiring to reach decisions that least affects their family. 
When distilling criteria upon which to base children’s competence assessments, 
subjective elements may be present that are not applied to adults. For example, whilst it 
is necessary for both adults and children to articulate reasons for their choices, Larcher 
and Hutchinson consider that children’s choices should be “compatible with a life plan,” 
which appears to relate to one that does not compromise a long and healthy life.106 
Further, linked to this is the criterion that the choice is required to be “reasonable, right 
or responsible.”107 Yet, these criteria are outcome-based, whereas adults’ assessments are 
process focused, having the right to make unreasonable choices.108 Nevertheless, those 
assessing children’s competence should remain objective and:109 
… also be aware of the potential biases that are linked with his or her own prejudices 
that may interfere with the ability to provide a neutral assessment of the adolescent’s 
decision-making capacity. This bias may arise for example from the provider’s own 
judgment of what can be considered as competence and the final outcome of the 
decision process.  
Thus, it appears that children are being asked to show a greater degree of competence 
than adults, as they are potentially asked to evaluate the needs of others, predict the 
future and evaluate their reasons based on their life plan in order to be competent. The 
difficulties with introducing subjective criteria are that it predicates inconsistencies and 
uncertainties, and justifies health professionals judging children as incompetent if 
children hold a different opinion. Whilst competence must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, the application of objective universal criteria would assist in reducing such 
inconsistencies, aiding children’s and parents’ understanding of health professionals’ 
assessments, while ensuring that children are being assessed fairly, as “it is important not 
to set a higher standard for competence than would be expected for adults.”110 
Dr Applebaum, psychiatrist, for example, has distilled “legally relevant criteria” for 
assessing adults’ decision-making capacities,111 identifying for each, tasks that patients 
require to fulfill, and assessment approaches and questions health professionals should 
																																																																																																																																																														
concept of themselves in relation to other people, including an ability to recognise their own needs and the 
needs of others. … [T]he competent child will be able to understand these issues (risks and benefits of 
having or not having treatment) in relation to the passage of time and be fully aware of what might happen 
in the future as a result of having or foregoing the treatment.” 
106 Larcher and Hutchinson, above n 94 at 308. 
107 At 308-9. The other criteria are an ability to understand, possess actual understanding and have the 
ability to choose. 
108 Appelbaum, above n 26 at 1836. Larcher and Hutchison, above n 90 at 308-9 suggest that children’s 
understanding requires to be actual understanding, whereas adults need only show an ability to understand, 
being a lower standard. This distinction is not made in the toolkits described in this chapter, which indicate 
actual understanding is assessed. 
109 Michaud and others, above n 96 at 365. 
110 Shaw, above n 98 at 152. 
111 Appelbaum, above n 26 at 1836. The criteria are: understanding the relevant information; able to reason 
about treatment choices; appreciate the consequences; and communicate a choice. 
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follow. It provides a clear and easy process, highlighting also the relational nature of 
competence between patient and health professional.112  
 
V. Chapter  Summary  
	
Gillick, the UNCRC and the Children’s Charter each recognise children as individuals and 
rights-holders, with growing competence and independence, whilst acknowledging also 
the importance of family support. Likewise, when health professionals engage with 
children they too have responsibilities to be alert to children’s competence, promoting 
their participation, understanding and decision-making. It is within the context of these 
relationships that children’s competence and autonomy develop and are promoted. 
However, health professionals’ obligations go one step further, requiring to assess 
children’s competence to ascertain whether consent should be taken from the competent 
child. Most health professionals will undertake this informally, or naturally, within clinical 
interactions. Nonetheless, having criteria to base such assessments upon will enhance 
their accuracy and consistency and if transparent should increase children and parents’ 
understanding. Whilst competence has been defined simply, as having the ability, or 
capacity, to perform a task, it is task specific, and therefore the criteria vary amongst 
contexts.113 In terms of competence to make specific medical decisions, competence can 
be further defined as having the:114 
… capacity to understand the material information, to make a judgment about the 
information in light of their values, to intend a certain outcome, and to 
communicate freely their wishes. 
These criteria can be expanded on, clarifying that (i) understanding relates to “the 
disclosed information about the nature of the disease and the proposed intervention”,115 
and also the “nature and purpose of a particular decision and [to] appreciate its 
significance”; 116  (ii) making a judgment involves weighing up the advantages and 
disadvantages of the options, considering the consequences and making a decision; and 
(iii) communication relates to the reasoning and the decision.117 
Children may be required to satisfy further criteria, such as, demonstrating an 
understanding of how the decision affects their parents or relationships with them.118  
The above criteria relate to the process of decision-making, and although children may 
need to satisfy additional criteria from those applied to adults, they do relate to children’s 
maturity and emotional intelligence. Clear and objective criteria, based upon the process 
																																																								
112 At 1836. See Appendix A. 
113 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress Principles of biomedical ethics (6th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001) at 70. 
114 At 71. 
115Hein and others, above n 76 at 973. 
116 Douglass, n 26 at 238. 
117 Hein and others, above n 76 at 973; Douglass, n 26 at 238; Larcher and Hutchinson, above n 94 at 309. 
118 For example, Larcher and Hutchinson, above n 94 at 309 and Gillick, at 189 per Lord Scarman. 
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of decision-making, rather than outcome, are required to promote consistency, certainty 
and understanding of assessments. This will be of particularly importance, for example, 
where children consult/consent without their parents, or where there are differences of 
opinions between health professionals, parents and children.  
 
The themes of competence and consent are explored further in the following two 
chapters, which respectively examine how New Zealand law regulates the issue of 
children consenting to, or refusing, medical treatment, followed by the law internationally, 
































 Chapter 3 
 
 New Zealand Legal Context 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
	
Consent is the gatekeeper to medical treatment, permitting not only physical bodily 
contact, but also respecting patients’ autonomy, dignity, right to self-determination and 
privacy.119 Without consent, health professionals risk being sued for negligence,120 or 
prosecuted for assault.121 Thus, it is of importance to all concerned - children, their 
families and health professionals - that there is clarity in the law on how, and from whom, 
consent is obtained. 
 
The focus of this and the following chapter is how the law regulates consent to, and 
refusal of, medical treatment for children, including any established criteria for assessing 
children’s competence. This chapter begins by considering New Zealand’s statutory law 
and the extent to which children’s rights to consent/refuse are specified. It then 
examines the development of the case law, considering how it has responded to gaps left 
by the statutory framework. The final section explores the nature and role of professional 




II .  Legis lat ion  
 
New Zealand does not have a specific statutory provision that regulates children 
consenting to, or refusing, medical treatment. Instead this is governed in a disconnected 
way, between the COCA, NZBORA and the Code. Moreover, there is a lack of clarity in 
the scope of children’s rights to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment within COCA, 
requiring the sections to be pieced together, with some inferences being made.122 This 
section interprets these statutes to elicit as much clarity as is possible. 
	
A. Care o f  Chi ldren Act 2004  
The COCA, which reformed and replaced the Guardianship Act 1968, gives more 
																																																								
119 For example, see Lord Scarman’s comments in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital 
and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 at 882 where he refers to adults’ right of self-determination as being 
the choice of whether to accept doctor’s advice and being “a basic human right protected by the common 
law.” 
120 For example, if harm resulted from the breach of the duty of care a health professional owes a patient in 
terms of the common law, or in terms of Health Practitioners Competence Act 2003 s 100. 
121 Definition of assault is contained in the Crimes Act 1961, s 2(1). See also ss 135 (indecent assault), 193 
(assault with intent to injure) and 194 (assault on any child under the 14 years of age, male assaults female). 
122 Robert Ludbrook “Children and the Law Update: The Child’s Right to Consent To or Refuse Medical 
Treatment” (2007) 11(2) Childrenz Issues: Journal of the children’s Issues Centre 37.   
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prominence to children’s rights.123 It acknowledges children as active participants by, for 
example, recognising “certain rights of children”124 and giving them the right to express 
their views on matters that affect them.125 However, in the context of consent to medical 
treatment, the rights of children are limited, essentially relying upon arbitrary age rather 
than maturity.126 Only three groups of young people are given statutory rights to consent 
to, or refuse, medical treatment: those over the age of 16;127 those who are married, in a 
civil union128 or living with another person as a de facto partner;129 and girls of any age 
for an abortion.130 COCA is silent on the rights of children to consent to, or refuse, 
general medical treatment. So what did Parliament intend? How did it anticipate that the 
rights of children would be regulated, and what did it believe those rights to be? I will 
answer these questions by firstly interpreting COCA and then looking behind it to 
Hansard to examine the debates. 
Turning firstly to the purposes in section 3, COCA aims to both protect children and 
promote their development, independence and autonomy.131  When combining this with 
the duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian under section 16, COCA 
envisages parents and children working together in partnership, each having varying 
degrees of contribution when making decisions on important matters affecting 
children. 132  Although section 16(1)(c) does not specify that the degree of parental 
involvement should be based upon children’s evolving competence and maturity, it is 
something akin to Gillick and that of evolving capacity in the UNCRC,133 and has been 
interpreted in that way.134 
Further exploring section 16, examples of “important matters affecting the child” are set 
out in section 16(2)(c), which includes medical treatment, but excludes “routine” medical 
																																																								
123 Mark Henaghan Care of Children (LexisNexis NZ Limited, Wellington, 2005) at 1. 
124 COCA, s 3(1) 
125 COCA, s 6(2). However, see Henaghan and Ballantyne, “Bill Atkin: A Fierce Defender of Children’s 
Rights and Proponent of Child-Focused Legislation” (2015) 46 VUWLR 591 at 593 where they note 
Professor Atkin’s view that the Care of Children Bill, which was then passed as the COCA, was more 
adult-focused than child-centred, as children’s views could be undermined.   
126 Atkin, above n 54 at 479. 
127 COCA, s 36(1) 
128 Children over 16 years can marry with their parents’ consent (Marriage Act 1955, s 18), or enter a civil 
union (Civil Union Act 2004, s 19(2)). 
129 COCA, s 36(2). Potentially this could give children under the age of 16 years the right to consent or 
refuse medical treatment. For example, a hospital doctor (HD1) participating in this study spoke of treating 
a 13-year-old girl in an adult ward as she was living with her boyfriend, was pregnant and was “living in an 
adult world.” 
130 COCA s 38. 
131 COCA, s 3(1)  “The purpose of this Act is to (a) promote children’s welfare and best interests, and 
facilitate their development, by helping to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for their 
guardianship and care; and (b) recognise certain rights of children.” 
132 COCA, s 16(1) “The duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian of a child include (without 
limitation) the guardian’s (a) having the role of providing day-to-day care for the child … and (b) 
contributing to the child’s intellectual, emotional, physical, social, cultural, and other personal development; 
and (c) determining for or with the child, or helping the child to determine, questions about important matters 
affecting the child.” (emphasis added). 
133 Article 5. 
134 COCA, s 16(1)(c); Atkin, n 54 at 479; Westlaw New Zealand, “Commentary - routine medical treatment” 
at CC36.04 www.westlaw.co.nz. 
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treatment. Routine is not defined in the COCA, but applying the commonly understood 
definition of “routine” to medical treatment, this could encompass commonly 
experienced complaints, such as colds, infections, vaccinations, warts, cuts, sprains, 
dental check ups, and fillings.135 However, the range is imprecise and subjective.  
 
Thus, parents have a responsibility to consider their children’s growing competence to 
make decisions on medical treatment, other than routine matters, for which it may be 
assumed they are capable of making themselves.136 Professor Skegg suggested that this 
qualification was added to reflect children’s increasing competence or evolving capacities, 
presuming that “it was accepted that children could often consent on their own to 
routine treatment, without the need for assistance from their guardians.”137 However, 
another, perhaps more cynical reason, is that this exception has been singled out to avoid 
separated parents filing guardianship applications when in conflict for routine medical 
treatment, adding time and expense to the court system, and causing further stress to 
children.138  
	
Moving to section 36, which deals with consent procedures generally, young people (over 
16 years) have clear rights to both consent to and refuse treatment.139 Yet section 36(3) is 
very unclear and non-specific as to whom it covers:  
 
If the consent of any other person to any medical, surgical, or dental treatment or 
procedure (including a blood transfusion) to be carried out on a child is necessary or 
sufficient, consent may be given— 
(a) by a guardian of the child.  
 
By implication this could cover under 16-year-olds, meaning that a guardian can consent, 
but does it cover all under 16-year-olds, or only those who are not competent? The 
																																																								
135  “A sequence of actions regularly followed” English Oxford Living Dictionaries 
<www.en.oxforddictionaries.com>. See also Westlaw, above n 134 at CC36.04 where routine medical 
treatment is defined as “Medical treatment for minor health problems such as acne, colds, cuts or sprains, 
or vaccinations would probably be characterised as “routine” but there might be questions whether a 15-
year-old seeking advice or contraception from a Family Planning clinic was accessing routine treatment.” 
Children can consent for contraception by the repeal of s 3 Contraception Act 1977 and consent to an 
abortion under the COCA, s 38.  
136 Westlaw, above n 134 at CC36.04. ‘The guardian does not have the power to make a decision on behalf 
of the child if the proposed treatment is “routine”’. 
137 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 246. 
138 Both parents are children’s guardians and as such must “act jointly” in guardianship matters under s 
16(5) COCA. In the event that they are unable to agree an application can be made to court under s 46R. If 
parents became aware of the other’s opposition to medical treatment this should be resolved by agreement 
or through court. However, Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 255 have questioned the requirement to act 
jointly in even non-routine matters as s 16(5) provides for consultation of guardians being required 
“wherever practicably, with the aim of securing agreement” and consent may be given by a guardian (s 
36(3)).  
139 COCA, s 36(1) “A consent, or refusal to consent, to any of the following, if given by a child of or over 
the age of 16 years, has effect as if the child were of full age: 
(a) any donation of blood by the child: 
(b) any medical, surgical, or dental treatment or procedure (including a blood transfusion, which, in this 
section, has the meaning given to it by section 37(1)) to be carried out on the child for the child’s benefit 
by a person professionally qualified to carry it out.” 
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section states ‘if consent of any other person … is necessary’ (emphasis added), implying 
that that there may be situations where the consent of another person is unnecessary. 
One interpretation could be that parental consent is only necessary when children lack 
competence to give their own consent. Support for this view is gained from earlier 
statutes and case law.140 Nevertheless, one argument against this interpretation is that 
given the specific statutory provision for over 16-year-olds and also for girls under 16 
years consenting to, or refusing, an abortion, it is reasonable to believe that if this had 
been Parliament’s intention it would have been clearly stated. Moreover, section 38(2) 
(consent to abortion) overrides section 36, implying that the two are inconsistent to a 
degree. The more likely interpretation is that children have not been given a statutory 
right to consent and therefore “New Zealand statute has made it a guardian’s power.”141 
 
Support for this view is found in Hansard, where the Parliamentary debates regarding the 
Care of Children Bill (“the Bill”) are recorded. During the third reading of the Bill, the 
Hon Bill English (National—Clutha-Southland and Leader of the Opposition) stated:142 
 
Clause 35 [now section 36] states that there is an exception to the general rule that a 
child under 16 cannot consent to a medical procedure, and that a parent must give 
consent. The exception is when a girl is having an abortion. That is the one exception to 
the rule, as outlined in clause 35.	 
 
This is the only reference during the Bill’s passage through Parliament of the Minister’s 
understanding of the law for children under the age of 16 years giving general medical 
consent. Mr English reveals a glimpse of the lack of depth of Parliament’s understanding 
of the law when he states in reference to Clause 35:143 
 
I know for a fact that the debate on the clause was conducted largely in ignorance of the 
law by the MPs who were voting on it. The debate demonstrated that many MPs 
thought the current law prevented a medical or other health professional from advising 
parents when a girl under the age of 16 had an abortion. Of course, the current law does 
not do that.  
 
Instead, Opposition parties’ focused on preserving what they regarded as the traditional 
family and parents’ rights.144 Of particular concern to them was the clause enabling a girl 
																																																								
140 See for example Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 considered below at 
page 28 and Re J, above n 8 that confirmed that parental rights are never absolute but reflect their 
responsibilities towards their children, and R v Laufau and Laufau HC, Auckland T.000759 2 August 2000 
where the Court considered Tovia Laufau’s competence in the context of refusing consent, considered 
further at page 38-40. 
141 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 250. 
142 (9 November 2004) 621 NZPD 16715 <www.parliament.nz>. 
143 At 16715.  
144 For example, see (24 June 2003) 609 NZPD 6539 - Richard Worth (NZ National—Epsom) stated 
during the Bill’s first reading: “The Minister [Hon Lianne Dalziel (Associate Minister of Justice)] dismisses 
the concept of the ideal family. That family is, in effect, parents and their children. She dismisses that 
concept, because she says, “Well, that may be an ideal plan, but that doesn’t really reflect the reality of 
society”, and that is of course true. I acknowledge that, but it is not a reason for saying that that paradigm 
is not worth aiming for.” See also (1 July 2003) 609 NZPD 6711 - Hon Dr Nick Smith (NZ National-
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of any age to consent to an abortion without informing her parents. Their priorities were 
parents’ rights and children’s protection, believing that parents’ roles were being 
substituted by the State, and that parents’ abilities to implement their responsibilities 
were being eroded.145 However, supporters of the clause had confidence in health 
professionals and the system supporting and protecting vulnerable young girls, including 
their rights to privacy and freedom to make their own decisions. 146 Section 38 was passed 
with children’s right to privacy intact, but the COCA left ambiguous children’s rights to 
consent to, or refuse, other forms of treatment. 
 
Uncertainty and confusion are compounded when considering section 13(1), which 
provides for the COCA acting as a code.147 One possible interpretation is that the COCA 
overrides the common law on guardianship matters. If so, the implication could be that 
decisions on medical treatment, other than routine, are guardianship matters, and 
therefore, the COCA supersedes the common law on competent children giving consent 
to medical treatment. The majority of legal experts do not accept this to be the case.148 
Professor Skegg argues that section 13(1) does not cover the common law capacity of 
children to consent to medical treatment as it “stands entirely apart” from 
guardianship.149 In that way guardianship rights and children’s competence can co-exist. 
Additionally, when considering section 16(1)(c), guardians have the duty, right and 
responsibility of helping children to determine questions about matters of health, and 
this specifically recognises children’s independent right to consent. 
 
Further indication of children and parents working in partnership may be interpreted 
from section 36(5), which preserves the position of other statutes or precedents that 
enables children to consent in addition to any other person.150 Interestingly, it does not 
specifically state that it will not affect any other rule of law that gives children the right to 
consent independently, or instead, of any other person. Thus, although section 36(5)(b) 
recognises that children can consent, it lacks clarity of whether they can do so without 
their parents’ consent.  
																																																																																																																																																														
Nelson) stated: “This bill will be opposed by National because it is part of Labour’s dangerous social 
engineering that has the State assuming more and more control and power over children’s lives, at the 
expense of parents. The Minister stated last week: ‘This legislation is getting away from the language of 
parents having rights. Parents have responsibilities towards their children.’ We take a very different view.” 
145 (2 November 2004) 621 NZPD 16415. For example, Dr Paul Hutchison (National—Port Waikato. 
However, having been an obstetrician-gynaecologist and having sat on the Abortion Supervisory 
Committee he was clearly torn between safeguarding the welfare of such girls and protecting his obligation, 
and their rights, to privacy. He considered that data on the informed consent process would be advisable as 
it is “unlikely that we will be able to make wise legislation” without it. 
146 (21 October 2004) 621 NZPD 16415. For example Hon David Benson-Pope (Associate Minister of 
Justice) and Metiria Turei (Greens). 
147 COCA, s 13(1) “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act has effect in place of the rules of the 
common law and of equity as to the guardianship and custody of children.” 
148 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 248; Henaghan, above n 123, at 20; Ludbrook, above n 122 at 38; and 
Ministry of Health, Consent in Child and Youth Health, above n 93 at 31. 
149 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 248 footnote 189. 
150 COCA s 36(5) “Nothing in this section affects an enactment or rule of law by or under which, in any 
circumstances,—(a) no consent or no express consent is necessary; or (b) the consent of the child in 
addition to that of any other person is necessary; or (c) subject to subsection (2), the consent of any other 




Thus, from the statutory provisions of the COCA and from the parliamentary debates it 
would appear that the rights of children to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment were 
simply overlooked. This seems quite astounding given the large number of submissions 
on the Care of Children Bill recommending inclusion of a provision in line with Gillick:151 
 
… the Ministry of Justice report to the Select Committee considering the Care of 
Children Bill noted a large majority of the submissions on the Bill recommended that the 
relevant clause needed revision to remove uncertainty around the ability of children 
younger than 16 years to give effective consent to medical treatment, and that most of 
these suggested that the rule in Gillick about evolving capacities be adopted. The 
Ministry’s view on this was that clause 35 (s 36 of the Act) does not prohibit persons 
under 16 years from consenting in their own right, and that, in determining whether 
“consent is necessary” or “consent is sufficient” under s 36(5)(b) and (c) common law 
rules and health legislation apply.152 
 
Nevertheless, “[f]or reasons which are not clear the Ministry and Parliament decided not 
to clarify the position of under-16s”,153 and COCA missed “the great opportunity to 
determine the place of Gillick in the law.”154 Parliament had a further opportunity in 2013 
to clarify the position during the review of the Family Court system, but failed to do so. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond COCA for clarification of the law.  
 
B.  Code o f  Health and Disabi l i ty  Servi ces  Consumers ’  Rights 1996  
 
The Code recognises the importance of informed consent processes by presuming 
everyone’s competence,155 and giving everyone the right to make an informed decision to 
consent to,156 or refuse,157 treatment. However, the Code is a regulation (secondary or 
subordinate legislation) under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, and as 
such, does not fill the gap, or clarify the uncertainty, left by the COCA. As Professor 
Skegg points out rule 7(2) is “simply for the purposes of Code liability - although it may 
well have a knock on effect on disciplinary liability. … Parliament did not intend to 
confer a power to alter by regulation the general law relating to capacity to give, or to 
refuse, consent.” 158  Nevertheless, it does establish patients’ rights and health 
professionals’ duties/responsibilities to follow informed consent processes by providing 
																																																								
151 Westlaw, above n 134 at CC36.02(8) 
152 See also Henaghan and Ballantyne, above n 125 at 596 where they note that as long ago as January 1987 
Bill Atkin, submitted to the Social Services Select Committee on Children and Young Persons Bill 1986 
that account should be taken of Gillick in what became The Children, Young Persons and Their Families 
Act 1989. Further, at 596-597 they state: “It would have been more helpful if the Care of Children act 2004 
had incorporated some guidelines directly based on Gillick, such as a requirement for a prescribed 
sufficient level of understanding by the child. Clear guidelines would have assisted health professionals to 
determine when, and which, particular children should have the right to be more involved in important 
medical decisions.” 
153 Westlaw, above n 134 at CC36.02(8). 
154 Atkin, above n 54 at 479.  
155 Code, Right 7(2). 
156 Code, Right 7(1). 
157 Code, Right 7(7). 
158 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 239. 
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effective communication,159 fully informing,160 and enabling patients to make informed 
choices and give informed consent.161 
 
C.  Contracept ion,  Ster i l i sat ion and Abort ion Act 1977  
 
Through the repeal of section 3 of the Contraception Act 1977, contraception can be 
provided to children under the age of 16.162 Although it is not stated as a right, the 
removal of this section enabled children to obtain advice and be prescribed 
contraception without requiring their parents’ consent.  
 
D.  Mental  Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment)  Act 1992 (Mental  
Health Act)  
 
Whilst the Mental Health Act stipulates the age of consent as 16 years, its guidelines163 
recognise consent from competent children under 16 years, independently of their 
parents. It further gives indicators for assessing competence based upon understanding 
and maturity: 164    
A child/young person under the age of 16 years may give valid and effective consent if 
they have a sufficient understanding of the significance of the proposed treatment. This 
depends on the maturity of the individual child/young person, the effect of the relevant 
disorder at the time, and the seriousness of the matter for decision. If a child/young 
person under the age of 16 years is able to give consent, the consent of a parent/ 
guardian is not necessary.  
E.  Protec t ion o f  Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR Act)  
 
Similarly, the PPPR Act, despite its remit being over adults, defines capacity in 
comparable terms to Gillick in section 5:165 
(a)  To understand the nature, and to foresee the consequences, of decisions in respect 
of matters relating to his or her personal care and welfare; and 
(b)  To communicate decisions in respect of those matters. 
	




159 Code Right 5. 
160 Code Right 6. 
161 Code Right 7. 
162 Contraception Act 1977, s 3 was repealed on 7 September 1990 by s 2(1) of Contraception, Sterilisation 
and Abortion Amendment Act 1990. 
163 Ministry of Health, Guidelines to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (Ministry 
of Health, Wellington, 2012).  
164 At 77. 




F.  New Zealand Bi l l  o f  Rights Act 1990  
 
Section 11 of the NZBORA gives everyone the right to refuse medical treatment, applying 
to all New Zealanders, with no age restrictions. There is no doubt that only competent 
children could be included, as this is consistent with the rule of law in respect of children 
consenting. 166  Nonetheless, the NZBORA does not override another statutory 
provision,167 and there is a limitation on its rights. Section 5 states that “the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,” and 
section 6 provides for the preferred interpretation of enactments being consistent with 
the NZBORA. Including children in the interpretation of NZBORA would not conflict 
with any other statutory provisions, as there are none that specifically provide for 
children consenting or refusing consent, and “limitations to the application of section 11 
should be set out explicitly in statute and will be read strictly.”168  
 
Support for children’s right to refuse is also found in the Code, with right 7(7) giving all 
patients the right to refuse services and withdraw consent. Whilst there is no New 
Zealand case law specifically on this matter, there are conflicting indicators from the 
High Court. The Court in Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v Liu appeared to assume 
that children had no agency, and were therefore unable to consent to, or refuse, medical 
treatment.169 On the other hand, the competence of Tovia Laufau to refuse treatment 
was in issue during the trial of his parents who were prosecuted for failing to provide 
him with the necessaries of life.170 When summing up to the jury, Potter J not only 
directed the jury to apply Gillick, but also seemed to assume that children could be 
competent to refuse consent:171 
You will need to consider and decide whether Tovia was capable of making an informed 
choice not to have medical treatment. … The important thing about the Gillick decision 
is that it recognises that age is not the only or the major determinant in deciding whether 
a person is capable of giving informed consent. Age will always be a very important 
relevant factor, and you will take into account that Tovia was 13 years and 2 months old. 
Then you will have to consider whether he was capable of understanding what was 
proposed and of expressing his own wishes in relation to the treatment proposed. Did 
he have sufficient understanding and intelligence to fully understand what was proposed 
in the circumstances of the case? From that I think it will become clear to you that the 
second important component of informed consent is that the person making the 
decision, in this case it was not consent but choice was indeed informed. Did Tovia have 
																																																								
166 For example, competence is required in terms of Gillick, the Code, and the High Court decision of Re S 
[1992] 1 NZLR 363 at 364. Re S involved an application under the Mental Health Act 1969 against 
detention in which the court held that "everyone" in section 11 means "every person who is competent to 
consent.”  
167 NZBORA, s 4. 
168 Ministry of Justice “The Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990:  Introduction to the Guidelines” 
(Ministry of Justice, undated and unnumbered).  
169 Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v Liu, above n 6. 
170 R v Laufau and Laufau, above n 140. This case, together with those of Caleb Moorhead and Liam 
Williams-Holloway, will be considered in more detail at pages 39- 42. 
171 At [31]-[33].  
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all the necessary and relevant information about the course of treatment proposed, to 
make an informed choice? Was he capable of making an informed choice? 
This is a clear application of Gillick by the High Court in the context of children refusing 
medical consent and acknowledgement that it is possible for children to be competent to 
refuse medical treatment, otherwise it would be a moot point. This is significant, despite 
it being in the context of a criminal trial, rather than in the context of a civil law/family 
law matter, where the Court can make findings of fact and give a ruling.  
As will be seen in the following chapter, precedents post-Gillick from the English Court 
of Appeal decided that parental consent could overrule the refusal of competent children. 
However, these have not been adopted in New Zealand, and there is indication that they 
should not be followed. For example, Ron Paterson, Chief Advisor, Services, Ministry of 
Health, advised:172 
In England … the Court of Appeal has suggested that it would be possible to have both 
a refusal to consent by a competent teenager and at the same time a valid consent by a 
legal guardian. There has been much criticism of this view. It would be possible to avoid 
such an unfortunate result in New Zealand by: 
• being cautious in assessment of competency and  
• where the teenager is found to be competent, relying on s. 11 of the Bill of 
Rights, to come to the conclusion that parents/guardians lose the right to give 
or withhold consent to treatment of that teenager. 
 
The right to refuse consent is the most controversial and debated issue, not only because 
of the degree of ambiguity in the law, but also due to the emotive and ethical issues of 
whether children should have treatment forced upon them, or alternatively are left to 
suffer, and in its extreme, die without it. Whilst some commentators focus on whether 
children are competent, rather than their age, with the corollary of competence being 
both the right to consent to, and refuse, treatment;173 others believe that the necessary 
degree of competence to refuse treatment is greater than that required to consent, as it 
involves rejecting health professionals’ advice,174 or requires consideration of moral and 
family questions.175 Viewing the issue from a practical perspective, and giving priority to 
parental authority, Skegg and Paterson voice their concerns that children having the right 
to refuse medical treatment “would not be without problems”, and “[i]f children acquire 
the right to effectively prohibit treatment when they first become capable of giving 
consent, there would be room for endless disputes about whether a particular child had 
capacity to consent to a particular procedure in the particular circumstances. This would 
																																																								
172 Ministry of Health, above n 93 at 48. 
173 Norrie, above n 14 at 436; Sarah Elliston “If You Know What’s Good for You: Refusal of Consent to 
Medical Treatment by Children” in Sheila McLean (ed.) Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics 
(Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, England, 1996) at 34. 
174 JK Mason and RA McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (4th ed, Butterworths, London, 1994) at 229. 




make it much more difficult to rely on a guardian’s consent in, say, the case of an 
articulate 12-year-old.”176  
 
 
III .  Case Law 
 
A.  The Extent to which New Zealand Case Law Recognises  Gil l i ck 
Competence177 
 
There has not been a thorough examination of the issues of children’s competence and 
their rights to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment, although some courts have 
referred to, followed and applied Gillick.178 This has led to inconsistency and uncertainty 
of not only the existence, and extent, of children’s rights, but also the criteria upon which 
competence is assessed.179 	
	
Starting precariously from the standpoint of Gillick, the High Court assumed children 
had no right to consent. Hillyer, J in Re X (sterilisation: parental consent) gave a generalised 
and sweeping statement, that “[o]f course when a child is under the age of 16 years or 
intellectually handicapped, such [parental] consent is required.”180 However, Hillyer, J 
made this obiter statement, with no reference to, or consideration of, Gillick, as 
competence was not in issue, the 15-year-old girl being severely intellectually 
handicapped. Likewise, Tompkins J in Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v Liu failed to 
consider the competence of a 12-year-old boy (Joseph) and the ratio of Gillick, when the 
Court indicated children less than 16 years have no rights of consent or refusal,181 
																																																								
176 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 253.  
177 Gillick has been applied in a variety of contexts outside of medical treatment by the New Zealand courts. 
For example: in Tao v Woodridge [2015] NZFC 6212 children aged four and five were deemed to be not 
Gillick competent to decide whether they attend Seventh Day Adventist Church with their father; Moore v 
Moore [2015] 2 NZLR 787 children aged six and four were not yet Gillick competent to decide upon 
whether to participate in the Jehovah Witness faith. In Moore at [137]-[146] the court had regard to whether 
they had reached a stage in their development where they were able to make an informed choice by 
weighing up the pros and cons; Powell v Riley FC Auckland FAM-2013-004-1204 26 November 2013 at [57], 
an application was made under COCA, s 103 for return from New Zealand to Australia of a young person 
aged 15 years and 5 months who could “readily be described as having Gillick competence”; and ARB v 
KLB [2011] NZFLR 290 the court applied Gillick to determine whether a young person nearly 14 years was 
competent to choose her dental and medical practitioner. It appears that the Court undertook a 
competence assessment. At [17] Judge Moss interviewed her to “not only ascertain her opinion but also the 
underlying basis for the formation and expression of that opinion … relating to both her capacity and to 
her opinion, and the extent to which she was in a position, independently, to form a view.” At [18] Judge 
Moss had regard to her intelligence, her “particular skill in abstract and analytical thinking”, her ability to 
form “opinions herself which she was able to express articulately” and had a high level of ability to think 
for herself and express herself clearly but gently.” She was able to list the qualities she sought in each 
health professional, and at [23] the court concluded that she was capable, with parental support, of 
choosing their identity. 
178 For example, Re J, above n 8; Hawthorne v Cox, above n 9; Re SPO, above n 10. 
179 Tim Grimwood, “Gillick and the consent of minors: contraceptive advice and treatment in New 
Zealand” (2009) 40 VUWLR 743 at 744 believed that “if the Gillick situation arose in New Zealand the 
courts would be working in a very grey and ill-defined area.”  
180 Re X (sterilisation: parental consent) [1991] NZFLR 49 at 57. 
181 Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v Liu, above n 6 at 7. The child and his parents refused to give consent 
to the surgery on the grounds of their religious beliefs. Tompkins J at 7 confirmed the decision of Re J, 
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although recognising Joseph’s right to express his views on whether he had retina surgery. 
The Court appeared again to assume that he had no right to either consent or refuse 
treatment:182   
… a child under the age of 16 is unable to give effective consent and in my view similarly 
is unable to exercise the right that would otherwise be conferred by s 11 of the Bill of 
Rights Act. Whilst of course full weight should be given to Joseph's views, I do not 
consider that s 11 of the Bill of Rights Act can be determinative.  
Taking a similar approach in Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v T,183 Paterson J took 
account a 12-year-old girl’s views, considering her “both positive and mature”, but also 
“somewhat confused, … notwithstanding her maturity, having regard to her age”184 In 
failing to apply Gillick, or specifically address her competence, the paramount concern of 
the Court, in this application for guardianship, was her welfare and best interests, when 
she and her parents refused to give consent for treatment on the grounds of their 
religious beliefs. 
Nevertheless, on 6 March 2002 there was clear recognition of both a competent child’s 
right to consent and of Gillick by the Health and Disability Commissioner (the 
Commissioner) after reviewing a complaint by a 14-year-old boy’s mother, Case 
01HDC02915 (tetanus case).185 The boy had been taken by a school staff member to his 
medical practice after being injured at school and required a tetanus vaccination. The 
issue related to whether he could give consent for it. The Commissioner indicated:186 
 
The common law concerning consent by minors (persons below the legal age of 
majority) to medical treatment is well established as a "competency based" assessment: 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority. This means that Mr B's ability to 
consent to receiving an immunisation against tetanus is not determined on the basis of 
his age alone. Rather, Dr C was under a duty to consider whether Mr B was able to make 
an informed choice and give informed consent to the tetanus and diphtheria 
immunisation.  
In considering the question of the boy’s competence, the Commissioner took account of 
“his ability to understand the information given to him about the risks of his condition 
and the consequences of any decision, as well as the relative seriousness of the situation.”  
Establishing that the boy had understood the information given, and was competent to 
give consent, the Commissioner stated:187 
 
Mr B was 14 years old at the time of this incident. A young person of that age is well 
																																																																																																																																																														
above n 8 that it could only interfere with parental rights “where the child’s life or well being was in serious 
jeopardy and there is no other reasonable medical or therapeutic treatment available and that such an order 
should be made on terms that least interfere with the parents’ rights to decide for their child.” 
182 Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v Liu, above n 6 at 7. 
183 Auckland Healthcare Service Limited v T [1996] NZFLR 670. 
184 At 671.  
185 Case 01HDC02915, 6 March 2002. 
186 Case 01HDC02915, above n 185 (pages and paragraphs are unnumbered). 
187 Case 01HDC02915, above n 185. 
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able to understand basic medical information and give consent to a vaccine injection. 
There is no evidence that Mr B did not understand any of the information that Dr C 
provided to him. Mr B understood that he was receiving an injection to “fight off 
tetanus” and that tetanus was a “disease” which “was not a good thing” to have because 
“you get real sick”. Mr B knew that the injection would hurt, after Ms D [nurse] told him 
so. 
Similarly, the potential of children’s competence was recognised in another complaint to 
the Commissioner, involving an 11-year-old girl who underwent dental extractions. 
However, due to the orthodontist failing to first inform and then obtain consent prior to 
the extraction, her understanding and competence were not determined.188 
Nevertheless, despite the Commissioner’s recognition of children’s potential competence 
and right to consent, there has been a lack of transparency, process and consistency. For 
example, six months after the tetanus case, the Commissioner decided on 18 September 
2002 that a 10-year-old girl was not competent to consent to the vaccinations for polio 
and measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) when a complaint was made that her GP had 
administered, or authorised administration of, them without obtaining the informed 
consent of her mother.189 There were no details of the information provided to the girl, 
of her understanding, or how the commissioner reached his conclusion. It appears that 
incompetence was presumed, probably due to her age and the nature of the decision:190 
In light of Miss A's young age (10 years) and the nature of the decisions (consent to 
immunisation), there were reasonable grounds for Dr B to believe that she was not 
competent to make an informed choice and give informed consent. 
This lack of transparency was particularly unfortunate, as the issue in question was 
whether lawful consent had been given to the GP, as neither the child, a parent or 
guardian had consented.191  
Similarly, there was no acknowledgment of competence, its evolving nature, or the 
reasons for the incompetence of a six-year-old child who underwent more than 40 
appointments over more than five years.192 The Commissioner found that the dentist had 
failed to provide the girl’s legal guardians, or their representative (the Grandmother), 
with sufficient information on the proposed orthopaedic treatment to obtain informed 
consent. The reason for this lack of recognition of competence may be an assumption of 
obvious incompetence, given the girl’s age, combined with the complexity of the 
treatment, but there is nothing explicit to clarify the position, or any acknowledgement of 
how her competence would have evolved throughout the lengthy period of treatment, as 
she matured and developed experience.  
																																																								
188 Case 14HDC00736, 31 March 2015 at [44]. This involved three baby teeth being removed. 
189 Case 01HDC12269, 18 September 2002. 
190 At 2 
191 The child was cared for by her Grandmother. She was taken to the GP by her Aunt, who gave him a 
letter from the Grandmother stating that she was a guardian and gave permission for the child to be seen 
by him. However, the Grandmother was not a legal guardian and the mother complained as she had not 
consented and was opposed to her children receiving them. 
192 11HDC01103, 28 March 2014. 
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Nonetheless, there should be little doubt about the right of competent children to give 
consent after the Family Court in Re SPO accepted and applied Gillick.193 The issue 
before the Court was whether a 15-year-old boy could consent to vaccinations, despite 
his mother’s refusal. The court in considering his competence had regard to the 
following: the information he had received from the public health nurse; discussions he 
had had with his GP and older brother; 194  his earlier experience of having, and 
consenting to, the first of three vaccinations; and confirmation of his full understanding, 
through a letter he filed, and submissions from his lawyer.195   
 
Despite these factors confirming competence, this decision has been criticised for lacking 
sufficient consideration of it, specifically not examining “the boy's actual understanding 
of the treatment or his capacity to understand in terms of Gillick, just that he had 
received relevant information.”196 It is questionable in the context of the facts what 
additional evidence would have been necessary, as vaccinations are a relatively simple 
procedure. It would seem excessive to require either a medical practitioner or the child to 
attend court for the Judge to be satisfied of his competence. However, those steps may 
be appropriate in more complex matters, as is commonplace in Australia for example, 
when courts consider children’s competence to consent to transgender treatment.197  
The Family Court in BAS v CHE198 took such an approach in an application seeking a 
direction to fit a severely, intellectually disabled and autistic 13-year-old girl with a Mirena 
to suppress menstruation. Prior to the hearing, the Court directed her paediatrican to 
report to the Court upon whether the girl was competent to give her consent, and if not, 
whether she was likely to develop such competence. The conclusion of both matters was 
in the negative, the doctor confirming that she was not competent “to make reproductive 
choices because of her limited capacity to understand the concepts of menstruation, 
fertility and how her body works” and would be unlikely to ever achieve competence.199 
In accepting the paediatrician’s view, Judge O’Dwyer placed weight upon the length of 
his relationship with the girl, her family and social worker, together with his account of 
earlier assessments by other professionals: 200 
He [the paediatrician] bases that, in my view importantly, on his assessment since 2006, 
but also the previous assessment of Dr Hall, who was the developmental paediatrician 
between 2004 and 2006, the opinion of Dr Judith McDougall, the clinical psychologist, 
and his ongoing assessment of S through his contact with her social worker Ms Staples 
and also her caregivers, and also information available to him from her school.  
Despite the courts and Commissioner providing some confidence in the adoption of 
Gillick, and of competent children’s rights to consent, the situation lacks certainty and 
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194 At [27]. 
195 At [9]. 
196 Grimwood, above n 179 at 746. 
197 This is considered further in the next chapter.  
198 BAS v CHE [2012] 28 FRNZ 847. 
199 At 849. 





The question arises whether the common law capacity of some minors to consent to 
medical procedures can be relied upon in New Zealand. More than half a century after 
the New Zealand legislature first intervened in the area the question has still not been 
settled beyond all shadow of doubt.  
 
The primary reason for this uncertainty is the lack of explicit statutory provision, 
resulting in case law attempting to fill the gap, but doing so in an ad hoc manner. On 
some occasions the higher courts have little opportunity to develop the law. For example, 
in Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development v Young Person X “there was inadequate 
information as to when, how and by whom the ultimate decision to begin treatment 
would be made” in respect of a 15-year-old who had expressed desire to begin medical 
treatment to transition from male to female.202 Likewise, there was no opportunity for 
the Court to consider John’s competence, a nine-year-old boy, in Auckland District Health 
Board v Dee (Dee), albeit for a different reason. John had been diagnosed with HIV at four 
months old, but he was unaware of this fact. 203 No indication is given in the judgment of 
the reasons for this, and why he would be told at the age of 11/12 years, although it can 
be inferred that his parents and health professionals agreed he was too young.204 
Projecting into the future, the Court pre-empts to a degree, how it is likely to deal with 
John’s refusal, should that eventuate, confirming such refusal would not be decisive.205 
The Court supported this view with reference to two English cases, the first An NHS 
Trust and another v Mr and Mrs A and others, in which J, a 14-year-old boy, was held to be 
incompetent, although ‘intelligent thoughtful and articulate’ and having ‘received a very 
considerable amount of information about HIV and AIDS from a variety of sources.’206 
The issue was that J did not accept that he was suffering from HIV, and as such, he 
could not assess his state of risk.
 
The Court accepted unreservedly that J had HIV and 
was at risk of AIDS and other serious illnesses. The second case, to further illustrate “the 
nature and extent of this Court’s jurisdiction”,207 was Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) (Re 
W), in which the refusal of a 16-year-old girl was not accepted by the Court, as she was 
deemed to lack capacity, due to suffering from anorexia nervosa.208 Notably, although the 
Court in Dee placed importance upon being aware, and taking into account, of John’s 
views, it does not reflect upon the implication to his competence when he becomes 
aware of his condition, nor the bearing that this would have upon the issue of consent to, 
																																																								
201 Skegg and Paterson, above n 5 at 241. 
202 Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development v Young Person X HC Auckland CIV-2013-404-004621 18, 
20 November 2013 at paragraph 10. The application was to seek an order to commence the use of 
hormone blockers, which initially the child was determined to pursue. However, at the time of the hearing 
the young person expressed ambivalence.  
203 Auckland District Health Board v Dee [2015] NZHC 304. 
204 At [8] his father’s evidence was that he is too young to know. See also ADHB v Dee [2017] NZHC 1049 
at [3] in which the judgment of Edwards J, in an application for continuing the guardianship orders, 
records that the parties agreed that it was premature to disclose John’s condition to him, and that the 
process would be best managed by his clinical team.  
205 At [17] per Keane J. 
206 An NHS Trust and another v Mr and Mrs A and others [2014] EWHC 1135 (Fam) at [18] per Baker J.  
207 Dee, above n 203 at [19]. 
208 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64. 
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or refusal of, treatment.209 
 
Similarly, the courts have had little opportunity to clarify the law at other times, due to 
the children involved being clearly too young to be Gillick competent in the context of 
the decision.210 Nevertheless, on other occasions, courts have missed opportunities to 
give more clarity or certainty, particularly on the assessment of competence. In some 
cases courts may have assumed children’s incompetence, but it is more likely that the 
issue was simply overlooked, as there is no reference to competence, Gillick, or even to 
children’s views. For example, in Waikato District Health Board v FF and MM a seven-year-
old boy was diagnosed with a rare and severe form of epilepsy when he was a few 
months old.211 An application was made by the Health Board seeking orders to enable 
him to receive medication. The question for the Court was whether the proposed 
treatment was in the child’s best interests. Likewise, in The Chief Executive of the Ministry of 
Social Development v Bates there was no indication of whether the competence of a 10-year-
old girl had been assessed or consideration given to her evolving capacity.212 Her parents 
had not appropriately addressed her medical condition of congenital nephrotic syndrome 
that causes significant loss of protein and swelling in the face or lower legs, and gives rise 
to higher risks of infections. The child’s views were not considered, as lawyer for child 
had been unable to meet with her. Her mother’s evidence was that her daughter was 
opposed to treatment, but the doctor conveyed that during treatment there was “no 
noticeable objection.”213 Given that the doctor was able to so report, the Court could 
have made inquiry of what information she had received, of her understanding and 
whether she was competent. 
Thus, the New Zealand courts have considered, followed and applied Gillick in an ad hoc 
manner, resulting in children’s potential competence and right to consent sometimes 
being overlooked. When courts have considered competence, account is taken of the 
information children have received, their understanding and abilities to weigh up risks, 
their age, experience and acceptance of their health conditions. 
B. The Scope o f  Parents ’  Rights  to Give or Refuse Consent  
The most authoritative precedent on the nature and limits of parental authority was from 
the Court of Appeal in Re J.214 In delivering the judgment Gault, J not only recognised 
Gillick as applicable in New Zealand, but also confirmed that parents have 
responsibilities towards their children, as well as rights, stating:215 
																																																								
209 At [16]. 
210 For example, Auckland District Health Board v E [2013] NZFLR 451; Waikato District Health Board v L 
[2008] 27 FRNZ 596; Auckland District Health Board v Z [2007] 26 FRNZ 596; Paddy v L [1994] NZFLR 
352; and Director-General of Social Welfare v M [1991] 8 FRNZ 498, where each child was four years old or 
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211 Waikato District Health Board v FF and MM, HC Hamilton CIV 2008-419-001471, 5 December 2008. 
212 The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development v Bates, [2014] NZFC 5554. 
213 At 47. 
214 Re J, above n 8. This case involved a three-year-old whose parents refused to consent to a blood 
transfusion due to their religious beliefs. 
215 At 145. Subsequent High Court authority have followed this approach: L v A (2003) 23 FRNZ 583 




The upbringing of children extends to making decisions for them as to health and 
medical treatment. That is a right long recognised under the common law in any event: 
Gillick v West Norfolk AHA [1986] 1 AC 112 though, as that case makes clear, it was 
never absolute. As was pointed out particularly by Lord Scarman … the scope of 
parental rights is reflective of parental duties towards children.  
Continuing this child-centred view of guardianship, the High Court in Hawthorne v Cox, 
confirmed the yielding nature of parental involvement in children’s decision-making as 
they develop and mature: 216 
The dual focus on determination and assistance in s 16(1)(c), coupled with the general 
policy shift towards a more child-centred approach to guardianship, reflects the concept 
applied in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 
All ER 402 (HL). … Put in those terms, the Act is consistent with the philosophy 
underpinning Gillick, namely that a parent's interest in the development of his or her 
child does not amount to a “right” but is more accurately described as “a responsibility 
or duty”. The terms of s 16 itself reflect that proposition.  
 
The extent of parental authority and how it is balanced with children’s rights to 
participate and consent/refuse are issues with which the courts have grappled. This was 
highlighted in the three high profile cases of Liam Williams-Holloway (Liam), Tovia 
Laufau (Tovia) and Caleb Moorhead (Caleb), who all died when their parents refused 
treatment.  
 
1. Liam Wil l iams-Hol loway 
 
Liam died from a cancerous tumour on his jaw in 2000 aged five and a half years old, 
following his parents refusing conventional treatment, preferring alternative methods in 
Mexico.217 They evaded Court orders for wardship, custody and a warrant to enforce the 
custody order by going into hiding for four months, orders that the Court had granted in 
an effort of protect Liam’s welfare, best interests and right to life. 218 In making Liam 
subject to a wardship order under the Guardianship Act 1968, the Court followed the 
evidence from medical experts that with intensive chemotherapy Liam would have a 50% 
chance of survival,219 but without it, he would die.220 The case attracted significant media 
attention, which was later controlled by a Court order, restricting further publicity.221 
After four months, with no success of locating Liam’s parents, the Court discharged the 
																																																																																																																																																														
v Z, above n 210 which viewed parents as having duties and responsibilities towards their children rather 
than having rights over them.  
216 Hawthorne v Cox, above n 9 at [57] and [61] per Health J. This case involved an application for a 16-year-
old girl to be placed under the guardianship of the Family Court and did not consider medical decisions or 
competence of children under the age of 16 years. 
217 Martin Johnston and Francesca Mould, “Little Liam’s battle ends” The New Zealand Herald  (New 
Zealand, 28 October 2000) at 1. 
218 Healthcare Otago Limited v Williams-Holloway [1999] NZFLR 804. 
219 At 806. 
220 At 804. 
221 Healthcare Otago Limited v Williams-Holloway, above n 218. 
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orders upon an application by Healthcare Otago, as “the likelihood of conventional 
medical treatment being able to provide benefit to Liam [had] diminished to the point 
where the application of further public funds towards this end cannot be justified.”222 
When Liam died he was described by the media as having become “a national symbol of 
the tug-of-war between conventional medicine and controversial alternative therapies, 
and that “[h]is plight also plunged the nation into debate on the rights of parents to 
decide treatments for their children.”223 This divergence of views is reflected to some 
extent by oncologist, Rob Corbett, who was reported as being of the view that their 
decision was “illogical”, and that Liam died because of his parents’ choice,224 and the then 
Children’s Commissioner, who sympathised with his parents, stating: “His mum and dad 
did the best they could. They did what they felt compelled to do, and that's what any 
parent would do.” 225 
 
2.  Tovia Laufau 
 
Contrastingly, in 1999/2000 Tovia’s parents were charged, prosecuted and found guilty 
of failing to provide him with the necessaries of life,226 when Tovia, aged 13 years, died 
from a cancerous tumour (osteosarcoma) on his knee, after he refused to attend hospital. 
The jury decided that Tovia had not been competent to make his own decision, and thus 
it was the responsibility and duty of his parents to ensure he received potentially life 
saving treatment. Giving evidence as a defence witness, Dr Peter Watson, from the 
Centre for Youth Health in South Auckland, stressed the shared responsibilty amongst 
health professionals and families in managing young people’s needs, believing that in this 
case the health system had failed him. He is reported as saying:227 
 
This young man and other young people before him and subsequently in the future, I 
believe, have and will suffer - not only suffer but also die - from the failure of the health 
system to recognise the unique needs of young people in our hospitals and provide 
appropriate services for them. I think it is also a tragedy for this family and would hope 
that no other family ever has to be put through this experience when there is such an 
evident failure of the health system. 
 
Dr Watson is reported also as saying that ‘the medical world was full of jargon’ and 
that:228 
… it was critical for families to understand exactly what was being said at 
stressful times when bad news about complex issues was being given, especially 
when it was in a foreign language and in a "foreign" environment. 
 
																																																								
222 At 813. At 814 the Court acknowledged the efforts of health professionals to work and compromise 
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226 Crimes Act 1961, s 151. 
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Nevertheless, when sentencing Tovia’s parents, Potter J emphasised the sanctity of life, 
and the responsibility of parents to protect children’s lives, at times overruling their 
objections, when they lack maturity to make life or death decisions: 229 
 
The duty the law imposes on parents and caregivers is greater and stronger than the 
wishes of their children, no matter how sincerely and strongly they might be expressed, 
and no matter how strong may be the wish or will of the parents to accede to the child's 
bidding. It is one matter for an adult person with full mental faculties to exercise a right 
to elect not to undergo medical treatment. It is quite a different matter for the parents or 
caregivers of a child who carry the legal duty and responsibility to ensure that child has 
the necessaries of life, to determine that the child shall not have medical treatment when 
medical treatment is necessary to protect his life.  
 
However, illogically, although the State condemned Tovia’s parents after his death, it had 
not sought any protective court orders for Tovia. Professor Henaghan believed that this 
may have been due to doctors probably not wanting to risk public backlash in light of the 
public’s response to Liam’s situation.230  
 
3. Caleb Moorhead 
 
In 2002, public sympathy swung away from the rights of parents and towards children’s 
protection, with the death of Caleb. The media attention centred on the preventable 
damage to Caleb and the extreme beliefs of his parents,231 raising general questions of 
whether in such cases doctors should be making applications to court. 232 Caleb’s parents 
were found guilty of manslaughter, and sentenced to five years imprisonment, for killing 
him by failing to provide him with medical treatment in the form of vitamin B12, due to 
their religious beliefs.233 Their conduct was at the extreme end of negligence, justifying 
the severe conviction.  
 
Yet the efforts of the State to protect Caleb were not commensurate with public opinion. 
More significant efforts had been made to protect Liam, by way of court orders, than 
either Tovia or Caleb. Whilst the ripples of public opinion may have resulted in a 
reluctance to proceed to court for Tovia, it is unlikely that this was the situation for 
Caleb. Clearly, an application to protect Caleb should have been made. There was no 
difference in the stance of Caleb’s parents and that of parents who refuse blood products 
for their children, due to their religious beliefs. There is an established line of New 
Zealand case law protecting children’s lives in such situations by overriding parental 
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rights, the leading authority being Re J.234 Nonetheless, each case must stand on its own 
facts to evaluate the welfare and best interests of children, as Baragwanath, J 
acknowledged in Auckland District Health Board v Z: 235 
 
… an unblinkered approach must be taken by the Court in accepting its solemn 
responsibility in such cases. While continuation of life is of great importance it is not 
necessarily conclusive; quality of life must also be considered. There must be a 
meticulous evaluation of the interests of the child, viewed broadly, and of that alone.  
One aspect of those broad interests is the importance of the family, and parental support, 
through the treatment process, as was identified by both Tompkins, J in Re Norma236 and 
Baragwanath, J in Auckland District Health Board v Z.237 Tompkins J, in considering 
whether to order chemotherapy against the cultural practices and beliefs of the family, 
stated: 238 
 
A child's welfare is also bound up with his or her family. If a course of action is likely to 
cause serious distress and disruption within a family, that too is a factor that must bear 
on the welfare of the child and therefore weigh with the Court.  
 
Therefore, in terms of the law, the matter is relatively clear when parents’ decisions are 
contrary to what health professionals regard as protecting children’s welfare: 
 
1. The paramount concern of the court is the welfare and best interests of children, 
including the protection of their right to life. 
2. Parental rights to refuse medical treatment and their right to follow their religion 
are curtailed when it compromises this right. 
3. However, courts will consider all the facts and circumstances before making their 
decision, including any likely adversity to children resulting from treatment being 
ordered.  
 
The complexity for judges is in the weighing up of competing factors in the assessment 
of children’s welfare and best interests. Also, for health professionals, there is a layer of 
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complexity in trying to maintain channels of communication and trust with families to 
prevent the necessity of such court action.239  
 
Thus, as Liam and Caleb were too young to be competent and the court deemed Tovia 
incompetent, the question remains unanswered as to whether competent children have 
the right to refuse consent to medical treatment.240  
 
 
IV. Profess ional  Guidance  
 
Professional regulatory bodies who are responsible for maintaining professional 
standards and competence, such as the Medical, Dental and Nursing Councils, provide 
advice to health professionals to which they are responsible in the form of guidance, 
guidelines or codes. This section considers the guidance they provide on informed 
consent. 
 
A. Medical  Counci l  o f  New Zealand (Medical  Counci l )  
 
The Medical Council’s advice to its members reinforces their duty to abide by the Code, 
and that under the Code every patient has the right to make an informed choice and 
consent to medical treatment.241 Further, it reminds doctors of their responsibility to 
obtain informed consent from the patient before initiating treatment,242 including from 
competent children:243 
People under 16 years of age are not automatically prohibited from consenting to 
medical, surgical or dental procedures so judgement of the patient’s competence to make 
an informed choice and give informed consent is needed in each instance.  
Citing Gillick as authority, the Medical Council advises doctors to: 244 
 … assess a child’s competency and form an opinion on whether he or she is able to give 
informed consent. Generally, a competent child is one who is able to understand the 
nature, purpose and possible consequences of the proposed investigation or treatment, 
as well as the consequences of non-treatment.  
It concludes that when children are competent, parental consent is not always necessary, 
and that until there is clear legislation Gillick should be followed, which is consistent with 
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B. Dental  Counci l  o f  New Zealand (Dental  Counci l )  
The Dental Council updated their ‘Informed Consent Practice Standard’ (the Standard) 
in May 2018, having first undertaken a consultation process with stakeholders between 
November 2017 and February 2018.246 The Standard provides direction on the criteria 
for competence, the informed consent process, and children’s rights to consent to, or 
refuse, dental treatment. It advises that competence assessments relate to patients’ 
understanding and decision-making processes, relative to the complexity of the 
treatment.247 Further, in emphasising that informed consent is a process rather than 
simply the act of signing a form, the Standard guides practitioners on the requirements 
for effective communication, necessary information and giving competent consent 
freely.248 The Standard further confirms that in respect of obtaining consent, it should be 
sought from competent children, and whilst parents do not require to also provide their 
consent, practitioners should continue to involve them in the process.249  
 
C. Nursing Counci l  o f  New Zealand (Nursing Counci l )  
 
Whilst there is no specific mention of children in the Nursing Council Code of Conduct, 
two of its four values underpinning it are to treat health consumers and their families 
with respect, and to work in partnership with health consumers. In respect of the latter 
value this includes giving patients sufficient and understandable information in order that 
they can make an informed choice.250 
 
D.  Distr i c t  Health Board Pol i c i es  (DHB pol i c i es)  
 
Some health professionals are subject to another layer of regulation on informed consent 
through DHB policies. There are 20 DHBs in New Zealand, each with its own Board 
responsible for strategic direction and monitoring staff performance, and with its own 
policy. 251  There are contradictions within and between some policies, with some 
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appearing to be inconsistent with the law. For example, Canterbury DHB’s Policy on 
Informed Consent dated June 2015 refers to the Guardianship Act 1968, despite the 
passing of the COCA in 2004.252 Also, although it states that there is no age for giving 
informed consent, it directs that parental consent is required, with the child being 
involved as much as possible and agreement sought where possible.253 This policy does 
indicate that it would be reviewed in June 2016, and whilst it may have been updated, it 
did not reflect the law of its time, nor has any subsequent policy been made public.  
 
On the other hand, Waikato DHB’s policy dated 1 June 2017 states that competence is 
not linked to age and that consent of a guardian is not required when children are fully 
competent to consent to treatment. 254  Similarly, Capital and Coast DHB’s policy, 
“Informed consent- adults and children”, considers the legal provisions under the COCA 
and the Code, advising that competence is not defined by age, although is one relevant 
factor, together with understanding, maturity and the gravity of the treatment.255  
 
Thus, such policies add further complexity, confusion and uncertainty for health 
professionals, children and parents when they are not consistent with the law. 




V. Chapter  Summary  
 
The law on children’s rights to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment at best can be 
described as piecemeal. Regardless of the reasons, Parliament chose not to clarify the 
position in the COCA. By piecing together the COCA with other statutory provisions, 
and the common law, they confirm collectively that children do have the right to consent 
when competent, independently of their parents. Children’s right to refuse treatment is 
even more uncertain, with there being conflicting indications from courts, and nothing 
definitive. Nonetheless, by combining the NZBORA, Gillick, the Court’s consideration 
of Tovia’s competence to refuse treatment, and the lack of distinction in the law between 
consent and refusal, they point to competent children having the right to refuse 
treatment. However, until there is a statutory provision, or a court decision that 
specifically considers the right of a competent child to refuse treatment, doubt will 
remain. 
 
Equally imprecise is the law on assessing competence. Gillick established the benchmark 
for competence, but the courts have applied it in an ad hoc way. There is a lack of logical 
process or enquiry when approaching cases involving children and medical consent. 
Courts do not as a matter of course make enquiry into children’s competence. Further, 
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when they do, it is often unclear what factors they believe are relevant for its assessment.  
 
This lack of clarity in New Zealand’s law leads me to explore the position of other 






































 Chapter 4 
 
Children Consenting/Refusing Medical Treatment: An 
International Comparison of the Laws of Australia, 
England/Wales and Scotland   
 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
Australia, England and Scotland have either adopted Gillick into statute or through case 
law. Despite this commonality, each country’s laws have evolved in very different ways. 
Australian law in this area is mostly regulated by the common law, with much of its focus 
on ‘special medical procedures’, particularly those for transgender young people. English 
case law, on the other hand, has differentiated between the rights to consent to, and 
refuse, medical treatment, developing different competence criteria for each; whilst 
Scotland enacted Gillick into the ALCSA and has virtually no case law. This chapter will 
examine each country’s regulation of children’s rights to consent to, and refuse, medical 




II .  Austra l ian Law 
 
A. Legis lat ion 
 
South Australia (SA) is the only state with legislation providing for children giving 
consent to medical treatment. Young people of 16 years and over are presumed 
competent and may make treatment decisions,256 whilst younger children may consent if 
three criteria are met: (i) the administering medical practitioner deems them Gillick 
competent; (ii) the treatment is in their best interests; and (iii) the opinion is supported by 
the written opinion of at least one other medical practitioner who personally examines 
the child.257 
 
In New South Wales (NSW), although The Minor (Property and Contracts) Act 1970, 
section 49(2), provides for children of 14 years and over being capable of consenting, the 
provision does not confer the right to consent, and fails to specify criteria for 
competence. Rather, it protects health professionals from claims of assault and battery 
																																																								
256 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995, s 6. 
257 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995, s 12 “ A medical practitioner may 
administer treatment to a child if (a) the parent or guardian consents; or (b) the child consents and (i) the 
medical practitioner who is to administer the treatment is of the opinion that the child is capable of 
understanding the nature, consequences and risks of the treatment and that the treatment is in the best 
interest of the child's health and well-being; and (ii) that opinion is supported by the written opinion of at 
least one other medical practitioner who personally examines the child before the treatment is commenced.”  
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when they rely upon their consent.258 Yet, in 2008, the NSW Law Commission reported 
and recommended a new statutory framework, giving competent children and young 
people the right to consent to, and refuse, health care independently of their parents. 259  
It suggested a presumption of competence for over 16-year-olds, 260 and a competence 
test for those under 16 years based on understanding information relevant to making the 
decision and its consequences, similar to the criteria in Gillick. 261  Despite these 
recommendations, NSW chose to leave the matter to the common law.  
 
Adding to the legal complexity, all Australian States have legislation that defines a minor 
as aged under 18 years, after which competence is presumed.262 This demarcation may 
produce some confusion for medical professionals. For example, The Queensland Law 
Handbook, ‘Medical Treatment for Children’, states:263 
 
Some medical practitioners take the view that a person of 16 years or older is assumed to 
have full capacity to consent, and therefore the consent of a parent or guardian is 
unnecessary. Other doctors and hospitals take a more conservative approach and assume 
that only a person of 18 years or over can be considered to have such capacity. 
 
However, having adopted Gillick into the common law, children under 16 years may be 
competent to give medical consent. 264 Thus, to gain a sense of how Australia has applied 
Gillick, Australia’s significant cases are now considered, in particular, in the context of 
gender dysphoria, where there is a significant line of authority. 
  
																																																								
258 The Minor (Property and Contracts) Act 1970, s 49(2): “Where medical treatment or dental treatment of 
a minor aged fourteen years or upwards is carried out with the prior consent of the minor, his or her 
consent has effect in relation to a claim by him or her for assault or battery in respect of anything done in 
the course of that treatment as if, at the time when the consent is given, he or she were aged twenty-one 
years or upwards.” 
259 NSW Law Reform Commission, Young People and Consent to Health Care, Report No 119 (October 2008) 
at recommendation 4. 
260 At recommendation 6. 
261 At recommendation 5. 
262 Age of Majority Act 1977 (Vic) s 3; Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1971 (SA) s 3; Age of Majority Act 
1972 (WA) s 5; Age of Majority Act (NT) s 4 (The name of this Act does not have a year but is in force as 
at 1 April 1981); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 17; Age of Majority Act 1974 (ACT) s 5; Minors (Property 
and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW); and Age of Majority Act 1973 (Tas) s 3. 
263  The Queensland Law Handbook “Medical Treatment for Children” (21 November 2016) 
<www.queenslandlawhandbook.org.au>. 
264Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB [1992] 175 CLR 218 (Marion’s Case). 
Complexity is added when considering abortion and contraception, as there are no separate laws governing 
the right of children to consent to abortion in any Australian state. In some states it is illegal and governed 
by the criminal law, for example, Criminal Code 1899, ss224-226 (Qld) and NSW Crimes Act 1900, ss82-84, 
whilst in others abortion is lawful and privacy is protected, such as Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 and 
Public Health and Wellbeing Amendment (Safe Access Zones) Act 2015 (Vic). Similarly, there are no 
specific laws relating to prescribing contraception for children, and it is dependent upon the common law 
Gillick competence test. However, there are inconsistencies in practice, for example, in The Queensland 
Handbook “Children, sex and contraception” it states that “[s]ome doctors will refuse to give 
contraceptive advice or prescribe oral contraceptives to unmarried minors without parental consent. 
However, advice and prescriptions for contraceptives are usually available from offices of the Family 




B.  Case Law on Competence to Consent  
 
1.  Secretary ,  Department o f  Health and Community Servi ces  v  JWB and SMB 
(Marion’s  case) 265  
This seminal decision of the Australian High Court marked the acceptance of Gillick into 
Australian law, although Marion, the child of this application, would never become 
competent herself, due to severe intellectual and physical disabilities. Marion’s parents 
had applied to the Family Court in North Territory for either an order allowing her to 
have a hysterectomy and an ovariectomy, or a declaration that it would be lawful for 
them to consent to those procedures. The rationale was to prevent pregnancy and 
menstruation, and stabilise her changing hormones.266 In delineating the powers between 
parents and the State, the majority confirmed that a decision to sterilise another person is 
beyond the scope of parental power in “non-therapeutic”267 situations, as a “procedural 
safeguard”,268 as opposed to in “therapeutic” situations. The Court defined therapeutic 
sterilisation as being a “by-product of surgery appropriately carried out to treat some 
malfunction or disease”, and by default, “non-therapeutic” must be all other 
circumstances. 269  The Court was reluctant to make this delineation because of 
																																																								
265 Marion’s case, above n 264. At 232 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ Gillick competence 
was described as a “threshold”, and at 237-8 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ considered 
that the Gillick approach, “though lacking the certainty of a fixed age rule accords with experience and with 
psychology.” 
266 The Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction to intervene to make orders relating to children’s welfare, 
in their best interests, under Family Law Act 1975, s 67ZC: “Orders relating to welfare of children 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction that a court has under this Part in relation to children, the court also has 
jurisdiction to make orders relating to the welfare of children. (2) In deciding whether to make an order 
under subsection (1) in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as paramount 
consideration.” Courts have separated ‘special medical procedures’ from ordinary parental rights, and these 
are the responsibility of the State. Generally, these involve medical procedures or interventions in which 
the proposed procedure is:  
• invasive, permanent and irreversible;  
• ‘non-therapeutic’, that being, not for the purpose of curing a malfunction or disease;  
• there is a significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future 
capacity to consent or about what are the best interests of a child who cannot consent; and  
• the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave.  
For example non-therapeutic sterilisation of a young person with intellectual disabilities (Marion’s case, 
above n 255); stage two treatment for gender identity disorder (Re Jamie [2013] 278 FLR 155); and sex 
reassignment surgery (Re Alex [2009] 248 FLR 312). 
267 At 219. The Court, with the exception of Deane J, held that parents could never consent to sterilisation 
for non-therapeutic purposes. At 305 Deane J would have allowed parental consent for non-therapeutic 
sterilisation only in a narrowly-defined set of circumstances, namely: (i) where the child is so profoundly 
intellectually disabled that she will never be able to have a mature human relationship involving informed 
sexual intercourse, of responsible procreation or of caring for an infant; (ii) where the surgery is necessary 
to avoid grave and unusual problems and suffering associated with menstruation; (iii) where the surgery is a 
treatment of last resort; and (iv) where there is medical advice from a multidisciplinary team acting on the 
basis of appropriate reports. 
268 Marion’s case, above n 264 at 249 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. 
269 At 250 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. More specifically was Brennan, J at 269: “I 
would define treatment (including surgery) as therapeutic when it is administered for the chief purpose of 
preventing, removing or ameliorating a cosmetic deformity, a pathological condition or a psychiatric 
disorder, provided the treatment is appropriate for and proportionate to the purpose for which it is 
administered. “Non-therapeutic” medical treatment is descriptive of treatment which is inappropriate or 
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uncertainty,270 but considered it necessary to make it “however unclear the dividing line 
may be.”271 The Court’s concern over sterilisation, as opposed to other forms of invasive 
surgery, was: 272   
… the significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a child's present or 
future capacity to consent or about what are the best interests of a child who cannot 
consent, and secondly, because the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly 
grave.  
 
The Court’s concerns mainly lay in protecting children’s vulnerability from the potential 
power of both the medical professional and parents:273  
Children with intellectual disabilities are particularly vulnerable, both because of their 
minority and their disability, and … there is less likelihood of (intentional or 
unintentional) abuse of the rights of children if an application to a court is mandatory, 
than if the decision in all cases could be made by a guardian alone. 274 
Their unease of the medical profession lay in two areas: (i) of children’s competence 
being inaccurately assessed, or assumptions being made, due to disabilities; and (ii) 
having a purely clinical view of the procedure, rather than viewing it in a wider context of 
social and psychological consequences.275 Their concern of parents related to possible 
conflicting interests.276 
Although the question of Marion’s competence was not central to this decision, Marion’s 
case would become the cornerstone of the law on the assessment of children’s 
competence, and as will be seen when considering Re Jamie,277 became its limiting factor. 
However, before examining Re Jamie, the issue of assessing children’s competence was 
considered in Re Alex.278 The dilemmas for the Court were the process for assessing 
competence and who should bear that responsibility. 
  
																																																																																																																																																														
disproportionate having regard to the cosmetic deformity, pathological condition or psychological disorder 
for which the treatment is administered and of treatment which is administered chiefly for other purposes.” 
270 At 250 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. 
271 At 250 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. 
272 At 250 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. 
273 At 250-253 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. They desired also to protect the 
potential right of children to give informed consent. 
274 At 253 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. 
275 At 250-1 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. 
276 At 251-2 per Mason CJ, Dawson J, Toohey J and Gaudron J. However, at 253 the Court acknowledged 
the implication of this for parents, and the need for legislative reform: “In saying this we acknowledge that 
it is too costly for most parents to fund court proceedings, that delay is likely to cause painful 
inconvenience and that the strictly adversarial process of the court is very often unsuitable for arriving at 
this kind of decision. These are clear indications of the need for legislative reform, since a more 
appropriate process for decision-making can only be introduced in that way.” fl 
277 Re Jamie, above n 266. 
278 Re Alex [2004] 180 FLRJ 89. 
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2.  Re Alex (2004)279 
Alex was 13-years-old at the time an application was made to the Court to enable her to 
undergo medical treatment and procedures that would change her gender from female to 
male. Central to the application was the question of Alex’s competence. The Court, 
following Gillick and Marion’s case, accepted that for children to be competent to consent, 
they require “sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to 
understand fully what is imposed,”280 and acknowledged the “significant onus” placed 
upon health professionals in such assessments.281 
Nicholson CJ relied upon the evidence of Professor P, a university professor in 
psychiatry; the treating psychiatrist, Mr T, who prepared the family report; and Dr N, 
Consultant Psychiatrist and specialist in child and adolescent psychiatry when considering 
Alex’s competence.282 Collectively, the experts considered that Alex was knowledgeable; 
had understanding of the treatment, its side effects and benefits; and was mature and 
intelligent.283 Dr N highlighted that although Alex held anger and unresolved feelings, 
that would have a bearing on her capacity to understand treatment, these “should not be 
seen as contraindications to medical intervention or as impairing [Alex’s] 
comprehension.”284 Although Dr N reached no conclusion on Alex’ competence,285  he 
was uncertain whether she understood “the full implications of the treatment.”286 Both 
Mr T and Professor P agreed “that it [was] not appropriate at age 13 [Alex] should be 
wholly responsible for the decision to undergo hormone treatment (emphasis added), it 
being a factor for Professor P that Alex was not in the care of her mother to share that 
responsibility.287 Further, he believed that Alex would be:288 
… able to make an informed judgment about the procedure and its risk in the 
foreseeable future but that the urgency of treatment is such that it should begin a soon as 
possible.  
The Court interpreted this evidence as suggesting “that Alex may have Gillick capacity or 
may reach that standard soon”, but at the present time the Court should make the 
decision.289 In concluding that Alex was incompetent to make this decision, the Court 
stated:290 
It is one thing for a child or young person to have a general understanding of what is 
proposed and its effect but it is quite another to conclude that he/she has sufficient 
maturity to fully understand the grave nature and effects of the proposed treatment.  
																																																								
279 Re Alex, above n 278. 
280 At [155] per Nicholson CJ. 
281 At [155] per Nicholson CJ. 
282 At [157] – [167]. 
283 At [160] per Mr T and [162] – [164] per Professor P. 
284 At 118. 
285 At [167]. 
286 At [160]. 
287 At [160]. 
288 At [164]. 
289 At [165]. 
290 At [168]. 
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During the proceedings the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(Commission) made written submissions on human rights principles,291 concluding that 
in this case if Alex is found to be competent the Court had no role in making the 
decision:292 
… the better view - and the view that is most consistent with Re Marion and the 
principles of international law outlined above - is that a court has no power to override 
either the informed consent or informed refusal of a competent child to medical 
treatment, or, if it does have such a power, it should not as a matter of discretion 
exercise that power except, perhaps, in extreme circumstances. … It is submitted that if 
this Court finds that the child has achieved “a sufficient understanding and intelligence” 
to enable the child “to understand fully what is proposed”, then this Court has no 
further role in this matter.   
 
Nonetheless, the Court doubted the accuracy of these submissions by focusing on the 
nature of treatment and age, concluding:293 
Much will depend upon what it is that is proposed in each individual case. It seems to 
me that there is a considerable difference between a child or young person deciding to 
use contraceptives as in Gillick and a child or young person determining upon a course 
that will “change” his/her sex. It is highly questionable whether a 13 year old could ever 
be regarded as having the capacity for the latter, and this situation may well continue 
until the young person reaches maturity.  
The Court took account of Alex’s views, her best interests and finality of proceedings, 
authorising the hormone therapies, but kept the proceedings on foot to enable them to 
be re-opened if additional orders/ interventions were required.294 
3.  Re Alex  (2009)295  
Further court procedure was necessary, and on 11 July 2007, leave was sought from the 
Court for special medical procedures - bilateral mastectomies and ongoing psychiatric 
assessment.296 At the time of the hearing Alex was almost 17 years old. Evidence was 
adduced from six witnesses: three medical specialists; a member from Alex’s school; his 
case manager; and the Departmental officer responsible for Alex’s care under the 
guardianship order.297 Alex was present at the hearing, and represented by a lawyer, who 
conveyed Alex’s views.298 The Court identified three issues to be addressed in the expert 
evidence, including “Alex’s views and level of understanding about the nature and effect 
																																																								
291 The Commission submitted that in respect of children’s right to refuse treatment the English cases of 
Re R (a minor) (wardship: consent to treatment) [1992] Fam 11 and Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627 should not be 
adopted. 
292 At [170]. 
293 At [173]. 
294 At [244]. 
295 Re Alex, above n 266.  
296 At [21]. At [100]: The latter was not pursued as it was part of the ordinary decision making powers of 
the Department. 
297 At [22]. 
298 At [24]. 
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of the proposed procedure.”299 Despite this, the Court’s enquiry was based upon Alex’s 
welfare and best interests, rather than on whether he was now Gillick competent.300 Prior 
to making her decision, Bryant CJ, took regard of, but accorded relatively little weight to, 
the submissions made by the Commission in the earlier hearing, which included the issue 
of whether a child could give informed consent to the contemplated medical 
procedures.301 Although no evidence was adduced, and no submissions made on this 
issue, the Court went on to consider it, due to its: 302 
… special importance in the circumstances of this case and in light of Alex’s age, the 
strength of his views and the greater recognition that is being accorded in the 
international law community to the right of children to exercise agency in decisions 
affecting them.  
In weighing up Alex’s competence, the Court had regard to his experience and impact of 
treatment since 2004; age and maturity; understanding of the process; weighing up of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure; initiative in undertaking research on it; 
consistent and unwavering view of being male; and his developmental capacity for 
decision-making. 303  The Court concluded that Alex was “an intelligent, thoughtful, 
reflective and creative young person with well developed adaptive skills,”304 and as such it 
was “not satisfied that Alex is not Gillick competent and therefore unable to himself 
consent to the surgery.” 305 Bryant CJ, however, avoided making a positive finding of 
Alex being competent, due to an absence of submissions from the parties and Counsel.306 
She stated that this “ was not an issue identified and thus not one upon which I sought 
evidence to be adduced.”307 The Court considered that the most appropriate way to 
proceed was: 308 
… to adopt the same approach as that of Nicholson CJ in the earlier proceedings, which 
is to take the view that the issue of Gillick competence is academic unless I intend to 
make orders not permitting the procedure. Alex’s maturity and likely Gillick competence 
however provide further support for the orders I made.  
Clearly, given that the Court had identified Alex’s understanding as an issue, his level of 
competence was, or should have been, argued and decided upon. Instead, the Court, in 
my view, took a glib, or unnecessary tentative approach to Alex’s competence, which 
lacked respect for it, avoiding the real issues of whether Alex was competent and 
																																																								
299 At [23]. 
300 At [44] for example, during the expert medical evidence, Bryant CJ stated “I then articulated my main 
concern, that being the benefit to Alex of the surgery being performed before he turns 18 years of age.” 
301 At [111]. 
302 At [138]. 
303 At [141]-[146]. 
304 At [174] Alex is described as “an intelligent, sensitive, thoughtful and good-humoured young man of 
considerable maturity and perception.” 
305 At [147]. 
306 At [147]. 
307 At [138]. 
308 At [147]. 
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therefore could consent to the proposed treatment.309 
Thus, the Court in both Re Alex decisions was reluctant to accept that children could 
possess the requisite level of understanding and intelligence to be competent to consent 
to such life changing procedures. Naturally, a high level of competence is needed for the 
serious and complex nature of treatment, but there was nothing in the competence 
assessments that would have led the Court to conclude that he did not possess the 
requisite level of understanding, and gave no specific indication of what he lacked. The 
effect of these decisions was to restrict the parameters of Gillick, by considering that 
some treatments are beyond the competence, and therefore rights, of children to consent. 
4.   Re Jamie (2013) 310 
The extent of parental authority to consent to stages one and two of hormone treatment 
for gender identity disorder was the subject of appeal in Re Jamie, when Jamie was almost 
11-years-old.311 A Full Court of the Family Court confirmed that stage one treatment was 
within parental responsibilities and was therapeutic treatment, as defined in Marion’s case. 
In giving the leading judgment, Bryant CJ widened the definition of therapeutic 
treatment to include psychiatric disorders, as “the question is whether the treatment 
relates to a disease or malfunctioning of organs, including psychological or psychiatric 
disorders.”312 She concluded:313 
… stage one treatment of childhood gender identity disorder is reversible, is not 
attended by grave risk if a wrong decision is made, and is for the treatment of a 
malfunction or disease, being a psychological rather than physiological disease. As such, 
and absent controversy, it falls within the wide ambit of parental responsibility reposing 
in parents when a child is not yet able to make his or her own decisions about treatment. 
However, in distinguishing stage two treatment, due to its irreversibility, the Court held 
that this remained under its authority, unless the child was competent to consent.314 In 
considering competence, Bryant CJ stated:315 
In my view, it would be contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to the 
autonomous decision-making to which a Gillick competent child is entitled, to hold that 
there is a particular class of treatment, namely stage two treatment for childhood gender 
identity disorder, that disentitles autonomous decision-making by the child, whereas no 
other medical procedure does. The High Court in Marion’s case, adopting the formulation 
																																																								
309 At [150] the Court’s concluded that permission was required for a bilateral mastectomy, as this 
procedure fell outside of the normal exercise of parental responsibility. The Court had regard to “the 
interventionist nature of the procedure, its irreversibility, [and] the risks that attend any form of surgery 
(however minor).” 
310 Re Jamie, above n 266. 
311 The trial judge, Dessau J in Re Jamie [2011] FamCA 248 had provided authorization in relation to stage 
one treatment, which was entirely reversible, but not in relation to stage two, which is normally 
commenced at 16 years and was only reversible with surgical intervention. 
312 Re Jamie, above n 266 at [98]. 
313 At [107]-[108]. 
314 At [140]. Court intervention may be required if there is dispute over treatment or competency. 
315 At [134]-[135]. 
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in Gillick, held at 237 that a child is capable of giving informed consent when he or she 
“achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand 
fully what is proposed”. I see no basis for reading this down because the treatment is for 
childhood gender identity disorder. Indeed, one might think that, of all the medical 
treatments that might arise, treatment for something as personal and essential as the 
perception of one’s gender and sexuality would be the very exemplar of when the rights 
of the Gillick-competent child should be given full effect. 
Despite this appearance of following Gillick, the Court reneged from fully respecting 
children’s competence and autonomy by creating a further legal barrier, albeit reluctantly. 
The Court concluded that competence assessments were required to be made by it, even 
when the treating doctors and parents agreed.316 Although Finn J acknowledged the 
implications of costs and stress to the child and parents, the Court believed it was bound 
by the High Court decision of Marion’s Case, in which: 
… the majority held that court authorisation was required first because of the significant 
risk of making the wrong decision as to a child’s capacity to consent, and second because 
the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave.”317 
Court intervention was further justified when conflict existed, regardless of children’s 
competence, with the Court considering its role to be more than assessing and 
determining children’s competence, but also making decision’s in children’s best 
interests:318 
d) If the child is Gillick competent, the child can consent to the treatment and 
no court authorisation is required, absent any controversy; (emphasis added) … 
f) If there is a dispute between the parents, child and treating medical 
practitioners, or any of them, regarding the treatment and/or whether or not the 
child is Gillick competent, the court should make an assessment about whether 
to authorise stage two having regard to the best interests of the child as the 
paramount consideration. In making this assessment, the court should give 
significant weight to the views of the child in accordance with his or her age or 
maturity.  
 
Thus, the court is acting as gatekeeper to stage two hormone treatment. Regardless of 
whether a child is competent or not the Court retains control: it determines whether 
children are competent to consent, and if not, it decides whether to consent; and by 
focusing on the outcome of stage two treatment, it being irreversible, the Court deemed 






316 At [137]-[138]. 
317 At [137]. 
318 At [140]. 
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5.   Re Jamie (2015)319  
	
A further application was filed to the Family Court on 28 May 2015, when Jamie was 15-
years-old, seeking confirmation of her competence to consent to stage two treatment. 
The court found Jamie to be competent, accepting the unchallenged evidence of Dr T, 
head of the hospital’s Gender Dysphoria Service; Associate Professor P, child and 
adolescent psychiatrist; Jamie’s parents; and Jamie, by way of letter. Thornton J, in 
applying Gillick, took account of her intelligence; understanding over a number of years; 
consistent views; the questions she asked health professionals; her evolving 
independence; and her appreciation of the potential consequences, including infertility.320 
The Court was satisfied that Jamie was competent “to fully understand the nature and 
consequences of the treatment described in the application and to make her own 
decision in relation to that treatment.”321 The Court considered that having found Jamie 
to be competent, there was no requirement to make a declaration of competence to 
consent.  
6. Post  Re Jamie 
Marion’s case and Re Jamie created confusion and uncertainty on the role and powers of 
the Australian courts, resulting in variations in approaches. Commonly, applications 
requested courts to make declarations of competence, and in the alternative, to authorise 
treatment on the basis of children’s best interests. Some judges simply made findings of 
competence, then dismissed the application, as occurred in Re Jamie;322 others made 
orders declaring competence;323 whilst some also found treatment to be in young people’s 
best interests.324 It was not uncommon for some judges to cover all bases, by indicating 
that in the event that they are wrong about their decision on competence, 325 or that a 
finding of best interests is also required,326 then treatment is found to be in young 
people’s best interests.327 For example, Austin J in Re Jacinta was strongly of the opinion 
that orders required to be made, as it would be “absurd for the Court to make no orders 
at all”, leaving health professionals without clear answers.328  
																																																								
319 Re Jamie [2015] FamCA 455. 
320 At [81]-[82] per Thornton, J. 
321 At [81] – [82] per Thornton, J. 
322 For example Re: Julian [2017] FamCA 621; Re: Mason [2017] FamCA 453; Re Logan [2016] FamCA 87   
323 For example Re: Pat [2017] FamCA 418. 
324 For example in Re Tahilia [2017] Fam CA 715 the Court made a declaration of competence and found 
that such a declaration was in the young person’s best interests. 
325 For example, Re Nadia [2017] FamCA 526. 
326 For example, Re Jaden [2017] FamCA 269. 
327 Re Kelvin [2017] FamCAFC 258 at [51]. Between Re Jamie on 31 July 2013 and 16 October 2017 (shortly 
before the judgement in Re Kelvin) the Family Court dealt with 63 cases for either stage two or stage three 
treatment for gender dysphoria, with 62 allowing treatment. The most common outcomes were: declaring a 
child Gillick competent to consent (26); finding a child is Gillick competent to consent (22); finding 
competence and making a declaration (7).  
328 Re Jacinta [2015] FamCA 1196 at [26]. 
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In 2015 Hon Justice Strickland called for either national or State statutory reform.329 This 
call was not responded to, and so in 2017, Watts J in Re Kelvin made a stated case to the 
Full Court - Family Court of Australia (Full Court). The first two questions of six sought 
clarification on firstly whether the Full Court confirmed its decision in Re Jamie, requiring 
the court’s authorisation for stage two treatment, and secondly whether courts should 
determine competence, rather than leaving it to health professionals caring for the 
child.330 Members of the judiciary, academics,331 and young people asked a more general 
question of whether courts have any role to play in young people accessing such 
treatment, given in almost all cases there is no conflict and no dispute over young 
people’s competence.332 For example, after giving his decision in Re Lucas,333 Tree, J made 
some further observations, describing the role of courts as “administrative 
sanctioning”334, and quoting Lucas’ views,335 concluded:336 
																																																								
329 Strickland, J “Building bridges: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Family Law To Treat Or Not To Treat: 
Legal Responses to Transgender Young People Revisited” (paper presented to Association of Family and 
Conciliation Courts Australian Chapter Conference Sydney, Australia) 14-15 August 2015 at 31. 
330 Re Kelvin [2017] FamCA 78 at [8]. The six questions in full were:  
1.  Does the Full Court confirm its decision in Re Jamie (2013) FLC 93-547 to the effect 
that Stage 2 treatment of a child for the condition of Gender Dysphoria in 
Adolescents and Adults … requires the court’s authorisation pursuant to s 67ZC of 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), unless the child was Gillick competent to 
give informed consent to the treatment? 
2. Does the Full Court confirm that the Family Court of Australia and not the child’s 
treating professionals should determine whether a child is Gillick competent to give 
consent to the treatment? 
3. If the answer to question 2 is yes, given statements made by the Full Court in 
Re Jamie … if a finding is made that the child was Gillick competent to give informed 
consent to the treatment, should any application for a declaration that the child is 
Gillick competent to give consent to the treatment, be dismissed?  
4. In the alternative, if the answer to question 2 is yes, given statements made by the 
Full Court in Re Jamie … if a finding is made that the child was Gillick competent to 
give informed consent to the treatment, should any application for an order 
authorising the administration of the treatment, be dismissed?  
5. If the answer to question 3 is no, given statements made by the Full Court in Re Jamie, 
if a finding is made that the child was Gillick competent to give informed consent to 
the treatment, is the jurisdiction and power of the court enlivened, pursuant to 
s 67ZC of the Act, to make a declaration that the child was Gillick competent to give 
informed consent to the treatment? 
6. If the answer to question 4 is no, given statements made by the Full Court in Re Jamie, 
if a finding is made that the child was Gillick competent to give informed consent to 
the treatment, is the jurisdiction and power of the court enlivened, pursuant to 
s 67ZC of the Act, to make an order authorising the administration of the treatment? 
(paragraph 56). 
331 For example Felicity Bell “Children with Gender Dysphoria and the Jurisdiction of the Family Court” 
(2015) 38(2) UNSW Law Journal 426. 
332 Of exception was Re: Chelsea [2017] FamCA 389 in which the court agreed with the second opinion that 
the 17-year-old was competent. 
333 Re Lucas [2016] FamCA 1129. 
334 At [68]. 
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… not only is the decision of Re Jamie open to serious doubt, given that it is said that the 
outcome was required by Marion’s Case, but further, the practical consequences of the 
decision do not appear to serve any sound policy objective either.   
I agree with the view of Tree J in the above case when he states:337 
With the greatest of respect to those who discern such a compulsion in Marion’s Case, I 
regret that it eludes me. Indeed, were I free to decide the matter for myself, I would hold 
that if the proposed treatment is therapeutic, what Marion’s Case compels is the 
conclusion that the decision about its administration is within ordinary parental 
responsibility, and hence no court involvement of any kind is required. 
In light of the Court in Re Jamie categorising the treatment as “therapeutic”, it was within 
the bounds of normal parental responsibilities for parents to consent, where children 
lacked competence, to consent, and thus no court intervention was necessary. Courts 
only require to give further consideration to the question of consent for “non-therapeutic” 
treatment. The implication of Re Jamie’s decision was that stage one treatment was 
therapeutic, but stage two was non-therapeutic. Inconsistently, the Court in Re Alex 
regarded the two stages together as “a single treatment plan”, and therefore if that view 
had been followed, the entire treatment could have been classified as therapeutic.338 
Clarification came on 30 November 2017 when the Full Court (five judges) delivered 
their judgment, answering the first two questions stated by Watts J in Re Kelvin negatively, 
and therefore the remaining questions were "unnecessary to answer.”339 As a result there 
is no requirement for courts to act as “a filter” in such cases.340 The Court considered it 
appropriate to depart from Re Jamie to reflect the current state of the medical 
knowledge,341 and as a consequence no longer viewed this treatment as one which 
justified court authorisation.342 The result is either competent children, or their parents if 
not competent, can consent to stage two treatment without an application to the court.  
Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that the same legal predicament could result with other 
																																																																																																																																																														
335 At [54]: “Australia is the only country in the world to have the Family Court process for children under 
the age of 18 to be able to access cross-hormone treatment.  This process is obsolete, there are processes 
within countries like the USA, or Switzerland, that are more effective, less time consuming and less 
expensive.  I am lucky that I am a patient person who understands that even this system is flawed, it still is 
a system I must go through.  This process of medically transitioning has taken over two years, which is a 
ridiculous amount of time for any person no matter their age to wait for something so essential to their 
wellbeing.  The suicide rates within the gender community always is at a high due to the external 
discrimination and marginalisation the community faces.  The Family Court process only adds to this in a 
turmoil.  There have been times over the last two years where Dysphoria, frustration and hopelessness has 
made me feel like I didn’t have control over decision making for my own body and own life.  But this 
frustration and hopelessness is what I have to go through to reach my goal of going on cross-hormone 
treatment before 18.” 
336 At [71]. 
337 At [66]. 
338 Re Alex [2004], above n 278 at [186]. 
339 Re Kelvin [2017] FamCAFC 258. 
340 At [119] per Thackray, Strickland and Murphy JJ. 
341 At [152] per Thackray, Strickland and Murphy JJ. 
342 At [182] per Thackray, Strickland and Murphy JJ. 
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forms of treatment, as the classification of treatment as “therapeutic” and “non-
therapeutic” depends upon “the circumstances surrounding the particular treatment” and 
“amongst other things, evolving medical science, which, notoriously, occurs at a very 
rapid pace.”343 Further, instead of courts focusing on the children’s processes of decision-
making, and rather on the outcome, courts will continue to assess children’s competence 
to consent to treatment “where there is the significant risk of making the wrong decision 
and the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave.”344 Yet, if children are 
unable to assess the risks and understand the consequences then they lack competence, 
whereas if they can, they are competent and can therefore consent. 
C. Summary o f  Competence to Consent  
Thus, although Australia adopted Gillick into its common law, a complex line of 
authority developed, with courts deciding whether children had competence to consent 
to treatment, most notable for gender dysphoria. In doing so, it illuminated the criteria 
used to determine children’s competence. Whilst there was some variation in the criteria 
used by health professionals and courts, generally they were based around young people’s 
abilities to: comprehend and retain information about treatment; provide a full 
explanation at a level commensurate to their maturity and education; describe, and weigh 
up, the advantages and disadvantages of the treatment; reach an informed decision; and 
understand that the treatment will not necessarily address all of their psychological and 
social difficulties.345 In some cases the court gave a realistic and common sense approach 
to the degree of understanding needed, rejecting the notion that children’s brains needed 
to be fully developed to give them the maximum degree of understanding.346 Instead, 
children were required to be “fully aware of the consequences and risks” and capable of 
making a rational and intelligent choice after considering all the relevant information.”347 
Nevertheless, the process applicants were required to undertake was considerable, 
involving affidavit evidence, reports and oral evidence, usually from several witnesses, 
such as health professionals, parents, other carers and educators, and sometimes the 
young people themselves. This process was intended to safeguard children for making 
wrong decisions, and to ensure health professionals were accurately assessing children’s 
competence. However, the emotional and financial cost was considerable. As a result of 
confusion and inconsistencies in court process, clarity was eventually achieved, enabling 
health professionals to make competence decisions and take consent from competent 
children. 
D. Refusal  to Consent  
 
SA stands out as being unusual with the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative 
Care Act 1995, which provides for a person over the age of 16 years to “make decisions 
																																																								
343 Re Kelvin, above n 339 at [139] per Thackray, Strickland and Murphy JJ. 
344 At [179] – [182] per Thackray, Strickland and Murphy JJ. 
345 For example Re Desi [2017] FamCA 20.  
346 Re Darryl [2016] FamCA 720 at [14] per Tree, J, and followed in Re Jaden, above n 326. 
347 Re Jaden at [51]. 
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… as validly and effectively as an adult.”348 Nevertheless, the extent of this right has not 
been tested in SA, in particular whether it includes competent young people’s right to 
refuse treatment.  
 
In common law, whilst young people’s right to refuse treatment is recognised,349 it is 
unlikely to extend to situations resulting in their death, as is supported by two leading 
authorities.  
 
The first is X v The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network, involving a young person, who was 
17 years and eight months at the time of the appeal to the Court of Appeal in NSW. The 
issue was whether he should be forced to undergo a blood transfusion against his refusal 
based on his religious beliefs. After considering the statutory law, and acknowledging the 
adoption of Gillick, the Court concluded that:350 
 
… the applicant was competent, in this practical sense, to determine whether or not to 
consent to the proposed treatment. The question at the heart of this case is what flows, 
as a matter of law, from the principle adopted in Gillick and the factual finding with 
respect to the applicant.  
 
Although the Court recognised the young person’s competence and right to refuse 
treatment, it instituted the protective jurisdiction of parens patriae, thus overriding his 
decision. 351 
 
Similarly ratifying the Courts’ protectionism, the Supreme Court case of Fletcher (an infant 
by her litigation guardian Rylands) v Northern Territory of Australia, confirmed that a competent 
minor’s right to refuse treatment could be overridden. 352 The issue was whether a 16-
year-old girl suffering from anorexia nervosa would be force-fed against her will, as there 
was dispute between the health professionals responsible for her care as to her level of 
competence.353 The Court found that she was incompetent due to her mental illness, 
resulting in impairing her “judgement to the point that she did not have the capacity to 
make decisions about nutrition in a manner that was in her best interests.”354 In following 
Gillick, the Supreme Court took account of the following factors when assessing 
competence: her ability to understand the issues and circumstances; her maturity and 
degree of autonomy; her age; the complexity and nature of the issue; and the nature and 
																																																								
348 Section 6, above n 256. 
349 X v The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network [2013] NSWCA 320. 
350 At [23]. 
351 At [26]-[44] the Court considered the common laws of Australia, England and Canada that support 
courts having inherent jurisdiction over competent children who refuse treatment in circumstances that 
would affect them having a normal, healthy life. Also, in the earlier Supreme Court of South Australia 
decision in Women’s and Children’s Health Network INC v M, CN & ORS [2013] SASC 16, although the child 
was clearly incompetent, the Court overrode parental refusal on religious grounds for transfusions of blood 
and blood products in the course of treating a three-year-old child with leukaemia, instituting parens 
patriae jurisdiction of the Court in the best interests of the child.  
352 Fletcher (an infant by her litigation guaridan Rylands) v Northern Territory of Australia [2017] NTSC 62 at [25]. 
353 At [38]. 
354 At [38]. 
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effect of any medical condition.355 However, it appeared that the Court had decided that 
someone with anorexia nervosa, by its very nature, resulted in incompetence, as in the 
judgment there was no detailed consideration of how the facts related to these criteria.  
 
Thus, when incompetent children/young people refuse treatment, their parents can 
consent;356 and where both competent children/young people and parents refuse, the 
courts may consent, under parens patriae, to protect children’s welfare and best 
interests.357  
 
 E.  Profess ional Guidance on Informed Consent  
Some guidance on informed consent is given to doctors and dentists by the Medical and 
Dental Boards of Australia respectively on good practice of communicating with children, 
providing information at an appropriate level, encouraging questions, and considering 
their capacity to make decisions and consent.358 However, there are no specific criteria 
recommended for assessing competence. Similarly, the Nursing and Midwifery Board of 
Australia provides a Code of Professional Conduct for Nurses (Nursing Code) 
establishing standards, such as the provision of information and explanations to support 
decision-making and the giving of informed consent.359 Although there are not specific 
standards pertaining to children in the Nursing Code, some States have initiatives to 
support child and family health. For example, the “Health Child and Family Health 
Nursing Professional Practice Framework 2011–2016” in NSW recognising the 
importance of health professionals working in partnership with families.360 
 
F. Summary o f  Austral ian Law on Consent to ,  and Refusal  o f ,  Medical  
Treatment  
 
Most States in Australia are similar to New Zealand in having adopted Gillick into their 
common law. However, there are procedural barriers to consenting to “non-therapeutic” 
treatment, as courts determine competence, rather than these assessments being carried 
out by treating health professionals. The law has developed in a piecemeal way, with 
inconsistencies in process emerging, particularly for gender dysphoria treatment. Rather 
																																																								
355 At [20]. 
356 At [26]. 
357 At [31]. Also at [42] per Grant CJ: “… to abide by the infant’s refusal to eat would, on the medical 
evidence to hand, give rise to an unacceptable risk of permanent injury.” 
358 Medical Board of Australia “Good Medical Practice: a code of conduct for doctors in Australia” (17 
March, 2014) at 9; Dental Board of Australia “Code of Conduct” (17 March, 2014) at 11-12.  
359 Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia “Code of Professional Conduct for Nurses in Australia” 
(August, 2008) at 3-4. Also, The International Council of Nurses “The ICN Code of Ethics for Nurses” (1 
March 2018) at 6. 
360  NSW Department of Health “Health Child and Family Health Nursing Professional Practice 
Framework 2011-2016” (2011) at 10 – “The partnership approach involves heath professionals and family 
members working together in pursuit of a common goal. It is based on shared decision making, shared 
responsibility, mutual trust and mutual respect. Working in partnership with parents requires a major 
paradigm shift from the traditional role of caring ‘for’ to working ‘with’. The family partnership approach 
respects parents as advocates, and recognises them as the most significant influence in their children’s lives. 
The CFHN [Child and Family Health Nurses] respects the client’s ability to understand, learn and manage 
situations (reference omitted).” 
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than concentrating on the process of decision-making and competence of children, the 
courts have focused on the nature of the treatment and outcome, their concerns being 
the irreversibility of stage two treatment and the consequences of a wrong decision. 
However, when patients are competent they are able to make decisions. The focus 
should not be on the outcome, as that is a subjective view, but on whether they meet the 
criteria for competence, and are capable of making the treatment decision.  
 
Although there is now clarity for gender dysphoria treatment, with the Court 
reclassifying stage two treatment to therapeutic, courts will continue to be responsible for 
assessing children’s competence in “non-therapeutic” cases. The concerns stem from a 
desire to protect children from mistaken competence assessments by health professionals 
and exploitation of parents. These goals show courts’ mistrust in the child-parent-health 
professional dynamic, and of the process in making right decisions for children. Yet, it 
seems hypocritical of the courts to mistrust health professionals in their competence 
assessments, but then to rely upon them to make their decisions.  
 
South Australia differs by regulating children’s consent by statute, enabling competent 
children to consent, but only if at least two health professionals deem the treatment to be 
in their best interests. Therefore, in effect, children only have the right to agree with 
health professionals. Although, this may appear limiting at first sight, it is liberating in the 
context of “non-therapeutic” procedures, as these will not require the court’s 
confirmation of competence, as is required in other States.  
 
Unlike New Zealand, Australian common law has confirmed that competent children do 
have the right to refuse treatment, although a parent’s consent or the court can override 
this. As will be seen in the next section, refusing consent is an issue that has concerned 
the English Courts. 
 
 
III .  Law of  England/Wales  
 
A. Introduct ion 
 
The law of England reflects that of New Zealand in two respects: firstly, young people 
between the ages of 16 and 18 years have a statutory right to consent, independent of 
their parents’ consent;361 and secondly, following Gillick, competent children under the 
age of 16 years have a right to consent. However, the legal right for children/young 
people under 18 years to refuse treatment is less certain in England. Unlike section 36(1) 
of the COCA, there is no statutory right for young people to refuse treatment, and the 
common law holds that competent children/young people’s refusal will be overridden if 
the courts consider it to be in their welfare and best interests. Thus, there is no 
distinction between those under 18 years and 16 years in respect of refusal, and Gillick 
competence has in effect been reduced to an expression of their views, which are not 
																																																								
361 Family Law Reform Act 1969 s 8(1). 
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decisive. This section will consider the statutory and common law of England. Firstly, it 
briefly reflects upon the statutes that regulate consent and refusal, before focusing on the 
common law, in how it deals with children’s right of refusal, and the criteria for assessing 
children’s competence. It then turns finally to professional guidance, considering the 
advice given to health professionals on assessing children’s competence and in taking 
consent.  
 
B. Statutory Right to Consent  to Medical  Treatment 
 
The Family Law Reform Act 1969 (FLRA) gives young people the right to consent to 
surgical, medical or dental treatment.362 Section 8(2) expands upon the definition of 
“surgical, medical or dental treatment”, clarifying that this includes diagnosis and 
ancillary procedures to treatment. However, case law has restricted its scope, excluding 
blood and organ donations, “as these do not constitute either treatment or diagnosis.”363 
Lord Donaldson’s concern lay in proceeding with treatment based on either the sole 
consent of the child or parent when it is not for the benefit of the child.364 
 
Section 8(3) further complicates the situation as it states “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed as making ineffective any consent which would have been effective if this 
section had not been enacted.” There is debate on what “any consent” means. For 
example, Professor Freeman does not believe that this section refers to parental common 
law rights, as by the age of 16 years these have yielded to the young person.365 However, 
Balcombe LJ in Re W  takes a different view: 366 
That the section did not operate to prevent parental consent remaining effective, as well 
in the case of a child over 16 as in the case of a child under that age, is apparent from the 
words of subsection (3).  
It is possible that the section refers to parents consenting for incompetent young people. 
However, another interpretation is that s8(3) states the legal position of those under 16 
years in terms of Gillick, as Professor Freeman suggests:367 
What is clear is that it is concerned with the preservation of pre-existing rights: in my 
view the right of a child under 16 to continue to be able to provide a valid consent.  
Thus, FLRA, like that of COCA, is not entirely clear. Where it differs is that it left open 
the question of young’s people right to refuse consent. As will be seen below, the English 
																																																								
362 FLRA s 8(1) “The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, medical 
or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall be as 
effective as it would have been if he were if full age, and where a minor has by virtue of this section given 
effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parents or 
guardian.” 
363 For example, Re W, above n 208 at 78F per Lord Donaldson. 
364 At 79A per Lord Donaldson. 
365 Michael Freeman “Rethinking Gillick” in Michael Freeman (ed) Children’s Health and Children’s Rights 
(Leiden: BRILL, 2006) at 203. 
366 Re W, above n 208 at 86B-C. 
367 Freeman, above n 365, at 203. 
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courts have interpreted children/young people’s right to refuse treatment in a restricted 
way. 
C.  Statutory Right to Refuse  Medical  Treatment 
 
The only statutory context in which children have rights to refuse medical examinations 
or treatment is when they are received into the care, or are under the supervision of local 
authorities. For example, when they are subject of an interim order,368 children may 
refuse to submit to a medical or psychiatric examination.369 However, this refusal may 
not be determinative, as the court may override that refusal when it “is of the opinion 
that the examination or other assessment is necessary to assist the court to resolve the 
proceedings justly.”370 In considering whether to so direct, the court will have regard to 
several factors, including any impact on the child’s welfare.371  
 
D.  Common Law Right to Refuse Medical  Treatment  
 
Children’s common law right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute. Whilst Gillick 
did not involve the question of children refusing, it has been suggested that Lord 
Scarman implied that competence to consent carries with it the right to refuse,372 when 
he stated obiter: 373 
 
… I would hold as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not  
(emphasis added) their minor below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates 
if and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him 
or her to fully understand what is proposed. 
 
This seems a reasonable assumption to make, as in meeting the threshold of being 
competent, children need to understand the information and be capable of making 
																																																								
368 Children Act 1989, s 38(6) Where the court makes an interim care order, or interim supervision order, it 
may give such directions (if any) as it considers appropriate with regard to the medical or psychiatric 
examination or other assessment of the child; but if the child is of sufficient understanding to make an 
informed decision he may refuse to submit to the examination or other assessment.  
369 See also Children Act 1989, s 44(7) Where any direction is given under subsection (6)(b) [emergency 
protection order], the child may, if he is of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision, refuse 
to submit to the examination or other assessment. The court can impose and examination under s 44(8)(b). 
370 Children Act 1989, s 38(7A). 
371 Children Act 1989, s 38(7B) “When deciding whether to give a direction under subsection (6) to that 
effect the court is to have regard in particular to— 
(a) any impact which any examination or other assessment would be likely to have on the welfare of the 
child, and any other impact which giving the direction would be likely to have on the welfare of the child, 
(b) the issues with which the examination or other assessment would assist the court, 
(c) the questions which the examination or other assessment would enable the court to answer, 
(d) the evidence otherwise available, 
(e) the impact which the direction would be likely to have on the timetable, duration and conduct of the 
proceedings, 
(f) the cost of the examination or other assessment, and 
(g) any matters prescribed by Family Procedure Rules.”  
372 For example, Jane Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009) at 155. 
373 Gillick, above n 4 at 188-9. 
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decisions, one of which is to reject some, or all, of the treatment. Nevertheless, the 
English common law during the 1990s restricted the scope of Gillick, both raising the 
threshold of competence, and determining that the right to consent does not confer the 
right to refuse. This enabled parents and courts to override children’s refusal, in effect 
reducing children’s competence to an expression of their wishes, which were then 
overruled on the grounds of their welfare and best interests. However, there is a glimmer 
of the tide turning in more recent times, with greater respect being given to children’s 
competence, and on some occasions children’s decisions to refuse treatment being 
followed, despite grave consequences. 
 
1.   Re R (a minor)  (wardship:  consent  to  treatment)  (Re R) 374 
 
In Re R, a 15-year-old girl, suffering from a mental disorder, was deemed incompetent by 
the Court, despite the consultant psychiatrist assessing her as competent between 
episodes of illness. The Court of Appeal held that due to the fluctuating nature of her 
illness she was incompetent to give or withhold consent, doubting that she understoood 
the implications of her decision.375 
 
The Court distinguished Gillick in two respects. Firstly, it decided that children only have 
the right to refuse treatment when everyone with rights refuse. Lord Donaldson 
considered that “concurrent powers of consent” exist, with a number of people 
possessing this right. He declined to hold that parents’ rights terminate when children are 
competent.376 By focusing on parental rights and the protection of doctors, he considered 
that if a competent child refused consent, then consent could be given by anyone 
authorised in law to give it, describing them as “keyholders” able to unlock the door.377  
 
Secondly, Lord Donaldson viewed competence as a developmental concept, dependent 
upon “mental and emotional age, as contrasted with chronological age”, 378  but 
considered that this test needed to be “modified in the case of fluctuating mental 
disability to take account of that misfortune.”379 In order to reach the threshold of 
competence he considered consistency of competence was needed: one that “will not be 
lost or acquired on a day to day or week to week basis”; and “a full understanding and 
appreciation of the consequences both of treatment in terms of intended and possible 
side effects and, equally important, the anticipated consequences of a failure to treat.”380  
Farquharson LJ agreed, considering Gillick to be inapplicable in situations such as this 
where competence varied “from day to day according to the effect of her illness.” 381 By 
taking a holistic approach to the assessment of competence, Farquharson LJ considered 
that it should not be assessed “at a particular moment in time, isolated from the medical 
																																																								
374 Re R, above n 291.  
375 At 26C per Lord Donaldson. 
376 Gillick, above n 4 at 189 per Lord Scarman. 
377 Re R, above n 291 at 22D-E per Lord Donaldson. 
378 At 26A per Lord Donaldson. 
379 At 26A per Lord Donaldson. 
380 At 26B per Lord Donaldson. 
381 At 32 B per Lord Farquharson. 
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history and background … [but] the whole of the medical background of the case as well 
as the doctor's opinion of the effect of its decision upon the patient's mental state” 
should be taken into account.382 
 
2.  Re W (a minor)  (medical  treatment :  court ’ s  jur isdic t ion)  (Re W) 383 
 
The ratio of Re R was confirmed in Re W, when the Court of Appeal exercised its 
inherent jurisdiction by ordering a 16-year-old girl, suffering from anorexia nervosa, to be 
transferred into a unit for treatment against her will. Although at first instance Thorpe J 
found the girl to be competent to make informed decisions, the Court of Appeal 
considered that he had failed to take sufficient account of a feature of her condition, that 
being an inability to make an informed choice. Lord Donaldson believed that the 
condition “creates a compulsion to refuse treatment or only accept treatment which is 
likely to be ineffective.”384 Belittling the views of children, he further stated:385 
Where the wishes of the minor are themselves something which the doctors reasonably 
consider need to be treated in the minor’s best interest, those wishes clearly have a much 
reduced significance.   
The decision sanctioned the limitless power of the court, confirming that treatment and 
procedures can be forced upon children in their best interests, even in the context of 
abortion:386  
Hair-raising possibilities were canvassed of abortions being carried out by doctors in 
reliance upon the consent of parents and despite the refusal of consent by 16- and 17-
year-olds. Whilst this may be possible as a matter of law, I do not see any likelihood 
taking account of medical ethics, unless the abortion was truly in the best interests of the 
child. This is not to say that it could not happen.  
Re W undermined the rights and autonomy of children established in Gillick, by being 
both protective of the medical profession and paternalistic. Children’s right to refuse was 
reduced to having a right to express their views, the importance of which increased with 
age and maturity.387 Despite this, Balcombe LJ acknowledged that at a matter of “logic 
there can be no difference between an ability to consent to treatment and an ability to 
refuse.”388 However, he failed to take that logic one step further to conclude that this 
should result in children having the right to refuse when competent. Rather, he 
interchanged “competence” with “wishes”, believing that their wishes were only one 
factor in assessing their best interests.389 Although he gave recognition to children’s 
increasing competence and autonomy, Balcombe LJ made clear that competence and 
wishes were not determinative, setting it within the welfare paradigm. In considering 
when it would be appropriate to disregard the wishes of a 16 or 17-year-old, he believed 
																																																								
382 At 31C-E per Lord Farquharson. 
383 Re W, above n 208. 
384 At 81B, per Lord Donaldson. 
385 At 81B, per Lord Donaldson. 
386 At 79 B-C per Lord Donaldson. 
387 At 81C–D and 84 A-B per Lord Donaldson MR. 
388 At 88B-C per Balcombe LJ. 
389 At 88 C-F per Balcombe LJ. 
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it unhelpful to define a threshold,390 although he indicated that this would be reached “in 
circumstances which will in all probability lead to the death of the child or to severe 
permanent injury.”391 
 
Whilst understandably seeking to protect children, the Court gave no detailed 
consideration of the required criteria for competence, and specifically in what respect the 
competence of this young person was lacking. There was simply a broad-brush approach 
to it basing it upon the mental health diagnoses, rather than upon understanding of 
treatment and intelligence.392 The Court could have taken a more objective approach to 
competence, measuring the facts to criteria, and if finding her to be competent, then 
separately considering treatment under the mental health legislation. It could be said that 
the end result is the same, but the means by which that conclusion is reached is 
significant for the sanctity of the Gillick competence test, and of children’s right to self-
determination and autonomy. The effect of the decision was to reduce competence to 
one of an expression of wishes, which in their best interests, could be overruled.  
 
3.  Re E (a minor)(wardship:  medical  treatment)  (Re E)393 
 
Prior to both of the above decisions, the competence threshold had already been 
elevated in Re E, where the court decided that life or death decisions were outside of 
children’s understanding, as they are unable to understand the full implications of the 
process of dying, the manner of death and the extent of family suffering. 394 However, 
																																																								
390 At 89 B-C per Balcombe LJ. 
391 At 88 E-F per Balcombe LJ. 
392 At 84D-F Balcombe LJ confirmed that the finding by Thorpe J of W’s competence was supported by 
the expert evidence of Dr G, a consultant psychiatrist specialising in anorexia nervosa, who examined W 
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393 Re E (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1991] 1 FLR 386. 
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consequences of those and have an independence of views at [22]; and An NHS Trust v ABC and A Local 
Authority [2014] EWHC 1445 in which a 13-year-old girl was assessed as being competent to consent to an 
abortion. The Court heard evidence from the consultant obstetrician who confirmed that she understood 
her position, options and implications and risks of those options, and was able to explain to him that her 
wish was to terminate the pregnancy, as she felt unable to cope with its continuance, it causing her stress to 
a considerable degree. In response to the question of the degree to which she understood the procedure of 
termination, he concluded that “she understood the gist of it to the extent that it would be necessary for 
her to reach a decision.” (Transcript of evidence at the end of judgement). Also, of relevance was her 
independence of mind, it being confirmed by the obstetrician that the decision was clearly hers, and that 
she was not under the influence of her family. On the point of influence the obstetrician stated: “We 
addressed that question specifically during our interview this morning and both A herself ... I mean, A was 
clear in telling us that this decision was her own, that she had made up her mind. Independently, the mum 
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upon reaching the threshold of 18 years, the age at which the law in England deems 
people capable of understanding their own death, E refused treatment and was allowed 
to die.395 
 
4.   Re S (a minor)(consent to medical  tr eatment)(Re S); 396  Re L (medical  
treatment :  Gil l i ck competency)  (Re L)397 
 
Likewise, in Re S and Re L, children aged 15½ and 14 years respectively were considered 
incompetent to refuse blood transfusions, as they lacked the maturity to make such 
decisions.398  Yet, both children were not given the opportunity to demonstrate their 
maturity and competence, as they had not been fully informed of the details of their 
potential death, due to its distressing nature. On a practical level this would be a difficult 
conversation for health professionals and children to have, but there needs to be a 
dialogue, enhancing the others’ understanding, about what the consequences would be if 
treatment is refused, and similarly, how it would feel to these children to be forced to 
undergo a blood transfusion against their beliefs and views. Without such exchange of 
information, neither the children nor health professionals are fully informed. Thus, 
children cannot be criticised for lacking understanding if they are not provided with 
necessary information, at an appropriate level, upon which to base their decision. In any 
event, as Professor Freeman points out, the issue is what they are capable of 
understanding, rather than their actual understanding.399 
 
5.   Re P (medical  treatment :  best  interes ts) (Re P) 400 
 
A more authentic approach to competence is found in Re P, whereby greater respect was 
given to the young persons’ beliefs, views and competence. John, aged 16 years and 10 
months, refused blood or blood products. The Court acknowledged that although young 
people’s refusal may be determinative as they reach the age of majority, the Court’s role 
until then is to protect them to ensure they reach that age.401 Mr Justice Johnson strived 
to overcome the conflicts between John’s views and competence; the importance of co-
operation between doctor and patient; the views and beliefs of John’s parents; and John’s 
best interests, finding “weighty and compelling reasons why this order should not be 
made.”402 However, he conlcuded, albeit reluctantly, that it was in his best interests “in 
																																																																																																																																																														
and grandma said that they did not in any way coerce her into this decision. I would also like to point out 
that in the interview itself, I did not detect any obvious sign of distress from A's part. She seemed calm, she 
seemed appropriate. Her responses, her eye contact and her speech seemed appropriate and I did not feel 
in my opinion, I did not detect any sign of distress or any suggestion that she might be either distressed or 
suffering from any acute mental illness for that matter” (Transcript of evidence at the end of judgement).   
395 This was confirmed in Re S (a minor)(consent to medical treatment) [1994] 2FLR 1065 and referred to in Re M 
(medical treatment: consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097 and Re P (medical treatment: best interests) [2003] EWHC 2327. 
396 Re S, above n 395. 
397 Re L (medical treatment: Gillick competency) [1999] 2 FCR 524. 
398 Re S, above n 395; Re L, above n 397. 
399 Freeman, above n 265 at 209. See also Fortin, above n 372 at 154 who points out that adults are not 
required to have this level of understanding in either case law or statute. 
400 Re P, above n 395. 
401 At [9] per Johnson J. 
402 At [11] per Johnson J. 
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the widest possible sense - medical, religious, social, whatever they may be” to override 
his refusal.403 Although there was no detailed consideration of John’s competence, it was 
implied.404  
 
6.  Hannah Jones and Joshua McAulay 
 
The need to consider competing factors when children refuse treatment highlights the 
unsuitablilty of a blanket rule. On some occasions, it will be appropriate to follow 
competent children’s decisions, as the following two cases demonstrate. The first 
involved Hannah Jones, aged 12 years, who decided not to proceed with a heart 
transplant, after having considered medical advice.405 She had a hole in her heart, caused 
or exacerbated by leukaemia medication, which she took from the age of five years.406 
She is reported in the press as having weighed up the risks against the benefits of the 
operation, believing that the risk was too great for her, and instead preferring to enjoy 
her remaining time at home with her family and friends.407 Initially, Hereford Primary 
Care Trust (the Trust) filed a court application to force Hannah to undergo the operation. 
However, upon the Court checking, and receiving confirmation of, her competence, the 
Trust discontinued its application, allowing Hannah to live at home with her family.408 
Hannah’s consultant paediatrician is reported as supporting Hannah’s decision, stating 
that “no one can be forced to have a heart transplant”, leaving it open for her to change 
her mind.409 This is in fact what Hannah did at the age of 14 years, and  upon consenting 
to the transplant, an NHS spokesman is reported as confirming her competence: 410 
 
In our discussions with Hannah we are convinced she has the maturity and experience to 
make decisions for herself about her treatment and truly understands the implications. 
 
Hannah is reported as stating that she was doing what believed was right for her at the 
age of 12 years, as she overwhelmingly felt that she wanted to be at home.411 
 
The second case, also reported in the English press, involved Joshua McAulay, a 15 year-
old, who refused a blood transfusion on the basis of his religious beliefs. His mother 
supported his decision and the medical practitioners respected it also. The hospital could 
																																																								
403 At [12] per Johnson J. 
404 At [11] per Johnson J. 
405 BBC unnamed reporter “Girl wins the right to refuse heart” (BBC News, England, 11 November 2008) 
<www.news.bbc.co.uk>. 
406 Robert Verkaik, “Girl, 13, wins right to refuse heart transplant” (Independent, 11 November 2011) 
<www.independent.co.uk>. 
407 Varkaik, above n 406.  
408 BBC, above n 405. 
409 BBC, above n 405. 
410 Matthew Weaver “Right-to-die teenager Hannah Jones changes her mind about heart transplant” The 
Guardian (The Guardian, 21 July 2009) <www.theguardian.com>. 
411 Emily Retter “Hannah Jones at 18: I turned down a heart transplant at 13 but I am so glad I changed 
my mind” The Mirror (The Mirror, England, 13 July 2013. 
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have asked the courts to determine the issue, but a spokesman from Selly Oak Hospital 
said:412  
 
There's not one single policy and not one single law regarding transfusions. There's no 
automatic right to override parental wishes or that of a minor. It's a very complex area 
that has to be approached on a case by case basis. 
 
E.  Competence Assessment and Profess ional Guidel ines  
 
It becomes clear when considering the above cases that the courts at times have struck at 
the heart of Gillick and its competence test, either by failing to apply competence criteria, 
or when doing so, have raised the threshold of what children are required to meet. The 
end result in both scenarios is that competence is reduced to an expression of wishes or 
views, which are then overruled when they do not accord with what is believed to be in 
children’s best interests. This subjective approach leads to inconsistencies and 
uncertainties, which may make it difficult for health professionals to have confidence in 
their competence assessments.413  
 
Nonetheless, the British Medical Association (BMA) and General Medical Council 
(GMC) provide guidance on assessing children’s competence and the taking of consent. 
The BMA has developed a “Children and young person tool kit”, designed to assist 
doctors in identifying key factors when assessing competence, and to assist them in 
understanding what this means in terms of children and young people’s ability to consent 
to, and refuse, healthcare. The criteria highlight the need for children to be capable of 
understanding not only the treatment, but also that they are able to freely use the 
information to make a choice: 414 
  
• the ability to understand that there is a choice and that choices have 
consequences  
• the ability to weigh the information and arrive at a decision  
• a willingness to make a choice (including the choice that someone else should 
make the decision)  
• an understanding of the nature and purpose of the proposed intervention  
• an understanding of the proposed intervention’s risks and side effects  
• an understanding of the alternatives to the proposed intervention, and the risks 
attached to them  
• freedom from undue pressure.  
 
																																																								
412 Laura Roberts, “Teenage Jehovah Witness refuses blood transfusion and dies” (The Telegraph, England, 
18 May 2010). 
413 For example, in An NHS Trust v ABC and A Local Authority, above n 206 at [6] an application was made 
for declaratory relief to avoid professional risk or crticism. It sought either a declaration that it would be in 
the interests of a 13-year-old girl to terminate her pregnancy if the Court deemed her incompetent to 
consent, or if deemed competent “a declaration to that effect so that the position is put beyond doubt and 
that any later criticisms of the Trust, in taking the steps that they did, can be deflected” (emphasis added).  




Similarly, following the wording of Gillick, the GMC advises doctors that they must 
decide whether the young person understands the nature, purpose and possible 
consequences of having or not having the health care.415 Only those who “are able to 
understand, retain, use and weigh this information, and communicate their decision to 
others”, are competent to consent.416 Doctors are advised to assess children’s maturity 
and abilities to make specific decisions at the time they need to be made, rather than 
focusing on age, requiring them to re-evaluate competence.417 Also, a collegial approach 
to competence assessments is recommended for borderline or doubtful situations, taking 
advice from other health professionals involved in children’s care and from specialists.418 
 
F.  Summary o f  Law of  England/Wales  on Consent to ,  and Refusal  o f ,  
Medical  Treatment  
 
In England competent children have the right to consent to treatment, but not to refuse. 
A higher threshold requires to be reached for children to be deemed competent, in 
addition to those in Gillick, such as: consistent, not fluctuating, understanding; views that 
have not been unduly influenced by family members; and exclusion of life or death 
decisions. The shifting nature of competence criteria results in uncertainties, although 
clearer guidance/criteria are provided to medical professions through their guidelines. 
 
 
IV. Law of  Scot land 
 
A.  Introduct ion 
 
Scotland is the most straightforward of the four jurisdictions considered, since young 
people have the same rights as adults,419 and children’s right to consent to medical 
treatment is secured in statute.420 Thus, the common law does not need to be relied upon 
to define children’s right to consent. However, there is some doubt whether section 2(4) 
of the ALCSA also covers children’s right to refuse treatment. This section firstly 
considers the background to the ALCSA, followed by the law on refusal, and finally 
professional guidelines on assessing competence. 
 
B.  Background to the Age o f  Legal  Capaci ty  (Scot land) Act 1991 
Prior the passing of the ALCSA, the law on the legal capacity of under 18-year-olds was 
mmuncertain in several areas of private law, including consent to medical treatment.421 As 
																																																								
415 General Medical Council “0-18 years: guidance for all doctors” (2007) at [24]. 
416 At [24]. 
417 At [25], [26] and [70]. 
418 At [73]. 
419 ALCSA, s1(1)(b). 
420 ALCSA, S 2(4). 
421 SLC, above n 14 at [1.1] 
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a consequence, practice amongst health professionals varied.422 Although the Scottish 
Home and Health Department (SHHD) circular, in 1979, advised health professionals 
that parents of children under the age of 16 years are required to give their consent, and 
may give their consent for those between the ages of 16 and 18 years,423 the legal basis 
was questionable, as acknowledged by the Scottish Law Commission (SLC): 424 
… there is no legal foundation for the widespread belief that 16 is the age of consent to 
medical treatment in Scotland. In the absence of any statutory provision, the matter must 
be governed by the common law and at common law the only relevant age for matters 
relating to the person of the child is the age of minority-12 for a girl and 14 for a boy. It 
would appear therefore that the present law is that a girl of 12 and a boy of 14 can give a 
legally effective consent to medical treatment. It is, however, by no means certain that a 
child below these ages could not give consent, at least to certain types of medical 
treatment, which would provide an effective defence to a civil claim for damages for 
assault. Much would depend on the age and understanding of the child and on the 
nature of the treatment. The consent of an older pupil child to a simple treatment may 
well be legally effective. 
Thus, clarification of the law was required, and in 1987 the SLC made recommendations 
for reform. Their initial proposition was that children should be recognised as having the 
capacity to consent at the age of 16 years. However, they accepted the rigid and 
unrealistic nature of such a law would fail to take into account the competence of 
younger children. It thus mooted four possible ways in which flexibility could be added 
to allow competent children to consent:425 
 
1. Where it was “in accordance with approved medical practice to act on the basis 
of such consent”;  
2. “[F]or specified illness or conditions”;  
3. Where children are “capable of understanding the nature and consequences of 
the treatment proposed”;   
4. “Where in the opinion of the qualified medical practitioner attending the child, 
supported by the written opinion of another, (i) the young person was capable of 
understanding the nature and consequences of the treatment; and (ii) the 
treatment and procedure to be used was in the best interests of the young person 
and his continuing health and well-being.” 
The SLC invited the public to comment upon, and discuss, the proposals for reform.426 
																																																								
422 At [3.65]: “Some doctors are aware of the legal significance of the age of minority and act on the basis 
of the consent of a girl from the age of 12 or a boy from the age of 14. Others regard 16 as the age of 
consent and, as we have seen, consent of a parent or guardian is often required as a matter of practice in 
relation to hospital treatment for patients up to the age of 18.”  
423 Circular SHHD (DS(79)2) at [2.7]. 
424 SLC, above n 14 at [2.9]. 
425 SLC, above n 14 at at [3.62]. 
426 SLC above n 14, which was laid before Parliament by the Lord Advocate in 1987, was preceded by a 
consultative memorandum published in June 1985 that reviewed the law of that time in respect of the legal 
capacity of pupils (girls under 12 years and boys under 14 years) and minors (girls between 12-18 years and 
boys between 14-18 years). At [1.2] as the Memorandum was technical and detailed SLC published “a short 
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The majority of those who supported a presumption of competence for young people 
also believed that there should be “some form of exception to it.”427 Notably, some 
influential members of the medical community, such as medical, nursing and family 
planning bodies, raised concern of fixing children’s right to consent at 16 years. Amongst 
their concerns were the view that there was not a problem in the law to fix, as it gave 
sufficient flexibility and protection to both children and the medical profession, and if it 
was set at 16 years this may create a barrier to children under that age accessing health 
services, particularly contraception and sexual health advice.428 
Whilst SLC accepted that the law did not appear to present practical problems, it 
considered that the current law was unsatisfactory, with their concerns being the lack of 
clarity and inconsistencies in practice:429 
It is, in our view, undesirable that such different practices should be adopted on the basis 
of what is believed, correctly or incorrectly, to be the existing law. For the protection of 
both the young patient and the doctor, the law in this area should be clear.   
The most favoured option amongst consultees to provide flexibility in the law was to 
base it upon children’s capacity to understand. Also, some consultees raised concerns 
over the competence test requiring a second opinion, or being based on best interests. 
The former was considered to be “too cumbersome and would not necessarily provide 
any safeguard for either the doctor or the patient,” and the latter was “too restrictive and 
unnecessary.”430 The SLC agreed, concluding that persons under the age of 16 should 
have legal capacity to consent where they are capable of understanding the nature and 
consequences of the treatment proposed. The draft Bill attached to the report proceeded 
through Parliament unchanged and became law in terms of section 2(4) of the ALCSA: 
A person under the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to consent on his own behalf 
to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment where, in the opinion of a 
qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is capable of understanding the nature 
and possible consequences of the procedure or treatment. 
 
Thus, the test reflected Gillick, with the attending medical professional assessing 






pamphlet which explained the issues as simply as possible and which contained a questionnaire. The 
pamphlet was distributed to members of the public by making it available in public libraries and citizens' 
advice bureaux as well as by sending it direct to interested groups and enquirers. To encourage further 
discussion of our proposals, we also held a series of meetings in Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow at 
which, following short contributions from a panel of speakers, members of the public were invited to 
express their views. 
427 SLC, above n 14 at [3.63]. 
428 At [3.64]. 
429 At [3.65]. 
430 At [3.77]. 
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C.  Refusal  to Consent  
 
Although the ALCSA does not specifically state that children also have the right to 
refuse treatment, the generally accepted view amongst the judiciary,431 some academics,432  
and implied by the SLC,433  is that section 2(4) should be interpreted as carrying with it 
the right to refuse. For example, Professor Norrie stated:434 
 
… it is submitted that the right to consent necessarily carries with it the right to refuse 
consent. The very, the only, point of asking patients to consent to medical treatment is 
to give them the opportunity to refuse that consent. The right to say yes must therefore 
carry with it the right to say no.  
Likewise, Wilkinson and Norrie indicated:435 
… if the right to consent is an aspect of individual autonomy, then the only point in 
asking a patient to consent to medical treatment is to give the patient the opportunity to 
refuse and for that reason the capacity to consent carries with it, it is submitted the right 
to refuse.  
Judicial approval of competent children’s decisions prevailing over those of their parents 
is found in the only reported Scottish decision of Houston.436 The Sheriff, referring to 
section 2(4), stated obiter:437 
[It] seems illogical that on the one hand a person under the age of sixteen should be 
granted the power to decide upon medical treatment for himself but his parents have the 
right to override his decision. I am inclined to the view that the minor’s decision is 
paramount and cannot be overridden.438  
Further, although the matter was not fully canvassed, it was conceded that “consent” in 
section 2(4) covers refusal, to which the Sheriff agreed.439  
However, the matter has not been put beyond doubt, as there is an absence of Scottish 
authority on children refusing treatment in general, and in life or death situations in 
particular, to test it. Commentary by Sheriff Kelbie on Houston notes the uncertainty as to 
																																																								
431 Houston, above n 14 at 945 per Sheriff J McGowan. 
432 See Wilkinson and Norrie, above n 14 at 261.  
433 SLC, above n 14 at [3.77]. In rejecting the inclusion of best interests into the capacity provision, the 
SLC commented that “[i]f it is accepted that a child may consent if he is of sufficient maturity to 
understand the treatment proposed then that test should apply whether the treatment concerned is for his 
benefit or not.” Although the SLC did not explicitly consider the question of rejecting treatment, following 
this line it could be argued that if competent children can consent to treatment that is not in their best 
interests, so too can refuse. 
434 Norrie, above n 14 at 436. 
435 Wilkinson and Norrie, above n 14 at 480. 
436 John Houston, above n 14. 
437 At 945. Also, the Sheriff described the mother’s position as “irrelevant” as the boy was competent, at 
945.  
438 This supports and answers the dilemma raised by Professor Norrie, above n 14, at 437, in which he 
ruminates upon conflicting positions of parents and child. 
439 Houston, above n 14 at 945. 
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whether children’s refusal would be upheld in such circumstances.440 However, it is 
questionable whether an application to the court by parents seeking a specific issue order 
to override competent children’s refusal would be competent, a view shared by 
Wilkinson and Norrie.441 On the other hand, Griffiths, Fotheringham and McCarthy are 
of the opinion that provided children are under the age of 16 years, courts retain the 
right to make orders in relation to parental responsibilities and rights under Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995, s11(1).442 Also, the Scottish Executive Health Department has 
offered guidance that a parent, health professional or anyone with an interest could make 
such an application.443  
 
Although allowing competent children to die may be unpalatable, in my view the logic of 
Wilkinson and Norrie is preferable in their interpretation of the law. As Scots law accepts 
that parental rights yield to those of competent children, then as indicated above, 
children must have an independent right to consent to, or refuse, treatment. If it is 
accepted that competent children do have the right of refusal, then that is regardless of 
the outcome. Whilst courts do retain the right to make orders until children are 16 years, 
those orders would be empty vessels, as they should not override competent children’s 
decisions. In the event that such an application is incompetent, the only avenues that 
could be pursued to attempt to override a decision of a competent child, would be under 
the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, if the circumstance fell 
within its remit, or perhaps under the nobile officium of the Court of Session, or parens 
patriae, stemming from the recognition of the sovereign historically, as pater patriae, 
being the natural and legal guardian of children under full age.444  
 
D.  Profess ional  Guidance  
The Scottish Executive Health Department provides guidance on good practice in taking 
children’s consent, advising health professionals to use their clinical judgement and take 
account:445 
• the age of the patient  
• the maturity of the patient  
• the complexity of the proposed intervention  
																																																								
440 At 948. 
441 Wilkinson and Norrie, above n 14 at 262.   
442 Anne Griffiths, John Fotheringham and Frankie McCarthy Family Law (4th ed, W Green, Edinburgh, 
2015) at 115 [4-39]. 
443 Scottish Executive, Health Department “A Good Practice Guide on Consent for Health Professionals 
in NHS Scotland” (NHS Scotland, 2006) at 10: “In some circumstances the refusal of consent by or on 
behalf of a child may be overridden by the courts which in terms of section 11(2) of the 1995 Act 
[Children (Scotland) Act 1991] may authorise medical treatment. Any person with an interest, which could 
include a medical practitioner, can apply to the court which will decide the matter on the basis of the best 
interests of the child. The circumstances in which such an application will be appropriate are likely to be 
limited but could arise in a life or death situation.” 
444 See Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate 1996 SLT 848 in which the Court of Session considered 
these in the context of terminating life sustaining treatment to a vegetative adult.  
445Scottish Executive, Health Department, above n 443 at 8. See British Medical Association, n 414 which 
is also applicable to Scotland. 
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• its likely outcome  
• the risks associated with it.  
E.  Summary o f  Scots  Law 
 
Young people have the same rights as adults to consent or refuse medical treatment. 
Children’ right to consent to medical treatment is protected in statute, and although not 
entirely free from doubt, includes the right to refuse.  
 
 
V. Chapter  Summary  
 
New Zealand, Australia (except for SA) and England have no statutory right for children 
to consent to medical treatment, relying on the common law of Gillick. Scotland is 
unique by having a statutory right that encapsulates Gillick. It is likely that this would also 
be interpreted as including the right to refuse. Although Australia has recognised the 
right to refuse in its common law, it has limited it, as parents or courts can override 
children’s decisions. Similarly, in New Zealand and England, it is uncertain whether 
children have the right to refuse, and if so, to what degree. There is an absence of case 
law in New Zealand, but in England, the common law has raised the threshold of 
competence for children refusing treatment, and even when found competent, their 
decisions can be overruled in their best interests. 
 
For young people in New Zealand, there is a clear statutory right to refuse medical 
treatment, unlike in England, who treat them in the same way as those under 16 years. In 
Scotland, young people aged 16 years have the same rights as adults to enter into any 
transaction.446 Therefore, cases such as those that have arisen in England, when young 
people have refused treatment, or in Australia when seeking treatment for gender 
dysphoria, would not arise in Scotland. It is striking that in Scotland there is a dearth of 
case law on children consenting to, and refusing, treatment. As a result, the Scottish legal 
system has not been faced with difficult situations, such as when children refuse 
treatment, or when parents and children disagree. However, it is probable that given the 
terms of section 2(4) of the ALCSA competent children’s decisions would be respected. 
 








446 ALCSA s1(1)(b). 
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Table 1:  International Law Comparison of New Zealand, Australia, 
England/Wales and Scotland on Children Consenting to, and 
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447 Norrie, above n 14, at 436. Also Griffiths, Fortheringham and McCarthy, above n 442 at 113 who 
described Gillick as “an English case but one which has been accepted as highly influential in Scots law.” 
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This chapter has shown the peculiarities that have developed in the common law of 
Australia and England in respect of consent to gender dysphoria treatment and refusal of 
treatment respectively. Although undoubtedly motivated by a desire to protect 
children/young people, the Australian courts have sought to act as a gatekeeper to 
treatment, appearing to hold mistrust in parents, health professionals and young people, 
in the following ways: by limiting parents’ ability to consent to “non-therapeutic” 
procedures; by enquiring into, and approving, the competence assessments of health 
professionals; and being reluctant to accept that children/young people are capable of 
making “non-therapeutic” decisions. In doing so, it has become preoccupied with the 
definition of “non-therapeutic”, creating uncertainty, inconsistency and complexity in the 
law. When tracing the path of the common law, it can be seen how, in my view, the 
common law took a wrong turn in Re Jamie, creating barriers and layers of complexity, by 
differentiating between stage one, “therapeutic” treatment, and stage two, “non-
therapeutic” treatment. This was despite having previously viewed them together as one 
in Re Alex. It seems illogical to separate them, as both stem from the same health 
condition and are necessary to complete the treatment.  
 
Age discrimination and disrespect of children, and their autonomous decision-making, 
appear also to be consequences of the way in which Australian common law has 
developed. It seems clear in Re Alex and Re Jamie that there was reluctance by the courts 
to accept that young people could be competent to consent to such treatment. The 
procedural requirement of applying to court for a decision on competence for stage two 
gender dysphoria treatment, in particular, and “non-therapeutic” treatment in general, in 
my view, undermines both the abilities and relationships of health professionals and 
children, and adds to the costs and stress for families. Although the court may bring an 
objective perspective to such assessments, and clarify criteria for competence, its 
involvement lacks proportionality, appearing unnecessary, particularly when, in all but 
one gender dysphoria case, the courts followed health professionals’ views, confirming 
young people’s competence. Such consequences could have been avoided, if in Re Jamie, 
the Court had either respected Jamie’s competence, or held that the treatment was 
therapeutic, and his parents could consent. The law’s uncertainty and confusion reached 
the point that clarification was necessary through a stated case in Re Kelvin, which was a 
more expedient and direct process than attempting to pass legislation. Applications are 
now no longer required for either an order permitting parents to consent, or to 
determine children’s competence, for stage two gender dysphoria treatment. 
 
Similarly, in England, a line of authority developed by differentiating between the rights 
to consent to, and refuse, treatment. In doing so, it elevated the competence threshold, 
resulting in some children/young person being deemed incompetent. Nevertheless, cases 
such as Hannah Jones and Joshua McAulay have paved the way for the possibility of 
children being sufficiently competent to make life or death decisions. Moreover, what 
Hannah Jones’ situation highlighted is that a decision reached by a child/young person 
may not be final, and should always be open for review, placing responsibilities upon 





Features common to laws of New Zealand, Australia and England are the inconsistent 
court processes and application of Gillick. On some occasions, applications for orders 
allowing medical treatment are viewed as guardianship matters, in which children’s views 
are considered, but where neither Gillick, nor competence, are considered. In other cases, 
although Gillick is considered, and competence determined, there is a lack of 
transparency from courts on what criteria are used and in what respect(s) children lack 
competence. 
 
Greater predictability in the law could be achieved by respecting the ratio of Gillick. 
Competence to consent relates to intelligence and understanding to make a specific 
decision. If children possess those, and can make the decision, they are competent, and 
as such have the right to give, or conversely refuse, consent. Competence gives children 
the right to decide, not simply to agree with health professionals’ or parents’ decisions. 
By distinguishing between the rights of consent and  refusal, it unnecessarily complicates 
matters.  Focus needs to be on the process of making the decision, rather than on the 
outcome. If the law’s attention is diverted to outcome, then subjective judgments will be 
made about children’s decisions, leading to inconsistencies and uncertainty. The law 
needs to clearly separate competence from outcome. If the law and society do not 
approve of that outcome, and seek to protect children, there needs to be a separate 
process, such as by making an application for additional guardianship, under parens 
patriae jurisdiction, or the mental health legislation, if applicable. 
 
However, what are the views of health professionals, parents and children who are at the 
sharp-end of the law? The next chapter reviews the research literature on children’s 























 Chapter 5 
 
                                Literature Review 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
In the legal sense competence to consent is viewed in black or white terms - either a 
person meets the threshold to provide valid consent or does not. However, taking a 
broader perspective, it is much more complex. Firstly, competence can exist in degrees, 
or at certain stages in informed consent processes. For example, children may show 
competence to participate in discussions, but are not able to make decisions. Secondly, 
children’s competence does not exist in isolation, but is relational. It is promoted or 
constrained by the relationships between children, parents and health professionals, and 
their attitudes, values, personal attributes and communication skills, together with their 
intersection with the environment - physical surroundings, availability of time, or nature 
of the health condition.  
 
This chapter reviews the international research evidence on the factors influencing 
children’s competence to participate in discussions and decision-making, and in the 
giving of consent. It firstly highlights the range of factors involved, moving then to 
discuss those relating to each key participant: health professionals, parents and children. 
Finally, the chapter reviews studies on health professionals’ practices in taking consent, 
to examine what, if any, barriers exist in the consent processes for children. 
 
II .  Factors  Inf luenc ing Competence   
A. Range o f  Factors  
Competence is affected by a multitude of factors, some of which relate to children’s 
individuality and others to external factors. Alderson argues that children’s social context 
is a powerful influence on their competence and divides this into i) inner/personal 
attributes, such as gender; ethnicity; temperament and ability; degree of independence 
and optimism; comfort in taking risks; and their hopes, fears and values;448 and ii) 
external factors, including home and family; the hospital environment; medicine; media; 
attitudes towards childhood; and the law.449 The range and interplay of these sets of 
factors are two reasons why it is unsound to make presumptions about children’s 
competence.  
To shed light on the diversity of factors affecting children’s communication with health 
professionals, Beresford and Sloper researched the experiences of 63 chronically ill 
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children, aged between 11-16 years, suffering from the chronic health conditions of 
cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, juvenile chronic arthritis, or Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy.450 They found that a multitude of factors influenced children’s abilities to have 
open discussions, such as a lack of time or privacy; feelings that there may be negative 
consequences if they divulge personal/sensitive information; their parents dominating 
conversations; their age;451 and the doctor-parent dynamic excluding them.452 Age was 
relevant in the sense that children of different ages were inhibited in various ways, for 
example, the status of health professionals impacted upon younger children more, 
whereas the lack of privacy constrained older ones.453 Children’s age was confirmed by 
several studies to be an unreliable indicator of how involved children were in 
consultations.454 Instead, Lambert and others found four factors influencing the degree 
of children’s participation in communication: their preferences; attitudes and skills of 
health professionals; attitudes of parents in recognising children’s needs to be part of 
conversations; and the hospital environment, such as the workload of professionals.455 It 
is the interweaving of these factors that influence children’s competence. They are now 
considered under the headings of health professionals’ roles, parents’ roles and children’s 
views and experiences. 
B.  Health Profess ionals ’  Roles  
1.  Health Profess ionals ’  Communicat ion Sty les  and Att i tudes  
Health professionals’ roles are central to children’s involvement in consultations, 
specifically their communication styles, attitudes, values, assumptions and time.456 For 
instance, health professionals who regard children as partners are more likely to 
communicate with them in an inclusive way, as they respect their abilities and 
contributions, rather than those who view them as vulnerable and in need of 
protection.457  Paternalistic attitudes can result in not only children’s exclusion from 
discussions, information and decision-making, but also cause them to have less 
meaningful encounters with health professionals, as the following two studies discovered. 
In Garth, Murphy and Reddihough’s research, the nine participating paediatricians 
acknowledged the importance of including children, describing the strategies they used, 
such as using understandable language.458 However, of significance was the purpose for 
which these health professionals involved children, as commonly they engaged with them 
more in preliminary discussions, to develop a rapport and to gather information, rather 
																																																								
450 Beresford and Sloper, above n 19. 
451 At 175-6. 
452 At 174-177. 
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Glacken and McCarron, above n 20 at 3098. 
455 Lambert, Glacken and McCarron, above n 20 at 3099. 
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children’s participation in treatment discussions with health professionals in hospital: familiarity with the 
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457 Annette Dickinson, Wendy Wrapson and Tineke Water “Children’s voices in public hospital healthcare 
delivery: intention as opposed to practice” (2014) 127 New Zealand Medical Journal 24 at 24. 
458 Garth, Murphy and Reddihough, above n 71 at 48. 
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than to enhance children’s understanding and involve them in decision-making.459 The 
study found that, at times, children were excluded from conversations by parents and 
paediatricians gatekeeping information to protect them from stress, having regard also, to 
children’s preferences.460 This had the effect of controlling the degree to which children 
were involved in treatment discussions and decision-making.461  
Similarly, van Dulmen found in 302 outpatient encounters that children’s contributions 
were limited to 4%,462 almost exclusively for the purpose of “social talk and laughter and 
the provision of medical information.” 463  Paediatricians sourced information from 
children (26%) more than they provided information to children (13%),464 which “would 
seem to be a contradiction, in that children are considered capable of providing 
information, yet not sufficiently capable of receiving information.”465 However, the 
average age of the children participating was low (5.3 years), 466  which may have 
contributed to these findings, as the study found also that the level of communication 
increased with age.467 Nevertheless, if younger children are not encouraged or expected 
to participate by health professionals and parents, it can result in social conditioning, or 
“passive obedience”, where children feel inhibited, or are otherwise unable to contribute, 
thus constraining their competence.468 The rationale in some situations may be due to the 
seriousness of children’s health, such as in cancer, where there is a lack of treatment 
choice, and the adherence to protocol is paramount.469 For example, Ruhe and others 
found, during their qualitative research in eight paediatric oncology centres, that doctors 
and parents controlled information. They did this by filtering and pacing its disclosure, to 
times when they perceived children prepared to receive it, and also by influencing 
decisions, by providing persuasive explanations.470 Whilst children’s cancer treatment was 
curative, both health professionals and parents believed that they should make treatment 
decisions, but when palliative, children had more say:471  
In the case of disease progression almost all parents and physicians stated that the child’s 
point of view becomes more important than theirs. Thus, they related that as long as 
cure is possible, decisional priority lies with adults, but in palliative situations, the roles 
are inverted and a priority shift takes place.  
However, some health professionals would give children choices for minor procedures in 
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curative situations, provided these did not affect the overall efficacy of the treatment, for 
example, whether to insert a porth-a-cath.472 Yet, there is no indication that health 
professionals’ judgement, of whether or not to involve children in such decisions, was 
based upon children’s competence. It was rather defined by outcome or consequence. 
Other factors that influenced children’s participation, beyond the categorisation of 
curative/palliative in cancer, were (i) from adults’ perspectives: the parenting culture; 
health professionals’ attitudes; time pressure;473 and children’s age, health, emotional state, 
maturity and preferences;474 and (ii) from children’s perspectives: adults’ behaviour and 
the state of their illness.475  
In the wider health context, beyond that of cancer treatment, Runeson, Enskar and 
Elander found a similar range of factors were significant to whether health professionals 
involved children in treatment decisions. Through obtaining the views of 350 Swedish 
health professionals (doctors, nurses, assistant nurses, play therapists and psychologists) 
the following issues were significant: children’s protests; age and maturity; parents’ roles; 
attitudes of staff; time; and whether alternatives were offered.476 These, in combination, 
influenced whether health professionals reconsidered their decisions to proceed with 
treatment when children refused, by for example, agreeing to administer medication in 
the child’s chosen method, or whether they forced treatment upon children. The 
complicity of health professionals and parents, at times, resulted in children being 
forcibly treated. For example, her parents and nurses held down a protesting two and a 
half year old, while a catheter was inserted, and a four-year-old boy’s father held him 
down while a blood sample was taken, whilst he screamed hysterically.477 Although older 
children were less likely to be forced to undergo treatment, the research found children 
aged eight and nine being forcibly treated.478 Children are more likely to co-operate if 
they have been emotionally prepared, understand the necessity and purpose of treatment 
and have a sense of control.479 Alderson contends that consent is not simply an act of 
signing a form, but a collective process, in which there is an exchange of information and 
consideration of options, to “arrive at a medical and moral agreement that satisfies both 
parties.”480 This applies equally to minor procedures, such as the insertion of nasogastric 
tubes or catheters, as it does for major surgery.  
 
Naturally, health professionals are experts in their fields, advising and guiding families, 
but the exchange of information, particularly listening to children’s views and 
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perspectives, is crucial to the best decisions being made.481 If assumptions are made on 
children’s views or best interests, and the focus is solely on treating health conditions, 
children may miss opportunities to contribute to discussions and decision-making. 
Powerful examples of this emerged in Alderson’s research in two children’s heart surgery 
units in England, when she considered the implications to children of decisions being 
made for them, rather than with them. 95 families were involved in her study, who were 
asked about their children’s illnesses and treatments, and how much they thought they 
were, or could have been, informed and involved in medical and nursing decisions. 
Accounts differed, with some families participating in joint decision-making with 
doctors,482 whilst some parents were given little or no opportunity to have a discussion 
with the doctor, but simply asked to sign the consent form.483 Patrick’s story illustrates 
what can happen when children are not consulted. Aged 10 years, Patrick was unable to 
stand straight, but could run in a hunchbacked way, and play football, which he loved. 
Following surgery to straighten his legs he became upright, and looked normal, which the 
surgeon regarded as a success. However, to Patrick it was a disaster, as he could no 
longer run.484  
 
Several studies have found significant variability in health professionals’ practices of 
including children. Coyne discovered, for example, that nurses were using their personal 
perceptions of children’s cognitive abilities, rather than using specified criteria to decide 
whether to involve children, such as children’s understanding relative to the treatment.485 
This led to practices of involving only older children, of at least 13 years, preventing 
younger children from having a voice and developing their decision-making skills and 
experience.486 Examples of this are vividly conveyed in Alderson’s study when she 
examined children’s ability to reach informed and wise surgical decisions.487 Some of the 
120 participating children, aged between eight and 15 years old, told of how they were 
not consulted in significant, body altering procedures, such as leg lengthening, and 
instead, surgeons made decisions.488 Some adult participants were protective towards 
children, believing that it was not worthwhile informing them, as it was too much 
responsibility to make surgical decisions, or beyond children’s competence, 489 and that 
children would refuse treatment.490 However, uninformed and excluded children feel 
ignored and forced into the surgery;491 whilst informed children, who are able to talk 
about their anxieties and understand its purpose, are more likely to co-operate and be 
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less fearful. 492 For some procedures, such as leg-lengthening, it is possible to give 
children time to understand and decide upon their options, as it can be undertaken until 
around the age of 30 years, although the clinical outcome may be greater if done 
earlier.493 However, being pressurised into the decision, or entering surgery unprepared, 
may come with psychological difficulties. Involving children, and giving them time to 
consider their options, respects their bodily integrity, individualism and growing 
competence. 
It is essential to include children in treatment decisions to gain their views, perspectives, 
and concerns, particularly prior to treatment, but also during it when children are finding 
it invasive and/or distressing. This is not uncommon for children when undergoing 
dental treatment. The only study exploring the informed consent process during dental 
treatment is that of Smith and others who considered the degree to which children were 
involved when receiving stainless steel crowns.494 They found that children’s right to 
choose was not always respected, and consent not always sought, when they filmed 22 
children undergoing this treatment.495 For example, although all the children were told 
that they could raise their hand to request that the dentist stop drilling, this was not 
respected for one child; whilst another received a local anaesthetic against his wishes, and 
without his mother’s consent, despite initially being advised that it would not be 
required.496 The first example highlights the on-going nature of consent, and the second 
is an extreme example of the dentist proceeding without consent. It is the exchange of 
information and working in partnership with both children and their parents that truly 
makes consent processes informed. Health professionals are in a position to inform and 
enable children to participate in discussions, decisions and in the self-management of 
their health.497 Whilst they may seek consent in the legal sense from parents, “[c]onsent is 
about sharing knowledge and control over decisions.”498  
 
Thus, health professionals’ attitudes towards children’s involvement affect the purpose 
and level of communication, the information they provide, and the extent to which they 
involve them in decisions. Where their focus is on protecting children from stress, or on 
the treatment outcome, they are less likely to involve children in these processes.  




492 Alderson, Choosing for Children: Parents’ Consent to Surgery, above n 20, at 103. 
493 At 28. 
494 Lee A Smith and others “Children’s Rights in their Oral Health Care: How Responsive are Oral Health 
Professionals to Children’s Rights (2018) 26 International Journal of Children’s Rights 354. The study 
involved six dental practitioners, each undertaking one to 14 treatments, involving children aged between 
four years and 11 months and nine years and two months. 
495 At 364-365. 
496 At 367. 
497 For example, nurses teaching children to care for their wounds after surgery. Alderson, Children’s Consent 
to Surgery, above n 20 at 20. 
498 Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, above n 20 at 16.  
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2. Signi f i cance o f  Health Profess ionals ’  Perspec t ives  on Age  
Health professionals’ perspectives on children’s age and maturity can influence their style 
of communication and the extent to which they involve children in discussions.499 
Commonly, children’s involvement increases with age and cognitive level,500 but even 
then there are inconsistencies in practice, as Coyne and others found. In their study, only 
a few children, generally over the age of 13 years, reported positively on participation in 
discussions, and of those, only two reported situations where they felt able to question 
procedures.501 Additionally, health professionals tended to make decisions for children 
throughout the age range (seven to 18 years), with the consequences that some children 
felt health professionals did not view them as being capable; others felt annoyed that 
their experience of their health was not respected; and some had to insist on being 
involved.502 Highlighting this final frustration, was an 18-year-old, who reported having 
to assert, and re-assert, himself, on whether he received his treatment by way of injection 
or cannula.503 Coyne and others surmise that:504 
 
Such experiences suggest that much younger children would require considerable 
courage to assert their right for inclusion and therefore may experience difficulties in 
having their voices heard.  
Yet, consistently since the seminal work of Weithorn and Campbell, more than 25 years 
ago, age has been shown to be an unreliable indicator of competence.505 Their study 
demonstrated that children aged 14 years were as competent as adults in making 
informed treatment decisions in hypothetical situations, and those aged nine years, 
although less competent in their understanding and reasoning for decisions, were able to 
make reasonable treatment choices, equal to those of the older participants aged 14, 18 
and 21 years.506 Thus, if preconceived perceptions of children’s capabilities based on age 
are eliminated, children have the opportunity to develop and demonstrate their 
competence. Alderson’s research highlighted how children’s competence can be 
enhanced to a level comparable to that of adults, when a psychologist recounted a three-
year-old demonstrating understanding of the nature and purpose of his liver biopsy, from 
careful explanations by his mother, who was a nurse.507  
 
Factors having greater influence on children’s competence than age are receiving 
understandable explanations from health professionals, children’s experience and 
maturity.508 This is particularly relevant to severely ill children with lifelong/chronic 
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health conditions, such as cancer or diabetes, who can be cognitively ahead of their peers 
in their understanding of their health and its treatment, due to their experience and 
frequent interactions with physicians and parents.509 Children from as young as four years 
begin to understand the principles of managing their diabetes, for example, and can take 
responsible moral and ‘wise’ decisions in their best interests, as Alderson, Sutcliffe and 
Curtis found. 510 They concluded that competence develops through experience, rather 
than according to age.511  
 
Similarly, Rost and others confirmed age was an unreliable indicator of children’s 
competence, when conducting quantitative research on shared decision-making in 
paediatric oncology, although participation in treatment decisions did increase with 
age.512  Most children participating in this study were capable of understanding their 
diagnosis at six and a half years; their prognosis at nine years; causes of cancer at nine 
and a half years; response to treatment at six years; and were able to make treatment 
decisions at 11.5 years.513 Parents rated their children’s capacities to understand diagnosis 
and prognosis information higher than physicians. 514  Of more relevance to their 
competence than age were the family dynamic and children’s personality and maturity.515 
As Alderson poignantly states “[c]ompetence is a way of relating to others, not simply an 
individual skill.”516 Thus, the manner in which health professionals communicate and 
build relationships become central to children’s competence.  
 
Whilst age is not a reliable indication of competence, it is relevant to children’s 
communication needs and desire for information, as Gibson and others found in the 
context of cancer. 517  Children aged four to five years relied on their parents to 
communicate with health professionals, also preferring to receive information from them, 
rather than directly from health professionals. On the other hand, children from six to 12 
years preferred to communicate directly with health professionals, and those from 13 
years favoured taking the lead over their parents.518 Likewise, these two older groups of 
children preferred receiving information directly from health professionals, but for 
children aged six to 12 years the level of information was important, with some needing 
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health professionals to read their body language better, to gauge, for example, when they 
were comfortable/uncomfortable in discussing matters; when they were feeling 
overwhelmed; when they wanted more; and also to encourage them to ask questions.519 
Teenagers were able to demonstrate greater independence and responsibility by seeking 
and retaining information.520 However, regardless of the age group, when children were 
well informed they felt more involved in the consent process, whilst insufficient 
information caused them anxiety.521 Although this study categorised children into age 
brackets, the researchers recognised that these are not fixed, with transitions depending 
upon the individuality and children’s development, 522  and health professionals’ and 
parents’ roles.523  
3. Triadic  Communicat ion 
Health professionals’ abilities to manage the triadic dynamic are key to children’s success 
in participating in consultations when their parents accompany them. This involves 
health professionals being mindful of not only children’s abilities and views on 
participating, but also encouraging parents to support their children’s involvement.524 
This dynamic can be challenging, as Van Staa found, when researching into the 
communication preferences and competence of adolescents (12-19 years). Hospital staff 
described managing triadic communication: 525 
… as balancing on a slack rope. Many felt incompetent to restrict parents’ involvement 
and to activate adolescents. Though professionals set the stage in hospital consultations, 
they seemed unaware of their power to turn the tables.  
Health professionals’ concerns lay in interfering in the parent-adolescent relationship and 
in parents’ established role as primary communicator or participant.526 Emphasising this 
was a finding in Coyne’s study, where some nurses felt that in order to involve children 
in decision-making, they needed both parents’ approval and children’s request:527 
… nurses may experience difficulty involving children in decision-making and may not 
encourage involvement of children unless explicitly requested by the child and approved 
by the parent. 
While health professionals may sense that parents are in control of their children’s 
involvement, children may feel that health professionals take the lead and set the agenda 
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in discussions.528 When health professionals are unable to successfully balance the triadic 
dynamic, this can contribute to children’s subordination in consultations.529 Nevertheless, 
although the triadic nature of interactions in consultations may be such that it constrains 
children’s involvement, there may be dyadic conversations occurring between parents 
and children at home, resulting in parallel, or distinct, discussions from those between 
parents and health professionals.530 Garth, Murphy and Reddihough questioned whether 
with age these merge into a triadic relationship, or remain dyadic, moving to one between 
health professionals and children.531  
4.  Parents ’  Roles   
 
Parents’ roles and relationships with their children are also central to the development, 
and demonstration, of children’s competence. Parents can either enhance or limit their 
children’s abilities to participate in discussions with health professionals, understand their 
health/treatment and contribute to decisions. For example, in preparation for 
consultations, parents can be supportive by rehearsing questions and giving children the 
confidence to interact with health professionals.532 Conversely, they may be inhibitive by 
dominating conversations, taking control,533 answering for their children or asking them 
to be quiet.534 These traits may be due to their need to discuss matters with health 
professionals,535 or it may be an established dynamic.536  
 
Several studies demonstrated the multiple roles parents play: facilitating communication 
between their children and health professionals; acting as agents by sourcing information; 
shielding children by controlling information; educating; and interpreting. 537 For example, 
Young and others found that most of these roles arose from children being unable to 
directly access information from health professionals; 538  whilst Lipstein and others 
discovered that researching not only enhanced parents’ own understanding and that of 
their children’s, but also connected health professionals with their children:539 
In the researcher role … [t]he gathered knowledge may have helped parents in one of 
their most important roles, connecting the physician and the adolescent through 
explaining the adolescent’s symptoms to the doctor, describing options to the adolescent, 
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and asking the doctor questions the adolescent has posed.  
Parents’ roles may change over time, particularly, where children have long-term health 
conditions. For instance, around the time cancer is diagnosed, gatekeeping is particularly 
prevalent, but can change over the course of treatment, with parents becoming more 
open.540 Nevertheless, for some, their desire to be protective, strong and positive for 
their children may result in them continuing to control discussions and information.541 
Wangmo and others found that health professionals supported families in excluding 
children, or in filtering upsetting information,542 by respecting family dynamics.543 Overall, 
however, the study found that parents and health professionals were willing to include 
children in discussions, be open and build trust, in order that children could voice their 
concerns and understand their treatment and its side effects.544 This helped them to cope 
with their imaginations, which can be sometimes worse than the reality.545  
 
A number of factors have emerged as influencing whether parents encourage their 
children to participate in decision-making: the nature of health conditions; parents’ 
perceptions of the seriousness of decisions; their desire to protect their children; and 
their children’s preferences.546 Angst and Deatrick explored how the nature of the health 
condition/decision affected parents’ roles in involving their children in health care 
decisions. They compared two different health areas, the first, cystic fibrosis, a 
lifelong/chronic health condition, and the other, a distinct surgical procedure. The first 
group of 20 children who suffered from cystic fibrosis were required to make daily 
decisions relating to their therapies, medication and diet; whereas the other group of 
eight children with scoliosis, required to make an isolated decision to correct a curvature, 
distinct from the everyday management of a chronic condition.547 One might have 
predicted that the first group would be more involved in daily decisions than the latter 
group, having developed experience of managing their condition. However, the study 
found that generally children with cystic fibrosis were not involved in decisions, as 
parents and children followed the advice of health professionals without question, 
believing that there were few decisions to make.548 Similarly, these children were not 
involved in the daily decisions of their care, as this had not occurred to most parents.549 
Three factors influenced parents’ views of their children’s involvement. Firstly, they had 
to recognise that there were options, or decisions, to be made. Secondly, their perception 
of the consequences - if serious, they were less likely to involve their children for fear of 
																																																								
540 Young and others, above n 19 at 306. 
541 At 306. 
542 Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 16. 
543 At 14. 
544 At 15. This was expressed in terms of children’s need to know, linking it to their health and welfare, 
rather than in terms of a right. 
545 At 15. 
546 Denise Angst and Janet Deatrick “Involvement in Health Care Decisions: Parents and Children With 
Chronic Illness” (1996) 2(2) Journal of Family Nursing 174; Garth, Murphy and Reddihough, above n 71 at 
48. 
547 The age range of the first group was seven to 11 years, the average being nine years, and the second 
ranged from nine to 19 years, the average being 12.5 years. 
548 At 181. 
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a wrong decision compromising their children’s health. Thirdly, parents were more likely 
to involve their children if they had positive previous experiences of doing so.550 
Children’s age was not a factor influencing whether parents involved their children.551 
Many parents wanted their children to be involved in the decision-making process by 
receiving information, being included in discussions, and being “treated as children 
first.”552 Although most children (45%) liked being uninvolved, a significant proportion 
(35%) wanted greater involvement.553  
Comparing this with surgical decisions, all parents considered that they were involved in 
decisions, 554  and that their children’s involvement evolved over time, through 
information and encouragement from them and health professionals.555 Most children 
made decisions jointly with their parents and health professionals, and had varying 
degrees of influence. For example, two children’s involvement and persistence were 
instrumental in persuading their parents to consent,556 and in one family, the 13-year-old 
made the final decision, as his parents felt that he was the one undertaking it.557 All 
parents and children felt involved in the process. The children/young people appreciated 
their views being heard on their desire for surgery and its timing.558 
Thus, in this study children were more involved in making surgical decisions than those 
with a lifelong/chronic condition. This may stem from both the belief, or understanding, 
that few options were available to them, and also from the perception that decisions are 
only made in respect of major procedures, rather than in the context of day-to-day health 
management.  
Hence, parents play vital roles in the development of children’s competence. They 
support their children’s participation in consultations, for example, by preparing them 
and bridging any communication gaps. They enhance children’s understanding and 
decision-making abilities by researching and discussing the issues, and also by giving 
them emotional support and confidence. The other side of the coin is that they can 
equally constrain children’s participation and competence by dominating the relationship 
with health professionals. Listening to children, valuing their contributions and 





550 At 184. 
551 At 184. 
552 At 185. 
553 At 185. 
554 At 186. Three viewed themselves as primary decision-makers, with the others considering that the 
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555 At 187. 
556 At 188. 
557 At 188. 
558 At 188. 
559 Shayne Rasmussen, Tineke Water and Annette Dickinson “Children’s perspectives in family-centred 
hospital care” (2017) Contemporary Nurse 1 at 8-9. 
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III .  Chi ldren’s  Views and Exper iences  
 
A. Introduct ion 
 
Children’s perspectives in much of existing research are represented through their 
parents, rather than from them directly. 560  Yet, children have unique experiences, 
perspectives and preferences, which when listened to, give insights into how they think 
and feel about their interactions with health professionals and the management of their 
treatment. This section reviews the research literature that has involved children. It 
reveals the many factors influencing children’s participation, such as whether health 
professionals view them as part of a family unit, rather than also as individuals; whether 
they are given opportunities or encouragement to be involved; the extent of treatment 
choices; and the seriousness of decisions. This section begins with the research that 
emphasises the individual and changing nature of children’s participation, preferences 
and experiences, before moving to consider cancer treatment, highlighting the issues 
children may face, and the degree of competence they can possess.  
 
B. Individual ism 
 
Children are individuals, distinct from their family unit, although naturally they receive 
essential support from their parents and families when receiving healthcare. Thus, their 
experiences may not coincide with those of their families, as Rasmussen, Water and 
Dickinson found when considering the factors that affect children’s experiences of 
hospitalisation. 561 Through the narratives of six New Zealand children, they discovered 
some struggling with asserting their agency, such as one child, who spoke of being scared 
and overwhelmed having a room full of people looking at her and talking about her.562 In 
contrast, however, the mother of a nine year old girl, Teresa, who had died of cancer 
several months prior to the interview, told of how her daughter loved to participate in 
her own care and how most nurses encouraged her autonomy and individualism. She said, 
“care happened when Teresa … was allowed to be Teresa, rather than an anonymised 
child with cancer.”563  
 
Children’s preferences are important for health professionals to recognise, as some 
children may seek to be included more, but find this difficult to exercise. Kilkelly and 
Donnelly’s study showed that their preferences and experiences might not always 
coincide, as a range of external factors influenced their experiences. For example, 
children were able to participate more when: treated in a specialist hospital, rather than in 
a general one;564 were older;565 and consulted with health professionals who effectively 
																																																								
560 Imelda Coyne “Children’s participation in consultation and decision-making at health service level: A 
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564 Kilkelly and Donnelly, above n 21 at 38. 
565 At 40. 
	
	 92	
communicated.566 In contrast, children struggled to effectively contribute when: health 
professionals communicate ineffectively; children did not know them; they were ignored, 
disbelieved, or not listened to by health professionals; there was insufficient time; and 
they felt inhibited, from fear of causing ‘trouble’, by asking questions.567  
Further insight into children’s communication experiences were discovered by Lambert, 
Glacken and McCarron, who coined the “visible-ness” spectrum, being “the degree to 
which children were, or wanted to be, included in the communication process.”568 Their 
study confirmed that age and experience did not equate to being at the forefront of 
communications, as some older and/or more experienced children preferred, and 
experienced, being in the background.569 Nevertheless, children were in “constant motion” 
along this spectrum, depending upon their preferences, the roles of health professionals 
and parents, and the healthcare environment.570  
 
Similarly, children’s inclusion in decision-making exists on a continuum, varying with 
individual preferences and existing at different levels, rather being ‘all or nothing.’571 For 
example, Coyne and others discovered that children tended to distinguish between “small” 
and “serious” decisions, when they considered the experiences and views of 55 
hospitalised children aged seven to 18 years with acute and chronic health conditions.572 
Nearly half of the children (23) believed they would make only small decisions, leaving 
serious decisions to health professionals, and/or parents, because they know best, some 
doubting their abilities to make the right decision. 573 Others felt that decisions should be 
shared, whilst some wanted to make their own decisions, believing that it was their right 
to have the final say over their bodies.574 Nonetheless, even those who preferred to be 
independent still expected that they would be encouraged and supported by their parents 
and health professionals. 575  Significantly, only one child expected that health 
professionals would assess their competence to make serious decisions.576  
 
The authors concluded that age was not a determining factor in children’s desire to 
contribute to decisions, as children throughout the age range (seven-18 years) were 
willing to participate, with most believing it to be their right, as it concerned their health 
and bodies.577 Instead, it was dependent upon factors, such as parents’ and health 
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567 Coyne and others, above n 20 at 33 and 49. 
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professionals’ views and support, and children’s confidence in decision-making. 578 
Consistent with the findings of Kilkelly and Donnelly, children’s preferences and their 
experiences may not coincide, as they may experience difficulties in participating due 
to:579 
… the lack of choice, lack of time for discussion and preferences being ignored. They 
generally felt that health professionals make the decisions without eliciting their views or 
presenting alternatives and then present them with a ‘fait accompli.’  
In navigating the triadic dynamic (children-parents-health professionals), children may 
need to negotiate with their parents that they are ready to assume decision-making 
responsibilities, and gauge whether their parents are prepared to relinquish some 
control.580 As Coyne and others concluded, involvement in decision-making “is not a 
simple matter that occurs overnight; rather, it can involve a delicate negotiation process 
between parents and children.”581  
Thus, research indicates that most children prefer to be involved in consultations and 
decision-making, to some degree, but their experiences vary, due to a number of factors, 
such as, their parents’ views and support, health professionals’ communication skills, the 
healthcare environment and the seriousness of decisions.  
C. Cancer  
This section explores children’s participation and competence in the context of cancer 
treatment, a particularly grave health condition, with few treatment options. Research 
reveals that many children demonstrate maturity and realism about the seriousness of 
their cancer diagnosis and the lack of treatment choices582 However, although they trust 
their parents and health professionals to make the right decisions, and recognise health 
professionals’ expertise, they can also feel frustrated at the loss of control from not being 
informed and included in discussions and decisions.583 Some may experience feelings of 
anger, inadequacy and challenge the treatment as a consequence.584 Understandably, 
some parents and health professionals may seek to protect children from adverse 
information at times,585 intending to avoid causing them fear or upset,586 but as Ellis and 
Leventhal found, children do not want information to be withheld.587 Most children in 
their study preferred to receive information directly from health professionals, but also 
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583 Ellis and Leventhal, above n 18 at 281. 
584 Coyne and others, above n 472 at 278. 
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favoured their parents to be present.588 When moving into their teenage years though, 
more sought to exclude their parents, with 42% of children/young people aged between 
13 and 17 years preferring to have private discussions with health professionals.589 This 
study found also that there was a cumulative effect, in the sense that, the more 
information children possessed, the stronger their desire and need became for further 
information, which then resulted in them being more involved in the consent process.590 
This applied across the age range of eight to 17 years. When decisions needed to be made, 
those aged between 13 and 17 years had a greater sense of it being their right to make 
these about later phase I, II and palliative chemotherapy than younger children, and 
more often than their parents felt they should.591 Nevertheless, most children/young 
people and parents preferred health professionals to decide,592 being content to follow 
their advice. When they were asked the reasons they had agreed to treatment, almost all 
children (90%) and parents (98%) indicated, it was due to trusting the health 
professionals.593 Ellis and Leventhal concluded that although children prefered to be fully 
informed about their disease and its treatment, “with the exception of terminally ill 
teenagers,594 children do not want to make decisions about their treatment.”595 However, 
the same could be said of parents, as most delegated that responsibility to the doctor.596  
Similarly, Coyne and others found that teenagers struggled the most with the limited 
involvement in decision-making. In their study, children aged between 12 and 16 years 
preferred to be informed, and to contribute to major, as well as minor, treatment 
decisions.597 Their dissatisfaction and frustration stemmed from the lack of choice, and 
being unable to influence the outcome.598 On the other hand, younger children (seven-11 
years) reported satisfaction with their level of involvement in decision-making.599  
Several studies, including the above two, demonstrated that adults, in particular health 
professionals, make major cancer treatment decisions. 600 This may be due to parents and 
children feeling ill-equipped to make these decisions immediately after diagnosis, and/or 
from a lack of treatment choice, as refusal is not an option.601 Adults may be uncertain 
whether children would agree to it, or may lack understanding of children’s competence. 
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However, this mistrust in children’s maturity and realism may be misplaced, as children 
can be accepting of adults overruling their views in the final decision.602 Most children 
simply seek to work in partnership with parents and health professionals, when treatment 
is curative (as opposed to palliative), as they value their opinions being taken seriously 
and decisions being taken together. 603  These desires become stronger as treatment 
progresses, with children and parents becoming more knowledgeable. They may seek to 
redress the power balance with health professionals as a result.604 Families aim to live 
their lives as normally as possible, whilst also having the same goal as health 
professionals, of children’s survival.605 Thus, tensions can develop between families and 
health professionals over decisions relating to healthcare management, such as the timing 
of treatment, diet, and whether a nasogastric tube is inserted, as families seek to regain 
more control over their lives.606 However, health professionals’ agenda is to strictly 
follow the protocol in order to maximise its effectiveness and to standardise treatment. 
The children participating in De Vries and others’ research felt that they had no choice, 
and that their refusal would not be respected, even for minor procedures, such as the 
insertion of nasogastric tubes.607  Despite this research giving insights into why, at times, 
there were clashes in decision-making, it did not question the model of best interests, as 
the standard for reaching decisions. Thus, children’s competence, or their potential 
autonomy, was not addressed. The study’s focus was on the factors health professionals 
and parents take into account when considering children’s best interests, highlighting 
their different perspectives. They found that the way in which decisions in cancer 
treatment were taken had the effect of depersonalising children and subordinating them 
and their families to health professionals’ superior knowledge.608 In an effort to recognise 
the views of parents and children, with a view to making joint decisions with health 
professionals, De Vries and others proposed a model called “communicative ethics.” 
Although De Vries and others avoided discussing power or rights, this process is 
designed to give greater respect to the views and rights of families, acting as a vehicle to 
redress the balance of power, moving from a purely paternalistic approach towards a 
more rights-based approach.609  
It can be seen, therefore, that even in cancer treatment, where there are few treatment 
options, children’s preferences, needs and sense of their rights, are to be involved and to 
work in partnership with adults. They prefer to know the reality of the situation and to 
have some say in their treatment. Whilst they may not wish to have the responsibility of 
curative decisions, this increases when palliative. However, children’s response to cancer, 
and the degree to which they choose to be involved, will vary from child to child, and 
from time to time during their cancer journey. Respecting their individualism by adopting 
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“an individualised flexible approach so that children can have an active, shared or passive 
role as and when they prefer” is key.610  
 
D.   Value in Chi ldren’s  Part i c ipat ion and the Impli cat ions o f  the ir  Exclusion  
 
The benefits children derive from participating relate to their wellbeing, the development 
of their competence and relationships with adults, and compliance with treatment. 
Commonly children experience positive feelings when they are included in 
communications and decisions, such as feeling valued, respected and less anxious,611 as 
they are treated as individuals, who are “intrinsically worthwhile.”612 For example, most 
of the children participating in Kilkelly and Donnelly’s study were happiest when health 
professionals spoke to them directly, either in addition to, or instead of, their parents.613 
They specifically appreciated being involved, and having an element of control, through 
being able to: accurately describe their symptoms; develop greater understanding of their 
health; build rapport with health professionals; have their fears allayed; and felt happier 
to co-operate with treatment.614 However, their participation was not to the exclusion of 
their parents, as they understood the importance of the roles of, and partnership with, 
parents.615 
Underpinning children’s inclusion are the trusting relationships that children build with 
adults who are open and honest with them.616 Children appreciated knowing the truth, as 
it makes them feel less anxious, and helps them cope with the reality of their illness and 
treatment, rather than feeling isolated in their imagination, as Wangmo and others found 
in their cancer research.617 In this sense, the importance of children participating is 
expressed in terms of their need to know, rather than in terms of their right to know.618 
Nonetheless, the two are not mutually exclusive, as children may also seek to participate 
to have their agency respected, as Coyne and others’ study revealed, when they 
considered children’s experiences of acute or chronic illnesses. The children in their 
study valued health professionals listening, and providing information directly, to them. 
They viewed these in terms of their rights to have their opinions about themselves and 
their bodies respected, 619  together with helping them prepare for treatment and 
alleviating their fears.620   
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Research has found that the greater children/young people participate in their healthcare 
management, for example, through information sharing, negotiation, expressing their 
opinions and being presented with options, the greater their compliance with 
treatment.621 For example, Miller and Jawad’s study found that the value was in children 
and parents’ partnership:622 
Working through problems and decisions with parents provides youth with the 
opportunity to learn decision-making skills and have a voice in the process, with the 
parent still present as a source of support and guidance.  
Conversely, research indicates that when children are marginalised in their interactions 
with health professionals, such as, by being only asked one or two specific questions; 
being physically excluded from consultations; having their treatment preference 
ignored; 623  and having things done to them, with brief or no explanations, 624  they 
experienced a range of negative emotions. These include feeling “disappointed, sad, 
confused, angry, worried, shocked, betrayed, lonely, ignored and rejected”,625 with the 
consequences that they feel “forgotten and depersonalised, as if they are an inanimate 
object with no feelings.”626 They are unable to express their concerns, or have their 
agendas addressed, as a consequence. 627 These negative emotions are likely to compound 
children’s inability to participate, thus reducing their competence.628 
 
IV.       Consent  
 
Studies focusing on the consent processes have discovered inconsistencies in health 
professionals’ practices: some health professionals fail to take explicit consent, 
proceeding on an assumption; some take consent only from parents; whilst others take 
consent jointly from parents and children.629 For example, most oncologists participating 
in Dutch research, explicitly sought consent from either parents or children to 
commence cancer treatment in only two out of 43 consultations.630 This was despite the 
consent of parents and children over the age of 12 years being legally required.631 Three 
explanations were given for this finding: oncologists assumed parents wanted their 
children to receive it; the success of treatment reduced the need to discuss the risks and 
benefits; and refusal is considered to be not an option, as it could result in legal 
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Taking consent only from parents was the norm for health professionals participating in 
Alderson’s study in the context of surgery.633 Commonly, children’s competence to 
consent was only considered at 16 years, with many believing that children legally 
required to be this age, or perceived that younger children were unable to take a long-
term view, and/or that they should not bear such responsibility.634 Similarly, Kilkelly and 
Donnelly found differences in practice across health disciplines,635 with some taking 
consent from parents only, whilst others, particularly in specialist hospitals, secured joint 
consent from parents and children.636 The reasons for those taking children’s consent 
were to secure their co-operation, in the interests of the treatment proceeding 
successfully, and for it not to constitute an assault.637 The researchers recognised that this 
was an area deserving of further attention, particularly with a view to forming joint 
protocols for consistency of practice to safeguard children being treated with the highest 
standards.638   
In other healthcare environments, such as vaccinations in schools, parents give prior 
written consent, with children consenting orally at the point of vaccination. There is no 
difficulty with this consent process when parents and children agree. However, when 
there are differences of opinion, health professionals may feel unable to rely upon 
competent children’s consent, as Wood and others found when they considered the 
practices of vaccinating girls between the ages of 12-13 years with the HPV 
vaccination.639 Of the 25 health professionals participating, 640 only three considered that 
there was no ethical dilemma to rely on the consent of a Gillick competent child, where 
there was no written parental consent.641 All three were involved in the development, 
rather than the implementation, of the vaccination programme. 642  Most research 
participants held significant concerns about vaccinating without parental consent, 
although they accepted that guidelines on Gillick competence were relevant.643 These 
concerns included how Gillick competence could be assessed within a school setting; 
whether nurses had the skills to assess it; and potential damage that might be caused to 
schools’ relationships with parents.644 Their reservations of assessing Gillick competence 
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were professional limitations/abilities, time restrictions, the girls’ ages, and professional 
risk. 645  Nonetheless, one nurse felt that risks could be mitigated by “careful 
documentation of the Gillick assessment and consent-taking process”,646 and, despite 
reservations, all participants confirmed that they would respect the girls’ refusal to 
consent, for proceeding against their will was generally considered to be assault.647 
However, almost all regarded such refusal as being an emotional response, and a lack of 
maturity, rather than viewing it in terms of being competent to refuse. Only one 
participant alluded to such competence.648 Wood and others recommended that guidance 
be provided for health professionals, including advice that girls who are Gillick 
competent can give consent, despite parental refusal.649  
In Sweden a wider perspective on competence was adopted when Gottvall and others 
undertook similar research involving 30 school nurses who administered the HPV 
vaccine.650 The study explored the relational aspects of the consent process, suggesting 
that nurses should engage in an interests-based negotiation/mediation type process with 
parents, children and the school when there are disagreements, rather than focusing on 
rights. Contradictions emerged from the research. Firstly, all nurses considered that 
parental consent was required for 11-year-old girls, both in terms of the law,651 and their 
maturity, considering them too young to make such decision themselves, and therefore it 
was a parental responsibility.652 Yet, many believed that by the age of 15 years, girls 
should have the choice, and that the law was a barrier.653 They were willing to assist 15 
and 16 year olds to be vaccinated without their parents’ knowledge when parents refused 
their consent.654 Secondly, although nurses respected the girls’ refusal, despite parental 
consent, they did not respect their consent when parents’ refused.655 The barrier of taking 
girls’ consent, for some, was the concern of excluding parents when it should be a joint 
process through discussion, as was their common practice.656 The rationale for this 
practice was to provide a transparent and democratic process, promoting “dialogue that 
could strengthen the autonomy of both child and parent, without necessarily destroying 
the family bonds.”657 Naturally, the ideal situation is that consensus will be reached 
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interventions. However, the law also states that as the child grows older and becomes more mature, his or 
her wishes should be taken more into consideration.” 
652 At 55.   
653 At 56. 
654 At 59. 
655 At 58. 
656 At 59. 
657 At 60. 
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through communication, education and understanding, which health professionals can 
promote. However, where this cannot be achieved, there needs to be a mechanism for 
breaking the deadlock. The crux of the issue in such situations is whether the autonomy 
and competence of children will prevail over parental authority. Transparent criteria for 
the assessment of children’s competence, together with clear policies and legal provisions, 
could assist in resolving such matters. 
 
V. Chapter  Summary 
 
Children’s competence develops, and is demonstrated, through children’s participation 
during the stages of the informed consent process, with health professionals and parents 
playing crucial roles in supporting children’s participation and competence. Competence 
or incompetence cannot be assumed, due to its complex relational nature. Research 
confirms that basing competence solely on age is an unreliable indicator, and thus during 
each consultation children’s competence needs to be supported. The relationship most 
children prefer to have with health professionals and parents is a partnership, as they 
value being listened to, and their contributions considered, when medical decisions need 
to be made. However, they prefer not to bear the responsibility of such decisions, until 
they move into their teenage years, when they seek more autonomy.658 When children are 
viewed as partners they feel respected, valued and less stressed,659 and can develop high 
degrees of knowledge and competence over their health, particularly when suffering from 
long-term conditions, such as diabetes and cancer, as they are managing their health on a 
daily basis, and frequently engaging with health professionals.660  As such, they can 
develop maturity, and be cognitively ahead of their peers in their understanding of their 
health.661   
Health professionals in general, and hospital nurses in particular, can play key roles in 
advocating for children, by ensuring that they are active partners in decisions about their 
healthcare. 662  This can be challenging, due to work pressures and the lack of 
structure/criteria for assessing competence. As a result, practice becomes inconsistent, as 
it is based on their personal perceptions of children’s competence.663 Certainty and clarity 
of the law, policies and criteria would assist in providing more consistency in practice. 
For example, Coyne and Gallagher, recommended that:664 
Hospital policies and ward guidelines on information sharing and decision-making need 
to be developed. Such guidelines should emphasise the importance of giving children 
sufficient time to communicate and of not prejudging children’s capabilities by their age. 
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 Children as Social Actors 
 
Theories are the Living Centre of Research.665 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
Childhood is socially constructed and has varied according to the prevailing social norms, 
attitudes, values, laws, politics, and culture throughout history, and is thus not universally 
defined.666 Prior to the 18th century, childhood was regarded as a preparatory stage to 
adulthood, with little value being attributed to it. However, from the 18th century, 
although childhood was separated from adulthood, providing children with a protected 
place, it was one in which they were viewed as dependent, vulnerable and ignorant. It was 
not until the 20th century that children’s agency was recognised. By creating a separate 
space for childhood, children became visible, emerging from the family unit. 
Consideration could then be given to their lives, development, relationships and views.  
 
Theories influence our attitudes towards children, enhancing our understanding of their 
status as citizens and rights-holders. This chapter begins by tracing the history of 
childhood, and how children’s status and our views of their competence have changed 
over time. The chapter then draws on Childhood Studies, which views children in the 
context of their lives, such as the culture, historical period and politics. It gives respect 
also to children's individuality, by valuing their perspectives and views of their lives, 
providing a foundation for children’s agency and advocacy.	Moving then to Sociocultural 
Theory, this continues to advance our thinking of children as social actors, with agency, 
rather than perceiving them as incompetent and vulnerable. It provides also deeper 
understanding of how children learn, acquire skills and make decisions through the 
support or ‘scaffolding’ from adults. Finally, adding to these principles of social agency, 
competence and scaffolding is the Capability Approach. This moral theory not only 
respects children’s human dignity, agency, abilities and individuality, but also promotes 





665 Priscilla Alderson Childhoods Real and Imagined: Volume 1: an Introduction to Critical Realism and Childhood 
Studies (Routledge, Abingdon, England, 2013) at 18. 
666 Allison James and Alan Prout “Introduction Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood” in Allison 
James and Alan Prout (eds.) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues - The Sociological Study 




II .  History  o f  Chi ldhood 
 
A. Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries  
 
Controversially, Philippe Ariès claimed that childhood was invented in Europe in the 17th 
century, since “[i]n medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist.”667 Earlier 
societies had recognised, however, that children were different to adults, and as such, had 
classified them. For example, in the time of Emperor Justinian in the Roman Period, 
childhood was separated into three periods:668 
 
Infantia, when children were incapable of speech, tutela impuberes, when, prior to puberty, 
children required a tutor, and cura minoris, when, after puberty, young persons had not yet 
reached their majority and required the care of a guardian.  
The intent of Ariès’ observation was that society lacked sentiment for children, with a 
lack of awareness of their “particular nature.”669 During this period “childhood was, 
relative to the nineteenth century, undervalued”,670 although parents did nurture and care 
for their children. The goal was to produce functional citizens, and thus childhood was 
simply a preparatory phase for adult roles:671 
The overriding impression derived from ancient sources is that childhood was not seen 
as important for itself, but as part of a process towards producing a good citizen. … 
Moreover, it was common to consider children, not as individual human beings, but in 
terms of the services they could render their parents, partly in continuing the line, but 
also as supports in old age, and in carrying out essential rituals at the time of the parents’ 
death. 
 
As soon as children were independent, they entered adult life,672 which Ariès considered 
occurred at the age of seven years.673 Nevertheless, in doing so they did not have the 
same role and status as adults, but found their place in the adult world, with “no 
boundary fence separating off the world of adults from that of children.”674   
 
Significant developments occurred in how childhood was perceived during the 18th 
century that led to its recognition as a distinct phase of life:675    
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Some people began to see childhood not as a preparation for something else, whether 
adulthood or heaven, but as a stage of life to be valued in its own right.  
 
Influencing this change in perspective were several factors, the most significant of which 
was the increase in secularism. Greater importance was laid upon children’s education, 
development and growth, moving away from their spiritual welfare:676 
 
… the evidence is powerful that a change of some magnitude occurred, one which may 
be summarised as the shift from a prime focus on the spiritual health of the child to a 
concern for the development of the individual child.  
 
Significant in changing attitudes towards children was John Locke.677 He believed that 
child-rearing principles must be adapted to the individual, recognising that not all 
children are the same, having differing abilities and temperaments.678 Following Locke, 
the romantic poet Jean Jacques Rousseau perpetuated the appreciation of childhood in 
its own right. In his landmark work Émile (1762), Rousseau emphasised that children 
should be raised in accordance with nature, experiencing love and happiness, and 
learning through play.679 Combining these influences with improvements in domestic 
living conditions, such as, through greater privacy and comfort, family dynamics 
changed.680  Parents showed more affection and attention towards their children and 
their individuality.681 
 
Unfortunately, the economic reality of the Industrial Revolution rather overshadowed 
this Romantic Period, with children being exploited and abused for labour.682 Once more 
children entered the adult world, unprotected, and the concept of childhood was 
somewhat lost. Nevertheless, within the landscape of industry, three factors led to the 
reconstruction of childhood and the protection of children.683 The first was recognition 
that the nature of child labour was different from that of adults’, as children do not enjoy 
the same status in the employer-employee relationship. Secondly, following on from the 
first, were the parallels between children and slaves, and thirdly, were concerns for the 
breakdown of the ‘natural order’ that threatened the patriarchal society, as the demand 
for child and female labour increased.684  
 
In Britain, responding to these concerns, and preceding the passage of protective 
legislation, were debates that recognised the differences between adults and children. In 
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1833 a Royal Commission declared childhood to end at 13 years, based upon 
psychological evidence and in recognition of children’s independence and 
competencies.685 This was the first step in Britain towards a socially constructed, and 
universal notion of, childhood. Ultimately, this led to state intervention by regulating 
employment and protecting children from the dangers of working. For example, the 
Factory Act 1833 was passed in Britain, prohibiting the employment of under nine year 
olds and restricting the working day to eight hours for children aged nine to 13 years.686 
Likewise, enactment of the Education Acts in the 1870s and 1880s were pivotal in 
separating and institutionalising children by making, for example, schooling 
compulsory.687 Driving such changes, between 1830 and 1920, were concerns for “the 
child’s soul”, “the future manpower needs of the state”, and “to save children for the 
enjoyment of childhood.” 688  Protecting and educating children met not only their 
interests and rights, but also those of the State, in producing functional adults. However, 
in doing so, this positioned children as vulnerable, ignorant and in need of protection: 689 
 
It was recognised that the child was not ready for life and that he had to be subjected to 
a special treatment, a sort of quarantine, before he was allowed to join adults.  
 
Similarly, in New Zealand, from 1873, the government regulated the employment of 
children and placed greater importance upon their education.690 Traditionally, Māori 
children had been educated in whare wānanga, with missionaries establishing schools 
from 1816 to teach them literacy and practical skills. However, from 1800, the English 
influence had growing significance for New Zealand culture, family life and institutions, 
including the parliamentary, legal and education systems. The Education Act 1877 
established free, secular and compulsory education for children between the ages of 
seven to 13 years, and children were entitled to attend from five to 15 years. Nonetheless, 
children continued to work, as their  wages were important to poor and rural families, 
and as such, their attendance at school was irregular.  
 
In health, separation of children from adults occurred also, with the growing 
specialisations of children’s medicine. Children’s hospitals opened, such as in Paris in 
1802, followed by others in the mid-1800s in Germany, London, New York and 
Philadelphia.691 New Zealand followed with the first hospital wards for children opening 
in the 1880s.692 Health and development were then linked to education through, for 
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example, assessments of their physical and mental abilities, as a means of ascertaining 
whether they were able to participate in mainstream schooling. This had the effect of 
“categorising children by intelligence, and … measuring their physical development 
against newly-conceived norms.”693 Thus, the expectations of children’s development and 
capabilities were predetermined through generalisations, and measured by standardised 
testing.  
 
B.  Twentie th to Twenty-Firs t  Centuries  
 
During the first half of the 20th century, childhood became increasingly defined by 
education, health and welfare, with significant refinements through the emerging fields of 
psychology and psychiatry.694 This provided new insight into children’s lives, such as, 
their thinking, development, relationships and parenting. In particular, the work of Cyril 
Burt and Susan Isaacs gave greater understanding into children’s individual differences 
and their development, leading to an appreciation of children having the “same 
mechanisms of thought” and comprehension as adults.695 The effect of this knowledge 
was to view children in a more holistic way, taking account of their minds, personalities 
and emotions, as well as their physical welfare.  
 
In the second half of the 20th century, there was growing cognisance of relationships 
between adults and children, children’s individuality, and the need to consider children in 
their social context. One catalyst for these changing perspectives was the surfacing, or re-
surfacing, of physical abuse, and then later, sexual abuse.696 Some social scientists began 
reflecting on this power dynamic between adults and children, and by taking a child-
centred approach, gained new insights into children’s individuality and their social lives.697 
These two strands (children’s individuality and their social lives) were the foundations for 
promoting children’s rights, and for the emergence of Childhood Studies in the 1970s (or 
the Sociology of Childhood as it was formerly known). Both disciplines recognised that 
children were active and capable participants in the shaping of their lives.  
 
Exemplifying this in England was Gillick in 1986. In New Zealand, movement in 
attitudes towards children’s status occurred also, albeit later, with the passing of the 
COCA in 2004, which replaced the Guardianship Act 1968. Children’s legal status shifted 
from being regarded as possessions, with their guardians having rights of control over 
them,698 to one in which parents have diminishing, or at least variable, authority. 699 In 
Ma ̄ori tradition children are regarded somewhat differently, having never been 
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considered as property, but rather as taonga (precious or treasures) and rangatira mo 
opopo (tomorrow’s chiefs).700 Ma ̄ori children are not only children of their parents, but 
also of their extended family, wha ̄nau, hapu and iwi. Commonly, wha ̄nau is translated as 
“family”, but its meaning is more complex, since it encompasses the common values, 
understandings and relationships that bind the family together, including physical, 
emotional and spiritual dimensions.701 Children are protected and cared for, and decisions  
taken, collectively.  
 
In the modern age, “media environments” 702  and parents’ desire for “emotional 
gratification” are additional influences on children’s status and parent-child 
relationships.703 Children are exposed to consumerism through various forms of media. 
This has been linked to a lessening, or even a collapse, of parental authority, through 
parents’ increasing their spending on children, as a means of giving them a better 
childhood and having closer relationships with them.704 Consequently, it is thought that 
the demarcation between adults and children is becoming less defined, and children are 
seeking to gain their independence and enter the adult world earlier:705 
 
What has happened in the second half of the twentieth century is that parental authority 
has declined, and children have demanded and received an earlier access to the adult 
world; they have not been willing to accept the attempt to prolong childhood to the late 
teenage years. In some ways this represents a return to a historical norm in which 
childhood did not extend beyond fourteen at the maximum.  
 
Postman has gone as far as suggesting that childhood is disappearing, due to the impact 
of media, such as television. 706  Television has the ability to connect with people 
regardless of their age and intellect, and as a result is indiscriminate between adults and 
children. Children are exposed to matters that traditionally would be confined to only 
adults, such as fashion, current affairs, violence and sexual relationships. 707  One 
consequence is a blurring of boundaries, with childhood and children losing their 
innocence, by choosing to act in an adult-like manner, and society responding in a 
corresponding adult way. One of the most serious examples of this involved an act of 
extreme violence in England, when two 10-year-old boys, Jon Venables and Robert 
Thompson, tortured and murdered Jamie Bulger in 1993. Venables and Thompson were 
tried and convicted in an adult court. It brought to the fore the polarisation of 
perspectives: on the one hand, viewing them as evil and responsible, justifying their 
treatment as adults; and on the other, acknowledging their vulnerability and need for 
protection, as they were still children. However, as Wyness points out, this perception of 
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childhood disappearing, or being in crisis, is  “based on the misplaced idea that 
childhood is inferior to adulthood”, inferiority referring to children lacking “the full 
range of roles and responsibilities demanded of adults.”708 Instead, he argues that the 
crisis is the understanding of childhood, which requires serious revision, as the boundaries 
between adults and children are being contested. However, rather than viewing this as a 
challenge to authority, it can be considered positively in the sense that children are 
becoming less reliant on adults and more capable.709 Despite this shift in the power 
dynamic between parents and children, it is probably still weighted in adults’ favour as 
they have economic, political and “age-patriarchy.” 710  For example, Hood-Williams 
argues that childhood remains “a firmly exclusionary status” and that children “remain 
subject to authority relations.”711 Parents continue to demand obedience over children’s 
space, bodies and time, 712  with this positional power more distinctly defining the 
boundaries between childhood and adulthood.713 
 
 
III .  Chi ldhood Studies   
 
A. Introduct ion 
 
Childhood Studies emerged over 30 years ago, initially called ‘the sociology of childhood’ 
due to its academic base being in sociology and social anthropology. It then evolved into 
Childhood Studies, with the inclusion of other fields of research, such as education, 
health and law.714 It challenged the dominant theory of its time, child psychology, which 
regarded children’s development as pre-determined, moving through a sequence of 
stages from the immature and irrational, to the mature and rational, achieving complex 
thinking in adulthood.715 Jean Piaget was the most influential exponent of children’s 
cognitive development,716 believing that the child in isolation, as defined by the stage of 
development, determined learning. Childhood Studies, on the other hand, positioned 
children’s learning in the context of social relations and culture,717 being subjects, active 
in their own lives, learning and development:718 
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Childhood studies … positions children as participating subjects, knowers and social 
actors, rather than the objects of socialisation.  
 
Thus, this theory provides a different interpretative framework or paradigm within which 
to analyse and research childhood,719 by drawing together three elements: acceptance of 
children as social actors in shaping their lives; the permanence of childhood as a social 
structure; and its variance according to the historical period and culture.720 As such, 
childhood is described as a social construction.721 By thinking more widely about the 
concepts that create this social construction, such as environmental space and time, 
Childhood Studies can further adapt to new situations, giving deeper understanding to 
children’s lives, capacities and development. 722  
 
Nevertheless, there remains a place for developmental child psychology, as otherwise the 
reality of the many changes in children’s lives is sidelined, such as their physical, 
emotional and intellectual development, their maturity, interests, perspectives and 
skills.723 By giving attention to both fields, respect is given to children’s present lives, as 
well as to their future ones.724  
 
Childhood Studies, in common with Sociocultural Theory and the Capability Approach, 
gives respect to children’s individuality, competence and agency. In the next section, the 
key principles of Childhood Studies are firstly considered, before turning to children’s 
agency and individuality, followed by an exploration of how Childhood Studies could 
further evolve as a theory through the use of dialetical critical realism (DCR). DCR 
separates ontology from concepts, such as agency and law, which gives greater 
understanding of children’s lives.725  
 
B. Key Features  o f  Chi ldhood Studies  
 
Childhood Studies views children in various contexts of their lives, having regard to both 
the external settings, such as culture, history and politics, and also children’s internal 
features, for instance, their age, gender and beliefs.726 Within this framework two key 
features emerge: the social construction of childhood; and recognition of children’s 
status through their agency and rights.727  
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Firstly, the notion of social construction recognises that children develop in the context 
of social relationships, which themselves are influenced by cultural, politics, history and 
social practices and beliefs.728 Every aspect of children’s lives, such as the ways in which 
they are parented and educated, their recreation and health are influenced and defined by 
societies’ beliefs and understandings of the time. Further, childhood and children’s status 
are political, due to the power imbalance between adults and children. Children lack the 
economic and political power, and as such, to a large extent, depend upon adults to 
represent their views and protect their interests.  
 
This leads to the second feature of Childhood Studies, children’s agency and rights. Pre-
requisites to children’s agency are being able to form, and express, views. Views tend to 
be used in a fairly generic way,729 but are broader than simply their opinions, as they 
include matters such as values, priorities and aspirations. Pufall and Unsworth capture 
the depth of children’s voice when they define it as “that cluster of intentions, hope, 
grievances, and expectations.”730 Through such expression emerges their individuality. 
 
Agency is an extension of being a social actor, as it is the process by which their voice is 
heard. The concepts of actor and agency are central to contemporary Childhood 
Studies.731 Mayall defines these concepts as follows:732  
A social actor does something, perhaps something arising from a subjective wish. The 
term agent suggests a further dimension: negotiation with others, with the effect that the 
interaction makes a difference – to a relationship or to a decision, to the workings of a 
set of social assumptions or constraints.  
However, simply identifying the existence of children’s agency is insufficient. The 
enquiry needs deeper exploration to understand the reasons why children can sometimes 
demonstrate agency, and at other times, not:733 
 
The observation that children can exercise agency should be a point of analytical 
embarkation not a terminus.  
 
From consideration of these features of Childhood Studies, the importance of adults’ 
roles and relationships with children unfold. Adults’ attitudes, values and understandings, 
and their relationships with children, affect children’s development, opportunities, 
experiences, status and the implementation of their rights. When adults value children’s 
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views and abilities, it enhances children’s competence and respects their rights. 
Conversely, when adults hold a paternalistic view, seeing children as vulnerable, ignorant 
and in need of protection, or are motivated by exerting their power and status, children’s 
rights and competencies will be constrained.  
 
Childhood Studies considers “matters such as competence, not as fixed and measureable 
facts, but as shifting, contingent, social experiences, co-constructed between children and 
adults.”734 It is within relationships, and through negotiating the power dynamic, with 
their parents, siblings and teachers, for example, that children learn and develop 
behaviours, skills and values. They learn where the boundaries lie, recognising that adults 
have authority over them,735 although these will change over time, as children acquire 
increased knowledge, experience and independence.  
 
Thus, competence is relational, and not simply a skill that children acquire alone, or 
develop at a specific stage of their development. It relies on interactions with adults. In 
the health context, for example, children’s competence is promoted by parents preparing 
children for consultations, and supporting them in discussions, and by health 
professionals communicating effectively with them. With adults fulfilling these roles, 
children have the opportunity to effectively enter into discussions. These relationships 
are of the paramount importance to the development and demonstration of children’s 
competence. 
 
C. Evolut ion o f  Chi ldhood Studies 
 
Although Childhood Studies began to flourish from around 1990, with many studies 
giving children the opportunity to participate,736 Alderson considers that greater attention 
needs to be placed upon children’s real existence or being (ontology), as distinct from 
concepts and thoughts (epistemology):737 
 
Researchers … tend to reduce being into thinking, ontology into epistemology, things 
into thoughts, to mistake their perceptions and reports for reality, or to deny that there is 
an independent, essential reality. This reduction and loss of reality into ideas, termed the 
epistemic fallacy … is at the heart of social science and childhood studies. 
 
In order to separate ontology from concepts Alderson turned to DCR, “a philosophy of 
how knowledge about people and their social structures may be construed, interpreted, 
described and fitted together.”738 She argued that DCR could support Childhood Studies 
research by, for example, “moving beyond describing and documenting, to include 
																																																								
734 Alderson, above n 665 at 10. 
735 Mayall, above n 710 at 29. 
736 Alderson, above 665 at 13-14. 
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738 Alice AA Sawyerr and Christopher A Bagley Equality and Ethnic Identities (Sense Publishers, 
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analysing, making connections, explaining and working to resolve contradictions.”739 By 
doing so, children’s actual existences can be seen.740 
 
However, Qvortrup observed that whilst there has been a trend towards research at a 
micro level, which enables children’s voices to be heard more than is possible in large-
scale survey based research, generalisations cannot be made from them. 741  Whilst 
Qvortrup favours research at a macro-level, such as considering how political and 
economic conditions or structures affect large groups of children, he does acknowledge 
that “there are many ways of collecting information about children’s lives and childhood. 
No one method alone can produce all knowledge needed.”742 Alderson agrees that there 
is merit in both approaches. By separating the infrastructure from the individual child, it 
informs and raises awareness of the inequalities children experience, perhaps also raising 
its importance on a political level. However, without including children themselves, 
research risks being ill-informed.743 Alderson’s point is that adults should step into the 
shoes of children, and see their reality, rather than making assumptions. This debate 
would appear to be similar to that of the value of qualitative versus quantitative research, 
the former giving greater insight into the personal experiences of individual children, and 
the latter enabling trends and generalisations to be seen. There is a place, of course, for 
both, with one helping to inform the other. This is of particular relevance, and 
importance, when reviewing laws and policies, which are developed by one generation, 
but affect another.744 As each generation has a different set of perceptions, experiences, 
values and goals, it is of importance that there is involvement of both.745  
 
A further use of DCR is to separate the ontological entities of structure and agency, as it 
has the effect of illuminating the relational characteristic of childhood.746 It does this by 
emphasising how the structures, such as laws, policies and practices, control or regulate 
childhood, and also how they intersect with both adults’ and children’s agency, in the 
forms of their characteristics, views, experiences and goals. This process of separation is 
a useful process in the context of children providing medical consent, as it can be seen 
whether laws, policies and practice meet the needs, and reflect the reality, of children and 
their competence. 
 
Additionally, by applying DCR, it may give more credibility and validity to research, and 
therefore, in turn more influence.747 This view arises from Alderson’s concern that by 
separating the study of childhood from mainstream social science and society, it has less 
impact upon policy, practice and public thinking, and she questions whether in reality the 
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issues studied can be separated from the adult world.748 This issue is of significance to the 
question of how children’s right to provide medical consent should be regulated - 
whether based on reaching a specific age, or upon competence. The former has the effect 
of defining this right by status, excluding those who have not reached it, rather than 
upon ability or competence. By Childhood Studies being more reflective and critical of 
its own research practices, and of the issues it researches, it will develop into being a 
more critical social science.749 This is achieveable from not only identifying what is 
happening, but also asking why, and in turn, what needs to change, in order to make the 
situations better for children.750  
 
Thus, Childhood Studies positions children in context, viewing them as competent and 
active participants, in the shaping of their lives. This theory recognises that children 
contribute to their own learning, development, relationships and decisions, by using their 
experiences and expressing their views. This occurs, however, in a relational context, 
relative to their parents and other adults, who can support them. Through children and 
adults working together, children can on a personal level express, and exercise, their 
individuality and independence, and on a macro-level can influence practices, policies 
and laws. This theory provides a strong foundation for examining children’s competence 
to participate in managing their healthcare, and in considering how best to reflect this in 
practice, policy and law. As demonstrated by the research literature considered in the 
previous chapter, children learn about their health and treatment by being involved, 
whilst being supported by adults. By placing children at the centre of this process, and 
understanding their perspectives, their competence can evolve, and child-sensitive 
practice can develop. Woodhead sums up Childhood Studies as offering:751 
 
… an integrative framework for elaborating a ‘child-centred’ research that is holistic in 
approach, and built around children’s agency, their rights and their well-being, which is 
especially sensitive to the relationships between researcher and researched and which is 
inclusive of diversities related to age, gender, ethnicity, place and time. 
 
 
IV. Soc iocul tural  Theory 
 
A.  Introduct ion -  Key Features 
 
Adding to our understanding of children’s participation and development of competence 
is Sociocultural Theory. This emerged in the 1980s and 1990s from the thinking of Lev 
Vygotsky, a Russian child psychologist, described as the father of sociocultural 
theories.752  He viewed children’s learning and development as a social process set in a 
cultural and historical context, rather than a universal one that all children follow:753 
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There is no one pathway for development (such as the Piagetian progression towards 
rationality), rather development depends on cultural goals. 
 
Central to Sociocultural Theory is recognition of children’s agency as a relational and 
active process. Children learn and develop through participating in activities and 
engaging with others in “a reciprocal partnership where adult and child jointly construct 
understanding and knowledge.”754 Children are of course not limited to learning from 
only adults, as they spend much time with other children, such as siblings, friends, and 
from those sharing similar experiences.755 
 
B. Scaf fo lding 
 
Sociocultural Theory recognises the importance of the social, dynamic and relational 
nature of children’s learning and development through the support of those more skillful. 
Children acquire skills, not simply from observing others, but also from practicing and 
being challenged. In becoming adept at existing skills, they build upon these to develop 
more complex ones, with assistance:756 
 
Children advance to higher stages of development by being stimulated and guided at the 
outside limits of their skill by others. Child development is the result of children’s 
competence being challenged and extended with help. The help is gradually withdrawn 
and children become able to perform more and more on their own. 
 
The type of support through directing, guiding and supporting children’s learning and 
development has become known as “scaffolding”. This is a metaphor that arose from 
Vygotsky’s theory, and was coined by Wood, Bruner and Ross.757 Scaffolding involves 
a:758  
… process that enables a child or novice to solve a problem, carry out a task or achieve a 
goal which would be beyond his unassisted efforts. This scaffolding consists essentially 
of the adult "controlling" those elements of the task that are initially beyond the learner's 
capacity, thus permitting him to concentrate upon and complete only those elements 
that are within his range of competence. … It may result, eventually, in development of 
task competence by the learner at a pace that would far outstrip his unassisted efforts.  
It occurs through people around the child, such as parents, siblings and teachers, 
modeling and instructing how tasks can be performed, so that the child can learn new 
ways to approach or understand situations, 759 and enables the child’s capacities to 
evolve.760 As the child becomes more experienced, a transition occurs, with the support 
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being gradually withdrawn, and the child’s contribution increasing, until the child can 
manage alone:761 
… children’s interests are best promoted when they are given opportunities for graduated 
decision making that enable gradual assumption of independence so that full autonomy 
is not exercised until there is some experience with the decision or task. 
 
This process can apply to specific skills, such as reading or swimming, and to general 
ones that can be applied in many contexts, for instance, critical thinking. Through 
practise and experience children build their own sets of knowledge, skills and views, 
making it unwise to generalise about children’s abilities and responsibilities based only on 
age. Rather than age being a threshold for measuring children’s abilities and 
responsibilities, it is simply a biological marker. The plasticity of our perceptions of 
children’s abilities based on age is highlighted by Anne Solberg’s study, which discovered 
that the more responsibility children took in the home, by carrying out work and being 
alone, the older they became in the eyes of their parents.762 Thus, when children are 
permitted to engage in activities, and assume responsibilities, it has a dual effect of: (i) 
developing children’s internal attributes, such as their experience, maturity and 
intelligence; and (ii) adults’ perceptions of these changes. 
 
Nevertheless, the law tends to set thresholds for ages at which children are permitted to 
do activities, or when they can/must accept responsibility. For example, they can attend 
primary school at five years in New Zealand,763 and be responsible for certain serious 
crimes from the age of 10 years.764 Yet, age is an arbitrary concept, highlighted, for 
example, by the wide age range at which children assume criminal responsibility 
throughout the world.765  
 
Hence, Sociocultural Theory is relevant to the issues of children developing competence 
to consent to medical treatment, and to how that is reflected in practice and law. At a 
micro-level, children need supportive adults, giving them opportunities to practise skills, 
such as, contributing in consultations, understanding information about their 
health/treatment, and making decisions. As they practise these skills, and develop 
experience, they become capable of undertaking more complex tasks, and also more 
autonomous in the process. Research demonstrates how, for example, children living 
with lifelong/chronic health conditions become knowledgeable and skilled at managing 
their health.766 Although principally parents and health professionals will provide such 
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support, children in hospital, for example, are surrounded by others enduring similar 
experiences, who can also provide a learning environment. As a consequence, children 
develop knowledge, skills and maturity beyond those of their peers, who are not in the 
same situation. Also, at a macro-level, policies and law need to reflect the unique ways in 
which children develop competence. Age-based policies and laws fail to reflect children’s 
individuality and can undermine and underestimate children’s competence. 
 
V.  Capabi l i ty  Approach  
A. Introduct ion  
The Capability Approach was developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum over 
the last 30 years, focusing on “participation, human well-being and freedom as central 
features of [human] development.”767 This theory is based upon the principles of people 
flourishing and developing, through promoting their agency and freedom, to live the 
lives they consider worthy. 768  The Capability Approach extends our thinking and 
understanding of competence, leading to the freedom to make choices. In this section I 
will firstly explain the theory and then explore its applicability to children.  
B. What i s  the Capabi l i ty  Approach? 
The Capability Approach is a theory that focuses on people’s opportunities. It asks, what 
can people do and what do they want to be? 769 It has three key concepts: capabilities, 
functionings and conversion factors. “Capabilities” are defined as the freedom to choose, 
and act in ways, in accordance with one’s values - by “opening up the maximum number 
of choices for individuals is equivalent to supposing that they, alone, can judge what is 
good for themselves.”770 “Functionings” relate to people’s state of being, their skills and 
actions that they value. They range from the very basic, such as being nourished and 
healthy, to the more skillful, such as riding a bicycle and reading.771 The difference 
between functionings and capabilities is that the functionings are the achievements, or 
outcomes, whereas capabilities are the opportunities, or freedom, to choose to live one’s 
life in the preferred way, using the acquired functionings.772 However, in order to develop 
and acquire these, “conversion factors” are required. These are (i) internal/personal, such 
as intelligence and health; and (ii) external, such as societal, which relate to policies, 
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practices, laws and power relationships; environmental;773 and household - the family’s 
income and education.774 Thus, people with the same or similar functionings can have 
differing capabilities, depending upon their conversion factors. Adult interactions are 
conversion factors that will either promote or constrain the development, and 
demonstration, of children’s capabilities and functionings.775 Children are not passive 
recipients, as they contribute to the dynamic in the ways they respond to, and influence, 
that support. This results in a cumulative effect, with the more functionings and 
capabilities children acquire, the more these evolve; and conversely, the greater the 
constraints, the fewer functionings and capabilities children can develop.776 It can be seen 
how this process is relational and dynamic. Applying this to the health context, children 
may possess the communication skills and understanding (functionings), but unless, for 
example, parents prepare them for consultations, and health professionals include them 
in conversations, assess their understanding, and provide them with the opportunity to 
give consent (conversion factors), then they are prevented from making choices 
(capabilities). Likewise, if the law or policies (conversion factors) do not protect their 
rights, they will be prevented from choosing their preferred course of action.  
Figure 1 provides a theoretical model I have developed to depict the process for 
conversion factors being used to develop functionings, that in turn, convert into 
capabilities through conversion factors. 
Figure 1: Process of Functionings Converting to Capabilities under the 
Capability Approach 
	
C. Appli cabi l i ty  to  Chi ldren 
Central to the Capability Approach is the concept that human development involves the 
building of people’s functionings to expand their capabilities, so they can live the life they 
consider worthy. Human development is conceived in terms of having choices and 
freedom.777 In order to achieve this, participation and agency are required, concepts 
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which are familiar to children’s issues:778 
… the CA [Capability Approach] asks how each and every person is doing, and its goal 
is the empowerment of each? Children are no exception. 
Over the years, the Capability Approach has adapted to incorporate children into its 
thinking. It has progressed from believing children have only future capabilities in 
adulthood, or minimal/basic ones, such as relating to their survival,779 and consequently 
lack freedom of choice,780 to introducing the notion of evolving capabilities.781 The 
challenge for the Capability Approach, and the matter upon which it requires to assert its 
position, is in respect of children’s capacity for self-determination, as within the theory 
self-determination is implied.782 The question is, what are the boundaries of children’s 
right to self-determination? Ballet, Biggeri and Comim’s view on this is that the theory’s 
standpoint requires to be “softened for children, but not abandoned.”783 They suggest 
four perspectives, two of which are compatible with the notion of evolving capabilities, 
which are considered below. The other two perspectives are acknowledged as 
oversimplifying the issues.784  
Firstly, Ballet, Biggeri and Comim argue that the issue is not that children are unable to 
make choices, but rather whether they are able to revise and reconsider them. By adults 
providing them with “choice space”, rather than making choices for them, they can 
practise and develop their decision-making capacities.785 In this sense, children’s evolving 
capabilities are recognised.  
Secondly, if children’s evolving capabilities are viewed from a child-centred and 
subjective perspective, it reveals that they exercise self-determination and agency 
throughout their lives. It is the ways in which they do that varies. For example, for one 
child, walking on their own to the local shops, may be comparable in autonomy and 
agency to another, more experienced child, taking a trip in an aeroplane.786 The degree of 
self-determination needs to be considered from the child’s perspective, which will evolve 
with age and maturity.787 However, of relevance are more than simply age and maturity, 
but also the internal and external conversion factors, enabling them to realise their 
functionings and capabilities.788 This is the reason, for example, that young children, who 
are given clear explanations, are able to demonstrate competence comparable to those of 
older children or adults.789  
																																																								
778 Dixon and Nussbaum above n 769 at 560. 
779 Ballet, Biggeri and Comim, above n 770 at 22 and 25. 
780  At 25 
781 At 28. 
782 At 25. 
783 At 23. 
784 At 26. 
785 At 27. 
786 At 27-28. 
787 At 28. 
788 At 29. 
789 For example, Weithorn and Campbell, above n 505 and Alderson, above n 448 at 122. 
	
	 118	
Peleg advances these points by indicating that:790 
… it is not children's ability to choose that is debated, but rather the space that society, 
adults and the law gives children in order to make a choice, and the tolerance for what 
adults consider to be a mistake. 
Therefore, the Capability Approach can provide a theoretical basis for not only 
recognising the development of children’s competence and their agency, but can also 
support the argument that once children have attained competence, it gives them the 
right and freedom to make decisions according to their values and life choices. This is of 
particular relevance to when children are assessed as being competent to make health 
decisions, as the implication of being competent is to make the decision and provide 
consent.  
Moreover, the Capability Approach gives recognition to children’s individuality, 
experience and strengths, and as such can take a child-centered approach. This theory is 
egalitarian and liberal, focusing on what children are able to do, and what they want to be, 
recognising their priorities, values and aspirations.  
 
V. Chapter  Summary  
 
Individually, and in combination, these theories shift our thinking on children’s status, 
development and competence. Instead of viewing children as passive, ignorant and 
vulnerable, there is more understanding of their abilities, and how these develop. By 
tracing the changing conceptions of childhood throughout history, it has highlighted the 
differing attitudes and expectations of children. In some ways, childhood has come full 
circle from where it was in the 17th century, as today’s children also have independence, 
finding a place in the adult world, before reaching adult age. However, in those earlier 
times, childhood had not been defined and separated in the ways it has today. By 
separating children into the category of childhood, it defines them as having distinct 
qualities from adults, and as a consequence, are treated differently. Adults’ perspectives 
on these differences are key to children’s abilities to shape their lives, express their views, 
contribute to decisions and expand their competence.  
 
Childhood Studies has increased our understanding of children’s status and development 
by positioning children in context. The external influences of their environments and 
relationships, together with the ways in which children respond to them, demonstrate the 
relational nature of children’s learning and acquisition of competencies. Sociocultural 
Theory builds upon this, with the concept of scaffolding, highlighting the importance of 
supporting children in their development. This process, being both dynamic and 
relational, demonstrates the evolving nature of the ways in which children’s competence 
grows: the more responsive the support, the greater children’s competence develops. 
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Contributing to, and advancing, our thinking on children’s competence and autonomy, is 
the Capability Approach, which provides an egalitarian theory, complementing 
Childhood Studies and Sociocultural Theory. By recognising children’s functionings and 
capabilities, it gives respect to children’s rights to make decisions, in accordance with 
their views, values, priorities and goals. It values both children’s present and future 
situations.  
 
These theories together, provide a comprehensive foundation for appreciating the ways 
in which children develop competence in the healthcare, and upon achieving it, gain the 
right and freedom to make health decisions. Through parents and health professionals 
supporting children, and enabling them to participate, children’s competence and 
autonomy will develop. Initially, children may be in a position of inexperience and 
ignorance, at the time of diagnosis or treatment, but that does not define their status or 
level of potential competence, unless that is the expectation of adults around them.791  
  
																																																								
791 Pia H. Christensen “Childhood and the Cultural Constitution of Vulnerable Bodies” in Alan Prout (ed) 
The Body, Childhood and Society (Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom, 2000) at 38. 
	
	 120	
   Chapter 7 
 
Methodology and Methods 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
This small-scale qualitative study employed in-depth semi-structured interviews to 
investigate into (i) the practices and views of a range of health professionals on children’s 
participation in the informed consent processes; and (ii) the perspectives and experiences 
of children, parents and stakeholders in those processes. Of particular interest was 
capturing the health professional-child-parent dynamic, when children consult with 
health professionals, and consent is obtained. By focusing on children’s competence and 
the consent processes across health disciplines, this study makes a unique contribution to 
the understanding of those areas and to the international literature.  
In sections II and III of this chapter, I articulate in more detail the aims of the study, and 
its methodology. In doing so, I explain the theoretical framework of interpretivism, 
together with the phenomenological and qualitative methods. In section IV, I detail the 
research sample, considering also the study’s strengths and limitations. 
 
II .  Research Aims 
 
The aims of this reseach is to better understand (i) the development, promotion and 
assessment of children’s competence to give consent to medical treatment; (ii) the 
consent processes across different health disciplines and healthcare environments; and 
(iii) to determine the appropriateness of the current laws that regulate children 
consenting to, or refusing, medical treatment, and whether reform is necessary. The 
perspectives from a range of health professionals - doctors, dentists and nurses - are 
explored within different healthcare environments. Similiarly, parents and children’s 
perspectives and feelings on their experiences of the informed consent processes for 
treatment within each of these health areas and environments are gathered. This gives 
them a voice, which is seldom heard. Including parents and children’s views was central 
and vital to this study, as they are at the sharp-end of the law. 
 
Medico-legal research favours a cross-discipline approach, as it naturally involves a range 
of professions, health support societies, government and non-government departments 
and agencies.792  
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III .  Methodology  
 
A.  Theor ies  and Approaches 
 
The two principal frameworks for research are constructive/interpretative theory and 
positivist theory.793 The interpretative theory believes in the subjective meanings of 
people’s experiences, relying on them making sense of, and having insights into, aspects 
of their lives.794 The aim is to obtain rich data, “leading the researcher to look for the 
complexity of views.” 795  As such, interpretivism tends to use qualitative methods, 
enabling researchers to understand concepts from the participants’ views. This can occur 
through interviews, focus groups, documents, and from observing their actions.796 
 
Phenomenology, being a qualitative approach, focuses on the lived-in experiences of the 
participants. It seeks to capture “how people experience some phenomenon – how they 
perceive it, describe it, feel about it, judge it, remember it, make sense of it, and talk 
about it with others.”797 Phenomenology is most appropriate when an aim of the research 
is to obtain rich and personal accounts of an emotional and intimate experience. This 
approach lends itself to the individual/personal nature of qualitative research through in-
depth interviews with the participants.798  
 
Alternatively, positivist theory uses a more scientific and objective approach to 
research,799 beginning with a pre-determined theory that is tested through the collection 
of data.800 The aims are to specify the type of information to be collected in advance of 
the study”, 801  understanding the relationships between variables, and deducing or 
evaluating causal links.802  “Systematic procedures” observe, measure and analyse larger 
quantities of data,803 commonly through a questionnaire, producing statistical results.804 
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In contrast, the researcher in qualitative studies allows the information to emerge from 
the participants,805 seeking “answers to questions that stress how social experience is 
created and given meaning.”806 The researcher starts by assuming that there are different 
ways to view the phenomena and is interested in those different perspectives.807 In order 
to fulfil these aims, Cresswell and Cresswell distilled eight general research characteristics 
of qualitative research: natural setting; researcher as the key instrument for collecting 
data; multiple sources of data; inductive and deductive data analysis; participants’ 
meanings; emergent design; reflexivity; and a holistic account.808 The importance of these, 
collectively and individually, is the process of data collection, by creating a method and 
environment in which participants can freely narrate their experiences. Each individual 
participant is at the heart of such research, and although Cresswell and Cresswell identify 
“participant’s meaning” as an individual feature, in my view it is also a principle that 
guides the other characteristics to achieve that aim. The researcher’s focus and methods 
are designed with the participants’ meanings at the forefront. For example, the researcher 
provides participants with security and comfort, by entering their natural environment, 
so they can openly narrate their experiences and views in their own words.809  
 
One of the way in which data can be gathered in qualitative studies is through the 
researcher engaging with the participants in a semi-structured interview, using open-
ended questions. Through the building of a rapport, the researcher creates a situational 
closeness and understanding of the participants, enhanced by empathetic listening and 
responding. Neutrality and objectivity are preserved, for example, by testing what has 
been said in an inquiring way, and without being judgemental.810  
 
The choice of method is influenced by the aim of the research.811 I chose a qualitative 
design, using a phenomological approach, as my aim was to gain in-depth individual 
experiences.812 This allowed the participants to narrate and reflect upon their experiences, 
also giving their perspectives and views on issues relating to their personal experiences. 
This was particularly important when interviewing the parents and children, due to the 
																																																								
805 At 16. See also Mary Alison Durand “Planning your social science research” in Mary Alison Durand and 
Tracey Chantler (eds) Principles of Social Research (2nd ed, McGraw-Hill Education, Maidenhead, 2014) at 5. 
806 Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, The Landscape of Qualitative Research (4th ed, SAGE, Los 
Angeles, 2013) at 17. 
807 Tracey Chantler “Qualitative methods of data collection and analysis” in Mary Alison Durand and 
Tracey Chantler (eds) Principles of Social Research (2nd ed, McGraw-Hill Education, Maidenhead, 2014) at 45. 
808 Cresswell and Cresswell, above n 793 at 181-182. 
809 There are a number of ways in which qualitative research can be conducted, for example, narrative in 
which the researcher asks the participants to recount their experiences; phenomenological where the 
researcher describes the participants’ experiences; grounded theory whereby “the researcher derives a 
general, abstract theory of process, action or interaction grounded in the views of the participants”; 
ethnography involving observation as well as interviews; and case studies where the researcher takes a 
prolonged and in-depth approach to an event, activity or process: Cresswell and Cresswell, above n 784 at 
14-15. 
810 Patton, above n 797 at 57 refers to this as “empathetic neutrality.” 
811 Cresswell and Cresswell make point that qualitative and quantitative are not “rigid, distinct categories, 
polar opposites, or dichotomies [but] [i]nstead, they represent different ends on a continuum.” Thus, a 
study can have more features of one or the other, with mixed methods at the midway point: Cresswell and 
Cresswell, above n 793 at 3.  
812 At 13-14.  
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highly sensitive and emotive nature of their health experiences. This method enabled me 
to capture the description and feelings of their experiences by using their own words. 
Likewise, when interviewing health professionals, the personal approach to interviews 
enabled them to reflect upon their practices and processes. Their recollection of 
situations, where consent was an issue, was invaluable to this research. 
Qualitative research is adaptable, able to change direction, with earlier data influencing 
the collection of future data, for example, by changing/extending intended participants 
and/or questions. Cresswell and Cresswell term this “emergent design”,813 while Durant 
and Chantler refer to it as “theoretical sampling.”814 Such changes demonstrate the 
responsiveness of the researcher to the data:815 
These shifts signal that the researchers are delving deeper and deeper into the topic or 
the phenomenon under study. The key idea behind qualitative research is to learn about 
the problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain the 
information. 
The flexible nature of qualitative research lends itself to studying phenomena, which 
although well established, has received little attention in research. 816  Children’s 
competence and informed consent processes across healthcare environments have 
received relatively little attention from a legal perspective, and thus flexibility was 
important to my research. In particular, purposeful sampling was a fundamental feature 
of this study, which is a characteristic that distinguishes qualitative from quantitative 
studies, where samples are random.817 This enables the researcher to select “information-
rich cases” that will illuminate the nature and substance of the phenomenon.818 Their 
values are in bringing deeper understanding and insights to the study. There are a 
number of purposeful sampling strategies, including single significant case, comparison-
focused sampling and group characteristic sampling.819 The strategy I employed was 
comparison-focused sampling. This involved selecting cases and participants to compare 
and contrast, in order to understand their similarities and differences.820 It was important 
to my study that I recruited participants who had either experienced healthcare or were 
practitioners in different healthcare environments. I sought further diversity within these 
environments, by for example, seeking hospital doctors with differing specialty, recruiting 
health professionals practicing within different locations and of differing experience. The 
aim was to gain deeper understanding of how different health conditions and healthcare 
																																																								
813 At 182. 
814 Chantler above n 807 at 47. 
815 Cresswell and Cresswell, above n 793 at 182. 
816 Initially conducting qualitative research can help to generate hypotheses, which can be tested later with 
quantitative research: Chantler, above n 798 at 48. 
817 Patton, above n 797 at 264. 
818 At 264.  
819 At 264. Patton lists eight categories of purposeful sampling strategies, classified from 40 possible 
options: single significant case; comparison-focused sampling; group characteristics; concept or theoretical 
sampling; instrument-use multiple-case sampling; sequential and emergence-driven sampling strategies 
during fieldwork; analytically focused sampling; and mixed, stratified and combination sampling strategies. 
820 At 267. 
	
	 124	
environments influence, if at all, the assessment of children’s competence and consent 
processes. 
B. Research Credibi l i ty  
Validity and reliability relate to the accuracy and credibility of studies, which differ 
between qualitative and quantitative research. In quantitative methods, validity relates to 
the effectiveness and accuracy of the instruments used to collect the data, and whether 
these have collected the intended data. 821  Reliability concerns the instruments’ 
applicability or generalisation of use.822 Generalisation and replication are key features of 
quantitative research. 
Conversely, individualisation, or uniqueness of the participants and researchers, is the 
central characteristic of qualitative research, and as such, validity is “based on 
determining whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the 
participants or the readers of an account.”823 Creswell recommends utilising multiple 
approaches from eight primary strategies to check the validity and reliability of data: 
triangulation; member checking; use of rich and thick description; self reflection of 
researchers’ bias; presentation of negative or discrepant information; spending prolonged 
time in the field; peer debriefing; and use of an external auditor.824 The strategies I 
employed were triangulation through the use of multiple sources and external auditors, 
the use of rich/thick data, self-reflection and presentation of negative and discrepant 
information feature. 
1.  Triangulat ion 
Triangulation is “a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to 
any inquiry”, by using for example, multiple sources, methods and theories.825 These 
strengthen and improve the validity of the research, as they provide greater 
understanding of the issue; stimulate the researcher to question the views of the 
participants and reflect upon the issues through earlier knowledge from other 
perspectives; and provide greater depth from consistent and divergent perspectives.826 
Triangulation through multiple sources strengthened my study, and was essential to 
exploring the perspectives of, and the dynamic between, children, parents and health 
professionals. By considering different areas of healthcare and environments, I was able 
to undertake comparisons identifying commonalities and differences. Consistency of 
																																																								
821 Cresswell and Cresswell, above n 793 at 153.  
822 At 154.  
823 At 199.  
824 John W Cresswell, Research Design: qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approaches (4th ed, SAGE, Los 
Angeles, 2014) at 201-202. 
825 Patton, above n 797 at 661 identifies four triangulation processes for enhancing credibility: triangulation 
of qualitative sources; mixed quantitative-qualitative methods; analyst triangulation; and theory/perspective 
triangulation. See also Denzin and Lincoln, above n 806 at 10. 
826 Patton, above n 797 at 660. 
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findings across types of data increases confidence in patterns and themes, whilst 
inconsistencies invite questions and reflection about possible reasons.827  
 
Analyst triangulation, or use of external auditors, was another strategy I used, achieved 
through the supervision of two very experienced researchers, Associate Professor Nicola 
Taylor and Professor Mark Henaghan. Although I conducted the interviews alone, they 
were in a position to review the content and processes I employed. Additionally, to some 
extent, my research was open to scrutiny by the research participants, when I sent them 
summaries of my research findings upon completing the writing of my findings chapters. 
Likewise, my peers and members of the public were able to view/consider the research, 
when I displayed some of my findings by way of a poster presentation, and spoke to 
attendees, at the Seventh World Congress on Family Law and Children’s Rights in 
Dublin in 2017.  
 
Triangulation of individual cases, however, was not employed, due to the impracticability 
of tracing patients and linking them to their healthcare providers. This would have also 
raised confidentiality concerns for participants, where the child, parent and health 
professional were linked together.  
   
2. Use o f  Rich/Thick Data 
 
The use of rich/thick data provides detailed and emotive description of the participants’ 
experiences, enabling the reader to be transported into their lives. The results become 
more realistic and richer, adding to the validity of the findings.828 In this thesis, I 
faithfully reported the words and feelings of the participants, using their own words as 
much as possible, to convey their experiences and perspectives.  
3.  Ref l exiv i ty   
Reflexivity is of importance to the credibility of qualitative research, which employs in-
depth interviews, due to the involvement and impact of the researcher on the data 
collection and analysis. Reflexivity is a means of enhancing the study’s credibility, as it 
involves “deep introspection, political consciousness, cultural awareness, and ownership 
of one’s perspective.”829 The researcher needs to be reflective about biases, values and 
personal background.  
The influences that I have brought to this study begin with my values of justice and 
equality, which filtered into my 22 years experience as a child and family law solicitor, in 
private practice, in Scotland and New Zealand, and also for the charity, The Scottish 
Child Law Centre. Status, on the other hand, has never held any relevance for me. Rather, 
of importance are personal attributes, skills and experience, personality and interests. 
These values lend themselves to having a genuine interest, empathy and respect for 
																																																								
827 At 660. 
828 Cresswell and Cresswell, above n 793 at 200.  
829 Patton, above n 797 at 70. 
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others, which I used during interviews. I found it easy to develop a rapport with all the 
participants, which I feel enabled them to be open with me. Conversely, these values 
resulted in entering the field with the assumption that children could acquire the skills to 
be deemed competent to consent to medical treatment. I was aware that this was my 
starting point, but what I lacked was the understanding and experience of what factors 
influence the development and demonstration of children’s competence. I have no 
personal experience of undergoing medical treatment, as a child or through my children. 
Thus, I had no pre-conceived impressions of the reality of coping with health conditions 
and treatment. I allowed the participants to educate me on how they felt and viewed their 
experiences. 
I consciously maintained an open mind when listening to and understanding the 
participants’ experiences, in order to accurately reflect their perspectives, regardless of 
whether it conformed with my underlying values or not. Through my legal experience, I 
am accustomed to understanding and considering different perspectives, which together 
build a complete picture. 
 
IV.  Methods  
The data for this study drew upon a diverse sample of health professionals from 
medicine, surgery and dentistry, based in private practice, hospital, school, and 
community settings, in four metropolitan areas in New Zealand. In total, I interviewed 
59 individuals. This section first describes the recruitment of the participants, ethics 
approval, participants’ demographics and interviews, moving then to detail the analysis 
methods. 
   
A. Sample Recrui tment and Ethics  
 
Three categories of participants were recruited to take part in this study – health 
professionals; families; and stakeholders. The only specific inclusion/exclusion criteria 
related to parents and children. Parents/guardians were required to have attended at least 
two appointments with a health professional relating to their child’s health condition; and 
children were required to: 
 
   (a) be aged between five and 15 years at the time of diagnosis; and  
(b) have, or have had, a medical or dental condition requiring treatment over a 
period of at least six months within the last two years.  
Children, who were vulnerable, in the opinion of their parent/guardian or health 
professional, were to be excluded, but none of the families I approached declined on this 
basis. Causing no harm to the participants was an important principle of research. At the 
very least the researcher seeks to do no harm, so the participants are unaffected by the 
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process, and at best derive benefit.830 This was particularly relevant to the parents and 
children in this research, as it involved them discussing personal issues of health. A 
balance needed to be achieved in recruiting children and parents, whereby the treatment 
was sufficiently recent for them to have good recall, but not currently being administered, 
which would make children vulnerable. Further, I took care to arrange interviews at a 
time and place convenient to them, and conducted them at their pace.  
A wide age range of children was selected in anticipation of including younger children, 
firstly, to respect their views and experiences, and secondly, to explore the extent of their 
participation and competence. Unfortunately, children younger than 10-years-old were 
not represented in this study.   
The principles of informed consent, confidentiality and the right to withdraw at any stage 
were also of vital importance, particularly as sensitive and confidential medical 
information was being discussed. By fully informing participants prior to interviews,831 in 
writing and orally, and being committed to protecting their anonymity, it would likely 
provide them with a sense of control and security to be frank during discussions.832 
Further, it was recognised that participants may seek to contact me post-interview, and 
were advised that they were welcome to do so. Three parents did subsequently contact 
me to advise of their positive experiences of participating, such as, giving their children 
an opportunity to talk about their health conditions, or enabling them to reflect on their 
relationship with their child. 
As part of the ethics application, I consulted with Ngāi Tahu Reseach Consultation 
Committee (“Committee), as it was of potential interest to Māori. The Committee 
considered the research to be of importance to Māori Health and strongly encouraged 
that ethnicity data be collected as part of the research project. I purposely recruited three 
stakeholders from a support organisation who supported children and their whānau with 
a long-term health condition. Unfortunately, however, amongst the health professionals 
and families no Māori were represented. 
The University of Otago Human Ethics Committee (“the Ethics Committee) approved 
the research on 23rd December 2013, reference 13/279. During the course of the 
research, I extended the range of participants twice to include private dentists and dental 
therapists. The Ethics Committee approved the amendments on 9th May 2014 and 18 
March 2015 respectively. These extensions enabled me to more fully consider dental 
health practices in three different settings, to provide deeper understanding of the factors 
that promote and hinder children’s competence, and to compare consent processes. 
																																																								
830 Following interviews with parents and children, three parents contacted me to advise of the benefit they 
and their children had derived from being able to talk, and reflect upon, the medical treatment and 
informed consent processes. 
831 See Appendix B for Information Sheet and Appendix C for Consent Form sent to all adult participants; 
Appendix H for Children/Young People’s Information Sheet; and Appendix I for Children/Young 
People’s Consent Form. 
832 Not simply ethical issues, but also factors that increase the credibility of the research. 
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Additionally, prior to commencing the research in the hospitals, approval was obtained 
from the relevant medical officers.  
The recruitment aim was to seek diversity, both in terms of healthcare environments, and 
also health specialties. I sought to achieve these aims not only for health professionals, 
but also for children and parents. The justifications for such diversity were: 
1. To be able to compare and contrast health professionals’ practices, and children 
and parents’ experiences, across health disciplines and environments; and 
2. To fill gaps in research, particularly in the private health sectors and in all 
dentistry environments. 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the categories of participants and the numbers of each. 
It can be seen from this table that in terms of health professionals, I recruited from those 
practicing medicine, surgery and dentistry, and from within healthcare environments of 

















Table 2:  Categories and Numbers of Research Participants 








Hospital Dentists 3 
Private Dentists 3 
Hospital Nurses 3 
Nurses- school/community 
youth service  
3 
Public Health Nurses 2 
School Dental Therapists 2 
Stakeholders: Non-Government 
Organisations (NGO) supporting 








including policy; training, 
advising, regulation of health 




1.  Health Profess ionals  
I aimed to recruit 12 doctors from hospital and private practice; eight nurses from 
hospitals and schools; five dentists from hospitals; three private dentists; and two school 
dental therapists. Within that sample, I sought diversity of specialty and experience. In 
recruiting health professionals, I began with my personal network, and then used the 
snowball effect, being referred to their friends and/or colleagues. This strategy proved 
effective. 
Table 3 details the categories of health professionals; their gender; age at the time of 




Table 3: Health Professionals by Gender, Age, Professional Experience  













Hospital Doctor 4 Female 
3 Male 
37-67 years 3-36 years 10 – 42 years 
GP 4 Female 
2 Male 
35-51 years 4 - 23 years 10 - 28 years 
Hospital Dentist  3 Female 40-41 years 7- 18 years 16-19 years 




15-18 years 16½ – 20 years 
School  
Dental Therapist 
2 Female 23 and 45 
years 
5 months and 
21 years 
5 months and 
21 years 
Hospital Nurse 3 Female 48-55 years 6 - 8 years 25 – 34 years 
School 
Nurse/Community 
nurse     
3 Female 43-55 years 2 - 11 years	 22 – 30 years  
Public Nurse  2 Female 47 and 54 
years 
8 and 13 years
  




I recruited surgeons and hospital doctors from different medical specialties. I identified 
health specialties that were likely to involve oral and written consent: paediatrics, 
paediatric and plastic surgery, anaesthesia, obstetrics and gynecology. The hospital 
doctors comprised of two paediatric surgeons; one plastic surgeon; two paediatricians; 
one obstetrician and gynecologist; and one anaesthetist. These doctors practiced within 
three different hospitals, had wide ranges of experience in their present area of practice, 
as well as their overall experience, and were of both genders. I was very fortunate to 
meet very helpful hospital doctors, and a stakeholder, who referred me on to potentially 
interested colleagues.  
Secondly, amongst the GPs, diversity was achieved through recruiting from four 
different practices, males and females, with varying lengths of experience. Additionally, I 





Whilst all hospital dentists, and both dental therapists, practiced in the same hospital and 
clinic respectively, they all varied in experience. The hospital dentists had hospital 
experience of between seven and 18 years, and one dental therapist had practiced for 21 
years, with the other only five months.  
The three private dentists were from different private practices, and two were male and 
one female, although were of similar experience.  
 
(c)  Nurses 
The eight nurses had experience in four healthcare environments – hospital, public 
health, school and community youth service. They had further diversity: three school 
nurses were employed at different schools, with one also practising at a community 
youth service; the three hospital nurses had different employers, with varying specialties 
– diabetes, oncology, paediatric critical care, and medical services; and the two public 
health nurses had had differing experience, although the same employer. 
 
(d) Information Documentation and Arranging Interviews  
Upon receiving confirmation of their interest in the study, I emailed a personalised 
letter,833 an information sheet and consent form.834 Interviews were either arranged over 
the telephone or by email. The consent forms were signed, and either returned to me, 
prior to interview, or at the start of the interview. 
I had anticipated that it may be difficult to secure the time and interest from a range of 
health professionals, given the demands of their work, but this could not have been 
further from the truth. They all graciously gave me their time, showing interest in this 
area, by explaining their practices, and recalling examples that highlighted some issues 
they had encountered.  
 
2.  Parents and Chi ldren/Young People  
 
It had been my intention to recruit parents and families through non-government 
organisations that supported children and parents in managing lifelong/chronic health 
conditions, such as cancer, diabetes and asthma. I had hoped, in particular, to reach 
Māori whānau through this method, as one NGO provided education and advocacy 
services to them. My rationale was that the NGOs would have relationships with families 
who had experience of healthcare systems/processes, and be able to approach them to 
enquire of their interest in participating in this study. This proved an effective strategy 
for one lifelong/chronic health condition, but not for others.835 My aim was to recruit 10 
																																																								
833 See Appendix D. 
834 See Appendix C. 
835 One in particular was initially very reticent about even taking part at an organisational level. Their initial 
response to my approach was defensive, viewing that their children did not have treatment choices, 
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parents and 10 children. I recruited two parents and two children/young people from 
one support organisation (SH9). This Stakeholder, having participated in an interview 
with me first, met with potential families to explain the study to them and confirmed 
their willingness to participate, before I contacted them. The other five children/young 
people and four parents, I knew, or was referred to them by mutual friends/colleagues. 
The only parent I did not approach was of a young person aged 19 years at the time of 
interview, was living independently, and had initiated contact with me independently of 
her parents.  
 
My aim was to recruit diverse health conditions and healthcare environments, of both 
genders and of different ages. Table 4 outlines the children/young people’s health 










sometimes having to be physically forced to have it administered. The agency explained that their “children 
do not have a choice over treatment” and that “some of our parents have to pin down their children” [in 
order to administer medication] otherwise they will end up in hospital.” Speaking for parents, she believed 
they would be very concerned about me asking children questions. However, with a change in personnel, 
this organisation willingly participated, but not to the extent of recruiting parents and children. 
836 The names are fictitious and some of their genders have been changed to help protect anonymity. 
However, the ratio of girls to boys, the health conditions and ages have been retained to preserve as much 
authentic personal detail as possible.  
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Table 4: Children/Young People by Health Condition and Age 
 
Child Health Condition Age at 
diagnosis 






Osteosarcoma 10 years 10-14 years 14 years 
Amanda 
 
Osteosarcoma  13 years 13-14 years 16 years 
Oliver 
 
Leukemia 14 years 14-17 years 18 years 
Alistair  
 
ADHD 9 years 10 years 10 years 
Poppy Vaccinations; 
Achilles condition; 













Endometriosis  15 years 15-17 years 19 years 
Donald Tooth extraction 10 years 11 years 11 years 
 
The parents interviewed were all mothers, and they and their children lived in three 
different geographical areas. Their ages ranged from 37 to 54 years and they all had 
professional backgrounds, with two having nursing experience. In two-parent families, of 
which there were three, they were able to choose whether one, or both, parents 
participated in the interviews. In all three cases, the mothers chose to solely participate, 
as they had been more involved in attending consultations with health professionals 
regarding their child. 
 
The children had been treated in hospital, at private GP or dentists’ practices, or in 
school, for surgery, medicine or dentistry. They comprised of three children/young 
person receiving cancer treatment and surgery in hospital; one receiving medication at 
the GP for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD); one undergoing surgery 
in hospital for endometriosis; one had a tooth removed at his dentist; and one had an 
operation for an achilles condition in hospital, routine teenage vaccinations in school, 
and dental surgery and braces fitted at a private dentist. The children/young people were 
aged between 10 and 19 years at the date of their interview. There were three boys and 
four girls.  
 
(a) Information Documentation and Arranging Interviews 
 
Prior to meeting with the families, I contacted the parents by telephone, explaining the 
purpose of the research and the process of interview. I informed the parents that I would 
be focusing on their child’s participation in the engagement with health professionals, 
specifically, the information given by the health professionals, involvement in discussions, 
the decision-making and consent giving processes. All parents indicated their and their 
children’s willingness to participate, confirming also that they had consulted with, and 
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informed, their child of the study. The parents received a personalised letter,837 the same 
information sheet as the other adult participants,838 with children/young people receiving 
a shorter and simpler one.839 Similarly, parents signed a generic consent form,840 signing 
also one to consent to their children participating,841 while children signed their own 
consent form.842 
 
(b)  Recruitment Strategies 
Having secured seven children/young people and six parents, I undertook the following 
strategies to attempt to increase my sample size:  
1. I followed up a telephone call from a parent of a six-year-old diabetic child, who 
had become aware of my study. However, arranging an interview proved difficult, 
and the parent ultimately did not follow through. 
2. One of the parent participants was aware of a work colleague whose child had a 
long-term health condition. Although the other parent initially expressed an 
interest to this participant, she did not give her consent to forward her contact 
details to me, nor did she initiate contact with me. 
 
3. I emailed a nurse working at a community youth health organisation to enquire if 
they could be of assistance, but did not receive a response. 
 
4. I enquired with another youth community health organisation as to whether they 
would be interested in taking part in the study in their own right, and also as a 
means to recruiting families. After showing initial interest, they did not respond 
further. 
 
5. I considered the possibility of speaking with groups of children and young people, 
in order to provide a different context to gathering data. The avenues that I 
explored were through camps, organised by support organisations for 
lifelong/chronic health conditions. However, this was not viable for one camp, 
as it is designed to give relief to children/young people, from the pressures of 
their illness, and therefore understandably they did not wish a researcher to affect 
that respite. For another, there was a sense of them protecting their members 
from a researcher speaking with children. They expressed concern over 
discussions I may have with children, fearing that I may suggest to them that they 
had a choice over taking their essential medication. Despite being reassured that 
the children would be the ones educating me over their health condition and 
medication, they were unwilling to contact their members. 
 
																																																								
837 Appendix F. 
838 Appendix C. 
839 Appendix H.  
840 Appendix C. 
841 Appendix G. 
842 Appendix I. 
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3.  Key Stakeholders  
In recruiting stakeholders, I was aiming again for diversity. I purposefully recruited 
stakeholders with different backgrounds and roles. The backgrounds sought were health 
and/or law. I recruited from three government and non-government agencies 
responsible for healthcare and advocating for children’s wellbeing and interests; three 
health support organisations for children suffering with long-term illnesses;843 two health 
professional regulatory bodies;844 four lawyers;845 a medical ethics educator; and a play 
therapist.846 One avenue that I explored, which was unsuccessful, was seeking judicial 
approval to interview two judges. This application was denied on the grounds that it was 
considered to be inappropriate to ask judges to comment on the existing law. Although 
their perspectives would have been very insightful, I secured the participation of four 
solicitors, all with different roles. One advised and represented clients on consent issues 
in private practice; another was an in-house DHB solicitor; the third advised on legal and 
policy issues for a Government agency; and the fourth was a leading child advocate.   
 
B.  Interv iews 
The sequence of interviews began with health professionals, followed by NGOs,847 
parents, children, and stakeholders. This gave me a general sense of the processes and 
perspectives from the health professionals, and issues that had arisen for children and 
parents, from both health professionals and the NGOs, before interviewing the parents 
and children.	 A few of the participants were out of sequence depending upon their 
availability. 
The interview locations were a consideration in the research design, as I sought to make 
it as convenient and comfortable as possible for the participants, to promote a relaxed 
dialogue. The participants chose where to be interviewed. I was conscious that for most, 
time would be a factor, and so I gave them as much control as possible. I interviewed 
																																																								
843 One agency supporting children with a lifelong/chronic health condition declined to participate in an 
organisation capacity to comment on their work with their members and any consent related issues that 
have arisen, as it did not consider the consent process to be of relevance to their organisation. Further, it 
declined to assist me in recruiting families for the study because i) the health professionals who treat this 
health condition are not based in the same geographical area as the children who would be participating 
and therefore they would not be involved in the study; and ii) consent for treatment can remain in place for 
up to three years and is not given for individual “administrations.” The agency considered that the health 
condition they deal with is “very different to other diseases, conditions or dental procedures.” They 
concluded that “whilst a good study not for our families.” 
844 Of five regulatory professional bodies approached two agreed to participate. A third was initially 
interested but with a change of personnel questioned the relevance of the study to their organisation. The 
Chief Executive of another advised that during her seven years in post no issues of informed consent 
regarding children had come to her attention, and referred me to an experienced health professional who 
was willing to participate in that capacity. After much persistence with the fifth they simply did not follow 
through with participating. 
845 One of which was from a government agency and has been included under “lawyer” rather than 
Government agency.  
846 See Table 2, page 129. 
847 I interviewed the two of the three NGOs supporting families with lifelong/chronic health conditions 
following the health professionals, as I had hoped that they would refer me to parents and children. 
However only one referred me to any families. 
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most health professionals and stakeholders at their places of work, except for three 
health professionals, and one stakeholder, who were interviewed in their homes; three 
health professionals, and one stakeholder, met me in my office; and one health 
professional and two stakeholders were interviewed by telephone. All the parents and 
their children were interviewed in their homes, except one parent, who was interviewed 
in her office; one young person was interviewed at her college; and another at her 
mother’s office. When planning the interviews with the children/young people, I was 
mindful of addressing the power imbalance that they may feel when I was seeking their 
views and feelings, as “the relations and contexts within which communication takes 
place fundamentally shape the nature and outcome of the research.”848 Thus, it was 
crucial to recruit children who had experience of, and opinions on, engaging with health 
professionals and informed consent. I was confident from the information I had received 
from parents, and also of what I knew of the children/young people I had already met, 
that these children had relevant experiences and opinions that they wanted to share. 
Further, they were likely to feel validation and confidence from being in a familiar 
environment, aware that their parents had participated and supported their participation.  
All interviews were audiotaped and the consent forms specifically included their 
permission for this. I checked with those participants who had sent me their consent 
forms in advance of the interview that they agreed to be recorded. This was of significant 
benefit to the interview, as I was able to concentrate on the participants and their 
responses, which enhanced rapport, rather than breaking eye contact and having a more 
stilted approach through note taking. It also ensured greater accuracy.   
I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with the participants.849 These occurred 
over 20 months, between March 2014 and November 2015. The interviews are best 
described as conversations and discussions that developed naturally. Whilst semi-
structured, there was flexibility to adapt the flow of questions, and add some new ones, 
depending upon the substance and direction of interviews. Most participants only 
required a few key questions to explain their experiences, whilst a few needed more 
direction on specifically the information being sought. Sensitive issues, particularly those 
discussed by parents relating to their children’s health, treatment and relationships with 
health professionals, were addressed through active listening and empathy, giving them 
time to describe events. Also, parents were aware in advance, through the information 
provided to them, of the focus of the interview, which provided them with parameters 
and structure.  
 
Having worked in the fields of child and family law, which sometimes involved children 
who were in need of care and protection, I was aware of child protection policies, and the 
exception to confidentiality, if children make disclosures, or are at risk of significant harm. 
In the unlikely event of a child disclosing abuse or neglect during interview, I would have 
																																																								
848 Pia Christensen and Allison James, “Researching children and childhood: cultures of communication” 
in Pia Christensen and Allison James (eds), Research with Children Perspectives and Practices (2nd ed, Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2008) at 7. 
849 See Appendices J - M. 
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agreed on a course of action in collaboration with my supervisors, and understood that a 
referral to Oranga Tamariki – Ministry for Children may have been required.  
 
As the interviews progressed, it was possible to share some of the views of earlier 
participants, obviously preserving confidentiality. For example, it had surprised me that 
the practice of one health professional was to involve children in more complicated 
matters than simple ones, as that had run counter to what I had imagined would be the 
situation, and I wondered what the views of some other participants were. 
 
I felt very comfortable interviewing the participants in this study, as with over 20 years 
experience as a solicitor specialising in child and family law, I am accustomed to 
interviewing people from all walks of life, in usually emotive situations. Further, as a 
Safeguarder in the Scottish Children Hearing System, representing children’s welfare and 
best interests, and reporting also to Sheriff Courts on child care and child protection 
matters, I was familiar with speaking to parents and children in their homes, learning 
about their circumstances, and discussing these with involved professionals. It has always 
felt natural to me speaking with children, as I am curious about their perspectives. This is 
enhanced by my experience of having two children and over 12 years experience of 
teaching children to swim. When interviewing professional participants, I felt confident 
in discussing medical consent matters, as I was secure in my legal knowledge. 
 
1.  Health Profess ionals  
The interviews with health professionals considered the stages of informed consent 
processes: discussions; informing; giving options and advising; assessing children’s 
competence; and obtaining consent. Their interviews ranged in duration from 21 minutes 
to one hour and 14 minutes. The topics discussed in the interviews included:850 
• Personal details, such as their length of experience and specialty. 
• Processes for consulting with children and parents, including strategies for 
involving children, and explanations given about health conditions, treatment 
and options. 
• Processes for assessing children’s competence, including the factors considered. 
• Factors that influence children’s competence. 
• Consent processes. 
• Challenging consent situations. 
• Understanding of the law on consent. 
• Views on children giving/refusing consent. 









2.   Parents  
The general structure of the interviews with parents followed the history of their 
children’s health condition, from initial consultation, to investigations, diagnosis and 
treatment.851 This assisted me in understanding the chronology of events, and provided 
the participants with a logical unfolding timeline. I sought to understand, in particular, 
the extent to which children were involved in discussions in consultations with health 
professionals; the ways in which children learned about their health conditions and 
treatment; how treatment decisions were made; and consent provided. 
The duration of these interviews ranged from 35 minutes to 2 hours and 22 minutes. The 
latter was of exceptional length, as it spanned four years of treatment and procedures, 
involving chemotherapy and three operations. The others were within the range of 39 
minutes to 55 minutes. The interviews with parents were in private, their children being 
unaware of discussions. 
 
3.   Chi ldren/Young People  
I interviewed the children/young people following the interviews with parents, in the 
same visit. Prior to interview, I had considered whether to interview them alone or with 
their parents present. I decided this after interviewing each parent, depending upon 
whether they offered that I speak with their children alone, or I suggested this, if I sensed 
that the parents and children would be comfortable. I was graciously given complete 
privacy with three children/young people, their parent being in a separate room. I knew 
two of these parents and children, which was likely to have been a factor in them feeling 
comfortable with me being alone. The third was a confident/strong-minded young 
person, who was capable of, and comfortable with, participating alone. Naturally, I 
interviewed the young person, whose parents were not approached, alone, in a private 
room at her college. 
I interviewed the other three children in the presence of their parents. However, for two 
interviews we were in an open-plan lounge, with their parent in the kitchen area. Both 
parents were unobtrusive, and took no part in the interview, to the extent that for most 
of the interviews, I was unaware of their presence. The children were not distracted, nor 
appeared influenced by their parents’ presence, as they were fully engaged and focused 
on the interview. I had not previously met these parents or children before the interviews.  
Of exception was one young person with Asperger’s Syndrome, whose mother and 
grandmother asked to be present, and actively assisted with the interview to keep him 
focused on answering the questions. Asperger’s Syndrome causes communication and 
social difficulties, and it was extremely helpful to have them present. It appeared that this 
was a role to which the family were clearly accustomed.  
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Before engaging in each interview, I checked with the children/young people at the start, 
that they understood its purpose. They confirmed they had read the information sheet,852 
discussed it with their parents,853 and had all signed the consent form.854 I also explained 
that I would be recording the interview, as it helps me to listen to them without taking 
notes, and they all agreed. I reinforced to them that this was voluntary and that at any 
point they could ask to stop or take a break.  
The interviews ranged from seven minutes to fifty-four minutes. The interview of seven 
minutes was with the young person with Asperger’s Syndrome. He was straight to the 
point with his views. The interview of 54 minutes was with a very capable young person, 
who had insights and views on many aspects of her health experience. I met her for the 
first time at the interview, and the length was therefore not attributable to any pre-
existing relationship. The other interviews ranged from 14 minutes to 28 minutes.  
 
I had anticipated that I might need to visit the children/young people on two occasions, 
the first being to build rapport, and the second to interview. However, I did not require 
the rapport building visit, as they were all very engaging. I was able to position myself as 
the non-expert, and they as the expert.855 They appeared to show a genuine interest in the 
topic, also appreciating my interest in them. After a few initial icebreaker questions about 
their day, school and what they liked doing, I asked them general questions about what 
decisions they are allowed to make at home. We then spoke specifically about their 
health condition and its treatment. The topics covered were: how involved they were and 
felt in consultations with health professionals; the roles they and their parent played 
before, during and after consultations; how they learned about their health condition and 
its treatment; to what extent health professionals explained these matters; how treatment 
decisions were made; the consent processes; and their views on children having rights to 
consent.856 I took the lead from the children, asking them to further explain or give 
examples on what they were describing. They all recalled events freely, and were easily 
able to articulate their views and feelings.   
 
Exceptionally, I visited one child twice, in a two-stage process, before and after her 
surgery. In the second interview, she was able to describe events immediately preceding, 
and subsequent to, her operation. Additionally, in the month between interviews she had 
also had dental surgery and braces fitted. She described the reasons for requiring these, 
her consultations with the dentists, both before and subsequent to the procedures, and 





852 Appendix H. 
853 Except for the young person whose parent was not approached to participate. 
854 Appendix I. 
855 Christensen and James, above n 848 at 9; Helen Roberts, “Listening to children” in Pia Christensen and 
Allison James (eds), Research with Children Perspectives and Practices (3rd ed, Routledge, Abingdon, 2017) at 153. 
856 See Appendix L. 
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4.  Key Stakeholders  
 
The majority of stakeholders were interviewed upon concluding the interviews with the 
health professionals, parents and children.857 They were identified as having a role, 
and/or interest in, the consent processes. Prior to interview, I contacted the 
organisations by email and telephone, confirming their willingness to participate, and to 
identify the relevant person(s) who would be interviewed. I sent those people a 
personalised letter,858 the information sheet and consent form.859 The interviewees were 
key people within organisations who had knowledge of practice, policy or legal issues. 
Their backgrounds were in health, law, ethics, youth work and policy. 
 
Discussions centred on their, and their organisations’, roles and experience in medical 
informed consent processes. The topics covered were their roles in advising, promoting 
knowledge of, and regulating on, children consenting; any issues that had arisen for them 
or their members in this area; their views on the regulation of children consenting; and 
their opinions on whether changes to the law could be beneficial.860   
 
The interviews ranged from 13 minutes to 72 minutes. The factors that most influenced 
the length of the interview, in my view, were the relevance of the topic to the agency or 
participant, the participant’s experience, and their available time. The shortest interview 
was with an agency in which the lawyer interviewed had efficiently prepared, by gathering 
together fact sheets and print outs of case summaries, with which the agency had been 
involved. The lawyer had only two years experience and did not have extensive personal 
knowledge, so there was little to discuss. Conversely, eight interviews were 50 minutes or 
more, with the participants having extensive experience in their professional fields, and 
knowledge of consent issues.  
 
Finally, one stakeholder taught an ethics seminar to fifth year medical students, which I 
attended. During this seminar, which lasted 90 minutes, the students reinforced their 
understanding of Gillick, were taught that competence is a legal test that is task specific, 
were given case studies to practise applying the law to practical situations, discussed 
effective communication, and practical means of resolving difficult situations. 
C.  Administrat ive  Procedures  
Following each interview, I allocated the participants codes, and when transcribing did 
not use their names, localities or other identifying details, such as the names of schools 
or health professionals. The transcriptions were kept in folders on my computer, which 
were secured by a password. The audiotapes were transcribed, and then deleted from the 
dictaphone, with the downloads also kept in a password protected folder. The consent 
forms were kept in a folder and the participant master-list was kept separate from the 
																																																								
857 Except for the two NGOs who were interviewed following health professionals. See f/n 847. 
858 See Appendix E. 
859 See Appendix C. 
860 See Appendix M. 
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coding profile, both of which were kept in a locked drawer at my home. Email 
correspondence was either deleted or, if needed for later reference, kept in the folder 
with the consent forms. 
D.  Data Analys is  
Upon completing the data collection, the challenge for the researcher is to “transform 
data into findings.”861 The researcher has a large quantity of experiences, reflections and 
opinions, and the task is to make them coherent. There is no one process or formula for 
achieving this.862 The researcher needs to be committed to the process of moving from 
an inductive to a deductive process, firstly analysing participants’ transcripts, comparing 
and contrasting them, to identify categories, patterns and themes.863 This system enables 
the researcher to make sense of the participants’ experiences, looking for consistencies, 
inconsistencies and gaps.864 
Thus, in an inductive process the researcher allows the data to speak for itself, directing 
the researcher to the issues and themes, whereas deductive processes involve the 
researcher identifying themes from previous research and theories, for example, and 
considering whether the existing data supports them, or whether further data collection 
is needed.  
 
I began analysing the interviews during the data collection phase, by highlighting key 
words, practices, process, perspectives and opinions in the transcripts. Although I was 
already familiar with their interviews, I read the transcripts several times, finding that the 
more I read them, the more I understood their experiences, and spotted further nuances. 
This assisted me when undertaking the first stages of analysis, of immersing myself in the 
data, in order to code it. Coding the data involves “categorizing, classifying, and labeling 
the primary patterns in the data,”865 giving it structure. I began coding the data based on 
the sequence of the interview schedules and the issues that emerged from the interviews. 
These naturally followed the logical timeline of consent processes:  
 
• Relationships and communication between children, parents and health 
professionals; 
• Information given to children on their health conditions and treatment;  
• Opportunities for children to participate in discussions;  
• How children’s understanding is promoted and the importance placed upon it;  
• How treatment decisions are taken;  
• How or whether children’s competence is assessed by health professionals; 
• The importance health professionals place on trust with parents and children;  
• The roles parents play in children’s participation; 
																																																								
861 Patton, above n 797 521. 
862 At 521-522. 
863 Creswell and Creswell, above n 793 at 181. 
864 At 181. 
865 Patton, above n 797 at 553. 
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• How consent is given;  
• The factors health professionals consider in the consent processes, in particular, 
the significance of children’s age; 
• Whether there are different considerations and processes when children or 
parents disagree with treatment;  
• Views on children having the right to consent to, and refuse, treatment; 
• Health professionals’ understanding of the law on children consenting. 
 
I systematically worked through the categories of participants beginning with each health 
professional group – GPs; hospital doctors; dentists/dental therapist; and nurses, before 
moving to children, parents and stakeholders. I worked through each transcript and 
organised the data into the themes by cutting, pasting and colour coding. If one section 
of the transcript applied to more than one category, I would include it in all relevant 
categories. Upon completion, I had a colour coded word document for each participant 
category that assisted me to identify sub-themes within categories. Describing the issues, 
and supporting them by all the relevant quotes within each category, also assisted with 
identifying sub-themes. From this analysis, I was able to identify commonalities and 
differences across the health professional groups. However, in order to fully understand 
how children’s competence is promoted, demonstrated and assessed, I needed to analyse 
more deeply, beyond the descriptive. This involved firstly inductive, and then deductive 
coding, by specifically considering factors that supports and hinders the development of 
children’s competence (Chapter 9).  
Having coded the data and carved it into themes, I reflected upon how best to present it. 
My intention for this thesis was for children and parents to be at its core. In order for the 
reader to fully understand their experiences, I considered it essential to provide a 
coherent picture through their own words. Thus, with the themes having been identified, 
and following the informed consent process for structure, I described each child and 
parent’s personal accounts in stand alone case studies.866 These provided compelling 
accounts of their journeys, from diagnosis, through consultations with health 
professionals, their processes of understanding and deciding upon treatment, to 
consenting. Once presented in this way further themes, similarities and differences could 
be identified. Similarly, with the data from the other participants, I found that the more I 
described and compared the data, the deeper my understanding developed, with more 
themes emerging. I wrote sections or chapters for all the themes, and found that when 
focusing the chapters on competence and the consent processes, I was able to draw 
upon my earlier work. 
 
This was a very labour intensive, time consuming and on-going process, throughout the 
writing of the thesis. It required in-depth consideration and understanding of the data. I 
chose to code the data manually, as I preferred to have control over the process, and felt 
more comfortable with that, rather than relying upon a computer system, such as, NVivo. 
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In this way I developed a thorough understanding of the data. The quotes used 
throughout Chapters 8 to 11 were selected to best reflect the richness of the participants’ 
experiences and highlight the themes.  
E. Strengths and Limitat ions o f  the Research  
 
The originality and richness of the data are the main strengths of this study. This is the 
first study of its kind in New Zealand to consider children’s competence, its assessment, 
and the consent processes in healthcare. Even worldwide these issues have received little 
attention.867 There is no single study that has considered the breadth of healthcare - 
medical, surgical and dental treatment, in different healthcare environments. In doing so, 
it provides insights and understanding of the factors that promote and constrain 
children’s competence, provides clarity on the factors that health professionals consider 
when assessing competence, and the consent processes in different healthcare 
environments. The richness of the data, particularly from parents and children, gives 
participants’ voices, and rarely heard personal accounts. Further, the spectrum of 
treatment, ranging from the routine, such as vaccinations, medication at the GP and 
extraction of a tooth, to the more complex surgical procedures, enables comparisons to 
be made in how children’s competence develops and is demonstrated, and also on the 
consent processes. 
 
One limitation of the study is that the participants are relying upon their memory of 
events. However, these events were reasonably fresh in their minds and were mostly 
exceptional and emotive circumstances, likely to improve their recollection from the 
mundane. The ideal combination of methods would be to include observations of 
children participating in consultations, health professionals assessing competence and 
taking consent. However, this would have additional ethical and privacy issues, and be 
time consuming, beyond the scope of this study, but could be considered for further 
research. 
 
A further limitation is the small sample. My aim was to recruit 10 children and young 
people and their parents. I had anticipated that it could be problematic to recruit families, 
as an access point is needed that does not compromise the patient’s confidentiality, and 
results also in children who meet the criteria.  It was my hope that I could recruit families 
through the NGOs, and it was disappointing, although understandable, that only one 
agreed to assist in this way. Recruiting mainly through my personal network meant that 
families with higher socio-economic status, such as parents in professional roles, with 
children aged 10 years and over, were recruited. Unfortunately, no Māori whānau were 
represented. The mothers were all well-educated with high health literacy. Nonetheless, 
prior to their recruitment I was unaware of their views and experiences of their children’s 
participation in the informed consent processes. Further research in this field would 
benefit from a more expansive sample, including fathers, children under 10 years of age,  
lower socio-economic backgrounds, Māori whānau and other ethnicities (particularly 
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Pacific and Asian in the New Zealand context). Also, within the sample of children only 
two experienced dental treatment at private dentists, and only one was prescribed 
medication at the GP. The access points for such cases are limited. In the case of dental 
treatment, hospitals deal with serious dental health conditions, but unfortunately the one 
I approached did not give me ethical approval to recruit children. The low sample of 
children means the study has only scratched the surface in eliciting children’s views and 
experiences of decision-making in healthcare. Nevertheless, this is mitigated by the 
richness of the data that was obtained from parents and children and the spectrum of 
treatment.  
 
Finally, children’s cases were not triangulated with their health professionals, which 
would have given further clarity and perspective on their respective experiences. 
However, this would have been difficult to secure, without compromising confidentiality, 
and protecting anonymity. Participants were more likely to be open in expressing their 
true feelings and views, due to this confidentiality and anonymity.  
 
V.  Chapter  Summary  
 
This chapter has explored the nature of qualitative research, the rationale for using that 
approach and described the sample in this study. Central to this thesis is eliciting 
participants’ experiences, perspectives, feelings and understandings of the issues, which 
become central to the development of a theory or hypothesis. The issues of competence 
and consent processes are aptly suited for a qualitative approach, due to the little 
attention they have received in research and their personal/emotive nature. Diversity was 
key amongst all the participants, recruiting those with a range of specialty or experience 
within medicine, dentistry and surgery, in four different healthcare environments – 
hospital, private practice, school and community youth service. This enhanced the 
richness of the data, enabling consideration of how children’s competence was promoted 
and assessed within each, together with whether and how the informed consent 
processes vary.  The combined contributions from participants provide a vivid picture of 
the multitude of personal, ethical, professional and legal issues they face, when children 
receive, or refuse, medical treatment. This qualitative research method provided, in 
particular, the parents and children with the opportunity to describe, reflect upon and 
give their views on significant, life changing events, explaining how the consent 
processes either empowered, or disempowered, them. Their voices draw the researcher 
and readers into their worlds, allowing some insight and understanding of their 
experiences.  
 
The following four chapters narrate the experiences of children and their parents in 
consultations, decisions and providing consent (Chapter 8), consider health professionals’ 
practices and experiences on promoting and assessing competence (Chapter 9) and 
obtaining consent (Chapter 10), and finally exploring health professionals’ knowledge, 
understanding and views on the law, together with all the participants’ views on children 





Experiences of Children and their Parents in the Consent 
Processes 
Fundamental to understanding the development and promotion of children’s 
competence and the consent processes is revealing the interactions between children, 
parents and health professionals. By doing so, insight is gained into their perceptions, 
feelings and views. The following seven case studies trace the experiences of each 
parent/child dyad, depicting the nuances of their worlds, as the children’s health 
condition and treatment unfold. 
This chapter highlights the experiences of six parents and their children 868  – 
Wilma/Samantha, Jenny/Amanda, Tania/Oliver, Laura/Alistair, Diane/Donald, and 
Anna/Poppy, together with one young person, Brenda. The health conditions for which 
they were treated were cancer (three), ADHD (one), dental treatment (two), teenage 
vaccinations (one), and surgery (four). Their experiences are diverse, both between and 
within these different healthcare environments, but they do share some commonalities 
that will be developed in the following three chapters, and discussed in detail in Chapter 
12.  
 
I .   Samantha (aged 14 years)  
 
It was an interesting day. They didn’t say much. When we got to the hospital early in the 
morning the oncologist or surgeon, I don’t know who he was, put us both in a room and 
then went to privately talk to Mum and didn’t tell me anything. I did not have a clue 
what was going on, and even after that, he didn’t say that I was diagnosed with cancer. 
(Samantha, aged 14) 
 
She (Samantha) looked me straight in the eyes and said ‘what is going on?’ I didn’t really 
know how to answer and I was saying, ‘well, we haven’t had the tests yet’, and she just 
said, ‘no, tell me what is going on.’ And she said to me, and I can still remember it as 
clear as day, and will never forget these words, she said ‘whatever it is Mum, there are 
only two things I want to know, promise me no lies and promise me you are going to be 
with me.’ (Wilma) 
 
This was Samantha’s first experience of being diagnosed with osteosarcoma, bone cancer, 
just above the knee. Following this diagnosis, Samantha was admitted to hospital for 
treatment. The health professionals were anxious to commence chemotherapy as soon as 
possible, but as they did, Samantha was without the vital support of her mother: 
 
Samantha got quite frightened and was quite fragile. I was her only support person, and 
so, she was very emotionally attached to me. When you are going through something 
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that is the worst thing in your life you have a right to have a support person with you, 
and that I think was very wrong that day, when they took her up to clinic. ‘We are just 
going to start pre-hydrating’ [said the nurse]. They said they wouldn’t put the chemo on, 
but they did, and I was getting these terrifying calls from Samantha saying ‘they are 
switching medicine on. I don’t know if they are putting on the right things. I need you 
back here.’ As a patient she should have had the right to say you are not doing this until 
my mother is here. She was 10 and shouldn’t have forced it on her. (Wilma) 
 
Samantha had little or no understanding of what was happening to her and what cancer 
was: 
Int: Did anyone explain to you what cancer is? 
Samantha: No. My Mum knew what it was so she explained it. She has done health 
science and stuff like that, double masters.   
Int: Did anyone explain to you what chemo is and what it does? 
Samantha: No, again it was left to my Mum to explain that. They gave us a book and 
told us we had two hours to read this before we switch the chemo on.  
 
None of it was explained, like what are the survival odds, what does a poor responder 
mean? … I explained to her in the best way I could what cancer was. No-one really sat 
down with Samantha and explained it. … Even with normal tests. … They would say to 
Samantha ‘we’re off for a renal scan.’ Well, what does that mean? They’ve got these 
things on the wards … generally for six and under. There is a dolly to show what an 
injection is, and they have wards for teens, but they have nothing for that age around 10 
[years]. I asked them why this was and they said, ‘you are not supposed to get cancer 
between 10 and 14 [years]!’ (Wilma) 
 
Although Wilma had given her consent for chemotherapy, she did not feel that she had 
done so in an informed way. She was given “a thick file” (Wilma) and essentially told ‘we 
need to get the chemo on, you need to sign it…. you have a choice but you don’t really’ 
(Wilma). Whilst Wilma understood the urgency of treatment starting, she felt health 
professionals lacked empathy in relating to their situation. To Wilma their focus was on 
fixing the problem, rather than treating the person. She described feeling like a 
“commodity” (Wilma) and likened it to taking your car into the garage to have it repaired, 
commenting, “sometimes the fact that they are dealing with people gets lost” (Wilma). 
This was highlighted to Wilma by the manner in which she was told of Samantha 
suffering from a rare genetic disease called Fanconi anaemia that affects the bone 
marrow and the production of all types of blood cells. Wilma had been previously 
unaware of Samantha suffering from this condition and so knew nothing about it, or of 
its implications for Samantha’s cancer treatment:  
 
I was told that Samantha had Fanconi anaemia as I was walking down a corridor. ‘By the 
way, the test results are back. She’s got Fanconi anaemia.’ ‘What does that mean? What 
are you going to do? Stop treatment?’ ‘No, we think we are just going to carry on.’ 
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Rather than ‘come into my office and let’s sit down and have a conversation’. I just think 
they need to have a little bit more respect.869 (Wilma) 
 
As a consequence of such lack of information and involvement in treatment, both Wilma 
and Samantha felt unimportant. Wilma observed that “somewhere along the road we had 
lost her. It was like a light had gone out. Everything was being done to her.” Samantha 
believed too that she had been “dealt with reasonably poorly. They don’t speak directly 
to me. … ‘Sorry, could you talk to me and not at me, and tell me actually what is going 
on?’”  
 
Wilma was aware that there was a lot that she was not being told, but even when she 
began to ask questions she received “ambiguous answers” (Wilma), although that did 
vary with health professional and area of medicine: 
 
I have to say, and it depends on the personality [of health professionals], but there does 
tend to be this kind of thing, especially with oncology, ‘well, you don’t really have a 
choice, so we’ve just got to do this.’ (Wilma) 
 
On one occasion, for example, when Samantha needed to be fed through a nasogastric 
tube, the insertion of the tube was a very upsetting process for both Samantha and 
Wilma, as six nurses held her down, forcibly inserted it. As a result, Samantha “shut 
down after that, psychologically she was crushed - ‘leave me alone, don’t touch me,’ you 
couldn’t go near her. (Wilma).870 
 
Personalising Samantha to the health professionals became very important to Wilma. She 
did this, for example, by placing Samantha’s photograph on the door of her isolation 
room. Wilma recalled health professionals commenting on this photograph, reflecting to 
her that this was the first time they had seen Samantha as a person, as they are in the 
habit of treating health conditions. 
 
Over the course of four years, from diagnosis, Samantha had three operations on her leg. 
The first operation occurred when she was 10-years-old and involved removing a bone 
and inserting a rod: 
 
It was a bit confusing at first. He [the surgeon] told me that the people upstairs are going 
to try and save you, and then maybe if you survive, then we might put together whatever 
is left of you. (Samantha) 
 
We were never given a choice whether the rod got put in or not. (Wilma) 
 
For two years, Samantha lived with the rod in her leg, before having a second operation. 
This involved transplanting bones into the leg to support it, called an allograft: 
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They put the titanium rod in my leg, and by that stage, 2012, the bone was not really 
growing around it like it was supposed to do. So they were going to do a rotationplasty 
or amputate the leg then, but the oncologist sort of talked the surgeon out of that and 
into doing allografts instead. Yet again, I did not know any of this. I was in hospital, 
wondering once again why I was there. … I only sort of figured it out after what they 
had done. They told me after the surgery, so I got no say and could not do anything 
about it then. (Samantha) 
 
At no time did somebody sit down and say ‘look, we are not quite sure what to do with 
Samantha, but here are the options.’ … Now to me that is the critical part, because it 
would have significantly different outcomes. … At no stage were we given choices or 
had the options explained to us, or the pro and cons. Not me and not her. (Wilma) 
 
Samantha understood that this operation was not a long-term solution, and so three years 
after diagnosis, Samantha needed a third operation. Wilma felt pressure from the doctors 
to proceed with this operation, but she created time, to enable her and Samantha to 
consider the options – “They said ‘well, it has to be done’ and I said ‘no, not this time. 
… We need to work through this.’” (Wilma) 
 
Samantha and Wilma took their time to consider the options and began to process the 
reality that Samantha might need her leg amputated. Samantha’s way of dealing with that 
was to withdraw into her bedroom, where she made her decision: 
 
She takes a while to think about things. She basically went to her room for two weeks. 
… She took control of it. … That was very empowering for Samantha. I said to her ‘it is 
your decision, but you have to know what you are signing off for.’ (Wilma) 
 
All I wanted was not to be in pain and be able to walk. ... I had been in pain for four 
years. You want anyway to stop that. (Samantha) 
 
Wilma considered that it was particularly important for Samantha be involved in this 
decision, not only due to its significance and irreversibility, but also to ensure that health 
professionals became aware of what was important to Samantha’s quality of life, which 
they had omitted to do previously: 
 
It is interesting, at no point did any of the staff ask Samantha about her home life and 
interests. … You know, when it is something that affects quality of life, like cutting off 
someone’s leg, I think the people involved, both the family and the child, should be 
involved on the basis that we know the personal stuff. They know the medical stuff, but 
they don’t know if Samantha is a footballer and if she lives for her sport or doesn’t. 
Those are things that they cannot answer. (Wilma) 
 
The decision Samantha reached was an amputation and rotationplasty, which involves 
amputating part of the leg and rotating the lower part, so the ankle joint acts as a knee. 
Samantha was 13 (nearly 14) years old when she made this decision. Wilma understood 
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that it was clearly important for the doctor and Samantha to be able to discuss this 
decision: 
 
I learned with experience of where to position Samantha when speaking with the doctors 
so Samantha would be included. I said to Samantha, ‘you sit here. There’s the doctor, 
you tell him the issues.’ I think where you place the patient is important. With this I said, 
‘Samantha has made a decision, you need to ask her about it.’ He did ask Samantha 
about it, and asked if she had any other questions, ‘is there anything else you need to 
understand about it?’ There is a deep respect there for Samantha. (Wilma) 
 
At the time of this operation Samantha was 14-years-old. She believed that she had 
“signed off” on it, as she understood that it could not be done legally, unless she gave 
her consent: 
 
… he [the surgeon] needed consent from the parent and also the child. It is the type of 
surgery that was to benefit the kid. If the kid doesn’t sign off you can’t get the surgery 
legally done. (Samantha) 
 
This operation proceeded, and Samantha felt empowered from having been included in 
the decision-making: 
 
She knows it was her decision and she is very proud of it. …I think there is a real power 
in that. ‘It is my body, my decision and I have got this much control back in my life.’ … 
It is a psychological power. (Wilma)  
 
It is easier on kids. You get concerned and stressed when you don’t know what is going 
on. (Samantha) 
 
Wilma sensed that this involvement and control contributed to Samantha’s recovery: 
 
… it was very empowering to Samantha who took ownership of it and amazing the 
difference in the healing. Samantha was a bit older, but even the doctors on the ward 
and surgeons said ‘she has just healed so well, she’s really taken on the challenge.’ You 
know, this is the third time we have had to teach her to walk and before it was such an 
issue getting it done, but this time she has taken control of it. (Wilma) 
 
Samantha has enjoyed the normality returning to her life: 
 
I have a knee joint and I can get a normal gait. ... I’ve got no pain. … [I can] walk and 
swim. … I’ll be able to get back involved in some sport. … I’m eating better because it is 









II .   Amanda (aged 16 years)  
 
Amanda was 13-years-old when she was diagnosed with osteosarcoma in her leg. 
Throughout the course of her treatment, from the initial investigation and diagnosis, 
through chemotherapy and a laparoscopy, to surgery, Amanda was actively involved in 
her healthcare.  
 
During consultations, it was important to both Amanda and her mother, Jenny, that 
Amanda was present at every meeting, so she could listen and understand what was 
being discussed. It appeared to Amanda, however, that this was perhaps not the norm, or 
at least not the expectation of her oncologist, as he had seemed surprised: 
 
My mum told him I had been to every meeting and knew what was going on and I was 
so confused about why he would talk about me behind my back. … My mum would not 
go to a meeting and then come back and tell me the information. I want to hear it for 
myself. (Amanda) 
 
So every time we see an oncologist or orthopedic surgeon she is always present. There 
has never been a time we have excluded her. She was basically like a co-pilot through 
this. When you’ve got a 13½ year old they are not like a child you can say wait outside. 
(Jenny) 
 
Jenny intentionally positioned Amanda nearest to the doctor so that Amanda knew it was 
important that she contribute – “She knew she was always the number one participant.” 
(Jenny). Jenny encouraged and supported Amanda in explaining her symptoms to the 
doctor:  
 
Mum would make me sit next to the doctor and usually I tell the doctor what is wrong 
and then Mum will say more. I will say what I think, like I have a sore leg. So she will let 
me describe what I think first and then she will come in. (Amanda) 
 
Amanda was also able to answer the doctor’s questions and follow/understand 
discussions, but did not ever ask any questions, as her Mum and Aunt, who accompanied 
her to appointments, had covered those. Amanda had confidence in them having matters 
under control, and so there was no need for Amanda to think of further questions: 
 
Jenny: The problem is that she has never engaged at all with any medical professionals. 
They ask her every time if she has questions and she always says ‘none.’ I do not think 
that she has asked a question ever.  
Int: Why do you think that is? 
Jenny: I think that she thinks that the experts have it under control. It may be that once 
she has heard the questions from my sister and I, that there were none left. She is an 
introvert not an extrovert. … My view is that she would think ‘I don’t have to worry 




Jenny found too that having her sister present at appointments supported her, allowing 
her to absorb the information: 
 
My sister asked 20 questions. I asked some, but I’m more an absorber of information 
and processing it. She can be like a rattling gun with questions. … You need at times of 
stress a second brain to hear what is being said because you don’t absorb it. (Jenny) 
 
Prior to the commencement of Amanda’s chemotherapy treatment, Jenny and her sister 
raised the issue of Amanda’s future fertility with the doctors. A gynecologist spoke with 
Amanda about this, and whether she wanted to undergo a laparoscopy. Amanda checked 
with her Mum and Aunt, who both considered that she should proceed, and so Amanda 
gave her consent: 
 
Well, my Mum could have easily signed it, but I don’t think she [gynecologist] even 
thought of giving it to my Mum. She gave it straight to me, ‘it is for you. You are the one 
who is having the operation.’ (Amanda) 
 
… they contacted a gynecologist. She engaged with Amanda and spoke to her about it. 
Amanda just said to my sister and I, ‘what do you think’, and whatever we said was fine 
with her. … Amanda signed that consent. … I think that is just her practice, she wanted 
her to sign it. We both did. (Jenny) 
 
Jenny felt that at 13-years-old Amanda was slightly young to take this decision on her 
own.  
 
The laparoscopy was carried out at the same time as the port-a-cath, and two days later 
Amanda started chemotherapy treatment. Amanda felt unprepared for this: 
 
I was straight into treatment. No-one explained to us what the treatment was [or] how 
long it would take. … I was like what is happening. (Amanda) 
  
… none of us had any real understanding of what chemo was like. We just learned 
slowly but surely. (Jenny) 
 
Whilst Amanda and her Mum had been given information, Amanda thought that it was 
difficult to understand: 
 
I can’t remember if this was before or after my first treatment, but they did give us a 
guideline, but we did not really understand it until I started having it. He explained that I 
had this path to go through and once I get here I have an operation and then do the path 
again and every three weeks you have a different treatment and then change it again for a 
week. So he was explaining it but we were like what does that mean? (Amanda) 
 
 
Once treatment had begun, communication/information about it from medical staff was 




I had so many nurses. ... They don’t really know what type of treatment or how long. 
They just know that you are having chemo and your blood count is good. (Amanda) 
 
The oncologist had very poor inter-personal skills. … There was no communication. We 
found it difficult to communicate with him and he did not get on her (Amanda’s) 
wavelength. (Jenny) 
 
However, with her Mum’s support, and with experience, Amanda understood the 
treatment: 
 
Mum was going through the guide, saying ‘okay you have had this one so we go onto 
this one.’ After about two months we knew how I was going to react to it and how it 
went. (Amanda) 
 
This brought Jenny and Amanda very close, spending intimate time together, under 
traumatic circumstances:  
 
It was quite a bonding time. We spent more time together than the average 13-year-old 
would spend with their mother. She would be asleep or having treatment and I would be 
there and you have this space together. (Jenny) 
 
Amanda found that she became highly knowledgeable and competent in the management 
of her treatment, knowing, for example, the dose and timing of her medication, the level 
of pain relief and gastric feeding:  
 
I knew my medication and when to take it. Sometimes with chemo I would want to take 
it as early as possible. … I knew I had to have one and half tablets and the nurse gave 
me one tablet. I told her, but she did not believe me. So I asked her to check and she 
comes back confirming I was right. … I had the control of how high the morphine 
would be. There was an extra pump if I needed it. My feeding stuff I could choose how 
fast I wanted it and if I was eating I would choose it lower. (Amanda) 
 
She would check that the nurses had the correct doses and would correct them saying ‘I 
have this then and I don’t have that then.’ (Jenny)  
 
Also, at times, Amanda assisted with procedures, such as the insertion of her nasogastric 
tube and the insertion of lines into her veins: 
 
I also knew what veins would work and what would not. … They tried to get it in a vein 
in my hand and I told them it can’t be done. They said that they would try anyway, but it 
did not work. I told him at this point that I wanted another doctor. He said ‘no.’ The 
nurse went to get another doctor and she put the line through a vein in my arm. They 
were not listening to me. … They told me I needed a nasal tube. … They asked me if I 




… if we needed a gastric tube fitted she (Amanda) … was very good at assisting with 
procedures because she is so practical … athletic and nimble. (Jenny) 
 
However, sometimes Amanda was not permitted to assist: 
 
Int: In general, do you think that the medical staff considered how competent and capable you were? 
Amanda: Some of them asked me if I wanted to do things and were happy that I did. 
Others insisted that they did it or did it straight away.     
 
After two cycles of chemotherapy, Amanda underwent surgery to remove part of a bone 
in her leg. She understood the process, as the surgeon had related well to her and 
explained the procedure: 
 
My surgeon who was really nice, complete opposite to my oncologist, I can’t even 
explain him. The surgeon explained what he was going to do. He said that the tumour 
was about 10cm but to get the whole tumour he had to go one cm out on each side and 
take the whole bone and not replacing it because it is not a bone you need. (Amanda) 
 
She absolutely loved, as did we, the orthopedic surgeon. She knew that there something 
eating away at the bone and the surgeon cut out 12cms. She knew that had to be cut out 
and I presume she picked up from our conversations that enough of the bone had to be 
taken so that it would encompass the tumour so it was not pricked or penetrated. (Jenny) 
 
Jenny gave written consent for this operation, but Amanda strongly believed that she 
should have given written consent, as she understood the procedure, and was the one 
undergoing it: 
 
I think I should have signed because it is my leg. Mum signing off for me to get a bone 
removed, ‘all good Mum, you are not getting bone removed.’ … My Mum signing off for 
an operation I am having is weird. I am having an operation I accept it. I was in their 
presence when they were talking about it. I understood what they were saying and what 
was going to happen. I should be signing off. Even although I was 13 [years old] I still 
understood what was happening. … I would have been happy to sign everything, but 
sometimes they did not come to me; they went straight to Mum. (Amanda) 
 
Amanda signed that (laparoscopy) consent. All other consents I signed. (Jenny) 
 
 
III .  Oliver  (aged 18 years)  
 
I felt that because Oliver had Asperger’s, she [Consultant Oncologist] was questioning 
what he was feeling was real or was it in his head? I said ‘for goodness sake, it is a social 
disorder.’ She just lacked the understanding. (Tania) 
 
This was not an unfamiliar experience to Oliver, who has Asperger’s Syndrome, and his 
mother, Tania. At the age of 14 years, Oliver was diagnosed with leukemia. Tania 
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experienced some difficulties with some health professionals, due to them being unable 
to understand Oliver’s different style of communication:  
 
… they were not sure and thrown by the Asperger’s. I had a few issues about [conveying 
the] symptoms he was feeling to some of the consultants because they did not know 
whether he was exaggerating or telling tales. I told them ‘my son does not lie and if this 
is how he says he feels that is how he feels.’ … [H]e said he felt like he had fire ants in 
his central nervous system, very poignant description, but it was taken that he was lying. 
(Tania) 
 
On one occasion, the Consultant Oncologist had even made inquiries about Oliver with 
professionals, such as teachers, social workers and nurses, rather than with Tania: 
 
This one particular Consultant Oncologist, very stoic, thought she knew boys as she had 
boys, quite bitey. She would stand at the doorway and be quite dismissive. I took her 
into the hallway to have a discussion as I was so angry because Oliver would talk to her 
and it was just like she wasn’t listening and then come and talk to me and she would take 
the attitude that I did not know what I was talking about either. … She rang the teachers, 
social workers, nurse and they all said ‘if you want to know about Oliver ask his mother,’ 
so she very coyly had to come back and ask me. (Tania) 
 
This was frustrating for Tania, as Oliver is high functioning, being intellectually at an age 
appropriate level, and having good comprehension and understanding of issues. Thus, it 
was important to Tania that she understood the information provided by health 
professionals, so that she could explain and discuss it with Oliver. She sourced the 
necessary information from nursing staff: 
 
I found a couple of the more senior nurses who had longer shifts, and they were 
fantastic with their information and knowledge, which is what I needed because I had 
that medical mind and I needed to sort it out in my head like a nurse. That also helps me 
explain things to Oliver, as we had lots of volleying discussions between him feeling 
revolting. (Tania) 
 
On occasions when Oliver was sick and in pain he was unconcerned about being 
involved, but at other times, he felt a “bit more refreshed and settled” by being involved. 
(Oliver). 
 
Throughout Oliver’s treatment, Tania, in effect, acted as an interpreter between the 
health professionals and Oliver to ensure he understood. This role came very naturally to 
her, as she was not only accustomed to fulfilling this role, having performed it 
throughout his life, but was also comfortable with the environment and medical terms, 
having a nursing background. Whilst health professionals spoke directly to Oliver, giving 
him opportunities to ask questions, he did not always understand their explanations, so 
Tania would explain them in terms she knew he would understand. This not only 




The doctors would come in and go ‘blah, blah, blah’ and then I would relay to him a 
little more simply. … He was there when they talked about it and the doctors, nurses, 
anesthetists would often say ‘so Oliver do you understand?’ And if he didn’t they could 
reiterate and I would reiterate over the top of it as I knew how to relay it to him so he 
could understand it and we had discussions volleying backwards and forwards. Anxiety is 
a huge thing for Asperger’s and that was the thing to contain. I was the go-between. If I 
had not been there they would probably have struggled. … I knew how to communicate 
with health professionals. … I had to make sure everything was being included. (Tania) 
 
Until Oliver was 16-years-old, Tania signed the consent forms, after which Oliver signed 
them, or gave his oral consent, without Tania being present. However, health 
professionals would still call her by telephone to also secure her verbal consent: 
 
They just give it to me and I read it and sign it. It is normally for IT, or painkillers or 
antibiotics. It is normally a checklist. (Oliver)  
 
When I wasn’t there they would ring me on the phone to get parental consent, which I 
would give, and Oliver would sign the form. He was over 16 [years]. (Tania) 
 
 
IV. Alis ta ir  (aged 10 years)  
 
Alistair was nine years old when he realised he was struggling to learn in school. He 
asked his parents (Laura and Douglas) for a tutor, and while initially they doubted he 
needed one, as his teacher had not raised any concerns, they agreed. The tutor 
recommended they obtain a “full educational, cognitive and psychological assessment” 
(Laura) of Alistair, so she could tailor her support to his needs. Alistair and his parents 
followed the assessment process, the outcome of which concluded Alistair had Attention 
Deficit Hyperactively Disorder (ADHD).871 Laura followed this up with her GP, who 
confirmed the diagnosis, and advised that Alistair should be treated with medication. 
Laura was surprised by the GP’s approach, as she had expected alternatives to be 
discussed: 
 
I thought she would give me options. I did not expect her to be so directive, ‘you should 
definitely think about this, because if you don’t you are being unfair.’ So I did feel a little 
pressure from the doctor to take it seriously. … My first reaction was ‘[Alistair] doesn’t 
need this because I think other strategies might be more effective, and let’s wait and see.’ 
(Laura) 
 
Laura began to educate herself on ADHD, even though the GP had told her ‘you don’t 
want to read too much about this’ (Laura). She sourced educational material through a 
work colleague and also through the psychological service that had assessed Alistair. 
Laura found that the literature reinforced her own knowledge: 
 
																																																								
871 The assessment involved Alistair’s parents having consultations with an educational assessor, clinical 
psychologist and their GP, together with Alistair undergoing a hearing test and being observed at school. 
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Laura: I watched some educational DVDs and tried to understand it a bit more. …  A 
public health nurse at work gave me it. Her daughter has ADHD and she was a really 
good source of information as well.  
Int: Did any health professional you consulted give you any leaflets or refer you to any websites? 
Laura: The child psychologist service did. They’ve prepared, along with the PHOs 
[Public Health Officers], a really good handbook for parents in quite simple language. 
But by the time I had that I had pretty much understood all of the information before, 
so that just reaffirmed what I had read or understood.   
 
However, there was “no patient material targeted at kids though, in their language, for 
their needs as a consumer of services. All the literature is targeted at adults” (Laura). 
Therefore, the role of explaining ADHD, and its treatment, rested on Laura, who not 
only needed sound understanding, but also awareness of the complexity of her language: 
 
When I first started to talk to Alistair about it I realised that I was using the same 
language, which was very clinical. I was talking to him in a way that he would never have 
understood it, so then I had to think really carefully about the words I used. We watched 
a video together and I thought ‘this is so hard to actually help him because I don’t really 
understand it.’ It takes me a long time to figure out what this condition is in order for me 
to interpret that, change my language and talk to him about it. It was really tricky. I 
didn’t know how he would understand why he was taking tablets. (Laura) 
 
Alistair’s parents then discussed his health condition and its treatment with him, and 
supported him in making the treatment decision: 
 
Both me and Alistair’s Dad said to him ‘it is completely your decision. If you want to 
start it and try it we will support you to do that and if you don’t want to start it that’s fine 
too.’ … He said he wanted to take the medication because he wanted to learn, and I 
think that made it quite clear for me. (Laura)   
 
They [Mum and Dad] talked to me about it, but they said it was all up to me to make the 
decision. (Alistair) 
 
Alistair, aged 10 years, made the decision in the context of his family, rather than during 
a consultation with a health professional. He only met with his GP afterwards. At this 
GP appointment, Laura alerted the GP to the fact that Alistair had taken the decision, 
and her impression was that the GP was surprised, but pleased with this: 
 
I think when we went back for that visit she assumed that Alistair was pretty on-board 
with how it would work. … I remember telling the doctor that we’ll let Alistair make the 
decision on it, and she looked quite pleasantly surprised. I got the feeling that she 
thought that was novel, that it was good, and there was going to be no issues. It was 
going to be an easy consultation, pretty much ready to try it out and see how it worked. 
(Laura) 
 





The GP examined Alistair, explained the medication and check ups and confirmed 
Alistair’s understanding of the treatment:  
 
Laura: It was pretty much a given what we were doing. So the GP had assumed that 
Alistair was on-board with it and there wasn’t so much of an opportunity for the doctor 
to talk to Alistair about what the options were, but she did check in with him if he 
understood what was happening here and that he was okay with it.  
Int: At that consultation how much of the dialogue was with you and how much with Alistair? 
Laura: I would say 80% directed to me. 
 
She asked my Mum questions and then she also asked me some questions. … Well, she 
wasn’t exactly asking questions, but she was doing stuff like looking in my ears and 
shining a light. (Alistair) 
 
Despite most of the conversation being with Laura, Alistair still felt included in the 
consultation, rating the degree of inclusion eight and a half out of ten. Although Laura 
did not detect the GP assessing Alistair’s competence, the GP did comment that Alistair 
was interested and smart, and had checked his understanding. 	
 
For Alistair the decision was a simple one - he wanted to try the medication to test 
whether it would improve his concentration, and was not surprised that his parents had 
allowed him to make this decision: 
 
Alistair: I wasn’t really surprised because I think I should have chosen whether to take 
them, and I wanted to take them. 
Int: Why did you decide to take them? 
Alistair: I decided to take them for the first week to test them out to see if they made a 
difference. So I tried them out and they did make a difference. … When I first took 
them I finished my [school] work first and I don’t usually do that. … My marks are 
going up slowly. 
 
Although Laura initially questioned whether the decision to take medication was the 
correct course of action, she recognised, when reflecting upon the journey they had taken, 
that Alistair had a sense of his own wellbeing. Her thinking had shifted and broadened, 
from initially believing that a decision, such as this one, was a parental decision, to 
listening to and valuing Alistair’s judgement: 
 
I still felt as a parent I am the one who makes decisions about that, but actually this 
situation has shown me that he was right to make that decision. [T]he GP … basically 
said ‘a good parent would make this choice,’ and then the influence of your study and 
thinking more about those issues, I thought, ‘well, it is probably not my decision.’ And I 
did not want to make a decision that could potentially hold him back when he (Alistair) 
had identified that there was a problem and wanted to take action. (Laura) 
 




Thus, Alistair’s involvement in the decision-making led not only to growth for Alistair 
and Laura, but also resulted in a development of trust between them: 
 
After it happened I realised I should trust him because he seemed to know better than 
anybody what he needed. … I think children do need to feel trusted by those who 
involve them in decisions because medication of any kind is a major decision that they 
have to be on board with. …  I think it worked really well for Alistair. I think he needs 
to feel trusted and because it is working well for him at school. … It is a great feeling 
when you do actually trust your kids to make a decision. (Laura) 
 
 
V. Donald (aged 11 years)  
 
Donald was 10-years-old when he and his mother Diane were advised by their dentist to 
consult with an orthodontist, due to concern about the growth of an adult tooth. At the 
orthodontic appointment, x-rays showed that a tooth was growing in the roof of 
Donald’s mouth, and was unlikely to push out the deciduous tooth. The orthodontist 
recommended that this deciduous tooth be extracted, advice which Donald was less than 
impressed with: 
 
We went to see the orthodontist and had various x-rays and worked out Donald had a 
tooth at a silly angle in the roof of his mouth. His solution was to take out one of his 
baby teeth to allow this other tooth to move to try and let other teeth naturally fall into 
place. Even at that appointment [Donald] wasn’t happy. As soon as the orthodontist said 
that his recommendation was that you go back to the dentist and have this tooth 
removed, he ran then actually out of that room and into the waiting room trying to get 
out. …  He was quite, quite annoyed. (Diane) 
 
Diane was unsure what Donald’s objection was, but she wondered whether it might have 
been as a result of Donald witnessing his older sister having an upsetting experience at 
the dentist three or four months earlier. 
 
A couple of months later, Donald returned to his dentist for his tooth to be extracted. 
Donald made it very clear that he did not want this to happen. He refused to follow the 
dentist into his surgery, and when the dentist took Diane into his room, Donald seized 
the opportunity, and bolted outside. He was coaxed into returning by a dental nurse, but 
strongly stated to the dentist that he did not consent to the tooth being extracted: 
 
… he (the dentist) said ‘could you have your tooth out?’ And I said ‘no, I don’t really 
want my tooth out.’ Then he said ‘could you please do it for your Mum and your Dad.’ 
And I said ‘I don’t give you permission to touch my mouth or my teeth.’ I just didn’t 
want to get it out. (Donald) 
 
… he [Donald] said ‘it’s my mouth, my tooth and I don’t give you permission to take my 




Donald knew that he could not be forced to open his mouth by the dentist and wanted 
to make it clear to him that he did not give consent to have his tooth extracted: 
 
I thought that if I said that they would have to agree that they couldn’t take it out, and if 
I wasn’t going to open my mouth they can’t do it. I just think that if they are going to try 
and get my mouth open they can’t really do that without me co-operating and trying to 
open it. (Donald) 
 
The dentist, turnning to Diane, confirmed that it would not be feasible for him to 
proceed in light of Donald’s refusal: 
 
That’s when the dentist looked at me and went ‘what am I supposed to do with that? He 
told me he doesn’t want me to take the tooth out and I am not going to take the tooth 
out because this is not going to work.’ (Diane) 
 
Diane recalled that the interactions with the dentist had been mainly with her, rather than 
Donald: 
 
Int: What were the interactions between Donald and the dentist? 
Diane: Not too many because it was more between me and the dentist because he 
[Donald] was not co-operating. So the dentist spoke to one of the dental nurses who was 
trying to persuade him to come back into the surgery and when he came back in the 
dentist spoke to him again and said ‘are you going to come through?’ And that’s the only 
time really when he spoke to him directly, and that’s when [Donald] told the dentist he 
did not want him to take the tooth out. 
 
Diane thought that perhaps the dentist could have engaged more with Donald, but 
acknowledged that Donald’s opposition was strong: 
 
He could have possibly come down a little bit to Donald’s level. The dental nurse, when 
she tried, sat next to him on the step outside. The dentist was standing above Donald 
and if he’d crouched down, got on his level, and he could have maybe tried a little bit 
harder to explain about the actual injection and what it does and ask him what his fear 
was. Because [Donald] was being so stubborn and physical about it, he was adamant that 
the tooth was not going to come out. (Diane) 
 
At the next routine check-up, the dentist found that Donald needed a tooth filled due to 
decay. The dentist advised Diane that this tooth was next to the one that needed 
extracting and both could be treated at the same time. Diane thought that perhaps 
Donald was not in the surgery at the time of this conversation: 
 
He did say that the tooth that needed filled was the tooth next to the one that needed 
extracting and he said to me, because then [Donald] disappeared, ‘we could see how it 
goes and if we can persuade him to have a filling we could maybe do it at the same time.’ 
So he did mention the extraction, but I can’t remember if Donald was in the room. 




Donald was not advised of this plan in advance of the following appointment, thinking it 
was for the filling only: 
 
I didn’t really talk to him about the extraction other than sowing the seeds, by saying it is 
the tooth next to the one that needs extracting. I think we did mention that there was a 
possibility of the tooth coming out, but certainly that is not why we were going to the 
dentist. It was almost that me and the dentist, we did have a little secret agenda, so we 
hadn’t hidden anything from him, but we hadn’t really talked about it. (Diane)  
 
Nevertheless, before Donald returned to the dentist Diane spoke to him about injections, 
how they worked and of the noises to expect in the dental surgery. She also explained 
that when she has something unpleasant to deal with she copes by thinking about how it 
will be over in a short period of time: 
 
In the prep work I did with him I tried to talk to him about the injection … about what 
it does and how it anaesthetises your face and a little about how it works, that the brain 
stops sending the pain messages. And I talked about the sounds in the dentists and how 
they can be worse sometimes than what you are having done. … I also talked to him 
about what it was like when I don’t like having things done to me and if the appointment 
is at 4.30pm I know the appointment will be over by 5pm. So I think this is going to be a 
horrible half an hour, but it will be over in half an hour and usually it is not as bad as I 
think it is going to be. (Diane) 
 
Donald understood why it was advisable for the tooth to be extracted sooner than later: 
 
I understood that if I didn’t get it out I would have to go through a lot more pain in my 
life, and if I didn’t have it out I would have to have my mouth cut open and it pulled out. 
(Donald) 
 
After the dentist filled Donald’s tooth, the dentist asked Donald if he agreed to have his 
other tooth extracted, although Donald was distracted at the time: 
 
The dentist did a really canny thing and distracted him with a movie, which was playing 
on the ceiling of the surgery, and he was lying back with headphones. … He did the 
filling and then said to me ‘should I do the tooth now?’ He lifted Donald’s headphones 
and said ‘I’m going to take the tooth out’ and Donald nodded and let him do it. (Diane) 
 
I kinda changed my mind, because in the meantime I was watching ‘The Simpsons’. … 
He [the dentist] kind of whispered in my ear ‘I’m going to take your tooth out now’, and 
… I just shook my head, and I didn’t even feel a thing. (Donald) 
 
Although Donald had not been included in discussions about the tooth being extracted, 
he understood the necessity for it being done, and it was a relief to him:  
 
I knew that if I got it out there wouldn’t be much to worry about again for a while 
because it was always on my mind that if I didn’t get it out it won’t be perfect, so I 




Donald felt more confident about being able to handle dental procedures in the future, 
having experienced the injections and tooth extraction. Diane reflected also that Donald 
needed to understand and be engaged in the process, as he is not the type of child who 
will simply comply with what adults want him to do:  
  
… some children are very compliant and just go along because the adult has said so. I’ve 
got one who doesn’t want to go along because the adults have said so, that is not a good 
enough reason. He’s got to be engaged. (Diane) 
 
 
VI. Poppy (aged 16 years)  
 
Poppy experienced three different types of healthcare procedures between the ages of 11 
and 15 years. Firstly, she was vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough 
at the age of 11 years and against the Human papillomavirus (HPV) at 12 years old. 
Secondly, at 14 years, she had an operation on her achilles tendon, for a condition with 
which she was born, and thirdly, she had dental surgery and braces fitted at the age of 15 
years.  
 
A. Vacc inat ions 
 
When Poppy was 11-years-old she was given information at school, through the 
vaccination programme, about the booster vaccination against diphtheria, tetanus and 
whooping cough. She took the information home to her parents who helped her to 
understand the importance of vaccinations, such as showing Poppy her Plunket book. 
Anna, Poppy’s Mum, thought this had helped Poppy to cope with being vaccinated, as 
previously she had been quite fearful. 
 
Poppy trusted her parents to make the right decision for her, and her mother consented 
to the immunisation:   
 
We got a booklet and it had all the information in it. We had to get parents to sign it and 
then hand it back in. I did not read it. I got Mum to sign it because I trust her in what 
she decided, and I never bothered to read it. (Poppy) 
 
A year later Poppy was due to receive the HPV vaccination, that helps prevent cervical 
cancer. Poppy attended a presentation about it at school – “We had a massive talk about 
that one” (Poppy). She was also given a significant amount of information to take home, 
which Anna and Poppy considered together. Anna had recently been for a smear test and 
was able to share the information she had received from the nurse about the HPV 
vaccination: 
 
Huge amounts of information. … It was almost like a booklet. … I had a chat to her. … 
I had a smear maybe about a month or two before and I remember the nurse 
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mentioning it. … I said to [Poppy] ‘I’ve been for a check up and they said how they are 
seeing results now, the incidence is coming down now.’ I read the information. She did 
not read it all. I explained where the cervical area is, because at 12 I think she had some 
idea. (Anna) 
 
Poppy was happy to agree to the vaccination, but did not consider this was a major 
decision, again trusting her parents’ judgement: 
 
Int: When you brought the information home do you remember having discussions with your Mum about 
whether you should have it? 
Poppy: Yes. I am pretty sure she asked me, and said ‘you’re all good getting it?’ ‘Yes.’  
Int: Do you feel that you contributed to the decision of whether you had it? 
Poppy: Yes. I feel like I did, but I feel like it was not that big of a decision. Like I trusted 
Mum to make the right decision. I saw her read the forms. 
Int: Why do you think that you agreed with her decision? 
Poppy: I trusted that she would do the right thing, like if it was sensible she would do it; 
if it wasn’t, she wouldn’t. I trusted her. If I didn’t want to get it she would be okay. She 
talked about why. 
 
I think for Poppy we read it and understood it and were happy with it. … I said to her 
too that they would not produce something in New Zealand that was not safe. I told her 
that I would do it if I were her age. … It was like ‘I trust you, in which case I will do it’. 
(Anna) 
 
Anna gave written consent for the vaccination, and Poppy thought that she had also 
signed. It was significant in Poppy’s decisions to agree to these vaccinations that most of 
her peers were receiving them - “everyone was doing it”, a fact that Anna also 
understood as significant - “the fact that everyone was having it made her feel safe.” 
(Anna)  
 
B. Achi l l es  Surgery 
 
Poppy was born with an achilles tendon condition that was monitored annually at the 
hospital by the same orthopaedic surgeon. At every appointment, before about the age of 
12 years, Poppy felt that the surgeon discussed her achilles mostly with her parents, with 
which Anna agreed:   
 
Int: Before 12-years-old how involved did you feel? 
Poppy: A three or four [out of ten]. Mum and Dad did the talking, and I think it was 
because we did not have to make major decisions, like it was not an operation or 
anything. They were talking to Mum and Dad, which I kind of get because I was younger. 
So I kind of understand that because if they told me stuff I wouldn’t remember it, but I 
do remember that they would talk to Mum and Dad. 
 




From about the age of 12 years, Poppy grew in confidence, feeling more able to engage 
with her orthopaedic surgeon: 
 
I would say around 12 [years], because before that I was shyer, and Mum knew better 
what to say. (Poppy) 
 
At the appointments they were very good at talking to her, and particularly now, they 
make less eye contact with me and more directly to her. (Anna) 
 
Though the degree to which Poppy felt included had increased, she thought that she was 
still not really involved in discussions: 
 
Before the last one I would say about a five or a six [out of ten]. Involved to a point. 
Like I was involved because it was my achilles, but I was not really involved much in the 
discussions. I was always there and I was always listening and if I had questions I could 
ask, but I didn’t really. (Poppy) 
 
At each annual review, until Poppy was 14 years of age, the surgeon had advised that an 
operation was not required. However, around the age of 14 years, Poppy began 
experiencing difficulties with her achilles. She was unable to stretch it, and so the 
orthopaedic surgeon recommended surgery: 
 
It had been giving her a bit of grief because she could not stretch it or get relief from it. 
They graded it a four out of five and said it will just get worse. (Anna) 
 
It was getting tight, tighter, and impacting on my sports, so we checked it out to see if 
everything was okay or there was anything more I could do. And this is when they 
recommended to get the operation. (Poppy) 
 
This came as a surprise to Anna and Poppy, as they anticipated the surgeon’s advice 
would be similar to that of the previous 13 years: 
 
We weren’t mentally prepared and hadn’t prepared questions. (Anna) 
 
It was a little bit like ‘okay, not expecting that!’ (Poppy) 
 
Nevertheless, at this appointment Poppy was more involved in discussions. She and 
Anna had talked about how they would approach the consultation, discussing what 
information was required, and agreeing that Anna would begin the conversation, with 
Poppy following on: 
  
Usually we go in and sit down and they will ask ‘what is going on?’ In the last one Mum 
said it was getting tight and I was having some problems with my hip. And then the 
doctor said to me ‘what is going on?’ So Mum would outline it because sometimes I 
forget stuff. So I will talk to Mum before we go to the doctor and she makes sure I have 




She always asks me to start. So I say ‘this is Poppy, she’s been having trouble with her 
foot lately, but she will explain it to you in her words.’ She doesn’t like starting off. 
(Anna) 
 
Then during the consultation, Anna assisted Poppy to be further involved in discussions 
by redirecting the conversation at times. For example, Poppy recalled how during the 
examination of her achilles the surgeon spoke to her mother rather than to her, but Anna 
steered the conversation towards Poppy: 
 
Probably about a seven [out of 10]. I felt at some parts they were looking at my achilles 
and talking to Mum and then Mum would talk to me. So Mum kept me involved, more 
than they did I felt. Yes, Mum knows. Mum gets it more than the doctors. They were 
talking to her a lot more. (Poppy) 
 
They spoke to her. They spoke to me as well, but they spoke to her more, and gave her 
more eye contact. To me that is the indicator. (Anna) 
The surgeon explained the operation. He used a number of techniques, such as a drawing, 
looking to Anna to assist in explaining it to Poppy, and recommending some Internet 
sites: 
When it gets technical I can see them looking at me to try and explain it to her in a way 
that she’ll understand and then drew a picture. They showed her that there were several 
ways in which they could do it. I thought that this was really great because they really 
related to her. They said ‘don’t google it because you will see some ghastly things. If you 
are going to google it then go on these sites.’ Of course she did, because that is what 
they do! I thought that was really nice because they related to her. I had no interest in 
googling it. She and her friends have. (Anna) 
 
Poppy felt less anxious from being involved in the discussions: 
 
It felt a lot better. This one was the first one that I felt involved in discussions because it 
was an operation. It makes me less nervous because I have a say and that made me feel 
good. (Poppy) 
 
Anna gave consent for the surgery at this appointment and completed the necessary 
forms: 
 
[The surgeon] asked if we agreed to the surgery and we had to fill out a questionnaire 
and … papers. (Anna) 
 
However, Poppy was still thinking about whether she wished to proceed with the 
operation or not. It was important for her to talk things over with her parents to help her 
make the decision: 
 
Int: Have you had discussions with your Mum and Dad after that consultation? 
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Poppy: Yes, quite a few. I went through a phase where I did not want to get it done. It 
was just because of the recovery, like it seems like a pain, quite a few months off school 
… but in the longer term it will be better. 
Int: Did you have any questions for your Mum and Dad about what is being suggested? 
Poppy: Yes, I asked them what they think I should do, if I should get it or not? And they 
said ‘yes, get it. If you don’t get it you will regret it later in life’, which is true. … Like 
Mum and Dad said ‘it is okay if you do not want to have it done, if you completely don’t 
want to, but we think that you will regret it.’ … Mum and Dad helped me look long-
term. 
 
At one stage she threatened not to go and I think she understood that, at the end of the 
day, it was her body and she could say ‘no’, but she also understood that it needed to be 
done. (Anna) 
 
Anna thought it had helped Poppy to proceed with the operation because she had 
known and trusted the surgeon since birth. 
 
Following this appointment with the orthopaedic surgeon, Anna and Poppy had a 
telephone call with a pre-operative nurse. This was important, as there were details about 
the operation they were still unsure of, such as whether Poppy would need an anaesthetic, 
and what would happen on the day of surgery.  
 
Poppy’s parents received a letter advising them of the time of the call. There was no 
written communication directly with Poppy. Before the call with the pre-operative nurse, 
Poppy and her mother discussed how this call would be organised, so that Poppy could 
participate. Poppy decided that she wanted the support of Anna, and agreed they would 
each use a telephone line. When the nurse rang, she asked to speak with Anna, who 
advised her that Poppy was on the other line, as she wanted to listen. The three-way 
conversation worked well, as Anna could support Poppy to cope with the uncertainty, 
and then shock, of requiring an anaesthetic for the operation:  
 
Poppy was listening in, but not answering, so I said ‘what do you think about that 
sweetheart?’ Because we learned on the phone that she would need a general anaesthetic, 
which shocked her a bit, so she went quiet. I was asking more and more questions and 
then sort of bringing Poppy in. (Anna) 
 
I was on one phone and Mum was on the other, so it was the three of us, and it was a bit 
easier. … We talked about getting the anaesthetic. … That was the first time we were 
told I would be going under. (Poppy) 
 
The nurse explained to them that the anaesthetic had risks, and that although Anna 
would be signing for it, Poppy should understand them. She suggested that she send 




… she thought that she would send Poppy both because the adult one might be a bit too 
technical and the other one a bit too childish, and maybe Poppy could find a happy 
medium. (Anna) 
 
Following the call, Poppy was anxious to understand the process, and immediately read 
the booklets when they arrived: 
 
I asked her how she felt about that and she said it was a bit scary. I said ‘let’s see what 
the booklets say,’ and as soon as they came she opened them straight away and took 
them upstairs and read them. She agreed that the kids’ one was a bit babyish and the 
adults’ one a bit much. We talked about when me, her Dad and a friend had anaesthetics. 
(Anna) 
 
On the day of the operation, Poppy and Anna met with a nurse at the hospital, who 
completed the forms by directing questions about Poppy’s health to Anna: 
 
Then I was taken through to a little room with the nurse who went over the form and 
was asking me and Mum questions about me, which was a bit weird. She would ask 
Mum ‘has she got ….?’ And I am sitting right there. … I am like ‘I am right here.’ It was 
questions like ‘has she had anaesthetic before and any allergies?’ She asked me my age 
and height, things I could not get wrong. (Poppy) 
 
Poppy and Anna then met with the anaesthetist and the surgeon: 
 
Then we went through to theatre. I had met the surgeon before, but not the anaesthetist. 
The anaesthetist talked to me. The surgeon talked a bit to me, but more to Mum because 
it got a bit technical. The anaesthetist did talk to Mum too. He would explain it to me 
and then to Mum, which I understand completely as I am under her care. (Poppy) 
 
The anaesthetist was very good and spoke straight to her. (Anna) 
 
When it came to signing the consent form, the anaesthetist turned his attention to Anna, 
explained the form and asked her to sign it because Poppy was under 16 years of age: 
 
He explained to her ‘because you are under 16 [years] your Mum has to sign for you’. 
(Anna) 
 
Poppy: It is interesting because I observed, because I knew I would be talking to you 
[researcher] again, and so I was watching who was talking to me and who was talking to 
Mum. The consent form with the risks, they talked more to Mum, which is kind of 
sensible. They did not really tell me about the risks, which is understandable. 
Int: Did they explain to you why your Mum was signing the form? 
Poppy: No, they didn’t, but I know it is because I am under 16 [years]. The only form I 




Anna signed another consent form on the morning of the surgery for the operation. 
Poppy accepted this process, but felt she should have taken joint responsibility for the 
risks, and signed that form along with her Mum: 
 
I did [sign the form] with Poppy there. We asked all our questions and both of the 
doctors explained because she was under 16 [years]. I remember them reading out to 
Poppy and explaining what we were signing and then they said that ‘Mum has got to sign 
for you’, and she understood. (Anna) 
 
I was happy for Mum to sign it because I trust her and the doctors, but I would probably 
have liked to sign that risk one, along with Mum. If I did I would probably be more 
worried, but it felt right that I should because I am taking the risk. But that is just how it 
is and kids probably wouldn’t care. (Poppy) 
 
Poppy acknowledged that while she had not given written consent, she had given verbal 
consent - If I was saying ‘no’ they would not have gone ahead with it. (Poppy) 
 
C.  Dental  Treatment 
 
At 15 years of age, Poppy needed dental surgery that involved cutting incisions into her 
gum to expose her two canine teeth, and then fitting fast braces to pull them down. The 
dentist explained the procedure to both Poppy and Anna, and Poppy’s parents supported 
her to make the decision of whether to proceed with the surgery and braces: 
 
Int: When you were getting information about the advantages and disadvantages of going ahead with the 
surgery or not how did you feel the split of attention was between you and your Mum?  
Poppy: Pretty even. They talked to Mum more about the financial stuff and me about 
the pain stuff, about what it would feel like, and to Mum about how long it would take 
and cost. Pretty even, eye contact back and forward. 
Int: Do you feel like you made the decision? 
Poppy: Yes 100%. I think that is got to do with the dentist and Mum and Dad. Like we 
got the consult and then they said we can think about it because there is the option of 
getting the bottom row as well. …  They were really nice about it. They said you don’t 
have to but you can if you like. 
 
Poppy understood that essentially this procedure was cosmetic, as her teeth would have 
eventually come through the gum, but they would have likely been crooked. Poppy 
realised also that the process would be easier and less expensive if she had it done before 
the teeth emerged. Poppy’s parents and the dentist advised her to have the lower and 
upper braces fitted, as she had a semi-cross bite:  
 
They wanted to initially fit braces top and bottom, so that was interesting because Euan 
[Poppy’s Dad] and I suggested to her it would be good to do both. It makes sense, but 
she did not want to. She was adamant, so she just stuck to the top one. She had a semi-
cross bite, but it wasn’t bad enough and she said she was happy with it. We explained to 
her that it might be harder when older and more expensive if you have to redo it again, 
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whereas if you do them together they start lining up. But, no, she did not want to. 
(Anna) 
 
Poppy was strongly of this view because the issue was not sufficiently serious to warrant 
fitting bottom braces too, as the cross-bite was slight, and her teeth were straight: 
 
… they said we can think about it because there is the option of getting the bottom row 
as well. … I felt quite strongly because my bottom teeth are straight and I think there 
was a little issue with a slight under or over bite, but it was really small and it seems to 
have fixed itself. And it was about $2,000 more to get the bottom row done and for me 
it was not worth it. If they were skew I would have, but it was not worth the extra pain 
and an extra two hours. (Poppy) 
 
Her teeth are completely straight, it is just the cross bite. She said she would rather live 
with the cross bite, and it wasn’t terrible, just a cosmetic thing. (Anna) 
  
Also, Poppy was aware from her friends, who had both sets of braces fitted, that they are 
more painful. 
 
Although Poppy appeared very clear about the decision, Anna thought it best to further 
discuss the options with her, and to check with the dentist about the advantages of fitting 
bottom braces at this stage:  
 
We … talked about it and kept encouraging her to do the lower layer. She said ‘no, no’. 
Then I emailed the dentist, told him she wasn’t keen and so could he give me a price to 
just do one and ‘could you just explain to me again the advantage of doing the cross-bite, 
sorting it now?’ Because sometimes you meet and there is a lot of information, so we 
followed it up by email and I made Poppy read the email. (Anna) 
 
Poppy’s parents continued to be of the view that it was better to have both braces fitted 
now, to avoid potential future difficulties with her lower teeth and as it was more cost 
effective. However, in retrospect, Poppy’s decision was the right one, as the cross-bite 
corrected itself: 
 
We were not that happy about it, but it has turned out that it was the right decision 
because the cross-bite has corrected itself. … You can see the economics in doing both 
at the same time. (Anna) 
 
During the surgery to expose Poppy’s canine teeth, the dentist communicated directly 
with Poppy. Anna used her own experience of dental treatment to suggest to Poppy to 
signal to the dentist during the procedure, so she was in control: 
 
Anna: She was definitely in control of it. I was just a sidepiece. I literally just sat in the 
room and did nothing. They talked to her the whole time. We agreed if you put your 
hand up they will stop because it is hard to communicate. 
Int: Who suggested that? 
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Anna: Us, because I had had a root canal in the past and it is really hard to communicate 
with the dentist. 
 
When I got the teeth exposed [the dentist] told me ‘I’m going to do this and is that okay?’ 
And I said ‘yes that’s fine’, and she was nice about it because I could put my hand up if I 
wanted her to stop. (Poppy) 
 
After Poppy’s braces were fitted, she had dental appointments to tighten and check them. 
From 15 years of age, Poppy took responsibility for making these appointments and 
attended most by herself. Poppy found that the dentist focused on her, even when Anna 
accompanied her: 
 
Going back every three or four weeks I do that myself, just after school. Mum 
sometimes comes with me, every second or third time, but that is just to pay. … The 
dentist that does my braces, whenever I see him I usually go alone and if Mum is there 
he is used to talking to me. (Poppy) 
 
However, Anna is aware of the appointment dates, in case Poppy needs to be reminded 
of them, but this has not been necessary: 
 
Int: When Poppy goes to the dentist does she make the appointments and go on her own? 
Anna: Yes. When she’s there she makes the next appointment and they text her and me. 
I spoke to the receptionist and said ‘she is a teenager so it is probably good that you flick 
it to me too so I can put it in the diary and remind her the day before’, but she has been 
good. 
 
Anna believed that the familiarity of the dentist, and trust the whole family has in him, 
helped Poppy’s confidence to attend by herself.872  
 
 
VII. Brenda (aged 19 years)  
 
At 14 years of age, Brenda began to suffer from constant pain in her lower abdomen and 
felt fatigued. She attended numerous appointments with her GP, gynecologists, dieticians 
and nutritionists, who each tried to diagnose the cause of her symptoms. When she 
attended these appointments, her Mum, who helped her recall all the important 
information she needed to give to the health professionals, accompanied her: 
 
The relationship was that I would answer everything that I could and because we were 
really close, if I forgot anything, because my mind was a bit fogged up, she would be like 





872 Anna also commented that the family has had the same GP for years, but recently Poppy had changed 
her GP within the practice, and found that they “connected” better. 
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Brenda felt important during consultations, as the focus was on her and she was given 
privacy and opportunities to ask questions: 
 
Brenda: My doctor would always talk to me, well both of us, but they would ask me 
about how I felt. They would ask my Mum to leave the room if there were more 
personal questions. I was very well taken care of. 
Int: Was that by all the different professionals? 
Brenda: Yes, I cannot think of anyone who made me feel like I was not important. 
 Int: Did you have opportunities to ask questions? 
Brenda: Yes. There was pretty much, one of my doctors in particular at the hospital, ‘do 
you have anything you want to ask or are not sure about? Don’t try and google it, and if 
you have any questions you can always ask as it is not that well known about.’ 
 
A year later, when Brenda was 15-years-old, it was suggested that she have a laparoscopy 
to further investigate the cause of her pain.  The doctor gave Brenda the choice of 
whether to proceed, which she did, as the pain was causing her to miss school, and she 
was wanted it resolved: 
 
They said this is our recommendation, ‘are you okay with this … or would you rather try 
other methods of treatment?’… I had had a year of suffering and was over it. (Brenda) 
 
Brenda was unsure whether her Mum had signed a consent form for the laparoscopy, but 
she could not recall doing so herself. After surgery, Brenda discovered that she had 
endometriosis, which the surgeon operated upon: 
 
After I woke up they explained ‘you do have this [endometriosis] and we have taken it 
out and once you have recovered from the surgery you should be better.’ When he 
[gynecologist] came to talk to me it was much more general, it was talking to me, but 
also to my parents as well. I don’t know if it was because you are this age. (Brenda) 
 
Unfortunately, the condition was unresolved and Brenda had multiple hospital 
admissions and meetings with her gynecologist, before proceeding to a second surgery at 
the age of 16-years-old, followed by a third one at 17-years-old. She made the decisions 
to proceed with both operations and signed each consent form -  “I felt very involved 
and treated very well in both of them. … I am pretty sure I signed at least two forms” 
(Brenda). 
 
VIII.  Chapter  Summary 
Whilst each child’s/young person’s experience is unique, some common features emerge, 
such as: the importance of parents’ roles in assisting their children to participate; the 
evolving nature of children’s competence; and generally the reliance upon parental 




A. Roles  o f  Parents  
Occurring both inside and outside of consultations, parents’ roles took several forms: 
emotional support; promoting communication and relationships with health 
professionals; enhancing children’s understanding of their health condition and 
treatment; and supporting their decision-making.  
 
1.  Emotional Support 
Emotional support was needed by all children, but was clearly seen and provided by 
Wilma, for example, prior to Samantha receiving chemotherapy, and also by Anna and 
Diane when they enhanced their children’s understanding of vaccinations and dental 
treatment respectively. As a result Samantha, Poppy and Donald were better able to cope 
with treatment.  
2.  Promoting Communicat ion and Relat ionships  
Both prior to and during consultations, parents promoted their children’s abilities to 
communicate and to develop relationships with health professionals. For example, they 
prepared them for how and what may be discussed, and once in the consultation sat 
them strategically, signaling to health professionals the importance of involving their 
children.  
3. Enhancing Chi ldren’s  Understanding and Decis ion-making  
Parents commonly carried out research following consultations, and discussed it with 
their children, to promote their understanding of their health and its treatment. At times, 
this compensated for the lack of explanations given by health professionals and resources 
available to families, as Wilma and Laura experienced.  
Once children’s understanding was developed, most were then able to make health 
decisions, with the support of their parents, who gave them space, time and permission, 
such as: Samantha (rotationplasty); Amanda (laparoscopy); Alistair (medication); Brenda 
(surgery); and Poppy (surgery and braces). Whilst their parents were unaware of any 
deliberate process health professionals undertook to assess their children’s competence, 
health professionals engaged with their children during consultations when consent was 
provided.  
 
B. Evolv ing Competence  
Competence evolves over time, rather than being determined by age. The time period 
will vary, depending upon, for example, the nature of the health condition and its 
treatment. For example, Alistair’s competence evolved over a focused period, from when 
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he identified an issue with his concentration, through diagnosis, to providing informed 
consent for treatment; whereas Poppy’s competence of her achilles condition developed 
throughout her lifetime. 
 
C. Rel iance on Parental  Consent  
Commonly, the consent processes involved children giving their verbal consent and 
parents providing written consent, when required, until children reached 16 years. For 
example, Poppy was unable to provide written consent as she was under 16 years, and 
Brenda and Oliver began providing written consent after they reached 16 years. The 
exception was Amanda, who gave written consent for the laparoscopy. 






























  Chapter 9 
 
Promoting and Assessing Children’s Competence 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
Having stepped inside the lives of the families, I move across to the healthcare 
environments to consider the perspective of the healthcare professionals, looking firstly 
at what supports and constrains children’s competence. Emerging as significant, were 
several external factors, common across the healthcare environments: time; privacy; the 
parents’ roles; building of relationships; and educating on health conditions and 
treatment. This chapter examines these factors, before then turning to how health 
professionals assess competence, specifically identifying the criteria they consider. 
 
 
II .  Promot ing Competence  
 
A.  Time  
 
1.  School  Medical  Servi ce  and Community Youth Servi ce  
 
During the interview process, the issue of time emerged as being significant for a number 
of health professionals, specifically in building relationships and trust, promoting 
children’s competence and responsibilities, protecting their safety, and assessing their 
competence.873 This was most apparent in the School Medical Service (SMS)874 and 
Community Youth Service (CYS).  
 
In the SMS and CYS, time was a great asset that enabled children to discuss their 
situation, enhancing not only their understanding, but also having all their needs 
addressed.875 At times, such needs extended beyond simply the initial physical concern, 
snowballing into much more complex, emotional and social issues: 
 
Sometimes what can be a relatively simple issue or problem can then turn into 
something huge. So what you think may be a five minute consultation, an hour and a 
half later you are still going. …  A good example is that the girls will come in and say ‘I 
need a plaster.’ I say ‘okay what for?’ So we start off with the physical and then they will 
be doing this, and I’ll say ‘okay show me your arms’ and I know they have been cutting. 
… So we start with that, treat the physical, tick all the boxes, check that there is no 
infection, then you need to go into what’s going on here, moving onto the social issues. 
(Nur2) 
																																																								
873 They raised this in conversation, rather than it being an identified theme that was questioned on. Thus, 
time could be of significance to other health professionals. 
874 The school nurses (Nur1 and 2) were based in their respective schools and the GP (GP6) visited one of 
those for three hours each week. 




Some of our appointments go for 45 minutes. The way we run it here, we look at the 
severity of the condition. We are dealing with huge abuse issues and huge social issues. 
Terminating pregnancy would be one. (Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
For example, one nurse in a CYS recalled a child attending with her aunt. Although the 
child was seeking contraception, she divulged that she did not wish to have sex. It 
transpired that the aunt’s intention was to prostitute her. 
	
Through intimate conversations between children and health professionals, trust, mutual 
respect and competence develop, as the health professionals listen, discuss and support 
children’s understanding and decision-making abilities: 
 
I think young people need to be respected and to understand. (Private/School/Youth 
Service, GP6) 
 
I think it is about respect for them, and giving them the opportunity to express, in a way 
that they can, and to make good decisions about their health. That is about their voice 
and about time to listen to them. (School, Nur1)   
 
The kids coming here, sometimes, it is the first time that they have been shown dignity, 
respect and understanding, and just love. (School, Nur2)   
 
This can be particularly valuable for those from challenging backgrounds, where they 
may not receive such support and encouragement at home: 
 
The kids out here are used to being told what to do, when to do it and their decision-
making capabilities are sometimes limited because they are not being supported at home 
to make decisions. There is sometimes fear and intimidation that goes with that, so if 
they can have more of a voice, a stronger voice, about their own decisions that’s perfect. 
(School, Nur2) 
 
2. School  Dental  Servi ce  
 
In contrast, time was scarce in the School Dental Service (SDS), and as a consequence, 
did not lend itself to developing relationships with children and their parents. Rather, it 
was functional in nature: 
 
Everything we do is timed. We get x amount of time to do this, right down to the filling. 
We have lost the human element that they are children. … Now that we have come into 
the hub it is very production line. (Dental therapist, DT1) 
 
One feature exacerbating the development of relationships was the disjointed contact 
school dental therapists had with families. Usually they examined children at school first, 
and if further treatment was required, they may again see the child alone, or with a parent. 
Time constraints not only limited dental therapists’ opportunities to establish 
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relationships with children and their parents, but also their opportunities to promote 
children’s competence, for example, through education on dental health.876 
 
3.  Hospital   
 
In other healthcare environments, such as hospitals, children can be encouraged to 
participate in consultations, when given time and space: 
 
With younger kids we have toys. ... Often you can see the child listening intently in the 
corner to the conversations and then you can engage with them in play. It is giving them 
the time, opportunity and time to talk. With adolescents it is the same thing, time, but 
also privacy. ... When we’ve got teenagers and adolescents it is important that they are 
given the opportunity to talk about things by themselves. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
Usually my first appointments are just talking. Most of the patients are quite complex so 
it usually takes about 30 minutes to get through, taking a history and why they have been 
referred. (Hospital dentist, Den3) 
 
Sit down and talk to the child absolutely. We don’t as healthcare professionals listen to 
children enough. … It is about sitting down next to them, not necessarily above them, 
sitting on the ground with them. (Hospital nurse, Nur3) 
 
With teenagers we are trying to see them without the parents.  
(Obstetrician/Gynecologist, HD7) 
 
When children need continuing hospital care, either as an outpatient over an extended 
period, or when admitted as an inpatient, it gives them greater opportunities to develop 
trusting relationships with health professionals. For example, hospital dental treatment 
may extend over many years for a cleft palate, where  “there is a set schedule … from 
birth to 25” (Hospital dentist, Den3). Through trusting relationships, children’s 
understanding and confidence develop, enabling them to ask questions. Sometimes these 
questions can be very direct, for example, relating to their mortality: 
 
As a nurse you are there 24 hours with the child either on day or night shift. They don’t 
sleep at night. So there is lots of time for them. … They will ask you, because you have 
developed a relationship with them, so you know them quite well, and it is a very 
intimate time, and they would ask me ‘am I going to die?’ (Hospital nurse, Nur3) 
 
Yet, within other hospital contexts, time is very limited, such as in paediatric surgery.877 
Both paediatric surgeons spoke of consulting with high numbers of children in clinics, 
																																																								
876 Chapter 10 considers the SDS system further at page 220-223. 
877 For example see Chapter 8, page 146 where Wilma described how no time or space was given to her 
and Samantha to explain Samantha’s health. Wilma reflected “Hospitals are a bit manic at times. I wonder 
if they need, when they have important information, they call you back or do it in some other way and not 
in the middle of a clinic with five other people standing around and lots of other things going on.” (Wilma). 
Similarly, in the context of the GP, no time was given to Laura and Alistair to explain and consider the 
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“on average over two clinics … 45-50 children” (Paediatric surgeon, HD1), and spoke of 
usually having “10 minute slots” with patients to take a medical history, “examine the 
person and decide the likely diagnosis and whether they need an operation or not. If it 
needs an operation then I go through the consent process” (HD1). Then on the day of 
surgery, it can be “a bit like a railway station” (HD1) due to its busyness. As a result, 
there is little time for children to be supported in discussions, or enhancing their 
understanding and decision-making. Similarly, when children need a general anaesthetic 
(GA), appointments are “about 10 or 15 minutes at the most, [but] [i]t obviously depends 
on their medical history. If it is a bit more complex, then it will be more time” 
(Anesthetist, HD5). Yet, despite anaesthetists and paediatric surgeons being under similar 
time constraints, the degree to which they assess children’s competence, and obtain their 
consent, are very different.878  
 
4.  Dentis try  – Hospital  and Private  
 
Having the ability to develop trusting relationships with children and their parents was a 
striking feature of dentists.879 They fostered trust by using a number of strategies - 
encouraging parents’ interest in their children’s dental health;880 involving parents and 
children in explanations and discussions;	breaking down processes and procedures; using 
simplified language to pitch information at the right level; and preparing children for 
what is to come, for example, through a process which is known as “show, tell and 
do.”881 These strategies enabled dentists to work with both parents and children, securing 
children’s co-operation for an examination or treatment, whilst parents provide 
consent.882 Dentists recognised that “when you deal with a child you are in a triangle of 
you, the child and the parent” (Hospital, Den3).  
 
Over the course of what could be many years, children become accustomed to attending 
the dentist, becoming familiar with the routine/process, during which time, parents and 
children develop trust to follow the dentist’s advice. Through developing experience and 
trust, children are able to attend without their parents, when they reach their teenage 
years. Yet, parents continue to be involved, despite their physical absence, as dentists 




diagnosis and treatment for ADHD, page 156. In contrast, Poppy and Brenda were given time for 
explanations and questions, pages 164 and 170 respectively.  
878 See Chapter 10, at pages 199-200. 
879 This was a theme that emerged through the data given by private and hospital dentists, rather than 
being specifically questioned upon. 
880 A range of methods are used, such as having information on the practice’s website, giving explanations 
before and during treatment and drawing diagrams. 
881 This is a process where dentists firstly show children the equipment, such as suction and air, and then 
tell them in language they will understand, what will happen, what the equipment is for and what noises 
they will make. This can be of particular importance to children on the autistic spectrum, for example, who 
are very sensory to noise. Lastly, the examination/treatment is carried out. 
882 See Chapter 10, page 209 where the consent process is in dentistry is considered. 







Privacy can be of immense importance to teenagers when they consult with health 
professionals, particularly for contraception or sexual health treatment/advice, as health 
professionals in all healthcare environments experienced. For instance, teenagers may be 
reluctant to consult with their family GP in some close communities, where large 
numbers of family members live, as they may not trust that their confidentiality will be 
respected. The implication to them of such a breach could be that many family members 
become aware of their health issues: 
 
They have an innate distrust of health professionals telling their stuff. They don’t go to 
GPs because they don’t trust them. They don’t trust that the receptionist, who might be 
an aunty or related, won’t tell their stuff. … I think the children here are right to be 
nervous because people do talk about their stuff, and I know that, because I hear it, but I 
also know because they tell me that. They ask, ‘You are not going to tell Mum?’ Because 
before you know it, Grandma and Granddad will know, and then Uncle and Aunt, and 
before you know it there are 10 people there. That whole lack of regard for privacy is a 
real issue. (School nurse, Nur1) 
 
Thus, some children may access contraception or sexual health advice at school or a CYS, 
which they perceive may better protect their privacy, but consult their GP for less 
sensitive matters: 
 
Sometimes they have appointments that they are happy to share. They might come here 
for contraception, but go to their family doctor for an ingrown toenail and that is often 
to do with family. They don’t want to be seen at the doctor. (CYS/School nurse, Nur5) 
 
Int: Are they worried about their parents finding out? 
Nur1: Always. Usually the first thing they ask is ‘you are not going to tell my Mum are 
you?’ That’s when you know it will be sexual health. 
 
Nevertheless, health professionals are mindful of balancing children’s privacy with 
potential supports. Most of the participating GPs and nurses, who prescribed 
contraception, spoke of encouraging children to be open with the significant adults in 
their lives.  
 
C. Parents ’  Roles   
 
1. Introduct ion 
 
Parents play a vital part in the development of children’s competence, for instance: they 
can prepare their children for appointments; promote their engagement with, and trust of, 
health professionals; provide emotional support; and enhance their understanding and 
decisional capacities. On some occasions, however, parents’ can act as the antithesis of 
these, creating barriers for children in their engagement with healthcare systems. This 
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section explores the importance of parents’ roles, and their impact on children’s 
participation from health professionals’ perspectives. 
 
2. Parental  Support  in Engaging with Health Profess ionals  
 
Within all healthcare environments, health professionals experienced parents preparing 
and supporting their children, both practically and emotionally, for consultations and 
treatment. Sometimes these supports began prior to consultations, for example, by 
parents preparing their children for what to expect:884 
  
A lot of parents are good at getting the doctor book out, or whatever, so the child is not 
coming in not knowing what is going to happen (Private, GP5). 
 
Preparation was particularly important when children were expected to undergo a 
procedure, such as surgery or a blood test, or an intimate examination. Health 
professionals found that the most helpful strategy was for parents to be honest and 
upfront, as then children understood what was going to happen and why: 
 
Most parents have explained it [the operation]. Some parents bury their heads in the 
sand and just go ‘I’m not going to tell them as they might get too scared,’ but that is 
actually not a very helpful strategy. The best thing to do is just be honest about it.… 
They do actually need to know what is going to happen. …You can’t operate on a child 
who does not have some understanding of what you are doing. It is not fair to the child. 
Some people try to completely ignore it and pretend it is not happening and I say you 
can’t actually do that. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
In most situations I probably rely on the parent to inform the child about what it is all 
about before they come, but I check out whether that has happened. …. Parents should 
tell their child why they are going to the doctor and if they don’t understand what is 
going to happen they need to find out what is going to happen so they can explain it. I 
have had children arrive and they have had no idea they are going to have a genital 
examination and that has been a reason for refusal. I think that is perfectly reasonable. I 
think being straight up if there is going to be a procedure, like a blood test or expose a 
bit of their body to a doctor that they would not normally expose. (Paediatrician, HD2) 
 
At times, Mum or Dad, usually the Mum, has brought them in not wanting to have that 
conversation in front of the child and the child is not ready to have surgery from my 
point of view if they have not had that conversation before they arrive here. (Plastic 
surgeon, HD4) 
 




884 See for example Anna preparing Poppy for consultations with her surgeon and the telephone call with 
the pre-operative nurse prior to her achillies operation at page 165, Laura preparing Alistair for what his 
GP may discuss with him at page 156 and Diane preparing Donald for dental treatment at page 160. 
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Sometimes you find that parents bring in kids because it is the child who has the primary 
concern, and it is the parent who is helping support the child’s self determination, or the 
child has said they feel unwell, but the parent was happy to wait a bit longer. (Private, 
GP3) 
 
Once in consultations, commonly parents and children provide a medical history 
together.885 Hearing directly from children was important to most health professionals, as 
children’s experiences of the symptoms may be different from their parents’ 
observations: 
 
The general principle is that you should always engage the child and the family into the 
consultation so you can get the history from both the patient and the family. … It is 
always important, and wherever possible, to put the questions towards the child if you 
are asking around symptoms. ‘Does it hurt, where does it hurt?’ It is important that the 
child is giving this history, as much as possible, rather than the parent interpreting the 
child’s symptoms. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
Parent for outside things, child for inside. (Private, GP4) 
 
Broadly speaking, as children mature, their capacities to engage increase, and parental 
involvement decreases. Commonly, health professionals found that children were able to 
provide them with a medical history, around the age of 10 years, and began consulting 
alone, as teenagers, with their dentist and GP.886 All GPs had experienced some parents 
showing sensitivity to their children’s desire to consult with them alone, for example, by 
offering to step out of consultations: 
 
Sometimes the parent will volunteer. They will say ‘I’m here and just want to make sure 
that this and this is known about it and I’ll leave you to it.’ Obviously that is a chance for 
the kids to say things that they are not happy to say in front of the parent. … It is 
normally with the teenagers with issues with mood or anxiety, or poor sleep. (Private, 
GP5) 
  
Often we make that decision together. Often the parent will offer, ‘I feel like it is a good 
idea, shall I go’, and often the child will say ‘yes’, but sometimes they say ‘no.’ (Private, 
GP2) 
 
Mostly GPs found that this arrangement worked well, but on occasions some children 
had struggled, when unprepared:  
 
I had one situation where the Mum had told me beforehand that her child was self-
harming. That put me in a difficult position as I felt that we had gone behind the child’s 
back, which we had, and then when they came to see me it felt a bit staged with the 
																																																								
885 Children’s abilities to do so are influenced by many factors that are discussed in Chapter 12, pages 242-
256. 
886 This appeared to be more common with private dentists than private GPs. 
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Mum when she said that she was going to leave so the child could talk to me on her own. 
The consultation with the child was awkward (Private, GP1). 
 
Following diagnosis, health professionals generally explained to both parents and 
children health conditions, and advised upon treatment.887 The relational nature between 
some health professionals, parents and children was exemplified in this process, such as 
one paediatrician giving families handouts on medication, enabling parents to discuss it 
later with their children,888 and others experiencing parents encouraging their children to 
ask questions.  
 
In all healthcare environments, parents and children commonly made decisions 
together.889 However, participation in decision-making was not necessarily equal, and the 
extent of children’s participation was dependent upon a number of factors, such as: 
parents’ roles and attitudes towards promoting children’s participation; the state of 
children’s health, as they may be too acutely ill;890 and whether children have formed 
views.891 One common factor across all healthcare environments affecting children’s 
participation in decision-making was the parent-child dynamic. 892  Most health 
professionals recalled examples of contrasting parental behaviour, where parents either 
promoted or constrained their children’s participation and competence. Parents 
constraining their children’s participation are considered in more detail below, but two 
examples in the dental context highlight this contrast.  
 
Firstly, in the hospital dental setting, where the most severe or complex work is 
undertaken, children may be involved in the decision of how treatment is to be carried out 
– either in the dental chair, which may be under the sedation of nitrous oxide, or under a 
GA. Commonly, parents and children work this out together with the dentist: 
 
I had a nine year old who needed three big teeth out. Between us all he agreed that we 
should do this while he was asleep… I asked him and his parent what they thought? 
They could try it in the chair or do it while he’s asleep. The parent and the child decided 
to do it while he’s asleep. It is very rare to have a parent saying ‘no’ to a GA and a child 
saying ‘yes.’ Parents will go off their children or the children off their parents. (Hospital 
Dentist, Den3) 
 
In contrast, at the SDS, where routine examinations and treatment occur, some children 
may be unable to participate. For example, a dental therapist recalled asking a child, aged 
																																																								
887 Chapter 10 explores the consent processes in each healthcare environment in detail. 
888 This also ensured that parents were aware of potential side effects of medication. 
889 Except for the SMS, where children consult independently. 
890 See pages 184-185: when children suffer from cancer they commonly regress through the emotional and 
physical effects of their illness. 
891 See page 205, for example, where some GPs experienced children lacking views on some treatment, 
such as antibiotics, but having strong views on how warts were removed. Likewise, at pages 201-202 for 
cosmetic/elective surgery children’s views were decisive for surgeons in whether to proceed. 
892 Although children attend the SMS alone, parents could still constrain children’s competence and 
participation. For example see Chapter 10, page 215 where a school nurse recalled a situation where a 
father refused to allow his child to be prescribed antibiotics. 
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around 12/13 years of age, if he would like her to take his loose tooth out, to which he 
responded ‘yes’. The dental therapist felt that the boy should be given a choice, and that 
it was a simple decision, which he was able to make. She issued a care plan for the boy to 
take home to his parents to sign. When they returned, the parent was “very annoyed” 
that the dental therapist had asked the boy his opinion, and said it was the parent’s 
decision. The boy did not challenge his mother’s stance. The dental therapist felt that the 
boy was accustomed to this family dynamic.  
 
These two examples highlight the relational nature of competence, which is dependent 
upon the successful triadic dynamic: 
 
… keeping that triangle happy and complete. Not one person over there is part of 
overall management, and end up with less complaints and stress for the parent - ‘What 
are you doing to my child? Why didn’t you tell me? (Hospital Dentist, Den3) 
 
Within this triadic dynamic, health professionals agreed that the levels of children’s 
engagement and competence varied with children’s internal characteristics, such as their 
personality, intelligence, experience, health and gender: 
 
There are huge variations on the level of engagement and understanding. It is not really 
age related. It is more on the experience of their health, particularly if they have an on-
going condition. (Private, GP2) 
 
… but it depends on the kid. … I always talk to the child directly, even if the parents go, 
‘she will not understand you.’ … I don’t have a specific age. You get to know the child, 
but around about 11/12 they are pretty onto it. … 14-year-old boys are wonderful, they 
just do as they are told, but 14-year-old girls want to know everything. (Hospital dentist, 
Den3) 
 
If they are older I will talk to them and find out their view. It is quite interesting, there 
are two broad groups of kids. Some of the older ones … I ask them a question and they 
will turn to their mother, and I’ll say ‘I asked you the question it is your body’, and there 
are others who you can’t shut up. (Paediatric surgeon, HD3) 
 
Further, there was consensus amongst health professionals that age was a misleading 
indicator of children’s competence, with several hospital practitioners recounting young 
children having capacities beyond their developmental years. For example, two-year-olds 
taking interest in their dental treatment, a nurse being “out smarted by a three-year-old” 
(Nur3) and a four-year-old coping with the removal of a mole under local anaesthetic: 
 
I, last year, removed a mole from a four-year-old’s foot under local anaesthetic. You 
can’t do that for most four-year-olds, so I think there are some children who are mature 
beyond their years and others are not. … There are some 20-year-olds who couldn’t do 






3.  Parents Creat ing Barriers  
 
Occasionally, across all healthcare environments, parents’ behaviour may have the effect 
of creating barriers for their children being able to consult directly with health 
professionals, or from receiving the healthcare they require. This may occur due to 
parents being accustomed to talking for their children, the parent-child relationship, or 
from their own beliefs. When parents block their children’s engagement, health 
professionals can assist by focusing on the child and redirecting the conversation. For 
example:  
 
Sometimes parents try to talk for the child and I will often try to talk to the child because 
they are the ones who have the complaint. … If a parent tries to control too much I’ll try 
and take it back and direct it towards the child because I think the child needs to have a 
sense of control. But I’m the one who makes that decision based on how I feel the 
interaction is going. If I felt the parent was trying to answer on behalf of the child I 
would direct my questions directly to the child and I would turn towards the child and 
blank the parent. (Private Dentist, Den6) 
 
 There are some parents who don’t want you to talk to their child, but I think it is also a 
learning process for them, so if you role model it hopefully they can see that their young 
person has a voice too. (Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
Some health professionals in private practice and CYS adopted another strategy by 
asking parents to step out of the consultation, into the waiting room. This allowed nurses, 
GPs and dentists space to develop relationships with children, whilst also enabling some 
children to focus better on engaging with their health professional.  In dentistry, for 
example, some children could cope better with the treatment,  “rising to the occasion a 
bit better” (Private, Den6). However, some health professionals perceived that this 
strategy was not available to them, due to both their apprehension of parents 
complaining, and a sense of it being parents’ right to remain:  
 
Int: Have you asked a parent to step out? 
DT1: No, I have never done it.  Have my colleagues? I think they have suggested ‘would 
you like to go to the waiting room’, but it is their right to be there. You could allude to it, 
but as far as saying you would like them to leave you with their child, you couldn’t do 
that. 
Int: Why do you think you could not do that? 
DT1: Because they would complain very quickly. 
 
Despite having strategies available to them, health professionals may be unable to redress 
the balance, particularly when the parent-child dynamic is well established. The strength 
of parents’ beliefs, together with health professionals’ concern for intruding upon the 
parent-child relationship, can result in children’s voices being unheard, and denied 
treatment at times, even when they are competent to consent. For example, a paediatric 
surgeon felt unable to take the consent of a competent 14½-year-old girl, when her 
mother withdrew her consent for her daughter’s operation, as the hospital could not 
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guarantee that there would be no male medical staff involved in her care. Despite the 
girl’s competence, the surgeon was reluctant to seek her consent, when the girls’ mother 
held such strong beliefs, due to the conflicting position this could create for the girl:  
 
I have had a difficult situation where I had a Ma ̄ori lady who had five kids, but became a 
radical feminist lesbian activist. The girl had an area of lung that had bronchitis, so it had 
infection in it, so she needed a bronchoscopy to see if there wasn’t a foreign body or 
something, and then she needed to have that bit of lung taken out because it kept 
making her sick and getting infections and the rest of her lungs were absolutely fine. 
Mum insisted that she wouldn’t have any discussions with men. The daughter was 14½ 
when I first met her. She was bright. I got consent for the operation from Mum. … 
Then at the anaesthetic pre-assessment she saw a female. She didn’t know who would be 
giving the anaesthetic on the day of surgery because the lists only come out the week 
before. When the anaesthetist told her this she got really aggressive and was going to 
punch her and insisted that she be told who would do it. The anaesthetist genuinely 
didn’t know. … Then we had this big discussion about the child being 14½, theoretically 
she could give her own consent and we went over that, but the problem is that for her to 
do that she had to be going against her mother’s wishes, and therefore we did not feel 
we could ask her that because she has to live with her mother and obviously her mother 
has some fundamental problems and beliefs that we’re not going to fix or alter. But that 
basically meant that her daughter could not get appropriate care. … In situations like 
that you sometimes think, ‘should we just be getting consent from her’, because she is of 
an age, she understood what we were talking about completely, but to ask a child to 
consent against the wishes of her family is too hard. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
Further, the surgeon believed that it would be futile to ask the girl her views, as she 
would have been unlikely to be able to express them:  
 
It wasn’t fair to ask the child to do that in my view because she had to go against her 
mother’s wishes, and trying to work out what her wishes were in that situation is really 
difficult, because she is never going to say in front of her mother that she’s okay having a 
man involved in her care because she knows her mother does not want that. (Paediatric 
surgeon, HD1) 
 
Similarly, most GPs gave extreme, albeit rare, examples of situations where parents 
dominated consultations, hindering their children’s ability to communicate directly with 
them, and in the wider context, preventing the development of their children’s 
responsibility and independence for their health. For example: 
 
GP1: I had a 15-year-old morbidly obese girl with terrible eczema. The mother was 
dominant and angry. She deferred responsibility for her daughter’s health on her 
daughter. She blamed her daughter for the way she was, saying she sneaks sweets and 
fizzy drinks into her room, buys chocolate and crisps with her pocket money. The 
daughter was very immature, although bright and intelligent enough, but really 
dominated by her mother. Her mother spoke to her like a six-year-old. I spent a lot of 
time trying to support the mother, telling her she is not to blame, but also trying to make 
her realise that her daughter is nearly old enough to get married and be independent and 
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she can make these choices for herself. The mother said to her daughter, ‘you tell her’, 
and then stormed out.  
Int: It sounds like the mother was the barrier to you accessing your patient.  
GP1: She was a barrier, but there was no way through. I was not able to consult with her 
on her own and she was very immature emotionally.  
 
Some parents think that they know best and their behaviour holds that young person 
back and dependent upon them, which is a good thing for them [the parents], and they 
are not willing to let them grow up. That can be a challenge and also in this particular 
case the young person was quite happy to have her Mum in the whole consultation, 
because she knows everything, but I actually thought it was important to remove the 
parent to give the young person her own voice. (Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
4. Life long/Chronic  Health Condit ions 
 
Moving into the fields of three lifelong/chronic health conditions - cancer, diabetes and 
asthma, parental support is vital, on emotional and educational levels. When diagnosed, 
families may feel grief and become overwhelmed, not only from the diagnosis, but also 
from entering a very unfamiliar world of hospitals, health professionals and treatment. 
This section considers the importance of the roles parents provide in emotionally 
supporting their children when diagnosed with cancer, with the following sections 
exploring the comprehensive education systems, and parents’ involvement within them, 
for diabetes and asthma. 
 
(a) Cancer - emotional support 
 
Once diagnosed with cancer, children commonly regress emotionally, needing their 
parents to take control of the situation, and provide them with emotional support to 
cope with the realities of their illness and its treatment: 
 
They regress, not just physically due to symptoms. It dents their confidence, so there is a 
psychological regression, and it can be emotionally as well, wanting more from their 
Mum or Dad, which to me is a very natural and normal behaviour. (NGO, SH9)893 
 
Social workers will move heaven and earth to get a family member to hospital … to do 
the emotional support and help with the distress that happens with chemo. (Play 
therapist, SH8) 
 
At the point of treatment, children may have little involvement or understanding of it, 
possibly as a consequence of this regression, the extent of their illness, and a tendency 
for the system to be parent-led. Discussions relating to treatment may be only between 
parents and health professionals, or with children as a bystander in the room: 
																																																								
893 The NGO supports young people and adults between the ages of 13-24 years. Its role is more psycho-
social support, for example, providing them with someone to talk to about how they are feeling, coping 
with their treatment, and organising peer support/activities. They may also at times provide advocacy type 




It is part of the maturity and also I imagine comes along with the medical model that 
they would be consulting directly to the parents with the child in the room with them. 
(NGO, SH9) 
  
In such situations, children rely upon their parents to be open and honest about their 
situation for them to understand it.894 The degree of openness has a knock-on effect to 
health professionals’ and children’s relationships. For example, one hospital nurse who 
had cared for children with cancer, described that at times her ability to be open and 
honest with them was restricted, or “directed by parents in what they want you to do” 
(Hospital nurse, Nur3). She found that this would place her in a difficult situation, at 
times, when children asked questions about their health, as she may not be able to be 
honest with them. She explained that the starting point is: 
 
… working with [the parents] in terms of what they want their child to know [and] if you 
begin those questions with parents early on you can understand what it is the parent is 
trying to do. Sometimes parents initially did not wish their children to know anything, 
and then it would be a matter of allowing the parents [time] to get over the initial shock, 
and then working with them in terms of what they want their child to know. (Hospital 
nurse, Nur3) 
 
From there she could help parents to understand the reality of their children’s 
experiences, and negotiate with them, as “we are doing all kinds of stuff - they might lose 
their hair or have surgery. They know something is going on.” She found that when she 
was permitted by parents to explain the treatment to children, they were capable of 
understanding it, in particular, remembering the terminology, as they are continually 
exposed to it. She believed that: 
 
… the more honest you are with them [children] the easier the process is for them. What 
I learned from children is if you are lying to them they figure that out very quickly. They 
are a lot smarter than we are. (Nur3)  
 
Through their illness, children could mature beyond their years, 895  developing an 
understanding and an acceptance of their health condition, which sometimes could be 
beyond that of their parents, who had different emotions to handle:  
 
These are children who have lived with an illness for a very long time. They have a 
maturity about them that another child of the same age may not have. … They have 
been around death, been around very sick people, and they know, and they do have an 
understanding, and sometimes it is more mature than a parent’s understanding. The child 
is living with it and the parent is distraught that they may lose their child. (Hospital nurse, 
Nur3) 
																																																								
894 See Chapter 8 page 171. 
895 See Chapter 11, page 238, where Wilma experienced this with Samantha: “I can speak from our 





On occasions, as a result of such grief, it was difficult for parents to recognise the extent 
of their children’s experience and understanding. For example, when treatment had failed, 
parents may wish their children to undergo further treatment or procedures in the hope 
that, on this occasion, it would be successful. The above nurse recalled such a situation in 
which a 13/14-year-old had relapsed with cancer several times. Following an 
unsuccessful bone marrow transplant she made it known to the nurses that she did not 
wish to undergo any further treatment and wanted to die at home with her cat. However, 
her parents “had a whole different understanding of that. They wanted her to have a 
chance, one more chance” (Nur3). Although initially the girl did not want her views to be 
known, it reached a point where her parents had to be told, and after many multi-
disciplinary meetings, including considering legal advice, her parents agreed with her view 
and took her home.   
 
In the experience of the above nurse, like that of the paediatric surgeon below, children 
intuitively know when they are going to die, and can ask in a direct way – ‘Am I going to 
die?’  This can be a very difficult question for nurses to handle when parents have 
instructed them not to disclose this to their child – “It was very difficult to handle that 
question from a young child, ‘well, we will wait and see’, but they know” (Nur3). 
 
Parents and children might try to protect one another from the reality, but sometimes 
children are more able to face it: 
 
Children always know that they are dying. Everyone is too scared to tell them. It is not 
for the children’s sake you don’t tell them, it is to protect everyone else. Parents say ‘you 
can’t tell them’, and I say, ‘but they know anyway’, and actually they have a right to know. 
… I have some children who have malignancies and they say, ‘How is my father going to 
cope with this? Are you sure we need to tell my father?’ ‘Yes we do actually!’ The child is 
saying ‘I think I need to tell him.’ (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
On the other hand, some children need their parents to protect them from the reality of 
the situation, until they are ready to deal with it. For example, an NGO staff member 
recalled parents supporting their 15-year-old son’s decision not to be informed of his 
prognosis. Whilst he was aware of meetings between the health professionals and his 
parents, and was continually given the opportunity by his parents to be informed about 
those, he was not prepared for the details. They believed that he was making the choice 
to live each day as it comes. 896 
 
Cancer is a stressful and emotional journey for families, which parents and children 
navigate together. Children rely on their parents to help them cope with the rigors of 
treatment, and also to understand it. However, even within such a harsh health area, 
where treatment options are limited, and the illness is sometimes terminal, children’s 
																																																								
896 In the opinion of this stakeholder the child had regressed to around 10-11 years, and prognosis was one 
month to a year. 
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competence can flourish, as their understanding, decision-making abilities and maturity 
develop beyond their years.  
 
(b) Diabetes - education and evolving capacities897  
 
The striking feature of diabetes was the educational structure provided to families, aimed 
at promoting parents’ and children’s understanding and management of diabetes. A 
comprehensive education and monitoring system exists, comprising an initial three-day 
programme in hospital upon diagnosis, on-going hospital reviews, and educational 
sessions and camps in the community, from both hospital diabetes nurse specialists and 
an NGO. Before considering this educational structure, I consider the importance of 
parents’ roles to children’s growing autonomy.  
 
(i) Parental responsibility and children’s growing autonomy 
 
Parents play vital roles in supporting their children’s learning, understanding and 
management of their diabetes. The roles parents provide largely depend upon the age at 
which children are diagnosed, the parent-child dynamic and the degree of responsibility 
parents are prepared to relinquish, and children are prepared to take. Children should 
progressively take more responsibility for their diabetes, often starting around the age of 
eight years, although sometimes younger: 
 
Nur4: Usually around eight they start to take an interest in helping, some younger. 
Int: What aspects of managing their health will children 12 and under take? 
Nur4: Testing, drawing insulin into syringes and checking doses with parents. Most 
would be doing injections or helping. Some on pumps they are really savy with the 
buttons and just get on with it, but we say to the parents they have to be checking. Quite 
a lot of kids text Mum or Dad at lunchtime and say ‘my blood sugar is this and I’m going 
to eat that,’ so they are calculating in their heads how much to give. Other kids don’t 
want to do that at school, so they do it at afternoon tea. They are definitely taking 
responsibility. 
 
From 13 years of age, teenagers should be taking more ownership for testing and taking 
their insulin, but parents still need to be involved. However, this may result in some 
conflict: 
 
The conflict is usually around not testing, not remembering to take insulin on time, 
alcohol, forgetting to take their kit or insulin if they are going away on holiday or for the 
weekend. … We say to the parents to stay involved to whatever degree you negotiate 
with your teen and the teen has to agree. (Nur4) 
 
Hospital diabetes nurses can assist in the transition of responsibility from parent to teen: 
																																																								
897 The emotional support provided in the cancer context applies equally to diabetic children, as diabetes is 
life changing, necessitating daily management. Children may “have to test their [blood sugars] four, five, six 
times a day, take insulin two, three, four, five times a day, eat healthily, and do it for life. That is a huge 




… it is the exceptional family that can manage negotiated hand over of those tasks and 
responsibility to the teenager. That is part of my job to help that happen, but some 
families are really resistant to it happening. (Nur4)  
 
This transition is challenging for most families, as either parents are reluctant to 
relinquish control, or conversely, teenagers are unwilling to assume responsibility, 
particularly if they have been accustomed to their parents taking care of it for a number 
of years. It is important that the transition occurs over a period of time, so that teenagers 
become accustomed to the responsibility before they become fully independent. In 
extreme situations where this has not been achieved, it could result in young adults at 
university continuing to be reliant upon their parents for the management of their 
diabetes: 
 
Some families are really resistant to it [the transition] happening. I have had students at 
uni who are still ringing Mum, and that really worries me because they should be living 
independently, but are not managing to do that. (Nur4) 
 
(ii) Three-day initial programme for diabetes (the programme) 
 
The programme begins in hospital, after diagnosis. The focus of the programme is on 
educating parents and children together, so parents can support their children. The 
volume of information given by diabetes specialist nurses can be overwhelming, so they 
provide it in chunks. The programme covers matters, such as, the nature of diabetes; its 
causes and symptoms; testing for blood sugars; injecting insulin; and advice on a healthy 
diet. The aim is for children and their parents to learn these over the course of two or 
three days, but there is no time pressure, as “no-one pushes them home” (Hospital nurse, 
Nur4). Teaching methods are tailored to each family’s learning style, with flexible 
methods available, such as, using pictures and DVD, giving explanations, and when 
English is not the families’ first language, an interpreter is provided. Supplementary 
information can also be supplied to families through an NGO, including “a child 
orientated information pack” (NGO, SH11). It is crucial for the successful management 




Within the first two or three months following discharge from hospital, children have 
two follow up reviews, the first taking place within the first month, and then every three 
months. Children and parents meet in hospital with a panel of health professionals, 
comprising a doctor, nurse and dietician. As children grow, mature and become more 
experienced, they typically take more responsibility for these reviews, with their parents 
being present for less time. Initially, these can be quite daunting for some children, but 
their confidence and abilities increase, as they become familiar with the professionals and 
process. Sometimes the panel needs to encourage parents to allow their children to 
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develop this independence, but they are mindful also of the importance of parental 
involvement: 
 
Int: Do you find there is a general need to educate parents on children taking responsibility and speaking 
for themselves? 
Nur4: Some parents need that. … Sometimes one of the doctors will say to the parent 
‘okay, be quiet, that’s enough.’ Occasionally they will be asked to step out for a moment, 
but we really try not to separate because we don’t want to get into that. The person with 
diabetes has to engage with the health system for the rest of their life and we don’t want 
to be the ones that put them off that. 
 
(iv) Transitional day 
 
Upon reaching Year Eight at school, children attend ‘a transitional day’ hosted by two 
diabetes nurses - their current one, and the one to whom they will be transitioned. Also, 
two Year Nine students, who transitioned the previous year, also provide information on 
the ways in which diabetes is managed in their college/high school. Separately, parents 
are given the opportunity to attend a session held by a psychologist to learn about 




Two camps are organised by an NGO each year to further support children/young 
people’s education and independence. One is for children of eight to 12 years of age and 
the other for 13-17-year-olds. The camp environment is an ideal setting for developing 
their learning and independence through educational sessions and from observing their 
peers: 
 
It is a huge step forward for them because they see other children doing the same thing 
as them, and often that’s when they step up to wanting to do their own injections or 
draw up their own insulin, because everyone else is doing it. (Nur4) 
 





In asthma management, supporting children’s knowledge, independence and 
responsibility of their health condition are also of importance. In common with cancer 
and diabetes, children and parents can be supported by an NGO, which plays a crucial 
role in providing both emotional and practical support. The importance of their role 
increases, for families who are unable to access GP services, for example, due to cost or a 
breakdown in relationships: 
 
… they are not going to go to the GP because they owe some money, they don’t like the 
receptionist’s attitude, or for whatever reason, we are the first call to help. I can ask the 
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doctor if he can do a prescription even although that person has not been every six 
months for a follow up about their asthma, which they are supposed to do otherwise 
they don’t get a script. We can ring up and they will do it, but we are still trying to 
empower them to get a better relationship with their GP. (NGO, SH10) 
 
This NGO has the advantage of being familiar to, and trusted by, the families, who have 
known them for many years. Nurses initially meet with children, and then their wha ̄nau, 
in their home, before again meeting children at their school or sports club. These 
external environments for educating children can encourage them to assume more 
responsibility, as outside of the home they may be less reliant on their parents, and in a 
better frame of mind to learn: 
 
Usually I would see the child first at home and deal with them, then expand to the 
wha ̄nau. … The environment in which you speak to them changes everything. In the 
home they are not so independent and don’t take responsibility for their health as much, 
but at school they actually absorb the information more because they are independent, 
there by themselves. Around their parents they are more babyish, but at school they are 
more grown up. (NGO, SH10) 
 
During these discussions some children may come to realise that they are capable of 
managing their asthma: 
 
Sometimes when I am educating them the switch turns on and they realise that they can 
take control of it. … We give them that permission by informing them and they take 
charge of their health. … Teach them good habits when they are young, make them 
health literate. (NGO, SH10) 
 
D. Summary o f  Promoting Competence  
 
Consistent with the existing literature, a number of factors emerged from the data 
demonstrating that children’s competence is influenced by several factors, such as time, 
privacy, support from parents, and trusting relationships with health professionals and 
parents.898 It is the presence and interplay of these elements and factors that promote, 
and enable children to demonstrate, their competence. Through children, parents and 
health professionals working together in partnership, both trusting relationships and 
children’s competence develop. Nevertheless, if some factors within these elements are 
absent, others can compensate.899 For example, children consult alone in the SMS, with 
some having unsupportive parents, but through time, privacy, and respectful 
relationships with health professionals, who effectively communicate and provide 
appropriate information, children have the opportunity to discuss all of their health 
concerns, understand treatment, consider their options and give consent. Yet, when 
some factors are absent or restricted, and the existing ones are unable to sufficiently 
																																																								
898 These factors are represented within the elements of my Competence Model – Space, Voice, Support 
and Influence. See Chapter 12, page 255. 
899 For example, see Chapter 8, pages 146 and 156 where Wilma and Laura respectively compensated for 
the lack of information provided. 
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compensate, children can be somewhat bypassed. This was seen for example in the SDS 
and paediatric clinics, where time was limited and the processes functional, with health 
professionals’ focused more on the result, or outcome, of treatment, rather than on the 
process by which informed consent is given. The result is that children’s competence is 
constrained in such environments.  
 
When systems are focused on supporting children and parents’ understanding of health 
conditions, children are able to progressively take more responsibility for their health, 
and become more experienced and independent. This was particularly highlighted in the 
structured educational supports for children with diabetes, and also for those with 
asthma. Although the same frameworks appear not to exist for cancer, children still 
develop knowledge and experience of living with, and managing their condition, through 
their parents, health professionals and peers. As a result, some children mature beyond 
their biological years. However, with the emotional and physical demands of cancer, 
children also regress, needing their parents’ protection.  
 
Health professionals need to carefully navigate the parent-child dynamic to ensure that 
positive relationships continue with both parents and children, as parents play crucial 




III .  Competence  Assessment  
 
This section turns to the factors that health professionals consider when assessing 
children’s competence to consent. Whilst there is no prescribed process for such 
assessments, common techniques are used by them.  
 
A. Process  and Factors 
 
All health professionals agreed that they used their clinical judgements during 
consultations to assess children’s competence. This was more an instinctive process, 
rather than following any formal process: 
 
I don’t think I am doing it consciously to be honest. You have a conversation with them 
and make that decision. (Private, GP4) 
 
I don’t do a formal process; it is a gut feeling. (Paediatric surgeon, HD3) 
 
I think we all gauge that [competency] from how they interact. (Anesthetist, HD5) 
 
Although not a conscious/formal process, health professional did have regard to a 
number of interlinking factors distilled as: children’s level of interest/independence in 
their health; their ability to engage with them and explain details about their health; 
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children’s intelligence and understanding; ability to ask and answer questions; and their 
development and maturity. All agreed that age is an unreliable indicator of competence.  
 
B.  Chi ld’s  Engagement ,  Independence ,  Arti culat ion and Knowledge o f  Health 
 
Health professionals were influenced by children’s ability to engage with them in 
consultations, shown through, for example, the degree of eye contact, the level of 
interest in their health and knowledge of it: 
 
I don’t think I have criteria that I am ticking off, age, appearance, questions, … [but] … 
looking for cues: good eye contact; body language; the way they answer, are they 
confident, are they not? (Private, GP4) 
 
If they are competent speakers and … are engaged in that process. Some older children 
are, and are able and forthcoming about details about their medical history and surgeries 
they have had and allergies. (Anesthetist, HD5) 
 
 Int: What is your ‘gut feeling’ about competency based on? 
HD3: … it comes down to how much eye contact you are having with the kid. … If they 
are maintaining eye contact, I talk to them as much as I talk to the parent. … It is based 
on the interaction of the child. Interaction is not quite the word I am looking for. 
Int: Responsiveness? 
HD3: Yes, and attentiveness. Are they paying attention or are they playing on the iPad? 
… If a child is keen to be involved I am happy to involve them. Most of the time it is 
communication through the parent. …[but] … I try to involve them as much as they 
want to be involved. … [I]t is sometimes quite difficult to be certain as to how much of 
that looking at the i-pad is a defence from having to be involved.  
 
C.  Inte l l igence  and Understanding 
 
During clinical interactions, all health professionals were looking for children’s 
understanding of the information they had imparted. For those who had established 
relationships, such as private doctors and dentists, they may already have a sense of this 
over a period of time: 
 
I guess you know from talking to the child what their understanding is, and you often 
know the children anyway, in a general experience. (Private, GP5) 
 
Others were observing whether children appeared to have age appropriate intelligence 
and understanding, as these two hospital doctors identified: 
 
If they come across at least average or above average intelligence …[and] are 
understanding, when I have a discussion about what is going to happen with the 




I suppose you usually have an understanding of where they are intellectually from the 
conversation. … You have asked them how they are doing at school. Are they age 
appropriate in reading and writing? … So if they are performing averagely at school, you 
think intellectually they are according to their peers. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
However, health professionals recognised, particularly those in the school setting and 
dental professionals, that there was a need to adapt their language to explain it in a way in 
which they could understand: 
 
There are difficulties because of the vocabulary of students here. Contraception names 
are on the wall. I ask do you know what that means, and often it is ‘no’, so it is putting it 
in simple terms and checking that they have understood, and getting that voice. 
(Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
I do try to make sure they understand what I’m talking about. I think that’s less jargon 
and more straightforward language. (Private, Den5) 
 
This could be challenging if matters were complex, as one paediatrican raised, and 
questioned how their understanding could be tested: 
 
 … it depends on the age of the child and the complexity of the information. Can you 
reduce the information to a point where they can understand it? It is difficult. How do 
you test with a parent whether they understand and give consent? (HD6) 
 
D.  Quest ions 
 
Two ways in which health professionals could gain a sense of children’s understanding 
were from how children answered questions and what questions children asked. At the 
outset of the consultation, health professionals might check children’s understanding of 
the reasons for consulting, and then during discussions, ensured they understood the 
explanations given: 
 
I usually start by asking them whether they have any questions. It depends on the 
situation, but usually I would ask them to ‘tell me what you understand we are going to 
do today? Tell me what you understand of the procedure?’ So it is what they are saying 
to start with. It is probably the same as adults. Then I give my spiel and ask if they have 
any questions. I guess with adults as well if I am not happy that they do understand I will 
ask them to tell me what they understand I’m going to do and then give them the chance 
again to ask questions. (Obstetrician/Gynecologist, HD7) 
 
The quality of the questions children asked were also relevant for health professionals 
when they were assessing children’s competence: 
 
I think too, part of that consent process is asking if they have any questions and if they 
ask any sorts of questions about the process, especially ones that are obviously well 
thought about. That is another ‘tick box’, and I think you are probably able to make 




However, as one hospital nurse identified, children’s willingness to ask such questions 
might only develop once they had established a trusting relationship with their health 
professionals: 
 
I need to gain their trust and so I would have a very high level of engagement. … The 
first point of contact they don’t ask you very much. It comes after some trust. (Nur3) 
 
E.  Age  
 
All health professionals agreed that age was an unreliable indicator of children’s 
competence, and instead their abilities, experience and maturity were of more relevance: 
 
No set age as children have different developmental abilities and inabilities. 
(Paediatrician, HD2) 
 
The difficulty is that there are such variations. You could get some 12-year-olds that 
could be Gillick competent and some 18-year-olds who probably aren’t. (Paediatric 
Surgeon, HD1) 
 
Some recognised that young children could be competent to different degrees, and at 
different stages of the informed consent process, such as being able to give a medical 
history, or consent to an examination or treatment: 
 
Kids at a young age can give the history. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
Int: Do you tend to find there is an age at which the child appears to be capable of giving consent? 
GP5: I see it more as a continuum. In some ways a three-year-old gives consent, if you 
are going to do liquid nitrogen. Even a four/five-year-old, if you say to them ‘can I look 
in your ears’ they are giving consent.  
 
…there are different competency levels in children. … It is not that they are not 
competent, it is a growing level of competence. … There are even some children in my 
experience, I believe, can make that choice at eight, nine or 10 because of their 
experience. (Hospital nurse, Nur3) 
 
Conversely, children regressed after diagnosis, as they coped emotionally and physically 
with their health, but then developed experience, and mature beyond their biological 






900 See Chapter 8 where Samantha at pages 147-149, Amanda at pages 150-153 and Oliver at page 155 all 
developed competence, as they became more knowledgeable and experienced of managing cancer. 
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IV  Chapter  Summary  
 
Many factors intertwine together to promote children’s competence: a conducive 
physical environment within which to consult with health professionals; being listened 
to; having opportunities to learn, practise and be responsible for managing their health; 
and receiving support from parents and health professionals, who value working in 
partnership with them. These factors should be in place to enable children to develop 
and demonstrate their competence at the optimal level.901 However, if any factors are 
constrained or absent, others can compensate, to still effectively promote children’s 
competence.  
 
Whilst health professionals have no prescribed criteria or formal process for assessing 
children’s competence, they all agreed that children’s level of engagement/interest in the 
process and their understanding are necessary for them to be competent to give consent. 
The degree of children’s understanding can be assessed from their responses to questions, 
the quality of questions asked and the accuracy of their recall of explanations provided to 
them. On the other hand age is an unhelpful measure. 
	
Therefore, the relational nature of competence is demonstrated, not only through the 
relationships children have with their parents and health professionals, but also from the 
obligations/responsibilities health professionals and parents’ have towards children in 






901 See Chapter 12, page 255 where these factors are represented in my Competence Model. 
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 Chapter 10 
 
                                    The Consent Processes 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
Consent provides health professionals with the legal authority to examine and treat 
patients. Without consent, health professionals not only disrespect patients’ bodily 
integrity and dignity, but also risk breaching the law and their professional guidelines.902 
 
This chapter explores the practices and attitudes of health professionals in obtaining 
consent in each healthcare environment. Firstly, the practice in hospital is considered, 
where mostly parents provide written or verbal consent, with children also consenting 
verbally, or at least co-operating with treatment. However, exceptions to this general rule 
were found. The second section considers general medical and dental private practice, 
where commonly parents and children provide verbal consent jointly. In the final section, 
the consent processes of the SMS, the vaccination programme and the SDS are explored. 
Although all occur within the school environment, there are varying consent processes. 
Commonly within the SMS, children provide oral consent for treatment, such as 
contraception and antibiotics, which I discuss. Finally, the chapter turns to the 
vaccination programme and the SDS, where reliance upon parents’ consent, and the 
impact of this upon children’s abilities to access treatment, are considered.  
 
 
II .  Hospi ta l   
 
A. Surgery ,  Medic ine and Dentis try  
 
1.  Overview 
 
In hospital, verbal consent is given for most investigations, examinations, tests and 
treatment;903 and in writing, by way of a prescribed form,904 for procedures, such as 
surgery, dentistry when receiving treatment under GA, and for anaesthetics. The effect of 
both verbal and written consent is the same, providing agreement for the medical 
intervention – “Just because it is written does not mean that it is any better than verbal” 
(Paediatrician, HD6). 
 
Although it may appear that consent is a one-off act, it is in fact an ongoing process. 
Prior to providing consent, patients should have time to understand and consider the 
information and advice, before giving consent:  
																																																								
902 For example, Crimes Act s 2(1) (assault), s 129 (sexually violation and assault) and s 135 (indecent 
assault), and s 196 (common assault). 
903 At the time of interview a Paediatrician (HD6) explained that there was a move to formalise blood tests 
by seeking written consent, with stickers having been developed stating ‘test signed consented.’    




Consent is really a gradual process that doesn’t necessarily occur during that one 
consultation. (Plastic surgeon, HD4).  
 
The College says we should do our [written] consents in a timely manner, not the day of 
surgery, so people have got time to think about it. Not everyone does that. Some people 
do it the day of surgery, and some don’t do the consents themselves, they get their 
registrars to do them, but medico-legally it is safer to do your own consents, to see 
people, talk to them and confirm on the day of surgery, and I always see them afterwards 
too. (Paediatric Surgeon, HD1) 
 
Before considering hospital doctors’, dentists’ and nurses’ processes, Table 5 summarises 
the consent processes, classified in areas of health. It draws attention to the 
differences/inconsistencies in practice. Although most parents give written consent, and 
children consent verbally, there are exceptions. In anaesthetics and obstetrics, competent 
children may give their sole written consent, with parents consenting verbally. Also in 
gynecology, both parents and children may give their written consent. In other areas, 
such as paediatrics and nursing, where written consent is not required, parents and 
children usually give their verbal consent together. Commonly, in nursing practice, nurses 
will be instructed by doctors and parents to carry out the treatment, with parents having 
first given their consent to doctors. If doctors have not also secured children’s consent 
or co-operation, nurses will to do so before administering the treatment.  
 
Table 5:  Practice of Hospital Practitioners Taking Consent 
 
Specialty Written Consent Verbal Assent/Consent 
Paediatric Surgery Parents 
Rarely by children 
Children 
Plastic Surgeon Parents 
Rarely by children 
Children 
Anaesthetic Children Parents 
Obstetrics Children Parents 
Gynecology Joint consent by parents 
and children 
N/A 
Paediatrics N/A for most 
treatment/procedures 







Nursing  Parents when required Joint consent by parents 
and children. 







2. Writ ten consent  
 
Forms are used for parents/guardians/patients to consent to procedures, such as, 
surgery, 905  anaesthetics, dental treatment under GA and on occasions, genital 
examinations. The form contains complex language at an adult level, as this paediatric 
surgeon explained: “You are getting into the technical language that is on the consent 
form because the consent form is quite a complicated document” (HD1). 
 
Although the form indicates that patients can sign, most participating hospital doctors (4 
of 6) who used such a form, usually asked parents to sign it, rather than children. For 
example: 
 
My understanding is that if you are happy that the child understands and has the 
appropriate level of competence to understand what you are talking about then 
potentially a child can do their own consent form. In practice we don’t do that a lot, I 
guess because usually there is a parent there. … We don’t commonly get 14/15-year-olds 
to do their own consent. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
Consequently, discussions and explanations on consent were aimed towards parents, 
although children would be present: 
 
I do my level best to keep the language in terms most parents would understand. 
(Paediatric surgeon, HD3) 
 
All the discussion about consent is done in front of the child. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
Whilst most children would not usually be required to sign the form, they may need to 
act as interpreters, on occasions, where their parents were unable to understand it, due to 
having poor English: 
 
We have some people [parents] whose English is not that great and usually in that 
circumstance the children’s English is great. So sometimes the children will read the 
consent form to their parents and tell them what it says. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
Likewise, written consent for dental treatment under GA was usually taken from parents, 
although one hospital dentist indicated that she arranges for both parents and children to 
sign when they are 14-years-old. This form is “a general consent for full dental treatment” 
(Hospital Dentist, Den1) to provide for an unexpected, but necessary, procedure, 
partway through treatment, so that dentists “can do the right thing for the child at the 
time” (Den1).  
 
The usual practice was for parents to sign the consent form until their children are 16-
years-old. This process seemed to arise from hospital doctors’ and dentists’ 
understanding of the law, or established practice within hospitals. For example: 
																																																								




Of course, you can’t sign your consent form until you are 16 [years] anyway. 
(Plastic Surgeon, HD4) 
 
Technically it is 16 [years] to sign your own consent…. because that is the age of 
consent. … I know that someone that is in a position to be able to make a 
reasonable informed choice can do so, but it is the generally accepted thing that 
the age of consent is 16 [years of age]. … I must admit I don’t routinely offer 
the opportunity, unless they are getting into teenage years. … I am happy to put 
pressure on a 10-year-old about compliance, but I am not going to necessarily 
say, ‘hey, you can sign your consent form.’ (Paediatric surgeon, HD3) 
 
For one doctor who practiced in two specialist areas, obstetrics and gynecology, this 
resulted in a somewhat contrived practice. When practicing in obstetrics, only children 
signed their consent forms, whereas for gynecological procedures, both parents and 
children signed. The difference stemmed from the doctor’s understanding of the law, 
that “under 16s can access contraception without their parents’ consent,” which relates 
to her field of obstetrics, but for gynecological procedures, “legally I have to get the 
parents to sign” (HD7). It appeared that an earlier professional experience had 
influenced this doctor’s understanding and practice, when a 15-year-old, who had signed 
her own consent form, was refused surgery, due to the absence of her parent’s written 
consent: 
 
I remember once as a paediatric house surgeon getting a 15-year-old to sign a consent 
form for an orthopedic procedure and getting told off for not getting the parent’s 
signature and they wouldn’t perform the procedure. (Obstetrician/gynecologist, HD7)  
 
Nevertheless, there were specialties within hospitals where it was acceptable for 
competent children to routinely sign consent forms, such as in anaesthesia,906 and as 
shown above, obstetrics. Upon assessing children’s competence, the anaesthetist had a 
logical process for taking consent, where she took consent from either: (i) competent 
children; (ii) both children and parents, where children appeared competent, but she was 
not absolutely confident; or (iii) parents, when children were incompetent. She described 
her system as follows: 
 
If I have decided that they are competent to make their own decisions, and I frame it as, 
‘there is no minimum age of consent and it seems to me that you understand what is 
involved here’ and the parent is there, [the child signs]. … If I am really not sure about a 
child but they have engaged, perhaps if they are young, then I will get Mum, or whoever 
is with them, to sign as well, so I don’t feel uncomfortable with it. (Anaesthetist, HD5) 
 
In doing so, these health professionals not only respected children competence, but also 
recognised the importance for children’s self-esteem and growing independence: 
																																																								
906 See Chapter 8 at page 166 where Anna signed Poppy’s consent form when, at the age of 14 years, she 
received an anaesthetic, as they were told Poppy required to be 16 years before she signed it. Thus, 




It would be easy for me, wouldn’t it, just to say ‘you are under 16, I’ll get Mum to sign.’ I 
guess it is about giving them a sense of empowerment I think for me. (Anaesthetist, 
HD5) 
 
… if I have a 15-year-old who I think is competent it seems slightly insulting to her that 
I have to get her parent to sign the consent and that is why I get the 15- year-old to sign 
as well as the parent. … They are the one having the procedure. (Obstetrician and 
Gynecologist, HD7) 
 
On occasions, some hospital doctors, who did not routinely obtain children’s written 
consent, did so when parents were not present, or had poor English; when the outcome 
of the procedure was uncertain; and when children of 14 or 15-years of age requested to 
do so: 
 
I have done it before. 14/15-year-old with the parents in the room, ‘well, if you want to 
do your own consent form you can do the form.’ … The more common time when we 
would ask someone to give consent who was of that age would be if the parent did not 
have good English but the child did, or if there was not anyone immediately there but we 
knew the parents knew as we had talked to them on the phone or whatever, and we 
knew that was okay. I guess the other times are where you cannot get in touch with the 
parents at all. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
I’ve had one child who was a frequent flier getting a [procedure] on his oesophagus 
every month or so. His Dad was in the clink [prison], his Mum didn’t come, and so from 
14 [years of age] we got him to sign. …. I have had the occasional child who has wanted 
to sign their own consent form. … I tend to make a point of getting them to sign their 
own consent form, or at least countersign their own consent form, if I’m not sure I am 
necessarily going to make them better. This may or may not work. (Paediatric surgeon, 
HD3) 
 
The above surgeon recalled a situation when he involved, and sought the consent of a 
13-year-old, for a novel procedure, the success of which was uncertain: 
 
There is enough uncertainty about it that if she decided that she didn’t want the 
procedure I would be happy not to do it. But if she wants it I am not going to make her 
any promises. (Paediatric surgeon, HD3) 
 
3. Verbal consent  
 
Verbal consent was given for most examinations and treatment in hospital, but when 
written consent was required, the party who did not sign the form gave verbal 
consent/agreement. Children and parents jointly consenting/agreeing was important for 
all hospital doctors and dentists, and was usually taken jointly, rather than on an 




Unless there is a specific reason I don’t think there is a need to ask the individuals 
separately. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
Commonly, parents and children accepted health professionals’ advice, or “children go 
along with what their parents go along with” (Paediatrician, HD2). However, there were 
contrasting perceptions of the significance, or weighting, of each person’s consent, with 
some health professionals proceeding on the basis of parents’ consent, as the first 
hospital nurse below described, whilst others relied upon children’s consent, as the 
second obstetrician/gynecologist outlined: 
 
Children are very much with the parents and so it is about the family-centred philosophy, 
children and families together, and so the consent is always from the child as well as the 
parent, with acknowledgment that the parent has the overriding guardianship and 
acknowledgment that the parent gives signed consent. (Hospital nurse, Nur8) 
 
I do not need their parents’ consent, but I encourage them to involve their parents. I am 
struggling to think of a pregnancy where parents have not been aware and ditto with 
contraception. So while they sign their consents I go through it with them and usually 
their parents are there as well. (Obstetrician and Gynecologist, HD7) 
 
On rare occasions when children attended hospital without a parent, health professionals 
might seek the consent of both parents, as one hospital dentist recalled doing when she 
treated a 10-year-old girl who attended hospital with her mother’s friends. In this 
situation, the dentist ensured that she had the consent of both parents, together with the 
child, who was “very competent” (Den3). Her rationale was to promote ongoing 
relationships with the parents, whilst also ensuring that the child had the security and 
reassurance to give her consent, safe in the knowledge that both her parents were 
involved and in agreement with the treatment plan. 
 
Additionally, in hospital health professionals placed greater importance on children’s 
verbal consent for cosmetic/elective surgery, such as chest-walling abnormalities, 
circumcision and correction of bat ears, or when the success of surgery was uncertain.907 
Children’s consent was either given explicitly or sensed through children’s level of co-
operation and non-verbal cues:  
 
At the stage I speak with the child. It is implicit. I can tell from their body language, and 
I will ask them ‘do you want this done?’ I don’t think I have operated on anyone where 
there has not been at least that sort of agreement. … The child has got to agree to it. 
(Plastic surgeon, HD4) 
 
If the child said to me ‘I do not want this’ or is signaling that, I would be a lot more wary 
about going ahead. … Although you are not formally involving them in a consent 
process you are still saying ‘well, is it what they want?’ Explaining to the parent that it is 
about the child and what they want. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
																																																								
907 See HD3, page 200. 
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The above surgeons were clear that if children refused to consent to such surgery they 
would not proceed, regardless of parental consent: 
 
… it is their body, their decision, especially if it is a cosmetic-related thing (Plastic 
surgeon, HD4).  
 
‘I am not actually going to go against his wishes, as I understand them, because you 
signed the consent.’ (Paediatric surgeon, HD1)908 
 
When the procedure was necessary, but non-urgent, hospital doctors used several 
strategies to assist children to cope better, such as being matter of fact and honest with 
them, as the first paediatrician below described, or by giving them time, as the second 
paediatrician and plastic surgeon both explained: 
 
The most common thing is kids don’t want to have a blood test. They don’t want to 
have anything that is going to hurt, so you explain that they will go to the ward and there 
are things that we can do not to make it as unpleasant. But then I will say, ‘I know it is 
something that you are not going to like, but it is something that is important that we 
have to do to find out what is happening’. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
HD2: I have had the child not wanting a blood test those sorts of things. … 
Int: How is that resolved? 
HD2: ‘We won’t do it today because you weren’t prepared for it. We’ll do it another day 
when we’ve got time to have the numbing device’, or do we really need it?… I don’t 
want to be holding children down to do anything. (Paediatrician, HD2) 
 
I would rather not operate. For most things we do you can always come back and do it 
on another day when they want to have it done. (Plastic Surgeon, HD4) 
 
However, where treatment was urgent, or these strategies were ineffective, children could 
be offered a sedative to reduce their anxiety, which assisted them in coping with the 
anaesthetic. However, the question arose whether they were giving consent to the 
sedative and to the treatment, or were in effect no longer able to refuse, as this 
anaesthetist recognised: 
 
Int: Have you had challenging situations, like that where the parent has consented, but the child is 
clearly not co-operating? 
HD5: Yes and we give them a pre-med. 
Int: So is that like a sedative? 
HD5: Yes 
Int: And how do you feel about that? 
																																																								
908 This situation related a mother requesting that her eight or nine-year-old son be circumcised. In the 
surgeon’s opinion it was not an unreasonable procedure for his condition, but there were other options. 
The surgeon knew the child well and was aware of his experience and understanding of the hospital system, 
as he had previously received treatment for cancer over three or four years. The boy expressed his 
unwillingness to be circumcised, and the surgeon informed his mother that she would not proceed with the 
operation unless the child agreed. She encouraged him and his parents to discuss the situation, which they 
did, and the circumcision went ahead. 
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HD5: Well now, thinking about it, it is a bit fraught, isn’t it. But I guess they still have 
the right to refuse to take the pre-med, and then it is a matter of thinking about getting a 
psychological assessment. … I give them a good pre-med to make them less anxious and 
if they are really not compliant then I send them off to a psychologist. 
Int: What is your process for going through the pre-med with them? 
HD5: I would say to a kid ‘I will give you something to make you feel a bit more chilled 
out, make this a little bit more pleasant for you.’  
 
In such situations, hospital doctors and dentists weighed up the medical need of 
proceeding, contrary to children’s refusal, against whether “you are going to miss some 
sort of window of opportunity” (Plastic surgeon, HD4). The impact on the child, and the 
strength of their views and feelings, of proceeding against their wishes were weighed up. 
Whilst younger children could be held down, older children’s refusal was more likely to 
be respected, as they could not be physically forced, and were more aware of the 
situation: 
 
Most are pretty good, but every once in a while one is held down, and at a young age, 
especially if they have had a pre-med, they won’t remember it, and I think the dental 
need outweighs that. I think the kids are fine if they don’t remember it. … Sometimes a 
parent says ‘yes’ to a GA and the child says ‘no’, and at about nine you can’t hold them 
down. They are just too big and they know what they want. I have refused to do a GA 
when the child has said ‘no.’ … She was kicking, screaming, refused to take the pre-
anaesthetic, and we just couldn’t hold her down. The weight of the dental need was not 
as great as the mental need. The anaesthetist and I decided that she can come back if she 
wants, but right now no. We can’t fake her out. You can hold a child down and you can 
give them a shot in the leg to make them do it, but she is old enough to make her own 
decisions to say ‘I’m not doing this.’ (Hospital Dentist, Den3) 
 
If, after I have explained to a 14-year-old who needs dental treatment, and is an 
otherwise normal 14-year-old, but she decides she does not want the pre-med and to not 
undergo the anaesthetic then we don’t proceed. (Anaesthetist, HD5) 
 
4. Nursing consent  
 
In hospital, there is a dual process of consent, where upon parents giving their consent to 
doctors, doctors and parents direct nurses to administer the treatment to children: 
 
The notion of nursing consent isn’t the same as the consent you sign on a piece of paper. 
It is ‘I am going to do this, is it okay because you already have the consent?’ And because 
we spend so much time with patients, and we are hopefully talking to them, we know 
exactly what they are thinking, what they want and why. (Nur3) 
 
On occasions, there can be difficulties where children form different opinions from 
parents and doctors, especially when challenging decisions need to be taken, such as, 
whether to end treatment when its success is unlikely. The above nurse expressed her 
frustration about the age of consent being regarded as 16 years in hospitals. This could 
have the effect of precluding younger children from making these decisions, without an 
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internal process, such as multi-disciplinary meetings, or court action. In most cases, 
parents’ consent prevailed, as the processes were time consuming and involved, and the 
nurse’s role was to manage children’s expectations and emotions around that. Often 
children simply acquiesced to their parent’s consent: 
 
If a teenager said ‘no, I have come to the end, I don’t want any more’ and the parents are 
not ready to accept that, if the child is 13 or 14 and not legally able to give consent, 
unless we go through a major process, then it is still a matter of ‘your parents have 
consented you still have to do it.’ So it is negotiating with that child around how we are 
going to handle this. You are kind of in a no-man’s land, especially for the ones who get 
closer and closer to the age of consent. … [T]here is pressure put on the child to say ‘the 
parents are giving consent, you have to do this’ and often through that pressure children 
will acquiesce. (Nur3) 
 
Conversely, when children consented and parents refused, internal/external steps were 
more likely to be taken, so that children could receive treatment, such as for cancer.  This 
could be frustrating for nurses, who were unable to administer the necessary treatment 
without parental consent or a court order, as one nurse recalled when caring for a 
nine/10-year-old child: 
 
If a parent doesn’t give you consent you can’t do anything, unless somebody says so. As 
a nurse my hands are really tied in terms of consent. … I can remember a child who had 
a form of cancer. … The parents chose a very alternative route and left the country to 
do so. The child did not want that. She wanted to stay here and do what we were saying. 
She was a bit younger, about nine or ten. … That was getting close to court, as no court 
in New Zealand would have let them go to South America to treat the child with snake 
venom. (Nur3) 
 
Therefore, it would appear that mostly there is a lack of reliance on children’s consent, 
where parents have not also consented, exemplified by the strong view of this hospital 
nurse: 
 
… we would never rely on a 12-year-old to give consent of course, never, ever. There is 
no way we would do that. We do have a legal requirement about the guardian consenting. 
Even if the child was here on their own and the parent was in Australia we would gain 
consent from their parent. … [A]lthough consent of the child is acknowledged, and that 
is documented, we would never ever solely rely on that under the age of 16. Think of the 
mess you could get yourself into. (Hospital Nurse, Nur8) 
 
5. Summary o f  Hospital  Surgery ,  Medic ine and Dentis try  
 
Within and across disciplines in hospital there are inconsistencies in practice. Mostly 
parents’ written consent is relied upon, with some health professionals only recognising 
children’s competence to consent as a matter of default, when parents are unavailable or 
for serious and uncertain procedures. Ironically, sometimes children’s consent is not 
sought, but they act as interpreter to facilitate their parents’ consent. Conversely, other 
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health professionals routinely assess children’s competence and take children’s consent. 
Nevertheless, regardless of who signs the form (parent or child), the other usually gives 
their verbal consent.  
 
Likewise, when only verbal consent is required, both parents and children confirm their 
agreement. In this sense, the family gives consent. Difficulties can arise, however, when 
parents and children disagree on treatment. When parents refuse, children’s consent may 
not be relied upon without an internal process, and possibly a court order. Conversely, 
when children refuse treatment, they are encouraged, and may also be pressurised or 
sedated into consenting/co-operating. However, generally children’s refusal is respected 
when they insist, unless outweighed by their health need. In particular, in elective surgery, 
or where the outcome is uncertain, surgeons ensure children are consenting, by being 
attuned to children’s reluctance. In these situations, parental written or verbal consent 
will not override children’s refusal, and thus agreement needs to be reached.  
 
 
III .  Private  Pract i c e  
 
A. General  Medic ine 
  
1.  Jo int  consent o f  chi ldren and parents  
 
GPs most often experienced children being accompanied by their parents/caregivers, 
when they consult with them, and so give their consent together.909 For some treatments, 
children do not have much of an opinion, such as for antibiotics, but for others, like the 
removal of warts/verrucae, children have stronger feelings and views. One GP explained 
that he provides parents and children with three treatment options for removal of warts, 
and even younger children have an opinion: 
 
If the child comes in with a wart I would give the child and the parent three options. 
There is a wart. They always go away. It may take a year or two. We can try freezing it 
with liquid nitrogen. That might take three or four sessions. It has a 70-80% chance of 
working. You can try wart paint. That takes four-six weeks and has a 70% or 80% 
chance. There is no right or wrong answer, it is what you are comfortable with. … Even 
the younger children will have quite strong views about liquid nitrogen. I describe what 
is involved and some kids will say ‘I’m not having the liquid nitrogen.’ … [T]hey know 
the liquid nitrogen might hurt. You do need their co-operation, so they are making the 
choice. (GP5) 
 
Generally, most GPs only proceeded with treatment against children’s refusal if safety 
was an issue. Where the treatment was non-essential/non-urgent, time could be given for 
children to develop the necessary maturity and understanding, as described by one GP 
who waits until children have reached the level of maturity to decide that the pain of 
having a verruca frozen is worth the result: 
																																																								




GP4: I think medical treatment goes better if you’ve got the child on board. … I look on 
it as parents bring in children for a verruca to be frozen. I won’t do it unless the child is 
old enough actually to make that leap between ‘I know it is going to be sore now but I 
hate this thing, it is a complete pain in the neck, it is inconvenient and I know that pain 
now equals pain later.’ There are different ages that that happens. If … a seven/eight 
year old or eight/nine year old is going ‘no Mum please don’t, I won’t do it’, it is not 
necessary, it is purely a cosmetic thing, that verruca will never hurt the child, but the 
treatment might.  
Int: Would that be the same for a wart?  
GP4: Yes any of those cosmetic things, the mother maybe doesn’t like it, but the child 
would rather have the verruca than the pain now, and deal with it later. I don’t think it is 
really a decision the parents should be making. 
 
Likewise, another confirmed that she would not prescribe for acne cream when teenagers 
were unconcerned - “where the mother wants the teenage boy to have treatment for his 
acne and he doesn’t care. In that situation there is no prescribing against his wishes” 
(GP2). 
 
As children develop and grow, they may become prone to other common conditions, 
such as, ingrown toenails, which are more prevalent in children of 12 years and over. 
Similar to that of warts, there are options for treatment, which commonly children decide 
on, and give their consent, together with their parent: 
 
GP5: The older kids, something like an ingrown toenail that is infected, the options are 
antibiotics for a few weeks, which might help, or remove the toenail. ‘What would you 
rather do?’ Again there is not right or wrong answer. Some people don’t like taking 
medicine and other don’t like procedures. The ingrown toenails are with children of 12 
and over so it is more the child giving consent. 
Int: Do you find generally that the child is giving their opinion and consent? 
GP: Most do, very rarely would they say ‘I don’t know.’ 
Int: Then does the parent tend to follow the child’s view? 
GP5: Yes. Sometimes they will have a chat and come to an agreement. 
 
Similarly, teenagers may be capable of reaching a collective decision with their parents for 
more complex procedures, such as, breast reduction surgery, as one GP recalled. In 
contrast, however, a collective decision was not made when one mother, who sought a 
referral for circumcision surgery, for her 10-year-old son. Although the GP, who 
consulted with them, did not consider there was a medical reason for the procedure, she 
made the referral, without confirming the boy’s view, as she perceived her role to be to 
“make a referral to the hospital, and it is for the surgeon to consider consent” (GP1). 
The GP sensed that the boy was being heavily influenced by his mother, as he was very 
withdrawn. In that situation, she doubted he would be able to freely express his views.  
 
Consistent with the findings amongst hospital doctors, GPs also held differing 
perceptions of who principally gives consent. For some, it was usually parents, and as 
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such, they were not mindful of assessing children’s competence to consent, although 
children needed to co-operate and agree: 
 
Int: When you consult with a child is it in your mind whether this child is competent or could be 
competent to consent? 
GP2: Yes it is interesting. I probably don’t except unless they are on their own, and there 
is no-one else to consent. … 
Int: Why do you think that is? 
GP2: I think that it is because the parent is there for the good of the child. 
Int: And following on from that who are you expecting to consent? 
GP2: The parent. We have a discussion about the treatment and options if there are 
options and I discuss that with the parent and the child if older. We talk about it and it 
depends on the child whether they are also consenting. 
 
Int: When you have an under 16, do you have a process for gauging whether they may be competent to 
consent? 
GP4: Not if they are with their parents I’m afraid I don’t think of it. Apart from in a way 
that if you are seeing somebody and you are treating them as a human being, ‘I’m about 
to stick a needle in you is that okay?’ ‘I’m about to feel your tummy, is that okay? ‘I’m 
about to put my hands on you.’ You don’t do that without consent. 
Int: Why do you think that is that you are not going through that process of assessing competency? 
GP4: I don’t know because I’m not that self-aware at the time. I wonder in retrospect if 
a) it doesn’t seems necessary and time is short: ‘The parents are there why would I 
bother?’ I wonder how much of an impact that whole 16 is the age of consent at the 
back of my head, and so I don’t need to do it. 
 
The predominance of parental authority was highlighted by one GP who described 
having “implied consent” from parents to consult with children when they attend alone, 
viewing them “as an agent of their parents, delivering themselves to the doctor.” (GP3) 
 
Conversely, some GPs were more mindful of the evolving nature of children’s 
competence, and the importance of taking their consent, even although parents 
commonly agreed too: 
 
Int: As the child gets older and they could possibly have the competency to give consent, does your 
procedure differ from younger children? 
GP5: Generally, I’ll give more explanation, but generally even from a five-year-old you’d 
still want their consent to do a procedure.  
Int: When you carry out these types of procedures (wart removal/ingrown toenail) who are you taking the 
oral consent from?  
GP5: Primarily the child when they are older, but it is always good to have the parent on 
board. It is hard to think of a situation where the child has consented and the parent has 
said ‘no’. That has never been a big issue. 
 
Of exception was one GP, who distinguished between “treatment” and “procedure”, 
considering that consent was not required for the former, as the health conditions were 





2.  Chi ldren consul t ing alone 
 
Teenagers have more independence and ability to consult alone with their GP, seeking 
treatment/advice on common illnesses, such as infections, where the treatment options 
are easy to understand; seeking repeat prescriptions for long-term condition, such as 
asthma; or on sexual health/contraception matters, in which they seek privacy. In 
consultations, GPs’ attention may be more focused on their competence, when they are 
alone: 
 
I would have a few between 13 and 15 who have come in without their parent, and that 
is always really interesting, because there is no parent there and they are really competent. 
They know what is going on, there is a good dialogue, and obviously they are actively 
consenting.  (GP2) 
 
Young people presenting for stuff that they have got to consent for where it is on you to 
establish whether they are competent to consent. (GP3) 
 
However, for one it raised some concern of whether their parents were aware of their 
attendance: 
 
It makes me quite uncomfortable I must say. Again, in retrospect, at the time you just get 
on, but I am conscious that 15-year-olds come in on their own and I must say one of the 
questions I ask is ‘do your Mum and Dad know you are here?’ ‘Oh, yes, they have sent 
me and they have given me the money.’ And I always check before I leave, let your Mum 
know that this is what I have given you so if you are sick on it she’ll know what to do. 
(GP4) 
 
3. Summary o f  general  medic ine 
 
When children and parents consult with GPs together, they usually give joint consent. It 
was important to most GPs that children understood and agreed to treatment. Yet, 
sometimes GPs could experience difficulty in ascertaining some children’s views, 
depending upon the parent-child dynamic/relationship, highlighting the relational nature 
of competence, and how it can impact on children being able to participate in the 
informed consent process. When children refused treatment, the GPs confirmed that 
their refusal would be respected, unless safety was an issue. All GPs had experienced 
children refusing treatment. Despite this respect for children’s autonomy, only a minority 
(two of six) perceived that they principally relied upon children’s consent, with most 
focusing more on parental consent, unless children consulted alone. The issue of whose 
consent is relied upon is particularly important when children and parents disagree about 
whether treatment should be prescribed. Although the GPs had not experienced children 
consenting and parents refusing, this could occur, as one school nurse had experienced 
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when the child consented to antibiotics against her father’s refusal.910 Children could be 
left untreated unless health professionals are secure in their authority to prescribe on the 
strength of competent children’s consent. 
 
B. Dentis try  
 
1.  Chi ldren’s  consent equates  to co-operat ion 
 
Consent for private dentists means that children understand the advised treatment and 
co-operate with it:  
 
For me I think informed consent is, I’m talking about teens/adolescents, that they 
understand what I’m telling them needs to be done and they are agreeing to it being 
done. (Den5) 
 
All I’d be doing is explaining the procedure as we go. It is not so much an informed 
consent thing, as I just want the kids to understand what is going on so they know what 
is going to happen … and we can get the procedure done. (Den4)   
 
There is implied consent by allowing the treatment to carry on. I don’t bully people into 
having treatment, I will discuss it with them but, I suppose, I assume the consent has 
been given by allowing it. (Den6) 
 
At times, children’s cooperation is promoted, not so much through their understanding, 
but by distracting them: 
 
We explain everything at the same time. We have a DVD on the roof. When they are 
having treatment they will invariably watch that and so we don’t give them information 
as we are trying to distract them as much as possible. Treating kids is one of the most 
challenging things I find to do. You really want to try and get them to switch off. (Den4) 
 
One factor in the extent to which children give informed consent is the nature or 
complexity of the treatment. For example, one private dentist explained that she takes 
the consent of children for basic matters, such as examinations and usually for x-rays, but 
always obtains parental consent for procedures such as tooth extractions: 
 
Even kids 13, I will ask if it is okay to take x-rays and get them to consent to things like 
that, and talk to them about the appearance of the teeth and what they would change. …  
I would never talk about crowns or things like that, it would be just basic procedures. … 
I would never take out a child’s tooth without the consent of the parent, even if they 
were 13, I would always get the parents’ consent. (Den6) 
 
Similarly, for fillings dentists advise parents on the best option, either an amalgam 
(silver/metal) or white filling, based on factors, such as, children’s co-operation and the 
																																																								




easiest and least painful filling to insert. Parents usually accept that advice, but children 
are not really involved in these discussions and decisions, although they need to co-
operate: 
 
It is quite interesting because I probably don’t involve the child that much about 
whether they have a white or silver filling for kids six to eight or nine [years of age]. … 
Parents of those children definitely have ideas of what they want their children to have 
and children tend to allow their parents to control the process. … Even a 13-year-old, I 
will put a white filling in, but only charge for a silver one, because I imagine that kids or 
people want a white filling, they don’t want people to see them. … But with a child that 
is older, with greater understanding, I am more likely, if I was going to discuss anything 
with them, then I might discuss certain options like whether I was going to fill or leave it, 
if there was an option of not filling it. But I have to say I wouldn’t say, ‘would you like a 
silver or a white filling?’ So you are making me think how I practice. … I would never 
have said I was a patriarchal or matriarchal person, but yes I suppose I do make 
decisions for them and I just maybe make assumptions about them that I maybe 
shouldn’t make. (Den6) 
 
Int: Have you ever had a child, who is of sufficient age and maturity, being part of that discussion? 
Den4: No never. Kids just sit back and let the parents and us make the decisions. I have 
never had a child question anything, other than, ‘no, I don’t want an injection.’ 
 
Den5: I think the child is guided and led towards the method or option that is 
recommended by the parent and by me. 
Int: Is there an age at which you see that changing where the child is more autonomous from the parent?  
Den5: Most are led by the parent until about 16 and some until they are 19/20 [years old]. 
It is a bit of a transition at that age where they have a bit more understanding and are a bit 
more confident.  
 
2.  Chi ldren Consul t ing Alone 
 
It is not uncommon for teenage years to consult with dentists on their own, as they and 
their parents have established a trusting relationship with them.911 Dentists guide children 
in the necessary treatment, and parents trust that the right decisions will be made: 
 
The parents are confident that they don’t need to be here to make the decisions for the 
child. They are more confident that the child can come on their own or after school and 
trust my judgment and that I have their best interests at heart. (Den5) 
 
However, when the treatment involves options, or is complex, dentists will confirm 
parents’ consent before proceeding:912 
 
																																																								
911 Some hospital dentists also experienced some children consulting with them alone, but this was 
exceptional. It appears to be more common for teenagers to consult the dentist alone than the GP, as it 
was not unusual to the dentists that they did so, whilst for GPs it was rare. 
912 As will be seen below in Section C page 220, dental therapists contact parents to obtain their consent 
over the telephone when the treatment plan changes from that to which they have consented. 
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Usually [when there are options] nothing is done immediately. It’s a matter of me ringing 
the parents, after talking to the teen or adolescent, and explaining that these are the 
things we need to work out and the options for treatment. Mostly I’ll speak to the 
parents on the phone, occasionally the parents will come in, so I can talk them through 
the process of what to choose and what to do. (Den5) 
 
The issue of contacting parents for consent may relate more to cost than to children’s 
competence, as private dentists need to be assured of payment for the treatment: 
 
… it [consent] is not just for the procedure, it is for the payment. That is always tied 
into it. Very few things we would ask a child for consent without consulting the parents 
because the parent always has to pay for it. (Den4) 
 
3.  Summary o f  pr ivate  dent is try 
 
In private dentistry, parents and children commonly agree with the dentists’ advice, with 
children taking a relatively passive approach to consent, allowing the dentist to guide and 
direct them. In that process, however, dentists will explain the treatment in order that 
children understand, and provide an environment in which children’s independence and 
competence can develop, as shown by teenagers consulting alone. 913  Children and 
parents will provide joint consent, even if parents are not physically present, as dentists 
require to be assured that parents agree, and will accept the cost. 
 
 
III .  Schools  
 
Commonly, children receive medical and dental treatment in schools in three contexts. 
Firstly, secondary schools may have a SMS onsite for children to seek general medical 
advice and treatment from a nurse, and possibly, a GP. Secondly, children may be 
enrolled in a SDS from the age of two years until 12/13-years-old (Year Eight). Dental 
therapists examine and treat children’s teeth, either in a van that visits their school, or in 
a dental hub (clinic) located in the school grounds. They carry out preventative 
procedures like examinations, x-rays, and Fischer seals, as well as restorative procedures, 
such as fillings. Thirdly, public health nurses immunise intermediate school age children 
around the age of 11 years with a tetanus/diphtheria/pertussis booster vaccination, and 
girls around 12 years,914 with the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination, to protect 
against HPV infections and cervical cancer. The following sections consider how consent 





913 Chapter 9 page 176: dentists used a variety of strategies to develop children and parents’ confidence and 
trust that promotes children’s co-operation. 
914 At the time of interviewing it was only girls who received the HPV vaccine. This has now been 
extended to boys who can access it at their GP. 
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A. School  Medical  Servi ce   
 
1.  Introduct ion 
  
Children always consult on their own with the school nurse/GP by the very nature of it 
being within the school. This environment promotes their responsibility and competence 
to manage their health by providing a service in which they can openly discuss matters; 
freely ask questions;  and take time to understand information, make decisions, and give 
their consent. This can be of particular importance in sensitive matters, such as sexual 
health/contraception, and when children are otherwise unable to access treatment. This 
section explores the consent processes for contraception and antibiotics, being two 
common reasons for children accessing the SMS.  
 
2.  Consent Process  for  Contracept ion  
 
A striking feature of children seeking contraception/sexual health advice was the extent 
to which school nurses and doctors follow the stages of the informed consent process.915  
They fully discuss children’s situations; educate them on contraception; explore options; 
support their understanding of how contraception works and is administered; advise on 
the risks and benefits; support them in making choices; assess their competence; and take 
their consent:  
 
Here (school) I generally always see the young person on their own and I allow more 
time because of the importance of their understanding. … I ask about whether they are 
sexually active. We talk through what their options are for contraception, what 
contraception would work for them, do they want to get pregnant, do they talk to their 
parents, how would their parents react? In discussions I am assessing their ability to 
consent, kind of from a Gillick point of view. Do they understand why, do they 
understand how and what they have to do? So you can imagine it takes a long time. Here 
we just take the time it needs because we recognise it is really important, because if they 
don’t understand they are not going to follow through. (Private/ School /Youth Service, 
GP6) 
 
When providing explanations, health professionals recognise that they need to adapt 
their language by using terms children will understand: 
 
We get them to voice their understanding. However it can be challenging if they are shy 
or not confident. Using I guess their terms. They have nicknames for all these that they 
have heard, for example, the jab. (GP6) 
 
Nevertheless, in some situations, determining children’s level of understanding and 
competence can be complicated, for instance, when children/young people may be 
developmentally delayed, or have had challenging childhood experiences that 
																																																								
915 Community/youth services were found to have the same characteristics. GP6 practiced in a school, 
community youth service and a private GP’s practice, and a nurse (Nur5) practiced in schools and a 
community youth service. 
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compromise their understanding. If available, a specialised opinion or a team approach 
may assist in gaining a better sense of children’s competence before prescribing 
contraception:   
 
Some young people are developmentally delayed, particularly if they are becoming 
involved in risky sexual behaviours, relationships, and so we will have a conversation 
about what approach as a team we are going to take here and whether to involve other 
people… to see what is the developmental level, what are we working with, to gauge 
their functional level and get a bit more feedback and then we have to make a decision as 
a team what we are going to do and whether to involve family if there are developmental 
issues. (Nur5) 
 
At other times, GPs may need to use their judgment on the degree of children’s 
competence, including whether it is in children’s best interests to prescribe contraception, 
despite children having limited understanding:  
 
There are times when, yes, understanding is not there, but safety. I can think of a 
number occasions. For example, a young person in the early years of high school, had 
had a pretty rough life and been in foster care, having sex, and doesn’t really know who 
they all are, and putting herself at risk and wouldn’t remember to take tablets, but 
doesn’t want an injection, because doesn’t want a needle and doesn’t understand that 
concept of what it means to be pregnant. I think that’s a very difficult situation to deal 
with and also getting parental consent breaks that confidentiality. They are putting 
themselves at risk but talking to their parents could put them at greater risk, so that is a 
really grey area for consent, but in this case she did agree to get the depo. In terms of her 
degree of understanding of what that means was limited but I think enough to agree. I 
think it was the right thing to do and we continued to work around the other issues. 
(GP6) 
 
Although children are autonomous in accessing this service, health professionals 
encourage them to use their family supports, if available: 
 
For contraception we don’t need to tell their parents, but we talk about involving parents 
as much as possible. And when I say parents I am actually saying that quite loosely as a 
lot of these young people are not with their parents, they are with aunties and other sorts 
of homes. (Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
If they have talked to Mum and she said ‘go to the nurse’ then that’s fantastic. The ideal 
situation is that they have spoken to an adult and have consent from that adult to come 
and see me. (Nur2) 
 
Once children are prescribed contraception, their on-going independence and 
responsibility in managing it are supported through the use of a computer 
reminder/recall system. Follow up appointments can be programmed into girls’ mobile 




The girls who have the depo go onto a recall system on the Medtec 32 system, standard 
practice software system. So I put their injection onto the notes and it goes onto 
screening and recall, and it comes up straight away. While the student is with me I’ll get 
her to date into her phone for the next 12 weeks and I book them for the next 
appointment. So they are booked even if they forget, and I can go and get them. If it 
falls in the school holidays I give them a family planning number and a list of option of 
where they can go. (Nur2) 
 
Thus, when children seek contraception from the SMS, nurses and GPs provide an 
environment for them to comprehensively discuss, understand, make decisions and give 
their consent. They engage alone in this process, and co-consent from parents is not 
required, although children are encouraged to involve them.  
 
3. Antibiot i c s  
 
An anomaly exists in the consent process for antibiotics in schools. Although children 
give their consent, health professionals also attempt to contact their parents/caregivers 
before prescribing antibiotics, and send them a letter when they are unable to speak with 
them: 
 
We have made a blanket rule for under 16s that we would always try and contact the 
parent to let them know we are prescribing this medication before we gave it to them. … 
We are just taking steps to inform the parent. … Most young people are competent to 
understand why they are taking antibiotics and what the risks of not taking it. What they 
are not so good at is taking it on time and taking the whole course, so there is a degree 
of understanding. (GP6) 
 
The purpose of the letter appears to be to inform parents, rather than to seek their 
consent, but this may not be always apparent. Also, there are differing practices of when 
parents require to be informed: under 14 years; under 16 years; or on a case-by-case basis. 
For example: 
 
Nur2: Amoxyl is a really good example, which I prescribe all the time, for suspected 
strep throat, upper respiratory infections, ear infections. We talk about that and if they 
are under 14 [years] then if I can’t get hold of Mum, Dad, Aunty, caregiver, a letter is 
given to the student stating that this is what has been prescribed, the treatment, dose, 
duration of treatment and possible side effects. 
Int: Is the purpose of that letter to inform rather than to get consent?  
Nur2: Well it is to obtain consent. 
Int: But you have already prescribed it so when and how are you getting consent?  
Nur2: I’m getting consent from the student, and I suppose, yes this is an interesting one. 
… The student presents, if they meet the criteria for treatment then we obtain full 
consent from the student, but a letter needs to go home to the parent if we can’t talk to 
them. … It is not asking for their consent it is informing them.  
Int: You said that you send a letter home for under 14s, so I assume not for over 14s. Why is that? 
Nur2: I actually don’t know. Those are the guidelines here. I know that at 14 they can be 




Nevertheless, despite parents being informed, health professionals can rely upon 
children’s competence even when parents disagree with their child’s decision to take 
antibiotics, as one school nurse had once experienced:  
 
It has only happened once and it was a young woman who has had numerous strep 
throat results. She wanted the treatment and the father is opposed to antibiotics. He 
wanted to treat her with a more traditional healing process. They are Ma ̄ori. She wanted 
antibiotics. She was very clear about that so what we did was I initially sent a letter home 
to her Dad. I couldn’t get him on the phone because he works at nights and sleeps 
during the day. I said ‘this is the situation I have antibiotics here.’ He said ‘no’ and the 
student said ‘just give them to me and I won’t tell him.’ So she was 14 and so had a long 
conversation about that and in the end I gave her the antibiotics. She had full 
understanding. It was not the first time she felt miserable with strep throat so I gave her 
the course and it is easy with amoxyl because you can give three tablets at once. I think 
in fact what happened she came here in the morning and took her tablets. I’m not sure if 
Dad found out but I did say to her if there are any issues it is really important he rings 
me and I was prepared for that and just explaining that she does have a right to this 
treatment. (Nur2) 
 
4. Summary o f  s chool  medical  serv i ce  
 
Overall, the SMS provides an environment in which children competence is promoted 
and respected, through the time health professionals spend with children, building 
relationships and supporting them in the stages of the informed consent process. 
However, the prescription of antibiotics, a common and relatively simple treatment, has 
raised questions over the consent process, in particular, whether children are sufficiently 
competent to consent, and if so, the purpose of the telephone call and letter to parents. 
When children are assessed as competent there should be no need for these, although 
children may prefer that a letter be sent to their parent/caregiver to support them in their 
compliance. At times, they may forget to take their antibiotics, despite understanding the 
importance of completing the course at the time of prescription. Nevertheless, if children 
were not competent, for example, by not understanding the importance of completing 
the course, then parental consent would be required.  
 
This process contrasts with that of contraception, where there is no process or option 
for parents to receive a telephone call or letter. Although privacy is likely to be the issue, 
both require adherence to the prescription, raising the question as to why their processes 
differ. 
 
B. School  Vacc inat ion Programme  
 
Children of around the ages of 11/12 years receive vaccinations at school. In order for 
children to be vaccinated, parents require to provide written consent, while children 
consent verbally. Public health nurses rely upon parents and children both consenting, as 
children will not be vaccinated when either refuse. This section explains how children are 
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informed about vaccinations, how consent is taken, and the barriers to relying on 




 At the outset of the vaccination process, nurses show children a video at school and 
provide them with written material to take home. During the presentations children have 
the opportunity to ask questions, either during or after these. However, children rarely 
seek out further information, as the nurses try to anticipate their questions, and children 
may feel self-conscious: 
.  
We show the video and it is a good opportunity for children to ask questions. And what 
we try to do is try and answer these questions before they think about them and we go 
over it again and say ‘if anyone wants to stay and talk, please talk to us.’ On the back of 
the consent form there is also a phone number. I think we have had the occasional child 
ring, but really it is part of being proud. (Public Health, Nur6)  
 
During the presentations, nurses adapt their language by simplifying their explanations, 
as they are aware of children’s varying educational abilities: 
 
We have to change our language a lot because developmentally they can be very different. 
When we are doing the three doses of hpv/gardol I talk to them about how their phone 
batteries drop down and how it needs charged up and it lasts a bit longer next time if 
you charge it up fully. You use tools like that. (Nur7)  
 
The students are then given information and the consent form to take home to their 
parents. The expectation is that parents will use “the consent form in the way that it is 
designed - which is information for you to read to your child or to talk with your child 
about”. (Nur6) 
 
Nevertheless, the rationale for providing children with information is more to enhance 
their understanding to a level that will secure their co-operation, rather than to give their 
informed consent. This is highlighted when children have English as a second language, 
as interpreters will be provided for parents over the telephone, but not for children, 
either during the presentation, or at the point of vaccination. In such situations, nurses 
rely upon parents to have adequately explained the vaccinations, and reasons for them, to 
their children, but are unable to check children’s understanding. Thus, children may be 
blindly following their peers: 
 
Nur7: … you may have children who have English as a second language and you can’t 
really explain to them, but you are hoping that that work has been done. There are forms 
in different languages. 
Int: So how do you know that they are understanding and consenting? 
Nur7: We do get an interpreting service to translate the forms. If they haven’t come and 
English is a second language, or not a language at all, we will get an interpreter on the 
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phone to explain it to the parent. We would hope that the parent has explained it to the 
child. 
Int: You couldn’t rely on that. 
Nur7: No, you couldn’t. It is only an observational thing for them to see what’s 
happening for the other children, so it is a bit of a grey area. 
 
2. Consent Process  
 
On the day of vaccination, children are usually vaccinated in their school hall; an 
environment that lacks privacy, although screens can be arranged, if required:  
 
They are generally in a hall. We like a big space where you have exits, one way for 
children to come in and another to exit so they don’t get mixed up. …  They (screens) 
went out the window. It could have been because the programme was so big in 2009 
that it was easier to do away with the screens because everyone was getting done at the 
same time. (Nur6) 
  
We see them in a hall, but can see them in private if something is really going on. (Nur7)  
 
Before nurses vaccinate each child, they “sit down [with the child] and have the one-to-
one” to understand “how they really feel about it, and whether they are happy to get it or 
not” (Nur6). This process enables children to either give their consent or refuse: 
 
So the child is actually approving at that time the vaccination. Children at that time can 
refuse. (Nur7) 
 
I actually think that we get the true consent from the child more so when we sit down 
with the child when they are vaccinated. That engagement between the child and the 
public health nurse when we are talking about what to expect and what it is going to feel 
like. That’s when I think we get the real ‘okay, I am happy for you to give it to me.’ 
(Nur6) 
 
Nurses value these opportunities to discuss any issues or concerns with children, as it is 
important for them to understand any challenges children may be experiencing.  
For example, one nurse recalled a child refusing the vaccination, as she was in turmoil, 
due to not being in the care of her parents, and this was one aspect of her life that she 
could control: 
 
I did have a child who was stressed. She wasn’t needle phobic, but she had so much 
going on in her personal life that she chose not to be vaccinated because she wanted to 
control something. … I had communications with her caregiver or parent as to what was 
going on and there had been a family break up and this was the only thing that the child 
could control and she was in the care of somebody else at the time. I explained to them 
that this is not the time to vaccinate. She needed time, help raising her self-esteem and 




This child was not forcibly vaccinated, as “[t]here would be another time. It wasn’t 
something that was going to kill her” (Nur7). Whilst children’s refusal is respected, their 
consent may not be relied on, where parents have refused/failed to provide written or 
verbal consent. The consequence is that children may be denied the opportunity to be 
vaccinated at school, despite their competence, and willingness, to verbally consent: 
 
Nur7: We do get children who don’t return their forms and won’t have given it to the 
parent. 
Int: What happens in that situation? 
Nur7: They come with their class, but their form has not come, so we will not be 
vaccinating, but we may be ringing up. 
 
However, there are variations amongst the DHBs, as some will accept children’s consent 
without parents’ consent: 
 
We still have problems with things like immunisations. The HPV vaccine, for example, 
where if they are under 16 they still need parental consent, as well as their own consent, 
so it gives you a double hoop to go through. That is not uniformly applied, and some 
will accept the consent of 14/15-year-olds, but it depends. Even for immunisations, 
which is a fairly benign procedure, there is still a mixed view from different DHBs. (PSD, 
SH4) 
 
Both participating public health nurses did not consider that there was need or value in 
children co-signing the consent form, as “parents will always have that final say” (Nur6), 
and they did not “want to make it more complicated” (Nur7).  
 
3. Barriers  to  chi ldren consent ing 
 
The barriers to the public health nurses trusting children’s competence to consent arose 
from their concerns of exposing themselves to professional risk. Although clearly aware 
of “Gillick competence”, and capable of assessing it, they felt unable to rely upon that 
assessment at times. As a consequence, they may refuse to vaccinate competent children, 
preferring that children attend their GP to receive the vaccines. For example, one nurse 
recalled such a situation involving a 14/15-year-old girl, in the care of Child Youth and 
Family (now known as Oranga Tamariki - Ministry for Children), who wanted the HPV 
vaccination. Her parent had refused to consent, and although the nurses assessed her as 
competent, they felt unable to proceed, instead advising her to consult with her GP. 
Their concerns were that they might miss important information about the girl, due to 
their lack of relationship with her, and also felt professionally exposed by the law’s 
ambiguity: 
 
Int: What was it that made you feel you did not have the right to immunise that child? 
Nur7: It is interesting because we use the ‘Gillick competency’ to make that professional 
decision and we could see that she had the capacity to do decision-making and 
understood what it is all about, but we didn’t feel we were in a position to be the ones to 
take the responsibility for that. Someone who knew her better and longer and because 
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she had this on-going relationship with her GP service was a better setting and a safer 
setting for her. …. We are protecting ourselves. Yes, it does appear she is competent, but 
do we want to risk that and maybe she has had it somewhere else before or there are 
other things that could come into play that might make it not safe for her to have.  
 
Nur6: I would not feel confident to say I am going to base my decision on the Gillick 
competence. I would rather refer her to a service that knew her better than I did to carry 
it out, as there is the potential to bounce back or backfire. 
Int: Why is that? 
Nur6: I feel it is not tight enough via the law. I don’t know the law that well, but I am 
not convinced that we are covered safely.  
 
Although in theory children can visit their GPs to be vaccinated, they may encounter 
barriers, such as, cost, and possibly insistence of parental consent:  
  
… the young girl could go to the GP by herself. She might be refused, as they do not 
want to do it without parents’ consent, and someone would have to pay the bill. (PSD, 
SH4) 
 
A further barrier to following children’s consent, when parents refuse, is avoiding 
difficulties with schools, as vaccination programmes need their goodwill, agreement and 
support: 
 
… immunisers are only in the school by grace and favour to some extent, so if they were 
to kick up a bit, the school committee could say these kids can go to the GP and get it 
done and we wouldn’t get the coverage. … They have a big enough job immunising 
those who want immunised without fighting with the ones who don’t. (PSD, SH4) 
 
4. Summary o f  s chool  vacc inat ion programme 
 
The mass vaccination programme contrasts in environment from the individual, private 
approach of the SMS. Educating and immunising children in a group setting does not 
lend itself to developing knowledge of, and relationships with, children, or cater for 
children’s individual needs, such as providing an interpreter for those with poor English. 
For some children, the public nature of the education session and treatment environment 
will not support their competence, as they may feel inhibited in asking questions, and 
only proceed with the vaccination as their parents have consented, and through peer 
pressure. Nevertheless, with information sent home, parents have the opportunity to 
support their children’s understanding through discussions.  
 
Although time is restricted, vaccinations are relatively simple for children to understand 
and decide upon, and nurses appear to have sufficient time to assess children’s 
competence and confirm their consent or refusal. However, nurses’ abilities to assess and 
rely upon children’s competence are compromised by a number of factors. Firstly, the 
system places more significance upon parental authority and consent, than to children’s 
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status and their competence consent.916 As a consequence, competent children who have 
consented may be denied treatment when parents refuse consent. The barriers inhibiting 
nurses are their concerns of exposing themselves to professional risk, emanating from 
both their lack of relationship with children and feeling exposed by the law. 
 
C. School  Dental  Servi ce  
 
1.  Introduct ion 
 
In the SDS, parents provide what is known as “enduring consent plus x-ray” (Dental 
therapist, DT1) at the time of enrolment in the service for their children’s teeth to be 
examined, cleaned, x-rayed and have fluoride and Fischer seals applied. This consent 
“endures” until the child leaves the service, usually in Year Eight (12/13-years-old).  
Parents give further written, or verbal, consent for additional treatment. Naturally, 
children give their verbal consent/agreement during the examination/treatment, but the 
consent process is particularly parent-led, resulting in dental therapists having limited 
ability to promote children’s competence. Children receive little information about their 
health and treatment, and their consent will not be relied on, when parents have failed to 




School aged children have dental examinations at school by dental therapists, either in a 
dental van that visits their school, or in a dental hub (clinic) located in the grounds of 
their school. When children need further treatment there are two systems. For children 
seen in the van, they receive a brief form to take home to their parents, who then make 
an appointment at a hub, and usually accompany their children for this treatment. 
Children who had their initial examination in a hub are given a “care plan, which briefly 
outlines the treatment required, the type of filling, …  anesthetic, and anything else, and 
that is issued to the child to take home to the parent”, and on the reverse it has space for 
“a medical history update and consent box” (DT1). Children are instructed to give this to 
their parents to sign, and they return to the hub alone for this treatment. 
 
At the examination, the dental therapists’ aim is to provide children with enough 
information so that they understand the treatment, and will pass the consent form onto 
their parents to sign: 
 
… you would say to them this is what we need to do and this is how it is going to be 
happen, so you are alleviating their fears, because that’s how you get the form taken 
home. You have got the child at least understanding what you are going to be doing so 
they are more than likely to take the form home and know that it is for their own good 
and request that the parents sign it and bring it back. (DT1) 
 
																																																								
916 A feature that is common also to the SDS. 
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They keep the information brief and basic, as time is short: 
 
DT1: You say to a child, ‘you need to come back and we need to’, rather than 
[use] the word “fillings.” ‘We need to fix up a couple of things,’ or if it is just 
preventative work you outline to them, ‘it is just this little thing we need to do,’ 
and you say ‘you need to take this home tonight and put it in your book bag and 
ask Mum and Dad to sign it.’ You don’t go into too much detail. They are 
welcome to read the care plan, but it is really quite a basic form: tick this box for 
a filling and put three fillings silver, tick the local anaesthetic box. 
Int: What is the reason behind not going through it with the child? 
DT1: I suppose it is a time factor if I am completely honest.917  
 
I keep it quite basic so they can understand. If they needed a filling I will tell 
them they have a hole in their teeth and they will need to come in to get it fixed. 
(DT2) 
 
Although including more information on the form could allow parents the opportunity 
to discuss it with their children, some may not have the necessary understanding to do so, 
or may pass on their own fears: 
 
I think things could be a bit more informative to the families, giving them a bit more 
information, but more so that the parent can talk to the child. … Some will try and 
discuss the options or plan but not have a lot of idea themselves. Some put their fears 
onto their children and sometimes they are both uptight in the waiting room before you 
have them in the door. (DT1) 
 
When further treatment is needed, such as fillings, parents usually attend with their 
children, unless their child attends a school where the hub is within its grounds. The 
dental therapists explain the treatment, and discuss the options, mostly with parents. 
Although children are present, they are not really involved:  
 
Int: To what degree is the child involved in those discussions? 
DT2: With the filling it is mostly the parents as I feel they are the deciding factor. 
Discussions are directed at the parent. 
Int: Why is that? 
DT2: In a lot of cases the child does not really know. If the parent is there they make the 
decision. Other times when we speak to the children and ask them questions they turn to 
their parents and look at them.     
Int: With the 12 and 13 year olds would you do the same, that you direct the discussion and decision-
making to the parent? 
																																																								
917 See page 174: “Everything we do is timed. We get x amount of time to do this, right down to the filling. 
We have lost the human element that they are children. … Now that we have come into the hub it is very 





DT2: Usually when they’re older, like 12 [years], I would mention it to the child, but I 
think I would still, with the parent there, direct it to the parent. 
  
3. Consent  
 
Dental therapists rely on parents signing and returning the consent form, when children 
attend alone for treatment, as without it they cannot be treated.918 Children do not 
sign/co-sign consent forms, although they do verbally consent/agree at the point of 
treatment. However, dental therapists will not rely upon children’s consent, in the 
absence of parental consent, including when additional/alternative treatment is necessary 
mid-way through treatment: 
 
DT1: If that treatment was to change part way through, you were going to fill that cavity 
with a white filling and suddenly it changes, you really need to contact the parent or 
guardian and update the consent [or] … you could be fixing a tooth and once you have 
cut your cavity you have noticed that the size of the tooth needs filled, so you would 
need to contact the parent and get consent. If you couldn’t you’ve got the local 
anaesthetic working but you just cannot do it unless you get consent. 
Int: So if it was a competent child, would you take the child’s consent if the parent couldn’t be reached? 
DT1: I would want to if they had the age of understanding but I would be restrained by 
the policies that we have here that say only consent from a parent. I probably would not 
call up my team leader or service manager because they would say to me ‘no’, which is 
unfortunate. 
 
Int: In a situation where you cannot get hold of the parent but the child is competent and consents would 
you go ahead with it? 
DT2: I think it would depend on the type of treatment it is. If it is something invasive 
like a filling then I would wait until I get consent. 
 
The dental therapists’ understanding of the “policy” is that they need the consent of 
parents, or if unavailable, another relative or caregiver, and are unable to rely upon 
competent children’s consent: 
 
DT1: If I started taking consent from a child I would probably get myself into trouble. It 
is written or verbal consent from a parent or a caregiver. Well, actually not even a 
caregiver. If the child was with a Grandmother or Aunty, you would have to say ‘I’m 
sorry, off you go’. But when you are in a low decile area, and there have been four failed 
appointments, and they have turned up with Aunty, you don’t bend the rules, but you try 
and phone Mum or Mum is happy and knows you are here. 
Int: So in that situation if the child was of “an age of understanding” would you take the child’s consent 
or the Aunty/Grandmother’s consent? 
DT1: I would take the Aunty/Grandmother’s consent. I could not put in my 
documentation that I had taken the child’s consent. We are working in this area under 
consent from the parent. 
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We contact the parent to make sure we get their consent before we do anything. … 
Even if they [children] do understand and consent, in my shoes I feel I still need to 
contact the parent to cover myself. (DT2) 
 
As a consequence, children’s competence may not be assessed or relied upon – “I think 
with the parent’s consent I do not assess” (DT2). The reason for such reliance on 
parents’ consent is fear of reprisals from parents. For example, one dental therapist 
expressed concerns over whether parents would understand and accept their competence 
assessment, and leading on from that, whether they could rely upon children’s recount of 
their medical history.  
 
4. Refusal  
 
Although children’s consent will not be relied upon, their refusal is respected, regardless 
of parents’ consent, and at times, pressure, to proceed: 
 
Some parents can get very stressed and uptight and I have had a parent say to me that 
they were not going to leave until it is done and we have to say we do not work like that. 
We have some parents who offer to hold their children down. (DT1) 
 
5. Summary o f  s chool  dental  serv i ce  
 
In the SDS, there is little opportunity for the promotion of children’s competence to 
participate in their dental treatment. Although children commonly attend alone, and 
receive treatment within a learning environment of school, there is little time or 
opportunity for children to learn about their dental health and treatment. The system 
depends on the written and verbal consent of parents, and does not take account of 
children’s growing understanding and independence, as parental consent is given at the 
age of two years and endures until children reach 12 or 13 years. Naturally, children’s co-
operation is required, but even when they are competent, their consent will not be relied 
on. This could result in them failing to receive necessary treatment. This system is much 
more akin to the vaccination programme than to the SMS, as it is dealing with high 




IV. Chapter  Summary 
 
Overall, across healthcare environments, children and parents provide joint consent. 
Children’s consent is mostly verbal, indicated through their agreement and co-operation, 
with parents providing either written or verbal consent. However, the significance of 
each differs, with there being inconsistencies in practice, within and across healthcare 
environments. In hospital, generally more reliance is placed upon parents’ 
consent/refusal, highlighted when either parents and children disagree, or when parents 
are not present to consent. There are exceptions, however, where some health 
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professionals (anaesthetist and obstetrician/gynecologist), confident in their assessment 
of children’s competence, routinely rely on children’s consent. Whilst the hospital 
environments are similar between specialties, the differences seem to relate to 
accustomed practice and respect for children’s competence and independence, rather 
than an inability to assess competence or ignorance of the law. For example, although the 
paediatric surgeons did not routinely rely upon children’s written consent, they were 
prepared to do so in exceptional situations, such as, when parents were unavailable. 
Significant to them was their pre-existing relationship with the children and an awareness 
of children’s experience.  
 
In schools, health professionals (public health nurses and school dental therapists) may 
feel exposed to professional risk by relying on children’s consent when they do not have 
pre-existing relationships with children, lack time, and operate within systems where 
greater respect is given to parental authority than to children’s competence. They 
perceive that their policies and/or the law leave them unprotected. In contrast, the SMS 
best promotes and respects children’s competence and takes their sole consent. Health 
professionals have time to develop relationships, discuss and listen to children’s 
situations, provide explanations, support their decision-making and take their consent. 
Although an anomaly arose with antibiotics, this process could be resolved by clarifying 
to health professionals that prescriptions are given on competent children’s consent, and 
a call or letter to parents is not required, unless children make that request.  
 
When children consult alone, some health professionals may give greater attention to 
children’s competence, in order to take their consent and rely upon it, such as some GPs. 
This contrasts with private and hospital dentistry, SDS and public health nurses, where 
health professionals will also confirm parents’ verbal consent. In private and hospital 
dentistry, the reasons are to ensure parents continue to be involved, and to develop 
relationships with them. In private dentistry, cost is also a factor.  
 
In all healthcare environments, generally, health professionals will respect children’s 
refusal, despite parents’ consent, unless safety is an issue. Thus, health professionals 
appear more secure in their practice of respecting children’s refusal, than relying upon 
their consent, when parents and children disagree. 
 
The rationale behind health professionals relying upon parental consent are: 
misunderstanding of the law, that children require to be 16 years of age; established 
practices within hospitals; lacking confidence in the law protecting them; cost (private 
dentistry); concerns relating to children being unable to accurately recount their medical 
history; and fear of reprisals from parents. In the next chapter, health professionals’ 
understanding and perspectives of the law are considered further, together with all 







 Chapter 11 
 
Knowledge, Understanding and Reform of the Law on 
Children Consenting 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
As a consequence of the law in New Zealand being fragmented and uncertain,919 it is 
important to ascertain how the participants in my study understood the law and 
implemented it in practice. The first two sections of this chapter begin by examining 
health professionals’ understanding of the current legal framework and their suggestions 
on changes, if any. Included also are the views of stakeholders, who have experience of 
advising and training health professionals on consent laws. The final section explores the 
perspectives of parents and children on the law who, of course, experience its effects 
most keenly. 
 
II .  Heal th Pro fess ionals ’  Knowledge  o f  the  Law 
 
As part of the interview process, health professionals were either asked about their 
knowledge on the law, or it arose naturally in discussions. Their knowledge and 
understanding was variable, with around half having some understanding that competent 
children have the right to consent: 
 
Anyone can give consent as long as they have full understanding, explored all the 
avenues, regurgitation of information, so I know they understand. As far as I am aware 
anyone of any age can give informed consent. (School nurse, Nur2) 
 
I am aware that there is no legal minimum of age of consent (Anesthetist, HD5) 
 
My understanding is that informed consent can come from the young person under the 
age of 16 if you consider that they understand what’s going on, why, taking into 
consideration their age, intelligence, education so you can get informed consent. 
(Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
However, within their general awareness there were confusions, such as that it only 
applied to sexual health, or that parental consent is also required until children are 16 
years:  
 
I did think that they had to be 16, except for sexual health and abortion. (School nurse, 
Nur1) 
 
My understanding is that at 16 children can consent for everything and anything. I’m 
talking medically. It is irrelevant what the parents think, but before that, at any age you 
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think the child can comprehend what you are talking about you need them to consent as 
well as the parent, but at 16 it becomes the child. (Hospital dentist, Den3) 
 
Int: What teaching did you get during your degree on informed consent for under 16s? 
Informed consent was quite a big thing. We were taught for under 16s the guardian was 
definitely most important but unless the child was understood and was well informed 
then you could get consent from them, but usually for any sort of treatment I do at 
school I definitely get the caregivers’ consent. (Dental therapist, DT2) 
 
Misconceptions and inconsistencies amongst medical professionals have also been 
experienced by three legally qualified stakeholders, when advising and/or training 
them:920 
 
Completely mixed up. … There are very different levels of understanding of what they 
can and can’t do. (Lawyer, SH12) 
 
I feel there is a lack of understanding amongst health professionals and parents about 
this area. (Lawyer, SH6) 
 
The most common misunderstanding of the law amongst health professionals 
participating in my study was that children were required to be 16 years old before they 
could lawfully consent. Generally, this confusion appeared to stem from either their 
experience of hospital practice, where commonly parents sign consent forms, or from 
their understanding of Gillick. Although many were aware of Gillick, there was confusion 
about its interpretation and applicability in practice. For example, some considered that it 
only applied to sexual health, whilst for another, although she interpreted it as enabling 
her to consult with competent children under the age of 16 years, “if anything it 
hammered home that, without specific criteria, you shouldn’t take consent from an under 
16-year-old” (Private, GP4). Thus, Gillick confirmed to her that the age of consent was 
16 years. She recalled feeling relief at time of this decision, because in her experience, 
prior to it, there was concern amongst the profession over whether “we would be taken 
to court, not too sure if we’d be sued.”  
 
Compounding inconsistencies in practice was caution or reluctance amongst some 
practitioners to follow Gillick, despite their awareness of its applicability. For example, in 
hospital there seemed to be a sense that children’s consent was optional, the preference 
being to defer to parents for consent, until children were 16-years-old: 
 
I know that you have this Gillick competence concept. … In practice we don’t do that a 
lot, I guess because usually there is a parent there. … I don’t know how widespread it is, 
Gillick competence. I suspect it is not widespread at all. (Paediatric Surgeon, HD1) 
 
Also, there may be some uncertainty over the implication of Gillick, as experienced by 
one hospital doctor during her employment as a registrar. She received specific 
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instructions from her boss not to use the term “Gillick competent”, but instead to state, 
“competent to make decisions” (Obstetrician and Gynecologist, HD7). This suggests 
caution around using the term “Gillick competent”, and may imply a lack of 
understanding of what it means.  
 
Similarly, other health professionals were reticent in following Gillick, such as public 
health nurses and dental therapists, who tend to practice defensively, due to concerns of 
complaints from parents, or feeling exposed by the law.921  
 
These issues of uncertainties/misunderstandings on the law, and inconsistencies in 
practice, may be a wider phenomenon than the participants taking part in this study. For 
instance, one stakeholder recalled a survey that had been undertaken involving 20 DHBs 
in New Zealand. The responses to the questionnaire that was circulated showed 
inconsistencies in practice and an over-reliance upon written consent: 
 
The analysis of it showed that there was a great disparity across the country, and a very 
poor understanding of the principles involved, for example, The Health and Disability 
Consumers Act. People making noises, token efforts. … There was too much emphasis 
on the outcome rather than the process, with the outcome being a signature on a piece 
of paper. (NGO, SH1) 
 
A number of factors are likely to contribute to such inconsistencies. Firstly, there may be 
a lack of uniformity in the curriculum for medical students across the medical schools in 
New Zealand on the issues of consent as “there are 25 teaching hospitals, [and] it is 
impossible to know whether there is a consistency and uniform standard of the teaching 
of consent” (NGO, SH2). It may be that recently graduating health professionals are 
more aware of competence and consent issues, as two stakeholders involved in the 
education of medical students both teach that competent children under the age of 16 
years have the right to consent, whilst in the experience of a third stakeholder “the newer 
graduates are much more aware of these sorts of non-clinical aspects of care” (NGO, 
SH1).  
 
Secondly, in some health specialties more experienced practitioners may not have 
received recent training, or be set in their ways: 
 
… unfortunately the way the system works as far as [area of health] is concerned, they 
come under the influence of an older and more mature group who are burdened with 
tradition, ‘this is the way we have always done it.’ It is very unbalanced. It is either one 
end or the other, not much in the middle. There is a top there too. It is cultural and that 
is what has to be changed. (NGO, SH1) 
 
Most health professionals reported deriving a sense of security from established 
professional practice and peer or collegial support in the consent processes: 
 
																																																								
921 See Chapter 10. 
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In a DHB we have a board lawyer if we have concerns and can draw upon the expertise 
of other health professionals, like paediatrics and liaison teams to talk with the families. 
(Hospital nurse, Nur8) 
 
What I would do if I had a situation that I was not sure about I would ring the Medical 
Protection Society to get their advice on the rules around it. (Private, GP5) 
 
I suppose I could google ‘Gillick’ and talk to other doctors to get peer support. (Private, 
GP1) 
 
Thirdly, as the law lacks clarity it is likely to be interpreted in different ways. Two 
stakeholders, employed by the same DHB, who both educate or advise health 
professionals on the law and its application in practice, but who have differing views on 
children’s right to refuse treatment, highlighted this: 
 
If they are competent to make the decision then they can consent or refuse. It is a matter 
of practice and figuring out what is the best, healthiest way to proceed, but at the end of 
the day like an adult if they are competent then they can refuse. (Lecturer, SH5) 
 
I would take the view that although competent a child does not have the right to refuse 
consent. (Lawyer, SH13) 
 
Further confusion and uncertainty in the law was exemplified during an interview with 
one stakeholder, who recounted an advice call from a health professional, checking 
whether parental consent was required for a 20-year-old patient. The advice provided 
was that as the person was over 16 years of age the patient could give his own consent.  
 
Finally, for some health professionals there may be a lack of relevance of the law, or 
disconnect between the law and practice: 
 
It is remarkable when you talk amongst practitioners about the Code or Medical Council 
standards, they see it as ‘guidelines’. ‘No, if you cross that line you are probably going to 
get into trouble.’ (NGO, SH7) 
 
Of more importance to them may be a general sense of being skilled in their profession 
and building relationships with parents and children, to promote children’s autonomy:  
     
I suppose my view is that the most powerful tool we have is educating clinicians about 
consent in childhood, irrespective of what the law says. In fact, a well-informed and 
skilled child health workforce is our best defence for practice and particularly either 
parent or child feeling that they didn’t have the proper opportunity to exercise autonomy.  
… I am much less worried about the law and much more concerned that we have a well-
educated and skilled workforce who understands the Gillick principle and how to apply 
them in practical everyday settings. (NGO, SH2) 
 
Thus, there is considerable confusion amongst health professionals around the law on 
consent and refusal by children under 16 years. Whilst some were aware of Gillick, there 
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was uncertainty and caution around its applicability in practice and misunderstanding of 
its interpretation. Health professionals derive more security from their peers and 




III .  Reservat ions on Changing the Law 
Health professionals and stakeholders expressed a number of reservations about the law 
changing: (a) the lack of need or value to health professionals; (b) how change could be 
formulated/expressed; (c) the implications for the professionals and families; and (d) 
reliance on competence assessments. 
A.  Lack of  Need or Value to Health Profess ionals  
 
The law’s lack of relevance and impact on practice were considered to be reasons for not 
changing it. The attitude appeared to be- “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”922 Most health 
professionals were either satisfied with, or unconcerned about, the current position, 
having not encountered consent difficulties in practice. Some attributed this to good 
communication with families and the obtaining of parental consent. For example:  
 
I have never run into any trouble. We have issues with special needs adults, but I have 
never had a situation where they [children] have not had a consenting adult with them. 
(Hospital Dentist, Den1) 
 
I think my practice works because I communicate with parents and children and I am 
not sure that it mega mega matters where the law stands, as long as we communicate, 
and we both agree, and it is in the best interests of the child. I certainly wouldn’t want to 
do anything that was against the law but at the same time I don’t think that laws really 
matter that much for the majority of the treatment I do. I don’t think we really do need 
to change any laws. (Private Dentist, Den6) 
 
Taking a pragmatic view, some stakeholders and health professionals questioned whether 
a change would assist health professionals in practice, as the issue is more the law’s 
application in individual situations: 
 
I actually don’t think that it will solve that many problems. I think the problems are 
often very problem specific, with this particular child and this particular procedure, and 
the law can’t help that. That’s professional judgment of competency and understanding. 
(Lawyer, SH12) 
 
The question that we need to ask ourselves is the fact that section 36 [COCA] is vague 
for under 16s and leaving it open, is that actually harming children? It is hard to prove 
that it is. I think that doctors don’t worry too much. If a kid comes along with a minor 
																																																								




illness they are not going to say ‘we are not going to give you anything for your cold, or 
stitch up your wound without consent.’ I think they exercise a lot of common sense. 
(Lawyer, SH14) 
 
I don’t think a change in the law is necessary. It is a bit like court, you have got law and 
then you have practice. I guess over a period of time we may get to the point where it is 
a more common thing to do consents for 14 or 15 year olds, but whether there is 
anything you could do in the law that would make that happen is hard to know. It is 
more a practice thing. (Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
 
Having both skilled health professionals and flexibility in the law’s application were 
considered by some to be of more importance to protecting children’s right to be heard, 
and protecting health professionals against complaints, than changing the law: 
 
While I feel very strongly about children’s rights and particularly the child’s right to be 
heard and the Convention rights of the child, practically children’s best defence for their 
voice to be heard is a well-trained workforce. … I think if practice is at a high standard 
that is your best defence against complaints. Particularly what we know about complaints 
is that communication skills are the prime defence against complaints (NGO, SH2) 
 
I am happy with the ambiguity and flexibility. (Paediatric surgeon, HD3) 
 
The concern of one health professional related to the law balancing children’s growing 
autonomy, whilst continuing to protect them, and was satisfied that the present law 
enables parental involvement: 
 
I am presuming that if an under 16 [year old] needs treatment and they are competent 
and we have asked them at least or tried to convince them to tell their mothers that we 
can actually give it. If that’s how it stands then that covers it. I still think we have to 
remember that they are still children. They may look very grown up, they may have got 
themselves into a very grown up situation but actually underneath it all they are still 
children, and I wouldn’t want to take away children’s protection. The problem with that 
is that some children do not have protective parents. (Private, GP4) 
 
B.  Appli cat ion o f  the Law and i t s  Express ion 
 
Whilst most stakeholders were open-minded about the possibility of changes in the law, 
some expressed reservations about how the law could be expressed:  
 
The problem with changing an Act is that it is hard to get nuances into law and that is 
presumably why they did not go there. It is a fairly nuanced sort of thing to do. (PSD, 
SH4) 
 
You can’t put a rule around it. It has to be case-by-case. (NGO, SH1)  
 
This linked to some health professionals’ concerns of preserving flexibility in the law, 




There are so many grey areas, emotional, intellectual, maturity, it is such a variable feast. 
(Plastic surgeon, HD4) 
 
Whether changing the law would result in a better understanding of that [Gillick 
competence] I don’t know, unless the only thing you could do is change the age to 14 
[years] and say that between 14-16 [years] it depends on the competence of the child. … 
The difficulty is that there are such variations. You could get some 12-year-olds that 
could be Gillick competent and some 18-year-olds who probably aren’t. (Paediatric 
surgeon, HD1) 
 
Of more relevance and practical application to some health professionals were 
professional practice, guidelines and policies. For some hospital practitioners, for 
example, directions like DHB policies provide greater guidance for their practice: 
 
That’s our practice and how we are told to practice, so that’s through guidelines and 
things. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
Int: If the law were to be changed, clarifying it for under 16s, do you think that would aid nursing 
practice or aid your practice at all? 
Nur8: Not particularly, because I guess you have that legislation but sitting under that is 
the DHB policy as well and we are employees so we follow our employer policy, which 
of course needs to be aligned with the legislation, so it is relatively straightforward. 
DHBs have got it relatively well sewn up as regards to that. 
 
Whilst such documents should be drafted in accordance with the law, this is not always 
the case, as they may not clearly reflect the current interpretation of the law.923  
 
Thus, for most health practitioners the law has little significance on their practice, with 
their professional/peer practice and guidance being of more influence. 
 
C.  Potent ia l  Impact  on Famil i es  and Profess ionals   
  
A few health professionals and stakeholders raised concerns about potentially negative 
consequences for families, if the law was changed, making it clear that children under the 
age of 16 years have the right to consent. These concerns related to: (i) potential pressure 
on children; (ii) adverse reaction from parents; (iii) how health professionals would assess 
competence, and have security to rely upon it;924 and (iv) whether it may open up the 





923 See Chapter 3 page 43-44. 
924 See also page 182 and 223 where DT1 described her experiences of parents’ asserting their rights. 
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1.  Pressure on chi ldren 
 
The pressure envisaged by one paediatric surgeon related to children being required to 
give their consent, when they were not capable, or emotionally ready to do so:  
 
Int: Do you think there is a need to change the law?   
HD3: The trouble is if you change the law significantly it becomes much more of a 
fudge factor. The 14-year-old who is not ready to make those decisions is then expected 
to make those decisions, if they can’t really adequately emotionally, intellectually, 
whatever, come to a decent informed decision then to actually demand that of them is 
unfair. 
Int: But then is it not the case that what you are doing with every patient is assessing the competency and 
ability of that patient to give consent, so you remove any age barrier then what you are doing is dealing 
with the individual? 
HD3: Yes. The thing is I’ve got the horrible feeling, I can see people willing to say to 
their five-year-old, I’ve seen this sort of thing happen, here’s Mum and Dad say to their 
five-year-old ‘will you make the decision?’ 
 
Similarly, a stakeholder from a lifelong/chronic health support organisation anticipated a 
different form of pressure, where children who are in denial of the nature of their health 
condition are asked to consent: 
 
For [our NGO] it would be useful for there to be clarification, but how that will portray 
on an individual basis, especially if a teenager is in the middle of that denial. (NGO, 
SH11) 
 
However, in situations such as these, it is likely that children would not be assessed as 
competent, and therefore not have the right to consent.925 
 
Two stakeholders raised a different form of concern, relating to health professionals 
potentially taking advantage of children’s naivety or trust, if they were treated in the 
absence of parental presence or consent, for example, by starting treatment early or 
prolonging it. As a counter-balance, they believed that parents might be more enquiring 
and confirm options. 
 
2.  Adverse  parental  reac t ion 
 
Some health professionals participating in my study had experienced complaints from 
parents, who found it “very disturbing” (School nurse, Nur1) that their children were 
permitted to consent. As a result, one school nurse described having experienced “many 
a barrage of unpleasantries down the phone” (Nur1), and has had to explain the law to 
them.  Similarly, a hospital doctor recounted the following interaction with a parent: 
 
																																																								
925 For example, see page 36 An NHS Trust and another v Mr and Mrs A and others, above n 206 in which the 
child was in denial about suffering from HIV. 
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HD5: I said to this 15-year-old, who was obviously articulate and quite intelligent, ‘there 
is no minimum age for consent so you can sign this consent form’ and his Mum said ‘I 
am a lawyer and that is not acceptable!’ 
Int: What did you do after that? 
HD5: I said there is no minimum age of consent and I think he is competent. 
 
Additionally, the following two stakeholders predicted adverse public reaction to the law 
clearly providing for children’s right to consent:  
 
I can tell you that the right wing groups that are so vociferous and carry such weight 
would scream their heads off and say ‘nanny state.’ (Lawyer, SH9)  
 
I think there would be a fairly strong negative response, similar to the anti-smacking, 
probably from the same people. A lot of people would see the value in it, but my guess is 
that without a lot of preparation the majority of New Zealanders would not be happy 
with it. (PSD, SH4) 
 
Nonetheless, despite this concern, stakeholder SH4 considered that such a reaction could 
be managed, particularly if done over time and with the support of key agencies, 
provided there was clear professional guidance on how to apply the law: 
 
It could be noisy, but it can be managed and the fact that there was not too much noise 
from the public around the smacking stuff. I think it was because we spent quite a few 
years talking about not smacking kids, the public discourse was you shouldn’t do it and 
discussion about how to manage bad behaviour. … If brought in with really good 
information and really clear guidance from Ministry of Health, DHBs or Health and 
Disability Commissioner, or someone who is charged with the issues of consent, or a 
range of bodies and practitioners to give formal guidance. (PSD, SH4) 
 
Further support for first educating parents and children was found amongst some health 
professionals, particularly those who commonly consult with children alone, such as in 
the SMS. Some believed that the potential benefits to children would be to increase their 
ability and confidence to access health services, and it may also free health professionals 
to respect children’s competence by taking their consent, without fear of retribution 
from parents: 
 
I think it is important for the parents to understand that their children have a right and 
are entitled to this service. …  I think it would be beneficial particularly when they 
[children] go to their own GP or another service, like dental service or sexual health. … 
[T]hey are not used to being told that they have options and rights. (School nurse, Nur2) 
 
I think rather than it being clear to us it is whether the parents know. … I think making 
it clear when they enroll the child in the service that the child can give consent. (Dental 
therapist, DT2) 
 
A consequence of parents having greater understanding of children’s growing 




Parents who demand this, this and this for their child, it is not necessarily helping them 
to develop their own independence. So just talk, which doesn’t happen a lot. 
(Private/School/Youth Service, GP6) 
 
Break down some of the communication barriers in families. (School nurse, Nur2) 
 
D. Rel iance on Competence Assessments  
 
Finally, some health professionals were reticent over children’s right to consent being 
more clearly stated in law, due to their concern of relying on their assessment of 
children’s competence: 926 
 
 Int: If hypothetically the statute was changed to say that under 16s had the right to give their own 
consent to medical, surgical or dental treatment, if they are deemed to be competent, do you think that 
would aid or change practice at all? 
Nur8: Absolutely not. I think that it would completely muddy the waters. I still don’t 
know how you deem they were competent. What you or I may deem competent another 
person may not.  
 
 
IV. Support  for  Changing the Law 
 
A.  Clari ty  and Consis tency on Chi ldren’s  Right to Consent  
 
Most stakeholders and a minority of health professionals were supportive of a law 
change, the most common reason being to give clarity. For example, one stakeholder, 
who also practiced as GP, supported greater clarity in the law, as at times she and her 
colleagues had sought clarification from the Medical Protection Society, but remained 
apprehensive over the advice: 
 
As a GP it is incredibly difficult to make the call and I and my colleagues have called the 
Medical Protection Society to help clarify. And even then it is not clear, so clarification 
would be useful from a GP perspective. (NGO, SH11) 
 
Of the health professional groups, nurses viewed either a change in the law or clearer 
guidance on the assessment of competence most positively. Most considered that these 
would provide them with more security: 
 
I think we all feel we are in a vulnerable place and we are trying to act wisely and you try 
to do it safely within the legislation, but you actually know there has been a case that you 
defer to but it is not a New Zealand law case, and probably having some guidance to 
have more clarity. (CYS/school nurse, Nur5) 
 
																																																								
926 See pages 218-219 where Nur 6 and Nur 7 expressed their concerns of relying upon competence 
assessments in the vaccination programme. 
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I think a change in the law would assist that. Nurses are very afraid of the law and the 
consequences if you don’t do what the law says so I think a change in the law would very 
much help that. (Hospital nurse, Nur3) 
 
Nevertheless, changing professional practices may prove difficult, as the above nurse 
ruminated: “I think it might be a hard sell. There would have to be a tremendous amount 
of education” (Nur3).  
 
Some of the research participants who were supportive of change, also preferred to 
maintain flexibility in the law, like those who did not support change.  For example, two 
health professionals weighed up pre-determining an age at which competence is 
presumed, against flexibility to adapt with children’s differing competence: 
  
It would be good to have it a bit more black and white, and the only reason I say that is 
if things go wrong, because it is really difficult to go back and say why you did something. 
It is much easier if you have it black and white, in this case you do x. … But I can see 
the difficulty in doing that because then you would have to have a set age. The patient is 
mature enough and intelligent enough to do it is quite good. (Private Dentist, Den4) 
 
I think it would be good to be clearer, but I guess it is, because it is subjective of whether 
they are competent, you can’t just make it from 13 year olds, there is such a variation, 
but I think having it tighter somehow. (Private, GP2) 
 
The solution for two stakeholders was to incorporate a competence test into statute: 
 
The simplest thing would be to amend section 36 to say that under sixteens can consent 
to their treatment and put in the Gillick formula. In other words, put the common law 
position into statute. (Lawyer, SH14) 
 
Well, you could say that you do a test of competence and if they are competent they 
agree, a bit like the PPPR Act. That is what you do in that situation so you could do the 
same for children. (PSD, SH4) 
 
Health professionals and stakeholders identified two potential benefits of the law being 
clearer. Firstly, giving health professionals greater assurance to rely upon their 
competence assessments, and therefore providing treatment on the strength of children’s 
consent, particularly when parents refuse: 
 
Int: Do you think if it is clearer in the law, that would give you more confidence to only take the consent 
of children if competent? 
HD7: Yes, because I am accustomed to taking their consent for pregnancy related 
procedures. 
Int: Do you think you could benefit from more widely available training? 
HD7: Sometimes I think it would be useful as I am a very rules based person and that 
would give me confidence to know what the rule is. Telling me the rule would give me 
confidence to say ‘she is under 16 [years], I assess her as competent, therefore I do not 
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actually need to involve the parents’ is reassuring and provides a back-up and I guess 
that training has been more ad hoc. 
 
Int: If the law and policies were clear, that if in your opinion the child had the necessary level of 
understanding to give the consent themselves, do you think that would aid your practice? 
DT1: Yes it would, very much so, especially in the lower decile areas where it is very 
difficult to get consent from the parent. It would be in the child’s best interests and you 
are able to get that understanding across to a child. 
 
I don’t think that a child’s consent to something that is considered to be in their best 
interests should be able to be overridden by a parental refusal to consent. I find that very 
concerning, and if there is one thing that could be changed in the law I think it would be 
helpful to have that clarified. (Lawyer, SH13) 
 
Secondly, clarity should lead to greater consistency in practice. For example, if the law 
was clearly stated in one statute, such as in the COCA, or perhaps a new Act, this would 
simplify the advising and teaching of practitioners/students, which in turn, could 
enhance consistency in health professionals’ practices:  
 
You would not have to have the discussion we always have to have about ‘the COCA 
says this, the Code says this, Courts have said this. (Lawyer, SH13) 
 
I think it would help if there was one provision in one Act, such as in the Care of 
Children Act, that we could refer the students to, as the statutory provisions are 
patchwork at the moment, and that is reasonably specific, because I think that otherwise 
it leads to different practices. (Lecturer, SH5) 
 
B. Clari ty  on Competence  Assessment 
 
A small number of health professionals, together with two stakeholders, considered that 
a practical and specific competence test would be useful, such as “a recognised national 
toolkit” (Lawyer, SH13) that is “well validated and widely accepted” (PSD, SH4):  
 
I think it would be good to have more guidelines around that, being more explicit about 
how professionals go around judging competency. (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
How you measure competency? If there is some sort of test that has been used in the 
past, some simple questions you can ask to gauge competency, [that] would definitely 
help. (Hospital Dentist, Den2) 
 
Currently, as there is a lack of specification over the criteria to follow, some health 
professionals were uncertain on whether they are following the law’s requirements or 
accurately judging competence: 
 
Those judgments talk about competency, but then that is a very difficult area. How do 
you judge competency? None of them say explicitly about how you come to that 
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judgment that someone is competent. You could say that if you disagree with me then 
they are incompetent! (Paediatrician, HD6) 
 
I still don’t know how you deem they were competent. What you or I may deem 
competent another person may not. I am not sure how you assess competence. How 
would you really assess competence in a 16, 15 or 14 or 13 year old? As I say health 
professionals have a basic intervention with the child and so how do you assess 
competence when you take them out of their day-to-day life and this is potentially the 
first time you have met them for such a short period of time. (Hospital Nurse, Nur8) 
 
For others, they were not so much concerned about their current assessments, but were 
more anxious about justifying their judgement, if challenged. For example, a dental 
therapist considered that there would be benefit in a clear process for assessing and 
documenting competence, which parents could understand, to avoid criticism/ 
repercussions.927 
 
Both public health nurses were of a similar opinion, believing that a tool could help to 
spread the risk, rather than competence assessments resting on the shoulders of one 
health professional:  
 
I think a tool would be really good for our service. If a nurse professional does the 
assessment and writes it down and then it is overseen by some other professional of the 
same standing, so it is not just sitting on the judgment of the one person, because it takes 
away the risk of personal leaning. (Nur7) 
 
Thus, there is a lack of drive from health professionals to change the law, as presently 
they do not encounter many difficulties in practice. Also, this may be as a result of the 
lack of connection between the law and their practices. However, most stakeholders, and 
some health professionals, saw merit in there being greater clarity in the law, which could 
result in health professionals having greater assertion/confidence in proceeding upon 
children’s consent. Additionally, it may be prudent to have clear guidelines on assessing 
competence, to protect them against potential challenges. 
 
 
V. Parents ’  Views on Chi ldren Consent ing  
 
During interviews, parents were asked their views on law that enable children to consent. 
All parents were supportive of children participating in the process, as they had directly 
experienced benefits for their children. The benefits they identified included their child 
feeling more in control and less anxious; being able to better cope with their treatment; 
and developing greater trust, with either them or their health professionals. For example, 
Laura, whose son Alistair was prescribed medication for ADHD, emphasised that 
medical interventions can be significant for children, so they need to be trusted to be 
																																																								
927 See also Den 4, page 235: “… the only reason I say that is if things go wrong, because it is really 
difficult to go back and say why you did something.” 
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involved in the process, such as, by being consulted, having the opportunity to 
understand and to give their consent: 
 
I think that this has been a really good journey for us. I realise that I should have trusted 
Alistair and will trust him every time in the future, because he knows what he needs, and 
I think I felt disappointed that I wasn’t ready to trust his decision-making. So from this 
point on I am taking a backseat. … I think children do need to feel trusted by adults 
who involve them in decisions, because medication of any kind is a major decision that 
they have to be on board with. So they have to have the information that will help them 
understand the benefits and disadvantages, and it is about informed consent for kids too. 
(Laura) 
 
Similarly, Wilma was able to compare the difference to Samantha when she was not 
involved in her first two operations, compared with the third one, when she was involved 
in the decision. She described the benefit as “a psychological power”, which is “very 
important and crucial to the healing process.” 
 
However, most parents expressed some concerns about children making final decisions. 
These related to matters like the potential responsibility, or pressure, placed on children, 
and their lack of maturity or life experience. For example, Wilma was mindful of 
children’s varying circumstances and capabilities, believing that “some flexibility” is 
required, and to involve them in “an age appropriate way.” She recognised that although 
children with serious health conditions can grow up quickly, they are also vulnerable. 
Thus, she questioned whether children would want to make the final decision: 
 
Int: In New Zealand there is no specific statutory provision for under sixteens to give consent to medical 
or surgical treatment. What is your view on the law being clearer and giving them that right? 
Wilma: I think there are two sides to that. There is a difference between being involved 
and having that whole decision put on you. Often you are dealing with a very fragile 
person, who perhaps does not fully understand what is going on. I can speak from our 
experience of oncology, from 10 [years] they grow up pretty fast. Within months they 
have literally grown years. However, I don’t think they want to be responsible for the 
whole decision. I think they want to be involved and included. 
 
Likewise, two other parents expressed their concerns about children’s potential 
vulnerability and limited life experience, when considering the level of responsibility 
children should bear. Whilst acknowledging the desirability and benefit of children being 
involved, they felt this should not be to the exclusion of parents:  
 
I think they should [be involved], but I think it needs co-done with the parents. I don’t 
think they are in any position to be fully informed. I don’t think they know enough and 
don’t think they are mature enough. They are as traumatised as anybody. I think they 
should definitely be part of it and I think it should be like a co-pilot. I don’t think they 
are equipped to be making major decisions at that age. They should absolutely be part of 




It is hard. I agree it is her body and that she should have a right, but I don’t think her 
perception on life is there. She would not want to do this procedure because it affects 
where she can go for six weeks. It is hardly a long-term vision. At this age their view is 
very narrow-minded. … It is classic that she is half an adult half a child, so I think she 
deserves to be treated as an adult, but at the same time I don’t think she really 
understands the importance of this. … I’d like to think that she can make the decision, 
but I don’t think she can. (Anna) 
 
Wilma also raised practical considerations about how such a law would be translated into 
practice. She wondered whether it would simply become another bureaucratic process, 
within which children are lost, defeating its intention of treating children as individuals: 
 
I think that there should be something that says they should be included, but then does 
that just become another paper pushing? Sometimes there is so much politics of people 
covering their bums that they are not actually seeing the people. (Wilma)  
 
Therefore, whilst parents were supportive of their children being included and heard in 
consent processes, they were concerned about the responsibility of decisions for children. 
The importance of inclusion lay in children having more control, being less anxious, 
coping better and building trust. 
 
 
VI. Chi ldren’s  Views 
 
During the interviews, children were asked about the importance to them of being 
included in decision-making and giving consent. All except one child valued being 
actively involved in discussions and in decision-making. They felt it gave them greater 
respect and equality, as well as emotional benefits: 
 
I think it is really important. At the end of the day it is my body. … It makes me less 
nervous because I have a say and that made me feel good. (Poppy, aged 14) 
 
It is easier on kids. You get concerned and stressed when you don’t know what is going 
on. (Samantha, aged 14) 
 
It is for them, for their sake. They are going through it, not the parents. The parent is 
not having some bone cut out, or their leg chopped off. It is the child and their choice. 
… Maybe I could have chosen not to have treatment (chemotherapy), but obviously I 
had to. But I still think that everything should go via the patient, no matter what age. 
(Amanda, aged 16) 
 
It is not just people over the age of 16 [years] who should have their voice heard to do 
stuff to you and your health. (Donald, aged 11)  
 
I think they definitely should get their input and that should be taken into account. But 
especially if they are quite a bit under 16 [years], the children will be like ‘no I don’t want 
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it because it will be scary’, like injections, but definitely they should not be just ignored, 
and ‘you are the problem we are going to fix it’, without their input. (Brenda, aged 19) 
 
On the other hand, Oliver who suffered from leukemia, recalled he was unconcerned 
about being involved: 
  
Well, I was so drugged most of the time that I couldn’t care less, so I just went along 
with it. (Oliver, aged 18) 
 
In order to gain a sense of their views on the level of importance for children to be 
included in decision-making, they were asked to rate this out of ten, where one is the 
least and ten the most important. All except one rated it between eight and ten, with 
Oliver rating it five. Despite this high rating, some appreciated that children’s maturity or 
capability to make final decisions and give consent will vary: 
 
It depends how mature they are. Girls, I think, are more mature. Even although I was 13 
[years old], I understood everything that was going on and I knew what medication I was 
on and when to take it. … I think 16 [years] is too high and should drop. (Amanda) 
 
Similarly, Poppy recognised that children are not always able to consider longer-term 
issues. She reflected on her own experience, having been initially concerned to proceed 
with her operation because of the short-term inconvenience, but that her parents had 
assisted her in understanding the wider perspective. Poppy reported her understanding of 
children’s development, and corresponding, their limitations: 
 
I guess it is really important for them [children] to be involved, but I don’t know about 
the final decision. I guess they are not capable of making really big decisions, like life 
threatening. I would definitely have issues with that. … There are a lot of laws put 
around teenagers making decisions and we are not actually capable of making really big 
decisions. I understand because our brains are not fully developed and so they shouldn’t 
have to make a really massive decision on their own. They should have parents. … I 
reckon that they should have a right more to participate. That they should have a say on 
whether they get an operation or whatever, but then you could not give a two-year-old 
that right because they would always say ‘no.’ I reckon 12 [years of age]. That is when the 
doctors started involving me, and it felt like the right time.  … But, even for me, why I 
said ‘no’ was because in the next few months I am going to be in a cast, not able to go 
into town with my friends. I think teenagers look [to the] short-term, not long-term, and 
Mum and Dad helped me look long-term. (Poppy)  
 
Finally, Samantha recognised also that there may be situations in which decisions need to 
be taken on children’s behalf, but she considered that health professionals should at least 
ask them:  
 
It is hard depending on the situation. Sometimes it does call for, depending on the 






VII. Chapter  Summary  
 
Overall, most health professionals did not regard the law as having influence on their 
practice. Around half were unaware of how the law regulated children consenting, and 
there was a sense of them differentiating between law and practice. Perhaps as a 
consequence of this lack of relevance and misunderstandings of the law, few health 
professionals anticipated any benefit in it changing. However, some health professionals 
expressed caution and unease about the law’s lack of specification on how to assess 
competence and to prove their assessments, and of relying on children’s consent. For 
most stakeholders, and a minority of health professionals, clarity and consistency of 
practice were identified as benefits. Flexibility in the law was important to those resistant 
to change and those supportive of it. Nevertheless, some were realistic as to how the 
public in general, and parents in particular, may perceive changes that made children’s 
rights to consent clearer. The anticipated reaction was that it would be viewed as 
challenging the authority of parents to make decisions on their children’s behalf. 
However, as this study has shown, the parents and children were supportive of children 
participating in the decision-making and them giving consent together. Most children 
expressed this in terms of their right, and/or to respect the fact that they are the ones 
undergoing the treatment. Children and parents appreciated, and had experienced, the 
emotional and psychological benefits that involvement can bring, together with the 




















 Chapter 12  
 
Discussion, Recommendations and Conclusion  
 
 
… the common law has never treated [parental] rights as sovereign or beyond 
review or control. Nor has our law ever treated the child as other than a person 
with capacities and rights recognised by law.928 
 
I .  Introduct ion 
 
The focus of this thesis was children’s competence and right to consent, examining the 
reality of the informed consent processes for children, parents and health professionals.  
My research has shown that the key to children developing and demonstrating 
competence is in the success of the relationships that surround them, in particular, with 
their parents and health professionals. Each participant brings to the relationship their 
experiences, knowledge, preferences, values, attitudes and personalities that impact on 
their interactions. Intertwining with, and influencing, these relationships are laws, policies, 
practices and healthcare environments, which together can either promote or constrain 
children’s competence. The multitude of influencing factors highlights the complexity of 
children’s competence, yet, for health professionals there is little guidance on the factors 
they should consider when assessing competence, and how assessments should be 
conducted. Further, compounding the complexities are the inconsistencies and lack of 
clarity in New Zealand’s law. My findings have shown differences in health professionals’ 
practices in obtaining consent and uncertainty in their understandings of the law. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the COCA is silent on children consenting to general 
medical treatment, and has left the gap to be filled by other laws.  
 
In this chapter, I firstly discuss the participants’ experiences, considering the importance 
of parents’ and health professionals’ roles to children’s competence. I depict the 
relational nature of competence, with its intertwining factors, in a conceptual model that 
I have developed, and called, “The Competence Model.” The Competence Model has 
evolved from my research, encapsulating my empirical findings, together with the 
international research and theory evidence base. My intention is that the Competence 
Model is used to assist medical students/professionals and parents in understanding the 
complex and relational nature of children’s competence, and how best to promote it, and 
may also assist health professionals when assessing children’s competence. I then discuss 
the implications of health professionals’ practices on obtaining consent, before 
examining how the law has defined competence and provided for children’s right to give 
consent. Finally, I make practical and legal recommendations for better consistency, 
clarity and respect for children’s competence and rights. I argue that given the 
interpersonal nature of children’s competence, parents and health professionals need to 
																																																								
928 Gillick, above n 4 at 184A per Lord Scarman. 
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be inclusive of children when consent is required, and that children’s right to consent 
needs to be clearly stated in the law. 
 
II .  Competence  
 
This research has found competence to be relational, consistent with previous studies, 
which have considered the factors influencing children’s competence. 929  The roles, 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes of parents and health professionals are pivotal to the 
development of children’s competence and their agency. In particular, the themes 
emerging from my study were parents’ roles in providing emotional support and 
promoting communication and relationship building; health professionals’ and parents’ 
roles in enhancing children’s understanding and supporting their decision-making; the 
importance of parents and health professionals taking account of children’s evolving 
capacities; and finally, the general practice of health professionals in relying upon parental 
consent, despite children’s competence.  
 
A. Parents ’  Roles   
  
1.  Emotional support  
 
All the parents in my study promoted their children’s competence by providing them 
with emotional support prior to, during, and after consultations. For example, it was 
present when parents exhibited care, empathy and understanding for their children’s 
situation; and took steps to provide them with the security, support and knowledge to 
better participate in, and cope with, their treatment. In the context of cancer, earlier 
studies found that children appreciate honesty and inclusion, seeking to work in 
partnership with their parents and health professionals. 930 This was consistent with 
Amanda and Samantha’s views, and also with how their parents responded to meet those 
desires and needs. For instance, Jenny ensured that Amanda was present at every 
consultation, describing her as a “co-pilot.”931 Likewise, there was openness and inclusion 
between Samantha and Wilma, with Samantha making it clear, when diagnosed with 
cancer, that she wanted Wilma to support her and to be honest. Whilst Oliver expressed 
ambivalence about his inclusion, it was clear from the steps Tania took, supporting his 
communication and understanding, that his participation was supported emotionally and 
practically.  
 
Unlike previous studies involving cancer, there was no indication from these three 
families that parents were gatekeeping information.932 They all described openness in 
their communication, although the lack of information flowing from health professionals 
																																																								
929 For example Coyne and others n 20 at 42; Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, above n 20 at 155; 
Miller and Jawad, above n 611 at 187; Kilkelly and Donnelly, above n 21 at 40-1; Garth, Murphy and 
Reddihough, above n 71 at 50; Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 17. 
930 For example, Ellis and Leventhal, above n 18 at 283; Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 17. 
931 See Chapter 8, page 150. 
932 For example, Young and others, above n 19 at 306; Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 16. 
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to Wilma and Samantha was a source of frustration and stress to them. In Amanda’s 
situation, layers of scaffolding were evident from the support of Jenny and her extended 
family. Jenny described having family members present at appointments, and researching 
information, allowing both her and Amanda to manage the rate at which they processed 
and absorbed the information. This helped to protect them from feeling overwhelmed in 
times of stress.  
 
Parental emotional support also came in the form of assisting their children to cope with 
their treatment. For example, Diane and Anna prepared Donald and Poppy respectively 
for consultations and treatment, by extending their knowledge and understanding of their 
health conditions and its treatment, resulting in them becoming more resilient to cope 
with it. Preparatory steps such as these are invaluable to health professionals and children, 
as it reduces the prospect of children refusing treatment through fear, and either failing 
to be treated, or being forced to undertake it against their wishes.  
 
In providing emotional support, parents demonstrated the importance to them and their 
children of being in a partnership with health professionals. This support created the 
foundations from which their children could develop the skills to participate in 
discussions, decisions and treatment.  
 
 
B. Parents ’  and Health Profess ionals ’  Roles  
 




All parents participating in this research valued health professionals taking the time to 
talk and listen to their children. For instance, Anna spoke of the doctor connecting with 
Poppy, 933  Jenny described him getting on Amanda’s “wavelength”, 934  and Wilma 
recognised the doctor’s “deep respect” for Samantha.935 Nevertheless, at other times, 
parents found health professionals to have “very poor inter-personal skills” (Jenny),936 
“could have maybe tried a little bit harder” (Diane) to communicate and relate to their 
child, 937 and were dismissive, by not listening (Tania). 938  Yet, simply engaging with 
children is insufficient. It is the purpose of the engagement that is important. Existing 
research found that health professionals predominately engage with children to help 
establish a rapport, and to hear how children feel.939 Similarly, my study also found that, 
at times, health professionals’ interactions were tokenistic, such as, when they mostly 
																																																								
933 Chapter 8 page 169 and f/n 872. 
934 At page 152. 
935 At page 149. 
936 At page 152. 
937 At page 159. 
938 At page 153. 
939 For example, Garth, Murphy and Reddihough, above n 71 at 49-50; van Dulmen, above n 462 at 565. 
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communicated with parents,940 or used sophisticated language, which children found 
difficult to understand, by “talking at an adult level” (Wilma).941 At other times, health 
systems treated children more as objects of concern, rather than as active participants. 
For example, Wilma vividly described the depersonalised care Samantha experienced 
during her cancer treatment, being excluded from discussions and decision-making, 
receiving no explanations of medical terms, and no interest being taken of her as a 
person. 942  Similarly, Alistair was observed and assessed, but no health professional 
explained the results to him, or the meaning and implications of ADHD and the 
treatment options.943 The only time that Alistair met with a health professional to discuss 
his condition and treatment was at the consultation with the GP when medication was 
prescribed.944  
 
Nonetheless, parents used a number of strategies to connect their children with health 
professionals during consultations, such as preparing them in advance, seating them 
strategically, and assisting with communication. In preparing their children for 
consultations, parents conferred with them beforehand, on what might be discussed, and 
how to approach these discussions. For example, Laura alerted Alistair to the types of 
matters his GP might raise, as she knew it was likely he would be prescribed medication 
for ADHD;945 and Anna and Poppy agreed how each of them would contribute to 
discussions with the surgeon.946  
 
Once in consultations, some parents (Wilma and Jenny) sat their children strategically, 
signaling the importance of their children’s inclusion, to both the health professionals 
and their children.947 Parents then prompted, or reminded, their children of important 
details to advise health professionals during discussions. This gave children the 
opportunity to describe how they felt, in their own words, and encouraged them to speak 
directly to health professionals.948 In turn, this directed health professionals’ attention and 
conversations to the children, such as Poppy during an examination with her surgeon.949  
 
																																																								
940 See Chapter 8 for example at page 154: “Oliver would talk to her and it was just like she [Consultant 
Oncologist) wasn’t listening” and at 163: “Involved to a point. Like I was involved because it was my 
achilles, but I was not really involved much in the discussions”(Poppy) and at page 164 “I felt at some 
parts they were looking at my achilles and talking to Mum and then Mum would talk to me. So Mum kept 
me involved, more than they did I felt. Yes, Mum knows. Mum gets it more than the doctors. They were 
talking to her a lot more” (Poppy). Also Samantha describes how she was excluded at pages 145, 146, 147-
148; Alistair and Donald were involved to marginal degree in consultations at pages 156-157 and 159 
respectively.  
941 At page 1. 
942 See Chapter 8 pages 145-148. 
943 At pages 155-157.  
944 At page 157. 
945 At page 156. 
946 At page 163. 
947 At page 150: “Mum would make me sit next to the doctor”(Amanda); and at page 149 “I learned with 
experience of where to position Samantha when speaking with the doctors so Samantha would be included” 
(Wilma). 
948 At pages 149 (Samantha), 150 (Amanda) and 163 (Poppy). 
949 At page 164. 
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Further aiding communication between children and health professionals was parents’ 
role as interpreter. Most evident in this role was Tania, who was accustomed to this role 
already, due to Oliver’s Asperger’s Syndrome. Tania could assist health professionals to 
better understand him, whilst also supporting Oliver’s understanding of their 
explanations. When this occurred during consultations doctors could check that she had 
covered matters correctly.  
 
Thus, children are able to participate more in discussions with health professionals when 
parents support their communication. Parents take deliberate steps to prepare their 
children, seat them strategically, support their recollections of their symptoms and act as 
interpreters. 
 
(b) Health professionals 
 
Some healthcare environments lend themselves more than others to the development of 
either a partnership with parents and children, or fostering relationships and 
communication with children, when they consult alone. There were many factors 
influencing the degree to which health professionals were able to achieve this, such as: 
the attitudes of health professionals towards a partnership; time; the numbers of children 
being treated; privacy; parents roles; and children’s preferences, personality and health.  
 
(i) Partnership, time and numbers of children 
 
A striking feature of hospital and private dentistry were the strategies dentists used for 
developing a trusting relationship with both children and parents.950 It was important to 
them that there was consensus and co-operation for treatment to proceed. Children’s 
competence was supported through these trusting relationships, such as, participating in 
discussions in hospital,951 and understanding about the treatment in private dentistry.952 
In private dentistry, children’s autonomy evolved, with them taking responsibility when 
consulting alone.953 These dental environments contrasted starkly with the SDS, where 
dental therapists’ abilities to develop relationships and involve children in discussions 
were limited.954 The focus on individual children was lost,955 and dental therapists had 
limited opportunities to educate children and parents about children’s dental health.956 
This stemmed from the disjointed nature of treatment, where children were initially seen 
alone; the lack of time; and the emphasis on parental consent.957 As a consequence, 
children’s competence could become further constrained, when parents were not 
mindful of supporting their participation, as dental therapists were unable to mitigate the 
																																																								
950 See Chapter 9 page 176. 
951 See Chapter 9 page 180 and Chapter 10 page 201 
952 Chapter 10 page 209. 
953 At page 210. 
954 At page 220. 
955 See Chapter 10 at page 174. 
956 See Chapter 10 page 220. Dental Therapists usually see children alone for an examination and consult 
with both parents and children when carrying out further treatment. 
957 At page 222. 
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impact. This finding is consistent with existing research, showing children can become 
socially conditioned to be passive, when health professionals and parents are complicit.958  
 
Similarly, in the vaccination programme and hospital paediatric surgery clinics, health 
professionals were limited in their abilities to develop relationships with children and 
support their competence. They examine and treat high numbers of children in a short 
space of time, and as a consequence the environment resembles a production line, more 
functional in nature, rather than relational.  
 
Contrastingly, in the SMS and CYS, the promotion of children’s competence is evident 
through trusting and respectful relationships.959 Health professionals give children the 
time necessary to fully discuss their situations, and support them in their understanding 





Consistent with earlier studies, my research has confirmed that privacy is important to 
teenagers.960 Health professionals in the SMS, CYS, and some private GPs, experienced 
teenagers seeking privacy, especially when they consulted about sexual health matters.961 
Also, a paediatrician and obstetrician/gynecologist routinely provided teenagers with the 
opportunity for privacy in consultations.962 Naturally, children have privacy when they 
consult alone at the SMS, but in other healthcare environments, the ease to which 
privacy can be accommodated depended upon factors, such as, the relationships health 
professionals have with children and parents; the receptiveness of parents; whether 
parents have prepared children for consulting alone;963 and in the vaccination programme, 
when children experience issues. 964  As a consequence, children may be able to 
demonstrate their competence more easily, and may be more apparent to some health 
professionals, when given privacy.965  
 
(iii) Balancing the Triadic Dynamic 
 
Whilst most parents are supportive of their children when consulting with health 
professionals, parents could at times inhibit their children’s competence.966 Existing 
research suggests that health professionals may experience difficulty in managing the 
																																																								
958 See Coyne and others, above n 20 at 40; See Chapter 9 pages 181 where DT1 spoke of a mother who 
was annoyed that the Dental Therapist had asked her son’s opinion; and HD1 at page 183 who did not 
take the views or consent of a competent 14-year-old whose mother refused consent; and Chapter 10 at 
page 206 GP1 who did not wish to interfere with the parent-child dynamic. 
959 See Chapter 9 page 174. 
960 Beresford and Sloper, above n 19 at 176. 
961 See Chapter 9 page 177. 
962 At page 175. 
963 At page 179. 
964 Chapter 10 page 217. 
965 At page 208. 
966 Chapter 9 page 182. 
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dynamic between children and parents, 967 and may be complicit in supporting parental 
authority, rather than promoting children’s participation.968 This is consistent with the 
experiences of some health professionals in my study who chose not to interfere in the 
parent-child dynamic when parents dominated discussions and/or expected to make 
decisions for their children.969 Advancing research one step further, my findings revealed 
the strategies that health professionals adopted to redress the balance of participation in 
consultations, such as, redirecting conversations,970 role modelling,971 asking parents to 
leave consultations,972 asserting the importance of children driving the treatment,973 and 
confirming their right in law to take children’s consent when challenged by parents.974 
These strategies can compensate for situations where parents do not adequately prepare 
children for consultations, or support their interest in their health, by allowing them, for 
example, to play on their iPads during consultations.975  These strategies may also have 
the effect of empowering children, and enhancing their competence, by enabling them to 
participate in discussions, make decisions, consent and cope with treatment.  
 
2. Enhancing Understanding 
 
Confirming the findings from earlier research,976 the health professionals and parents in 
my study enhanced children’s understanding of their health conditions and treatment in 
partnership. However, at times, some parents experienced having to compensate for the 




Consistent with earlier studies, and revealing further insights, my research demonstrated 
strategies of how parents promoted their children’s understanding through researching, 
explaining, sourcing further information and setting their treatment in a wider context. In 
order for parents to do this successfully, they needed to be certain about their own 
understanding. Some parents (Wilma, Jenny, Laura and Tania) used a number of 
strategies to extend their knowledge, such as, using family support and sourcing 
information from nursing staff and educational materials. Jenny found, for example, that 
having family members present at appointments, and researching information, allowed 
both her and Amanda to process and absorb information, at a level and rate that they 
could manage. Once parents were sufficiently informed, they could support their 
																																																								
967 Van Staa, above n 525 at 459.  
968 For example Runeson, and others, above n 476 at 73.  
969 For example see Chapter 9 pages 181 and 183 and Chapter 10 page 206. 
970 See for example Den6 Chapter 9 page 182. 
971 See for example GP6 Chapter 9 page 182. 
972 See for example Den6 Chapter 9 page 182. 
973 See for example HD1 and HD4 Chapter 10 page 201. 
974 See for example the experience of HD5, Chapter 11 page 233. 
975 See the experience of HD3 Chapter 10 page 192. 
976 For example, Ellis and Leventhal, above n 18 at 281. Kilkelly and Donnelly, above n 21 at 40-1; Garth, 
Murphy and Reddihough, above n 71 at 50; Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 17. 
977 See Chapter 8 pages 146 and 156 where Samantha and Alistair respectively relied upon their mothers to 
explain their health conditions and treatment. 
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children’s understanding, such as, Laura in explaining ADHD, and Jenny, the cycles of 
chemotherapy, to their respective children. Nevertheless, when doing so, parents needed 
to be conscious of the language they used in their explanations, as Laura realised. Having 
the opportunity to give these in the presence of health professionals may be reassuring to 
parents, as Tania found when giving Oliver explanations.  
 
Further, my findings revealed that sometimes parents needed to compensate for the lack 
of information provided by health professionals, confirming that of previous studies.978 
For example, Wilma was not provided with information on Samantha’s cancer treatment 
or Fanconi anaemia, 979 and Laura needed to research ADHD,980 so that they could 
explain these to Samantha and Alistair respectively. When children do not fully 
understand, and/or are frightened, they may refuse treatment, resulting in it being forced 
upon them. In my study two children refused treatment – Samantha (nasogastric tube) 
and Donald (tooth extraction).981 Samantha’s experience highlights how at times the 
system can exclude parents and children, making it very difficult for parents to prepare 
their children, as they have no control or voice. In Donald’s situation, the dentist 
appreciated it was not viable for Donald’s tooth to be extracted against his will, and upon 
Diane realising the strength of Donald’s reaction, she was able to enhance his 
understanding and support him in coping with the treatment at a later date.  
	
(b) Health Professionals 
 
Similarly confirming and extending upon the findings of earlier research,982 the health 
professionals in my study described using a variety of strategies to enhance children’s 
understanding, for example, by simplifying their language in explanations; avoiding 
jargon; using common terminology; breaking down processes and procedures; drawing; 
playing a DVD/video; directing them to websites; giving handouts to parents; and by 
dentists, a process of “show, tell and do.”983  
 
A salient finding in my study, between and within health environments, was the purpose 
for which health professionals secured children’s understanding. Whilst it was important 
to all health professionals that children understood, in order to co-operate or agree with 
treatment, they were more focused on securing children’s understanding when their 
consent was being relied on, such as in the SMS,984 or when children were required to 
manage long-term conditions, such as diabetes and asthma.985 For diabetes in particular, 
an impressive structured educational programme exists in hospital and in the community. 
Nonetheless, in other environments, much less emphasis was placed upon children’s 
understanding, such as in the SDS, vaccination programme, and paediatric surgery clinics, 
																																																								
978 Young and others, above n 19 at 307 
979 Chapter 8 page 146. 
980 At page 155. 
981 Chapter 8 pages 147 and 158 respectively. 
982 For example, Garth, Murphy and Reddihough, above n 71 at 48. 
983 For example, Chapter 9, page 177, 182 and 189. 
984 Chapter 9 page 173. 
985 See Chapter 9 pages 187-189. 
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where time was short and parents’ consent was relied upon. In the SDS and the 
vaccination programme, children were given sufficient information to secure their co-
operation, but the processes were not conducive to promoting children’s competence to 
make decisions or consent. Whilst public health nurses encouraged, and were open to 
questions, children were inhibited from asking any, due to being in a class setting.986 
However, a mitigating factor in the vaccination programme, which seemed limited in the 
SDS,987 was the information sent home with children, which their parents could discuss 
with them. 988  
 
3.  Decis ion-making  
   
(a) Parents 
 
Advancing understanding on how decisions are made, my research found that parents 
and children make decisions on two levels, and in two contexts, at times. The first is with 
health professionals during consultations, and the second is a continuing process at 
home. Three parents (Wilma, Anna and Laura) experienced their child making decisions 
within the context of the family/home, which was then communicated at a later 
appointment to health professionals. 989 In the minds of the parents and children there 
were treatment choices that they wished to consider.  
 
Exploring each of these situations, Wilma took control before Samantha’s third 
operation, creating the time and space Samantha needed.990 Yet, had it not been for 
Wilma making this assertion, and reinforcing the importance of Samantha being involved, 
the decision was likely to have been made for her, as she had experienced with the earlier 
two surgeries. 991  Until the consultation when Samantha advised the doctor of her 
decision, there was no sense of Samantha and Wilma being included in a partnership 
with health professionals.  
 
Secondly, Poppy made her decision on the fitting of braces at home, after considering 
her dentist’s and parents’ advice, together with using her friends’ knowledge and 
experience.992 Both the dentist and Poppy’s parents supported her in reaching her own 
decision, by providing her with the required information, and the time and space to 
weigh up her options. 
 
Thirdly, Alistair made his decision to take medication in the context of his family, rather 
than at an appointment with the GP. His parents educated him on his condition and 
																																																								
986 See Chapter 10, page 216: “ … what we try to do is try and answer these questions before they think 
about them … but really it is part of being proud” (Public Health, Nur6). 
987 See Chapter 10 page 221. 
988 See Chapter 8 page 161: Poppy’s parents supported her understanding of vaccinations.  
989 See Chapter 8: Samantha decided upon surgery following cancer treatment (page 148); Poppy upon 
dental surgery and braces (page 168); and Alistair upon ADHD medication (page 156). 
990 See Chapter 8 page 148. 
991 See Chapter 8, page 168.  
992 See Chapter 8, page 156. 
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treatment, before giving him permission to make this decision, which they supported. 
This decision was then communicated to the GP. It appeared to Laura, however, that the 
GP had assumed that she and Laura had made the treatment decision earlier, without 
Alistair being present, when they discussed the outcome of the assessments. Thus, 
Alistair’s parents’ support was crucial for him being included in the decision.  
 
In other situations, whilst parents and children may appear to make decisions during 
consultations with the health professionals, children may be contemplating matters 
further. For example, in Anna’s mind the decision to proceed with Poppy’s achilles 
surgery was agreed to by both of them at the hospital appointment with the surgeon. 
However, for Poppy, there were on-going considerations, further discussion with her 
parents, research on the Internet, and weighing up whether she was prepared to endure 
the short-term inconvenience for the long-term benefit. This highlights the continuous 
nature of decision-making, and the importance of ongoing parental support in giving 
children the time and information to prepare themselves for the treatment and its 
aftermath.  
 
Thus, all of these situations demonstrated not only the importance of parents’ roles in 
giving their children information, time, space and approval to make their decision, but 
also the competence of children to make decisions.   
 
For the remaining three parents and children there was a lack of treatment choice, so 
they followed the recommended treatment.993 Although Donald was not involved in the 
decision to proceed with the extraction of his tooth, due to his reaction when the 
procedure was first attempted, he was sufficiently aware its need, and ultimately did agree, 
albeit somewhat distractedly.994 
 
Consistent with previous research, having considered the effects of children being either 
excluded or included in decision-making,995 the children in my study reacted negatively 
when excluded from decision-making and experienced positive benefits when included. 
For example, Samantha felt stressed, frustrated, confused and depersonalised when 
excluded,996 and conversely, felt less stressed, positive and committed to her recovery 
when included. Samantha’s situation contrasts starkly with Amanda’s, who throughout 
most of her cancer treatment was able to demonstrate high degrees of autonomy and 
competence, when permitted to assist with the administration of treatment.997 This 
allowed her some control within a health context in which that is generally lacking, and 
																																																								
993 Chapter 8 Jenny/Amanda (page 151) and Tania/Oliver  (page 153) followed the cancer treatment 
protocol. Jenny commented: “It is like a train. There is not a lot of decision-making.”  
994 See Chapter 8, pages 160. Brenda was sufficiently experienced in suffering with the pain and competent, 
to make her decisions during consultations with health professionals. 
995 For example, Ellis and Leventhal, above n 18 at 282; and Coyne and Gallagher, above n 524 at 2337. 
See also Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, above n 20 at 15-22.; Lambert, Glacken and McCarron, 
above n 20 at 3097; Garth, Murphy and Reddihough, above n 71 at 48; Miller and Jawad, above n 611 at 
187; Coyne and others, above n 472 at 278.  
996 Chapter 8 pages 147 and 148. Samantha’s experience is consistent with earlier research: De Vries and 
others, above n 601 at 5-7. 
997 See Chapter 8 page 152. 
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as a result she appeared to be focused and determined to become healthy. Further 
research into the correlations between involvement and recovery may be valuable to 
health professionals. 
 
(b) Health Professionals 
 
Existing research has found inconsistencies in whether children participate in decision-
making. 998 In the experience of the participating health professionals in my study, 
children and parents commonly make decisions together. For example, in hospital 
dentistry, dentists strived to work with children and parents together to decide on how 
treatment was administered, either in the chair or by GA, 999  and also on what 
treatment.1000 This gave children some degree of control and responsibility. Likewise, 
most GPs and one paediatrician spoke of ascertaining from both parents and children 
their feelings and views, and deciding upon treatment together.1001 Despite public health 
nurses in the vaccination programme only having contact with children, joint decisions 
could be made between parents and children at home, after considering the information 
provided.1002  
 
A number of factors influenced the degree to which children were involved in decision-
making, confirming findings from earlier research:1003 parents’ roles and attitudes towards 
promoting children’s participation;1004 whether options were given;1005 the attitudes of 
health professionals;1006 whether their protests are respected, which depends on their 
age;1007 the state of children’s health, as they may be too acutely ill;1008 and whether 
children have formed views.1009 For some simple treatment, children are not involved in 
discussions and decisions, such as antibiotics, as they may not have formed opinions, and 
dental fillings, as private dentists may assume that children do not have an opinion, that 
they will follow the dentists’ advice, or agree with their parents.1010 In contrast, for life-
changing procedures, such as cosmetic/elective surgery, children’s views were 
																																																								
998 For example Runeson, and others, above n 476 at 73; and Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, above n 
20 at 23. 
999 Chapter 9 page 180. 
1000 See Chapter 10 page 201. 
1001 See Chapter 9 for example pages 179 and 206. 
1002 See page 216: The expectation is that parents will use “the consent form in the way that it is designed - 
which is information for you to read to your child or to talk with your child about”. (Nur6) 
1003 For example Runeson, and others, above n 476 at 73. 
1004 See Chapter 9, pages 180-181 where parents can either work in partnership with health professionals 
and children in making decisions or create barriers, where for example, they consider it is their right to 
make decisions on behalf of their children. 
1005 For example, see Chapter 10 page 205 where GP5 described the options given for wart removal. This 
contrasts with the lack of choices given by private dentists for fillings at page 210. 
1006 For example, see Chapters 9 and 10 pages 178 and 201-202 where health professionals indicate their 
respect for children’s bodily integrity. 
1007 See pages 203 for example, where Den3 spoke of younger children being forced to undergo dental 
treatment, but older children’s protests being respected. 
1008 See Chapter 9 page 184 for example, when children suffer from cancer they commonly regress and are 
at times very ill. 
1009 See for example page 205 where children may not have opinions about antibiotics but have strong 
views about wart removal. 
1010 Chapter 10 page 210. 
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decisive.1011 These situations highlight how children’s competence may not necessarily be 
related to the complexity of the treatment, but rather to the seriousness of the treatment 
or the consequences of its outcome.  
 
In the SDS, children’s competence to make decisions was not promoted, restricted by 
time, minimal information provided to children and parents, and adherence to parental 
consent. Although the separate engagement with children and parents is similar in the 
vaccination programme to that of the SDS, it does provide information, which may 
stimulate discussions between parents and children.  
 
Naturally, as children consulted alone in the SMS, they make the decisions. Health 
professionals give children time to discuss, and consider, information and options, 
enhancing children’s competence and self-determination.  
 
C.  Evolv ing Competence 
 
Children’s competencies evolve through participation and scaffolding, as supported by 
Childhood Studies, Sociocultural Theory and the Capability Approach.1012 These theories, 
individually, and in combination, support the philosophy that children learn through 
participation, and with support, can further develop their skills and independence. All the 
children in my research demonstrated evolving competence to participate in their health 
treatment, for example, by discussing and learning about their health conditions and its 
treatment, making decisions, consenting and coping with treatment. 
 
The evolving nature of children’s competence was seen most clearly in Poppy’s situation, 
having lived with her achilles condition from birth, until her operation at 14 years of age. 
As Poppy grew in confidence, matured and developed experience, she participated more 
in consultations, had a greater need and desire to understand her health and its treatment, 
until finally, she contributed to the decision on her operation. Likewise, Poppy’s growing 
competence can be traced from when she was vaccinated to when she underwent dental 
surgery and had braces fitted. At the age of 11/12 years, she had little interest or concern 
in simple, and common, vaccinations. However, by 15 years, the balance of involvement 
and responsibility swung more to Poppy, when she considered, discussed and 
understood the information and choices for her braces, and then made the decision 
based on what was important to her.  
 
Similarly, Samantha’s competence developed over four years whilst she lived with cancer, 
being treated in hospital and undergoing three surgeries. By the time she made her 
decision on the third surgery, her maturity, independence and experience had all evolved. 
 
Although over a more focused period, Alistair and Amanda’s competence evolved too, as 
they learned about their health conditions and treatment. Alistair demonstrated between 
																																																								
1011 See Chapter 10 page 201. 
1012 See Chapter 6 pages 114-115 and 116-118. 
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the ages of nine and 10 years, his competence to make a treatment decision, and 
Amanda’s competence was demonstrated in practical ways of managing her treatment. 
For Oliver, he developed experience and skills to engage with health professionals and 
provide consent without a parent present, whilst Donald’s ability to cope with dental 
surgery evolved through his experience and advice from his mother. Finally, for Brenda 
the transition was not so apparent, as she began with a high degree of agency, but once 
she crossed the threshold of 16 years, she also provided consent without a parent.  
 
D. Competence Assessments  
 
My study extends research on how health professionals assess children’s competence. 
Whilst Alderson’s study into children’s consent in surgery found that competence is 
assessed through interpersonal relationships, and that parents’ and health professionals’ 
attitudes are of importance, together with children’s inner qualities,1013 my research has 
distilled the criteria which medical, surgical and dental health professionals, in four 
healthcare environments, considered. It is significant that they have regard to common 
criteria, assessed within clinical interactions, despite the criteria and process not being 
prescribed or formal.1014 The criteria they rely on are: the importance of children’s 
abilities to communicate with health professionals about their health; their level of 
independence/interest in their health; their understanding and intelligence; their 
development and maturity; and their ability to ask and answer questions.1015 These 
findings further demonstrate the relational nature of competence, highlighting health 
professionals’ and parents’ responsibilities to support children’s participation. 
 
E. The Competence Model   
The relational nature of competence, together with its intertwining elements, can be 
represented in my conceptual model, “The Competence Model”, as shown in Figure 2. 
The findings of this study, in conjunction with the international research and theoretical 
base, have shown that competence is not simply an individual ability, developed or 
demonstrated by children, but is a relational one between health professionals, parents, 
children and the healthcare environment. For example, each participant’s experiences, 
knowledge, preferences, values, attitudes and personalities impact on the ways in which 
they interact, and in turn, influence children’s opportunities to participate, develop and 
demonstrate competence. Further, intersecting with this triadic dynamic are 
environmental factors, such as the state of children’s health, the urgency of treatment, 
privacy and the time available. The interplay of all these factors results in children’s 
competence either being promoted or constrained. The Competence Model depicts this 





1013 Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, above n 20 at 152-155. 
1014 See Chapter 9, page 191. 






Figure 2: The Competence Model – Children’s Competence in the Informed 




The Competence Model has been adapted from the ‘Lundy Model’, which represented 
the dynamic nature of, and the inter-related factors required for, upholding children’s 
article 12 rights under the UNCRC.1016 Whilst Lundy’s quadrants are Space, Voice, 
Audience and Influence, I have replaced Audience with Support, to reflect the relational 
nature of competence.1017 
 
In the Competence Model, Space relates to the physical environment within which health 
professionals consult. Voice denotes the internal factors influencing children’s abilities to 
express themselves, such as their personality, experience, age and preferences. Equally, it 
relates to the attitudes, practices and abilities of health professionals to actively listen to 
their voices. Support represents the ways in which adults, particularly parents and health 
professionals, assist children in participating in informed consent processes, for example, 
by supporting children to provide their medical history, understand about their health 
condition/treatment, discuss and decide on treatment options and give consent. 
																																																								
1016 Lundy, above n 61 at 932. 
1017 In Lundy’s Model ‘audience’ depicts that children’s voice must be heard and interlinks with ‘influence’, 
which is that their views must be acted upon: Lundy, above n 61 at 933. 
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Influence relates to the professionals, laws, policies and guidelines that can give effect to 
competent children participating, and giving, or refusing, consent. The quadrants or 
elements (elements) have been placed deliberately in this order, as they provide a logical 
sequence to informed consent processes, in the sense that children need a conducive 
environment (Space), for their voices to be heard (Voice), through the promotion and 
support of their competence (Support) to participate in giving/refusing consent 
(Influence). Children’s competence is best promoted and demonstrated at the centre 
point, where all the factors are present, but exists in lesser degrees, in the singularly 
overlapping areas.  
 
 
F. Summary o f  Competence  
 
The research participants’ experiences highlight the multitude of factors influencing 
competence, confirming that it is not age related. Of more importance are the 
relationships and support between children, parents and health professionals. My 
Competence Model summarises and highlights the relational nature of competence, also 
exemplifying the theoretical underpinnings of Childhood Studies, Sociocultural Theory 
and the Capability Approach, that all view children as social actors, whose agency and 
capabilities develop through the scaffolding of those more experienced. 
 
The Competence Model is of further significance, in light of my research discovering the 
importance health professionals place upon children’s interactions during consultations, 
when assessing their competence. Given the relational nature of competence, health 
professionals and parents need to be aware of these factors, such as, the purpose of 
health professionals’ communication needs to be more than a social chat, or simply 
children answering questions, as has been found in earlier research.1018 Unless health 
professionals and parents adequately support children’s participation and relationships, 
children are unlikely to be able to develop and demonstrate their competence.  
 
It may be understandably challenging for some children to demonstrate their competence 
in an unfamiliar and predominately adult-based system, such as in hospital; and 
correspondingly demanding for some health professionals to promote and assess it, given 
their time constraints. However, as the children I interviewed have shown, with support, 
they can demonstrate high degrees of competence, which may not be initially apparent 
from their interactions during consultations.1019 Thus, competence needs to be reviewed 
at different stages of treatment, as children’s health, their relationships, understanding, 





1018 See for example van Dulmen, above 462 at 565. 
1019 See Chapter 9 page 150 for example: Amanda was quiet in consultations but highly competent in 
understanding and managing her cancer treatment. 
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III .  Consent  Processes   
 
A.  Rel iance upon Parental  Consent  and Reasons 
 
Commonly, children and parents consult together with health professionals and consent 
is given collectively.1020 This is a practical and natural approach during clinical interactions, 
and is not an issue when children have an opportunity to contribute to discussions and 
decision-making, and parents and children agree.1021  
 
Nevertheless, a striking finding of my study is that in most healthcare environments 
parental consent is relied upon. This was highlighted when written consent was required, 
and/or when parents and children disagreed.1022 For example, the consent form in 
hospital is designed for adults, and despite age being an unreliable indicator of 
competence, it was the practice and understanding of many health professionals that 
parents were required to provide written consent until children reached 16 years of 
age.1023 This was the experience also of the parents who provided written consent for 
their children when under the age of 16 years.1024 As a consequence, some health 
professionals focused more on parents’ understanding and/or on their parental authority, 
when taking consent.1025  
 
Likewise, the consent processes in the vaccination programme and SDS were designed 
for parents to consent, resulting in limited respect being given to children’s competence. 
Whilst public health nurses educated children on the vaccinations to gain their 
understanding and co-operation, the focus was more on parents’ understanding and 
consent, as highlighted by the anomaly of interpreters being provided for parents to sign 
the consent form, but not for children. Therefore, there was no way of knowing the 
extent to which those children understood and gave consent.1026 Additionally, although 
nurses gave children opportunities to express how they felt, and give their verbal consent 
																																																								
1020 See Chapter 10 page 196. 
1021 On the proviso that health professionals do involve children in discussions and do not marginalise 
them. See chapter 9 pages 175 and 176 where some health professionals in this study spoke of the 
strategies they use for involving children. However, see Chapter 8 where some children in this study 
experienced exclusion, for example, Poppy felt little involvement until about 12 years (pages 163-164), 
Samantha struggled to be included (145-148), and no health professional explained to Alistair his condition 
and treatment until the consultation with his GP at which medication was prescribed, where 80% of the 
conversation was directed to Laura (page 157).  
1022 See Chapter 10. For example, the paediatric surgeons, plastic surgeon, one paediatrician HD2, all 
hospital dentists, both public health nurses and both school dental therapists all usually take the written 
consent of parents. 
1023 For example, see Chapter 10 page 199 and Chapter 11 pages 225-226. 
1024 See Chapter 8 Anna/Poppy (page 166), Tania/Oliver (page 155) and Brenda (page 170). Of exception 
was Amanda for her laparoscopy (page 151) and also Samantha, who recalled, “signing off” for her third 
operation (149). 
1025 For example Chapter 10 page 198 in hospital “All the discussion about consent is done in front of the 
child” (Paediatric Surgeon, HD1) and “I do my level best to keep the language in terms most parents would 
understand” (Paediatric Surgeon, HD3); and at page 201 “… with acknowledgment that the parent has the 
overriding guardianship and acknowledgment that the parent gives signed consent” (Hospital Nurse, Nur8).  
1026 See Chapter 10, page 216. This issue also arose in paediatric surgery where children may be given the 
responsibility to interpret the consent forms for their parents, in order that parents can give consent, but 
are not required themselves to consent (page 198). 
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at the point of vaccination, the environment and system created pressures on them to co-
operate, as usually prior written consent from parents was given, and the public setting 
created peer pressure and lacked privacy. Conversely, when parents had either not 
returned the forms or refused consent, children could fail to be vaccinated, due to the 
reliance upon parental consent. This was despite the nurses knowing the law and being 
able to assess children’s competence.  
 
There is no reason from a legal standpoint preventing competent children signing their 
consent forms or giving verbal consent. Whilst it may not be considered expedient or 
practical, there were health professionals, in time-pressured environments, assessing 
children’s competence, taking their consent and relying on it.1027 
 
Similarly, in the SDS, dental therapists relied on parental consent, with limited 
opportunity to promote and respect children’s competence. Thus, competent children 
were unlikely to receive dental treatment where parents had not consented.1028  
 
Comparable difficulties, with more serious consequences, could arise also in hospital, 
when parents and children disagreed on treatment, such as where parents refused 
chemotherapy. This could result in children not receiving treatment, unless there was an 
internal process, and possibly a court order.1029  
 
Conversely, when parents consented but children refused, most health professionals 
agreed that they would not forcibly treat them, unless the medical need predominated.1030 
Nevertheless, children could be pressurised, held down or sedated in order for treatment 
to proceed.1031 This finding is consistent with earlier research, which found health 
professionals could be complicit with parents in treatment proceeding, despite children’s 
strongly expressed refusal. 1032  However, as we saw with Donald, when health 
professionals respect children’s refusal, and parents work with their children to assist 
them to cope, treatment can proceed calmly.1033  
 
																																																								
1027 See Chapter 10 page 199. 
1028 Denial of treatment can occur in other healthcare environments. See Chapter 9 page 183 where HD1 
recounted a competent 14 year old who was left untreated due to her mother’s refusal and disruptive 
behaviour. 
1029 See Chapter 9 page 186. Additionally, children are likely to be affect negatively when they are 
insufficiently included in the consent process and their competence is undermined. The positive effects of 
inclusion and negative effects of exclusion are examined in Chapter 5 pages 95-96. For example, Ellis and 
Leventhal, above n 18 at 282; and Coyne and Gallagher, above n 524 at 2337; Alderson, Children’s Consent to 
Surgery, above n 20 at 15-22; Lambert, Glacken and McCarron, above n 20 at 3097; Garth, Murphy and 
Reddihough, above n 71 at 48; Miller and Jawad, above n 611 at 187; Coyne and others, above n 472 at 278. 
Also see Chapter 10 page 203-204: exclusion in the consent process can create issues for nurses when they 
are required to administer treatment to children. 
1030 See Chapter 10, page 202 where some spoke of strategies that they use to encourage children, such as 
being honest and giving them time. 
1031 See Chapter 10 pages 202, 203 and 204. 
1032 See Chapter 5 page 81: Runeson, and others, above n 476 at 73. 
1033 See Chapter 8 page 159. 
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There were several reasons for health professionals relying upon parental consent: 
convenience; cost of treatment; parental authority/rights; misunderstanding of the law; 
the law’s lack of relevance to practice. The simple answers were convenience and cost.  
Some health professionals considered it unnecessary to independently assess children’s 
competence and take their consent, as parents and children commonly consulted 
together and agreed to treatment.1034 However, issues arose when parents and health 
professionals did not provide environments conducive for children to express their views 
and give their consent, or when parents and children disagreed. Therefore, it is necessary 
for health professionals to be mindful of the factors in the Competence Model to ensure 
children participate. Nonetheless, a mitigating factor was how attuned some health 
professionals in my study were to children’s feelings and views, through children’s non-
verbal cues.1035  
 
In private dentistry, some dentists regarded consent for treatment to also include 
consenting to meet the cost. Whilst dentists could in theory take the sole consent of 
competent children, practically the two are inter-related, as parents could block treatment 
by refusing to pay. While cost was not an issue about which I specifically questioned 
health professionals, it is interesting that it was raised by dentists in private practice, but 
not by GPs, who had experienced parents giving their children the money to meet the 
consultation cost, when they attended alone.1036  
 
However, for other health professionals the rationale for relying upon parental consent 
was deeper, lying in the historical view of children, believing that parents’ authority was 
greater than children’s status. As a consequence, parental decisions/consent prevailed 
over competent children, for example, “the parent has overriding guardianship” 
(Nur8), 1037  and “[w]e were taught for under 16s the guardian was definitely most 
important” (DT2).1038 Following on from this belief, some health professionals feared 
reprisals/complaints from parents if they relied upon children’s consent, as some 
predicted, or had already experienced, parents criticising them for seeking children’s 
opinions on treatment,1039 or taking their consent.1040 Most health professionals were 
mindful of the need to foster and maintain relationships, with both children and parents, 
so that they could work together in partnership.1041 This dynamic needed to be delicately 
balanced to ensure that both parents and children could participate, which was better 
facilitated in some healthcare environments than in others. For example, dentists 
developed strategies to promote partnerships and trust, whereas in the SDS and 
vaccination programme, there were limited opportunities, due to limited time and the 
																																																								
1034 For example see Chapter 10: GP2 (page 207), GP4 (207) and HD6 (200). 
1035 See Chapter 10, page 201 for example: HD1 who sensed a boy was reluctant to undergo a circumcision 
and HD4 who will not operate unless parents have discussed it with their children and the procedure is 
being driven by the children. 
1036 See Chapter 10 page 208: GP4. 
1037 Chapter 10 page 201. 
1038 Chapter 11 page 226. 
1039 For example Chapter 9 page 181: DT1. 
1040 For example Chapter 10 page 219: Nur 6 and Nur7. 
1041 For example Chapter 10 pages 180 and 181: Den3  
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disjointed nature of contact with families.1042 In the vaccination programme, diplomacy 
beyond the parent-child dynamic was needed, as permission of both schools and parents 
was required to enter schools to immunise. As the aim is to immunise as many children 
as possible, in a convenient location, the programme does not wish to cause upset or 
issues for schools and parents. Where parents promote children’s understanding about 
their health, and support them in contributing to decisions and giving consent, children’s 
competence can still develop, and respect can be given to their consent.1043 However, 
where parental support is absent, and/or parents and children disagree on consenting to 
treatment, children’s competence and right to consent are disrespected. Whilst in most 
situations children and parents will reach consensus, there needs to be clear law, 
guidelines and practices to resolve disagreements.  
 
Children are no longer regarded as vulnerable, incapable, or the property of their parents. 
Understandings of children’s capabilities have progressed through theories, such as 
Childhood Studies, Sociocultural and the Capability Approach, and children are viewed 
now as social actors, with agency and voices. Together with the laws of Gillick, UNCRC 
and the COCA, these theories give respect to children’s evolving capacities, with parental 
authority correspondingly diminishing and yielding to children’s competence. Moreover, 
Gillick and the Capability Approach have advanced thinking on children’s autonomy by 
supporting children’s right and freedom to make their own decisions once competent. 
 
Despite this progression in the understanding of the development of children’s 
competence, my research found that most consent processes remained rooted in the 
belief of children becoming competent at a certain age, that being 16 years old. Many 
health professionals lacked an awareness of the law for children consenting, with some 
understanding that children could only do so at 16 years, or only for sexual health 
matters. It is unsurprising that health professionals are uncertain of the law for children 
consenting to health treatment, as it is not clearly stated. However, even amongst those 
who were aware of the law, it lacked influence.1044 There was a sense amongst some 
health professionals that assessing children’s competence and taking their consent was 
optional, as they could proceed with treatment on the strength of parents’ consent. 
Further, there appeared to be detachment between law and practice, their practice having 
formed over many years and become habitual.1045 Some health professionals derived 
security from the practices of their peers, and regarded their policies of more relevance 
than the law.1046 
 
Amongst those health professionals who were aware of the law, some felt that it did not 
sufficiently protect them against professional risk, were they to rely upon their 
																																																								
1042 See Chapter 9 page 174. 
1043 See Chapter 8 pages 161-162 where Anna supported Poppy’s understanding on the vaccinations. 
1044 For example, see Chapter 10 page 198: In practice we don’t do that a lot (HD1); and page 199 “I know 
that someone that is in a position to be able to make a reasonable informed choice can do so, but it is the 
generally accepted thing that the age of consent is 16” (HD3). 
1045 See for example Chapter 11 page 227: SH1 
1046 See Chapter 11 pages 227-228. 
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assessment of children’s competence and their consent.1047 They expressed frustration by 
the constraints of policy,1048 or felt exposed by the process and law,1049 resulting in 
defensive practice. Clearly, the law and professional training are failing these health 
professionals and children. 
 
B.  Rel iance on Chi ldren’s  Consent and Reasons  
 
Nevertheless, there were health conditions and environments where children’s 
competence and consent were routinely respected. For example, children’s competence 
was assessed, and their written consent obtained, for anaesthetics and 
obstetrics/gynecology procedures, and their verbal consent relied on in the SMS and by 
GPs, when children consult alone.  
 
The healthcare environment was a contributing factor, as in the SMS, children attended 
alone, and had time and privacy. However, this does not fully explain the situation, as in 
hospital there was much less time available, and children usually attended with their 
parents, but some doctors still relied on their consent. It appeared that the common 
factor amongst those who routinely obtained consent from children was respect for 
them and their growing autonomy and competence, highlighted by the attitudes of these 
health professionals: 
 
… giving them a sense of empowerment (HD5)  
 
… seems slightly insulting to her that I have to get her parent to sign.” (HD7) 
 
 … it is their body, their decision.” (HD4) 
 
 Int: Do you tend to find there is an age at which the child appears to be capable of giving 
consent? 
GP5: I see it more as a continuum. In some ways a three-year-old gives consent, if you 
are going to do liquid nitrogen. Even a four/five year old, if you say to them ‘can I look 
in your ears’ they are giving consent.  
 
Additionally, although some health professionals may not have routinely obtained 
children’s consent,1050 there was some degree of flexibility in their practices, by taking, 
and relying upon it, for example, when parents were unavailable or unable to consent, 
due to language difficulties, or if children expressed their wish to consent. 1051 
																																																								
1047 See Chapter 10 page 219: Nur6 and Nur7; page 222 DT1. 
1048 See Chapter 10 page 222: “I would want to if they had the age of understanding but I would be 
restrained by the policies” (DT1). 
1049 See Chapter 10 page 219: We didn’t feel we were in a position to be the ones to take the responsibility. 
… We are protecting ourselves. Yes, it does appear she is competent, but do we want to risk that” (Public 
Health, Nur7); and “I feel it is not tight enough via the law” (Nur6). 
1050 See Chapter 10 page 198 for example “[i]n practice we don’t do that a lot, I guess because usually there 
is a parent there” (HD1) and page 207 “[n]ot if they are with their parents, I’m afraid I don’t think of it” 
(GP4).  
1051 See Chapter 10 page 200. 
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Nevertheless, these situations appeared to be default positions, rather than as a deliberate 
means of promoting and respecting their competence and right to consent.  
 
C. Children’s  Views 
 
Confirming the findings of earlier studies, the children in my study were strongly in 
favour of children being included in decision-making and giving consent.1052 For example, 
when reflecting upon their cancer treatment, both Samantha and Amanda believed in 
their rights to be involved and to give consent, supporting the findings of Coyne and 
others, whilst challenging that of Wangmo and others, who found children viewing it as a 
need, rather than a right.1053 Nevertheless, the two are not mutually exclusive, as some 
children may view it in terms of both, depending upon their personalities, values and 
self-esteem. Whilst neither Samantha nor Amanda was specifically asked their opinion on 
whether they differentiated between minor and major decisions, it was clear from their 
responses that they did not do so.1054 This is also consistent with the literature, indicating 
teenagers prefer to be informed and involved in both major and minor decisions.1055  
 
D. Summary o f  Consent Processes  
 
Whilst parents and children commonly gave joint consent, health professionals mostly 
relied upon parents’ consent, regardless of children’s competence. This was most notable 
when written consent was required, such as in hospital, the vaccination programme and 
the SDS. The forms were designed for parents, and despite children’s competence, 
children would not usually be required to sign them. Nevertheless, some health 
professionals were mindful and respectful of children’s competence, having a practice for 
assessing competence and taking their written consent. These health professionals gave 
priority to children’s competence over other factors, such as established practice, their 
perception of parental authority, or fear of exposure to professional risk from parents’ 
challenges. When priority was given to such extraneous factors, children’s health could 
be compromised, by being denied treatment when their parents refused consent. Health 
professionals need to feel empowered and confident to assess and follow children’s 
competence to avoid such situations, and parents need to understand the development of 
competence and children’s rights. 
 
																																																								
1052 See Chapter 11, page 239. 
1053 For example Coyne and others, above n 20 at 35; and Wangmo and others, above n 18 at 17. 
1054 See Chapter 8 page 149 where Samantha felt less stressed by being involved. Also at page 147 Wilma 
described the negative effects to Samantha of the nasogastric tube being forced against Samantha’s will; 
and conversely at page 149 described the positive effect to Samantha of contributing to a major decision. 
See also Chapter 11 page 239 where Amanda clearly regarded inclusion as her right: “It is for them, for 
their sake. They are going through it, not the parents. The parent is not having some bone cut out, or their 
leg chopped off. It is the child and their choice. … Maybe I could have chosen not to have treatment 
(chemotherapy), but obviously I had to. But I still think that everything should go via the patient, no 
matter what age” (Amanda, aged 16). 
1055 For example, Coyne and others, above n 472 at 278. Also, Chapter 10 page 200 where HD3 recalled a 
13-year-old girl whom he would consult with on her view on proceeding with a novel procedure where the 
outcome was uncertain. 
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Conversely, where children refused treatment, counter to their parents’ consent, their 
refusal would be respected, where safety was not at issue. Therefore, despite the law 
being less clear on children’s right to refuse, more respect may be given to it, which 






A. Competence   
 
New Zealand law has had a limited role in defining competence, on occasions, following 
broad criteria, such as sufficient intelligence and maturity, understanding, and the ability 
to foresee the consequences of treatment,1057 and at other times, failing to consider the 
issues of children’s competence to consent entirely.1058 Rather, it rests upon health 
professionals to apply these broad criteria in assessing whether children are sufficiently 
competent to consent. This research has shown that whilst health professionals’ 
processes are organic/informal, rather than prescriptive, they are agreed on the relevant 
criteria.1059 This finding is significant, due to the lack of existing research into how health 
professionals assess competence, and particularly given that my study is trans-disciplinary.  
  
This consensus amongst health professionals, together with the findings that competence 
is relational, involving many interlinking factors, supports the argument that competence 
assessments are best left to health professionals, rather than the courts. Australia’s 
experience highlights the procedural complexity and difficulties that can be encountered 
when courts become over-involved. By categorising health conditions in terms of 
“therapeutic” and “non-therapeutic”,1060 and requiring courts to assess and determine 
whether children are competent in the latter category, has resulted in courts acting as 
gatekeepers to treatment, and intrudes upon child-parent-health professionals 
relationships. In my view, courts’ involvement in assessing children’s competence lacks 
proportionality, as the emotional and financial cost to families of applying to court 
outweighs any benefit, such as, acting as a check and balance for protecting children.1061 
Further, as shown by the experiences in gender dsyphoria cases, there usually was no 
dispute over children’s competence, and courts relied upon the evidence and opinions of 
health professionals, in effect rubber-stamping their assessments. This process moved 
																																																								
1056 See Chapter 10 page 206: GP4 describing waiting for children to understand the pain involved in 
removing a wart; Chapter 9 page 178 and Chapter 10 202 where HD4 respects children’s views and the 
need for children to understand and desire surgery; and Chapter 10 pages 201 and 202 where HD1 also 
expressed respect for children’s views and desire for surgery. 
1057 See Chapters 2 and 3 where Gillick, the Code, PPPR Act s 5 and Professional Guidance are examined. 
1058 See Chapter 2 pages 31-36. 
1059 See Chapter 9 pages 191-192. 
1060 Re Marion, above n 264. 
1061 For example, Re Alex, above n 278; Re Jamie, above n 266; Re Julian, above n 322; Re Mason, above n 
322 where families required to undergo litigation, including a court hearing and involving medical experts, 




away from the essence and context of Gillick – children demonstrating, in a natural 
interaction with health professionals, their level of understanding, maturity and 
intelligence, relative to the decision that requires to be made.  
 
English law also developed complexity, retreating from Gillick, by differentiating between 
competence to consent and competence to refuse treatment.1062  However, competence is 
not simply possessing sufficient understanding, maturity and intelligence to agree with 
health professionals’ advice, but is to make the decision, to either consent to, or refuse it. 
Whilst Gillick did not specifically deal with the refusal of treatment, it supported 
children’s autonomy to make decisions independently from their parents.1063  
 
The focus of competence assessments needs to be on the process of the decision-making, 
and not on the outcome. To differentiate between consent and refusal undermines children’s 
competence. By simply dismissing children as incompetent when they refuse treatment, 
and overruling their decisions without further enquiry, lacks respect for their competence, 
bodily integrity, values, priorities and goals. Protectionists will argue that it is the role of 
adults to safeguard children against making mistakes, but mistakes in whose eyes? In the 
eyes of an adult who possesses a different set of values, attitudes, experiences and goals?  
 
This debate returns to the one of whether children and childhood are valued in their own 
right, or are preparations for adults and adulthood. An example of this was Patrick, who 
featured in Alderson’s study, when he underwent surgery to straighten his back, resulting 
in him looking “normal”, but was unable to play football, which he loved.1064 By focusing 
only on fixing the problem sight is lost of children as people. In my research, Samantha 
experienced this attitude from health professionals until her third operation, such as 
when she was forcibly fitted with a nasogastric tube.1065 Samantha and her mother were 
not given information or options to assist Samantha in coping with its fitting. Whilst 
there may not have been options about whether it was fitted, there were options as to how 
it was fitted. Samantha’s experience is consistent with earlier cancer studies that have 
shown children are not involved in decisions when it may affect the efficacy of treatment, 
including for nasogastric tubes.1066 Contrastingly, other studies have found that some 
health professionals do give children choices for minor procedures in curative situations, 
for example, whether to insert a porth-a-cath, provided these did not affect the overall 
efficacy of the treatment.1067 Yet, in these studies the health professionals’ decisions 
appeared to be based upon the outcome rather than children’s competence. Health 
professionals may be assuming that children will refuse treatment if given the choice, and 
are incompetent when they so refuse. Accordingly the decision is made for them.  
At times courts also focus on the outcome of decisions when children refuse treatment, 
rather than on the process by which they make them. When courts decide on children’s 
																																																								
1062 See Re R, above n 291; Re E, above n 393; Re S, above n 395; Re L, above n 397. 
1063 Gillick, above n 4 at 172 per Lord Fraser; at 184 per Lord Scarman; and at 201 per Lord Templeman 
1064Alderson, “Choosing for Children: Parents’ Consent to Surgery”, above n 20, at 104. 
1065 See Chapter 8, page 147. 
1066 De Vries and others, above n 601 at 6. 
1067 Coyne and others, above n 472 at 278; Ruhe and others, above n 469 at 1149-1153. 
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competence, and determine them as incompetent, there needs to be more transparency 
and clarity on the reasons for them not being competent. It is insufficient to simply say 
that they do not fully understand the consequences or the gravity of the decision, such as, 
in Re E, where the Court considered the child was unable to understand the full 
implications of the process of dying, the manner of death and the extent of family 
suffering.1068 Before deciding that children are incompetent, courts need to specify what 
factors children are lacking and what more is expected from them. Asking probing 
questions brings to the surface the courts’ underlying concerns. To dismiss children as 
ever being competent to make certain decisions focuses too heavily on their age and 
status, and pre-judges the situation.1069  
 
Whilst greater competence is required for more complex and serious decisions, it is 
undermining and belittling of children, and their competence, to say that they will never 
be in a position to understand a medical procedure or treatment, or that they are unable 
make a decision until adulthood. When courts consider applications relating to medical 
treatment, children’s competence needs to be the first consideration, in my view, for if 
competent, children should have the right to make the decision to either consent to, or 
refuse, treatment.  
 
B. Consent  
 
New Zealand law is fragmented. With a gap in COCA, it is necessary to look to the 
common law, other statutes, and regulations to piece together the extent of children’s 
rights to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment. 1070  However, this can lead to 
differences in interpretations and uncertainty, as the data in this study has shown.1071 
Understandably, most health professionals were uncertain of the law, and some 
stakeholders held different views on whether the law provides for children to refuse 
treatment.1072 For some, the law’s lack of clarity inhibited their willingness to rely on 
competent children’s consent.1073  
 
In Scotland the position is clearer, with a statutory right for children under the age of 16 
years to consent,1074 and most likely refuse treatment,1075  when they understand the 
nature and possible consequences of the treatment. Certainty and clarity are likely to be 
																																																								
1068 Re E, above n 384. Likewise in Re S, above n 384 and Re L, above n 386, where the children were not 
informed of the process of dying due to its distressing nature. The children cannot be deemed incompetent 
without the necessary information and in any event how can anyone understand the full implications of 
dying? 
1069 For example Re Alex, above at 278. 
1070 See Chapter 3 where New Zealand legal context is considered. 
1071 See Chapter 11 pages 225-228.  
1072  See Chapter 11 page 228 where two stakeholders employed by the same DHB had different 
understandings of whether children have the right to refuse treatment. 
1073 See Chapter 10 page 219. 
1074 ALCSA s 2(4). 
1075 Whilst the ALCSA does not specify refusal, and there is an absence of case law to clarify the issue, it is 
likely that it would be interpreted to include refusal: Norrie, above n 14 at 436; Wilkinson and Norrie, 
above n 14 at 480; SLC, above n 14 at [3.77]; John Houston, above n 14 at 945 per Sheriff J McGowan. 
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contributing factors to the absence of case law in Scotland, but without further research, 
it cannot be fully explained.  
 
 
V. Recommendat ions 
 
This research has found inconsistencies in the approaches of courts when deciding 
medical consent issues, and in the practices of health professionals, when taking consent. 
Some health professionals were uncertain of the law, whilst for others, there was the 
sense that following it was optional, with established practice or policy being of more 
relevance.1076 Some expressed apprehension that the law was too uncertain to provide 
them with protection and security, if they relied upon children’s consent.1077 Therefore, 
the following recommendations are aimed at providing greater clarity, certainty, 
confidence and consistency in both the law and practice.  
 
A. Review of  Health Profess ional Guidel ines  
 
Health professional guidelines, standards and policies, and universities’ seminars/courses 
on competence and consent, should be reviewed, and where necessary updated.1078 It is 
essential that these are consistent and align with the law, particularly as my research 
found that professional guidance, policies and peers guide some health professionals 





1076 See Chapter 10 page 198 for example- “My understanding is that if you are happy that the child 
understands and has the appropriate level of competence to understand what you are talking about then 
potentially a child can do their own consent form. In practice we don’t do that a lot, I guess because 
usually there is a parent there. … We don’t commonly get 14/15 year olds to do their own consent.” 
(Paediatric surgeon, HD1) 
1077 See Chapter 10, pages 219 for example “We are protecting ourselves. Yes, it does appear she is 
competent, but do we want to risk that” (Nur7) and “I feel it is not tight enough via the law. I don’t know 
the law that well, but I am not convinced that we are covered safely” (Nur6). 
1078 For example, between 2017 and 2018, the Dental Council undertook a process to review its informed 
consent practice standards, and produced its final document in May 2018. The document clearly defines 
competence and the rights of children under the age of 16 years by giving direction on the criteria for 
competence, the informed consent process, and children’s rights to consent to, or refuse, dental treatment: 
Chapter 3 pages 43. See Chapter 3 pages 43-44: where inconsistencies amongst DHB Informed Consent 
Policies are highlighted. For example, Canterbury DHB’s Policy on Informed Consent dated June 2015 at 
pages 16-17 refers to the Guardianship Act, and despite stating that there is no age for giving informed 
consent, goes on to direct that parental consent is required with the child being involved as much as 
possible and agreement sought where possible. This policy indicated that it would be reviewed in June 
2016, and so may have been superseded, but if so, has not been made public. On the other hand Waikato 
DHB’s policy dated 1 June 2017 at 5.1 states that competence is not linked to age and that children under 
16 years can give consent if fully competent and Capital and Coast DHB considers the provisions under 
the COCA.  
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B. Educat ion Opportunit i es  for  Health Profess ionals  and the Publ i c 
 
Professional development opportunities on competence and consent through seminars, 
workshops and courses would provide health professionals with opportunities to clarify 
their understanding and processes, and apply the law to complex practical situations. My 
research has given an indication of health professionals’ lack of knowledge and 
misunderstanding of the law,1079 together with some of the barriers to them accepting 
competent children’s consent. 1080  By having collegial opportunities to undertake 
professional development/training, health professionals may derive support and 
confidence, by reinforcing best practice, and discussing issues they have encountered, or 
are of concern, to them. My Competence Model may be of use in such training events to 
help explain and summarise the multitude of factors influencing children’s competence, 
and reinforcing health professionals’ and parents’ responsibilities in supporting children’s 
competence. 
 
Of equal importance is the need to raise public awareness of children’s competence and 
right to consent. This would result in a greater understanding of how children’s 
competence develops and can be supported, and people will know better what to expect 
when consulting with health professionals. This could be done through leaflets, websites, 
and schools, if supported by agencies such the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, 
Office of Children’s Commissioner, and school principals/boards. 
 
C. Competence Toolkit  and Revis ion o f  Consent Forms 
 
Further supporting the education and practice of health professionals, a collection of 
health and legal agencies/personnel could consult, draft and produce guidance on the law, 
together with a universal process or ‘toolkit’ for assessing competence. It has been 20 
years since the Ministry of Health produced its “Consent in Child and Youth Health: 
Information for Practitioners”,1081 and whilst it remains a valuable and practical resource, 
it could be updated. 
 
Also through this process, a universally applicable toolkit for assessing competence could 
be developed. Some health professionals in my study expressed concern over assessing, 
or relying on, their competence assessments. This may provide health professionals with 
reassurance about the universally recognised criteria amongst health professionals, and 
the expected or advised process. It would need to be easy and quick to use to make it 
practical, and could be based upon either the BMA’s toolkit,1082 or the criteria and 
process in Appendix A. 
 
																																																								
1079 See Chapter 11, pages 225-227. 
1080 See Chapter 10 page 218-219 nurses feeling exposed by the law in the vaccination programme; page 
222-223 dental therapists bound by “policy” and parental authority; page 226 established practice of 
hospital doctors; and page 199 from the belief that children need to be 16 years. 
1081 Ministry of Health, above n 93. 
1082British Medical Association, above n 414. 
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Additionally, this group of experts could review the written consent forms used in 
hospital, SDS and the vaccination programme, to consider whether they need to be in 
more child-friendly language, and whether children should provide co-consent.  
 
D. Amend the Care o f  Chi ldren Act 2004 
 
Amending the COCA to give competent children the right to consent to, or refuse, 
medical treatment could be achieved by inserting a new sub-section (2) into section 36. 
This sub-section would provide for children under the age of 16 years to consent to, or 
refuse, medical treatment, where they demonstrate sufficient understanding of the nature 
and possible consequences of that treatment, and are able to communicate and make the 
treatment decision. It would not affect section 36(1), which presumes young people are 
competent, or section 38 that presumes children/young people of any age are competent 
to consent to, or refuse, an abortion. Preserving these sections would continue to protect 
children/young people’s competence and autonomy, whilst also retaining the clarity of 
the current law in respect of these two groups of children/young people. 
 
Alternatively, section 36(1) could be amended by removing the age threshold, and the 
words “as if the child were of full age”, and inserting the same competence criteria as 
outlined above. In this proposal section 38 would be repealed, it being subsumed within 
the general provision of section 36. However, this option is less promising, as discussed 
below, when I weigh up the advantages/disadvantages of the proposals. 
 
In addition, section 16(1)(c) should also be amended to clearly state that parental rights, 
responsibilities and duties should be exercised in a manner consistent with children’s 
evolving competence, on a sliding scale from direction to guidance. This aligns with 
article 5 of the UNCRC, and is consistent with the proposed amendments, as parents 
have more involvement when children’s competence is developing, than when children 
attain the competence to make decisions and give consent. 
 
The primary advantage of these amendments is that they provide greater clarity of 
children’s legal position. My research has shown that clarity is needed, as the law is 
fragmented amongst statutes, regulations and case law; courts have taken inconsistent 
approaches to children’s competence and their rights to consent;1083 and most health 
professionals in my study were uncertain, and understandable confused, about the law.1084 
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the majority of health professionals were 
unsupportive of a law change. They had not encountered problems in practice, the law 
lacked influence in their practice, and they sought to preserve the flexibility of the current 
law. However, a minority of health professionals and most stakeholders supported a law 
change to provide greater clarity. Both those resistant to, and in favour of, change 
expressed the desire for the law to be flexible.1085 Clarity and flexibility would be possible 
																																																								
1083 See Chapter 3, New Zealand Legal Context. 
1084 See Chapter 11, Knowledge, Understanding and Reform of the Law on Children Consenting, page 
225- 228. 
1085 See Chapter 11 pages 230 and 235. 
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with the proposed amendment, as the competence criteria are sufficiently broad. It is 
essential that the law retains flexibility, due to the varied and complex situations health 
professionals encounter, and also has criteria that can be easily applied and assessed by 
health professionals. Whilst competence must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, the 
application of objective criteria would assist in reducing inconsistencies and aid children’s 
and parents’ understanding of the assessments. This is likely to be of particular 
importance when there are disagreements between parents and children, and is also 
consistent with the my recommendations of education opportunities and the use of a 
toolkit for competence assessments. My Competence Model may also be of assistance in 
supporting health professionals’ and parents’ to understand the factors that influence 
children’s competence.  
 
In addition, most of the children strongly supported their rights to participate and 
consent being respected, 1086  such as Donald - “It is not just people over the age of 16 
[years] who should have their voice heard to do stuff to you and your health” (Donald, 
aged 11).1087 The children had experienced the benefits of inclusion,1088 and for some, the  
detriments of exclusion.1089 Parents too were supportive of children’s inclusion, desiring 
to work in partnership with them.1090 Effectively codifying Gillick in a new section 36(2) 
of the COCA would not detract from the importance of guardianship rights, duties and 
responsibilities. Health policies and professional guidelines, sitting beneath the legislation, 
should promote triadic relationships with children and parents, and where appropriate, 
encourage children to involve their parents, when they consult alone. My Competence 
Model may be a useful tool to support health professionals in their assessments of 
children’s competence, as it encapsulates the intersecting elements influencing children’s 
competence. For example, in order for children to voice their understanding to health 
professionals, they need support and space. Further, the Competence Model could be 
used as a training/educational tool for medical students, health professionals and parents, 
to show the complex nature of competence, and how they can best promote children’s 
competence. This is important given the findings of this, and existing studies, showing 
children’s competence to be relational,1091 and commonly parents and children giving 
joint consent.1092 In New Zealand, these findings are of particular significance for Māori 
culture, which traditionally is less individualistic. Whilst no Māori whānau participated in 
this study to share their perspectives and experiences, three Māori stakeholders, 
supporting Māori tamariki and whānau with a longterm health condition, acknowledged 
not only the importance of involving families, but also promoting children’s 
																																																								
1086 See Chapter 11 pages 239-240.  
1087 See Chapter 11, Knowledge, Understanding and Reform of the Law on Children Consenting, page 239. 
1088 For example see Chapter 8 page 149: Samantha was more committed to her recovery; page 157 trust 
developed between Laura and Alistair; page 160 Donald felt better able to cope with dental treatment; and 
page 164 Poppy was less anxious. 
1089 This was most significantly experienced by Samantha. See Chapter 8 pages 145-147. 
1090 Chapter 11, Knowledge, Understanding and Reform of the Law on Children Consenting, page 237-239. 
1091 See Chapter 5, Literature Review; Chapter 8, The Experiences of Children and Parents in the Consent 
Processes; and Chapter 9, Promoting and Assessing Children’s Competence, Part II. 
1092 See Chapter 10, The Consent Processes; Wiering and others, above n 600 at 64; Alderson, Children’s 
Consent to Surgery above 20 at 148-149; Kilkelly and Donnelly, above n 21 at 67. 
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independence and responsibility. They found that the environment in which they spoke 
to children was important. When children are at school, they absorb “the information 
more, because they are independent” and “are more grown up”, but that “around their 
parents they are more babyish … and don’t take responsibility for their health as much” 
(NGO, SH10). Further research in this area, including Māori whānau, would reveal how 
they support their tamariki’s competence and make health decisions.   
 
As this study showed, there were inconsistencies in health professionals’ practices of 
taking children’s consent, with some not assessing children’s competence, and/or relying 
on parental consent, rather than relying on competent children’s consent.1093 Taking 
children’s consent not only respects their rights and competence, but also, their 
participation provides positive benefits.1094 It seems incongruous that the COCA does 
not provide for children under 16 years giving consent to, or refusing, general medical 
treatment, given that it recognises: certain rights of children;1095 the rights of children 
over 16 years to consent to, or refuse, general medical treatment;1096 and also the rights of 
girls to consent to, or refuse, an abortion.1097  
 
Secondly, clearly stating children’s rights in one statute simplifies the law. This, in turn, 
should reinforce to health professionals the importance of assessing children’s 
competence, and provide them with the confidence to rely on competent children’s 
decisions. Commonly, such decisions are made collectively with parents and health 
professionals, but as this research showed, there was uncertainty and insecurity amongst 
some health professionals in taking children’s consent, when parents had failed to 
provide their consent.1098 The proposed amendments should give clarity to competent 
children’s consent being relied on, as guardianship rights would yield to children’s 
competence.1099 This is consistent with children’s evolving capacity reflected in the 
COCA, section 16(1)(c);1100 Gillick;1101 and the UNCRC, article 5. Otherwise, overriding 
competent children’s decisions reduces them to an expression of their views, and 
undermines children’s competence. 
 
Thirdly, if the age threshold was removed, it would reinforce and support what this, and 
existing, research has found; that the ability and rights to consent/refuse are not based 
on age.1102 It is competence that unlocks these rights. Nonetheless, one significant 
disadvantage to this proposal is that it would remove the presumption of competence for 
young people, which currently exists. The implication is that health professionals would 
																																																								
1093 See for example, Chapter 10, pages 198-201, 209, 211-212, 220 and 224-225. 
1094 See Chapter 11, Knowledge, Understanding and Reform of the Law on Children Consenting, page 
237-239; and for example, Lambert, Glacken and McCarron, above n 20 at 3097; Garth, Murphy and 
Reddihough, above n 71 at 48; Miller and Jawad, above n 611 at 187; Coyne and others, above n 472 at 278. 
1095 COCA s 3. 
1096 COCA s 36(1). 
1097 COCA s 38. 
1098 See Chapter 10 page 219: Nur6 and Nur7; page 222 DT1. 
1099 Gillick, f/n 4 at 184 per Lord Scarman; Hawthorne v Cox, f/n 9. 
1100 See page 24. 
1101 See page 10-11. 
1102 See Chapter 5 pages 85-86 and Chapter 9 page 194. 
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be required to assess young people’s competence, rather than only doing so only if they 
had some indication of young people’s decision-making capacity being compromised. 
Further, it is possible that some health professionals may assume that this change 
requires them to take parental consent, instead of young people’s, as some do presently 
when treating children.1103 Thus, these weaknesses make this proposal less preferable 
than adding a new section 36(2).  
 
When health professionals are uncertain about the level of children’s competence to 
make a specific decision, they could either take the joint consent of parents and 
children,1104 if they are in agreement, or otherwise seek an expert opinion on the level of 
children’s competence. This would be appropriate in exceptional cases, where, for 
example, children disagreed with their parents and/or health professional, or the decision 
was a complex one. They should clearly document the basis for their assessments in such 
cases, and would also seek advice from their legal advisors, ethics committee and 
professional regulatory bodies. Health professionals should be immune from liability, as 
they would be when taking adults’ consent, provided they follow the law and 
professional guidelines, and act reasonably and in good faith.  
 
In the event that children are assessed as being competent, they can lawfully give, or 
withold, their consent. Their decisions should not be overruled on the basis of welfare 
and best interests principles. Competence means having the ability to make a decision, 
and this should not be undermined by someone else’s subjective judgement based on 
welfare and best interests. The English case law demonstrated how the courts, when 
focusing on welfare and best interests, either failed to apply competence criteria, or 
otherwise raised the threshold of what children were required to meet.1105 This subjective 
approach may make it difficult for health professionals to have confidence in their 
competence assessments.1106  
  
In theory, amending the COCA, by inserting a new sub-section (2) into section 36, as 
proposed, should not be an issue, as Gillick is already accepted law in New Zealand. The 
COCA would simply reflect the common law. Crucially, the provision should be drafted 
in such a way that it is not reduced to simply an expression of children’s views. 
Nevertheless, there would need to be a consultation process to consider submissions on 
such law reforms, including representatives from tangata whenua, to ensure that the 
Treaty of Waitangi and tikanga Māori are respected and considered. The most 
controversial aspect of these proposals is likely to be the yielding of guardianship rights 
to competent children’s rights, and their decisions not being overidden on the basis of 
																																																								
1103 See Chapter 11, Knowledge, Understanding and Reform of the Law on Children Consenting, pages 
225-226. 
1104 This was the practice of HD5. See Chapter 10, page 199. 
1105 See Chapter 4, part III section D. 
1106 For example, in An NHS Trust v ABC and A Local Authority, above n 206 at [6] an application was made 
for declaratory relief to avoid professional risk or crticism. It sought either a declaration that it would be in 
the interests of a 13-year-old girl to terminate her pregnancy if the Court deemed her incompetent to 
consent, or if deemed competent “a declaration to that effect so that the position is put beyond doubt and 
that any later criticisms of the Trust, in taking the steps that they did, can be deflected” (emphasis added).  
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welfare and best interests principles. Whilst the most obvious drafting would be in terms 
of Gillick, it would be open to Parliament to enact it differently, such as making it a 
conditional right based on the welfare and best interest principles,1107 or exclude the right 
to refuse treatment.1108 However, in my view the most straightforward approach, and the 
one that gives most respect to children’s competence and rights to self-determination 
and dignity, is if Gillick was enacted into statute, and no distinction was made between 
competence to consent, and competence to refuse, treatment, as competence relates to 
making the decision. Distinguishing between consent and refusal has the effects of failing to 
respect children’s competence, raising the competence threshold, or presuming that 
children are incompetent, as experienced in England.1109 My view is supported by the 
theories of Childhood Studies, Sociocultural Theory and the Capability Approach 
together, that regard children as having autonomy and agency, as their competence 
develops. In particular, the Capability Approach supports the view that once people have 
acquired functionings, they have the right and freedom to make decisions, which accord 
with their values and goals.  
 
Finally, by incorporating Gillick into the COCA I do not anticipate a flood of litigation 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, this is the current position in the law and there have not 
been a huge numbers of cases. Secondly, most parents and children agree on treatment, 
but when there are disagreements, these are generally managed within the healthcare 
setting. Thirdly, Scotland has a similar provision to the one proposed and there is 
virtually no case law in this area. Conversely, there are significant lines of authority in 
Australian and English Law.1110 Leaving competence assessments to health professionals, 
unless there is a challenge to that process or decision, and clearly stating in law children’s 




E. The Legal  Capaci ty  o f  Chi ldren Act  
 
Alternative legal reform is to enact a new statute, named “The Legal Capacity of Children 
Act” (LCCA). LCCA would regulate when children can lawfully engage in acts of legal 
consequence, one of which would be giving consent to, or refusal of, medical, surgical 
and dental treatment. This provision would be in similar terms to Gillick, namely that 
children under the age of 16 years can consent, or refuse, on their own behalf to any 
medical, surgical or dental treatment or procedure, where they demonstrate sufficient 
understanding of the nature and possible consequences of that treatment, and are able to 
communicate and make the treatment decision. LCCA would be similar to that of the 
ALCSA. If enacted, sections 36 to 38 of the COCA would be repealed and inserted in 
the LCCA. 
																																																								
1107 COCA ss 4 and 5. 
1108 This is the position of Australia and England examined in Chapter 4 pages 58-60 (Australian Law) and 
63-69 (English Law). 
1109 See Chapter 4 pages 63-69. 




One merit of a separate statute is that its focus is on children’s competence and agency, 
rather than in the welfare context of the COCA, where Courts could decide that 
guardianship rights and/or best interests usurp competent children’s decisions. LCCA 
would embed competent children’s rights and freedom to make health decisions in 
law.1111 
 
Further, this provision would be consistent with the Code, in the sense that the Code 
contains rights regulating the informed consent processes, such as, the right to be fully 
informed,1112 and the right to make an informed choice and give informed consent,1113 
and is also in line with NZBORA, giving everyone the right to refuse consent.1114 For 
clarity and cohesiveness, the COCA would require amending by removing sections 36 to 
38 and inserting them into LCCA. 
 
No distinction is made between consenting and refusing in this provision, for the reasons 
discussed above. Once competent, the right to make the decision rests with the patient. 
However, as competence is decision specific, there will be differing levels of 
understanding required in each situation.  
 
Whilst LCCA provides for children’s rights, it does not preclude parents from exercising 
their crucial roles of promoting children’s competence and supporting their decision-
making. Although parents and children mostly agree on treatment, a statutory right for 
children respects their competence and growing autonomy.  
 
Further, for health practitioners, such a statute and provision would provide clarity in the 
law, reinforcing that they should be proceeding with treatment on competent children’s 
consent. On the rare occasions where parents and children disagree, a clear legal 
provision could assist them. In practice, there would be no change for health 
professionals who routinely assess children’s competence and rely on it, and for those 
unaccustomed to doing so, they may gain reassurance and assistance from the 
recommended professional guidance, education or a competence assessment toolkit.  
 
Nevertheless, as with the above law reform proposals, there would need to be a 
consultation process, particularly from representatives from tangata whenua, to ensure 
that the Treaty of Waitangi and tikanga Māori are respected and considered. The most 
controversial aspect of this proposal, which could be seen as being in conflict with Māori 
culture and values, is the potential autonomy of children when making decisions. The 
LCCA would need to be clear that the rights of children do not negate parental rights, 
responsibilities and duties to guide and advise children. The COCA, professional 
guidance and policies would promote such involvement. 
 
																																																								
1111 Underpinning of this is found in the Capability Approach. See Chapter 6 pages 115-118.  
1112 Code Right 6. 
1113 Code Right 7(1). 
1114 NZBORA, s 11.  
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Two major barriers to the proposed law reforms are securing political will and parents’ 
understanding. Whilst the amendments to the COCA and the LCCA reflect Gillick, and 
therefore the current law in New Zealand, they would be a blatant and public declaration 
that children can be competent and independent agents, whose rights cannot be 
overridden by a welfare and best interests test. Despite a change in Government since 
the COCA was passed, it is likely that this would be a step too far for Parliament. Given 
the lack of attention and understanding of this area of law, together with the support for 
guardianship rights when COCA was debated, it is unlikely to receive the backing of 
politicians and voters. Compounding this, most parents are unlikely to support such a 
move, as it could be perceived by them as losing control, and handing power over to 
their children. This perception is likely, in light of New Zealand only having moved from 
viewing children as objects of concern and ownership, to individuals with rights and 
capacities, in 2004, with the passing of the COCA, and only removing the legal defence 
of reasonable force from the Crimes Act 1961 in 2007. It is likely to be some time before 
such law reforms will receive public support or be passed in Parliament.1115   
 
 
VI. Conc lus ion 
 
This thesis centred on competence and consent within different healthcare environments 
(hospital, private, school and community youth health), and in various health areas 
(medicine, surgery and dentistry), exploring children’s, parents’, health professionals’ and 
stakeholders’ experiences and views. Children and parents provided powerful insights, 
rarely seen in research, illuminating the importance and benefits of children participating 
and their competence being supported and respected. Equally valuable were the 
perceptions of health professionals, providing understanding of their practices of 
assessing children’s competence and obtaining consent. By having greater awareness of 
the dynamic between children, parents and health professionals, and of the factors 
promoting and constraining children’s competence, greater attention and respect can be 
given to children’s competence. The findings of this study confirmed that competence is 
not age related, but rather relational, dependent on many interlinking factors, both 
internal and external to children. Emerging also were the inconsistencies within and 
across health professionals’ practice in obtaining consent. By responding to the need for 
empirical data on medical consent processes, and applying the theories of Childhood 
studies, Sociocultural Theory and the Capability Approach, they demonstrated that 
children’s competence evolves through the scaffolding of those more experienced, and 
that once children are competent, their right to make health decisions, and to give, or 
refuse, consent, need to be respected. As such age-based laws, policies and practices, 
defining consent, are not reflective of how and when children develop competence to 
consent. The essence of children’s competence was eloquently summarised by one GP, 
when reflecting on youth health, when she said that informed consent is about:  
																																																								
1115 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 s 59. The level of discontent is highlighted by 
the citizens-initiated referendum in 2009 when the public were asked to vote on whether “a smack as part 




… talking with the young person and asking opinions and questioning them in a non-
judgmental way, and questioning your own judgment …. [T]hey are going from child 
dependent to adult independent, and in order to help in that journey it is always asking 
questions and opinions and listening, so they learn to feel that their opinion is counted 
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Dr Appelbaum’s Legally Relevant Criteria for Assessing 
Decision-making Capacities1116 
 












Ask patients to 
indicate a 
treatment choice. 
Have you decided 
whether to follow 
your doctor’s … 
recommendation 
for treatment? Can 
you tell me what 
the decision is? [If 
no decision] what 
is making it hard 
for you to decide? 
Frequent reversal 
of choice because 
of psychiatric or 
neurological 
conditions may 


















Please tell me in 
your own words 
what your doctor 
… told you about: 
the problem with 




and risks; the risks 
and benefits of no 
treatment. 
Information to be 
understood 
includes nature of 
patient’s condition, 
nature and 
purpose of … 
treatment, possible 
benefits and risks 
of that treatment 
and alternative 
approaches … and 
benefits and risks. 
Appreciate the 







Ask patient to 





What … is wrong 
with your health 
now? Do you 
believe that you 
need some kind of 
treatment? What is 
treatment likely to 
do for you? … 
What do you 
believe if you are 
not treated; why 
do you think your 





patients who do 
not acknowledge 
their illness … 





of distortion or 
denial are the most 




Engage in a 








to offer reasons 
for selection of 
option. 
How did you 









focuses on the 
process by which a 
decision is 
reached, not the 
outcome of the 
patient’s choice, 
since patients have 
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Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health 
Care? 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we 
thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we 
thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
Fiona Miller is collecting the information as part of her PhD study on children’s 
participation in managing, and providing consent to, medical and dental treatment. There 
are three principal aims of this project:  
1. To consider the current practice of health practitioners in assessing the capacity 
of children under the age of 16 years regarding their consent to, or refusal of, 
medical, surgical and dental treatment. 
2.  To consider the experiences and views of child patients and their 
parents/guardians in this process.  
3.  To consider whether the law and policy on consent processes with child patients is 
satisfactory or needs amendment.  
 
What Type of Participants is Being Sought?  
1. Health professionals such as General Practitioners, hospital-based doctors, 
nurses and dentists, and school nurses who treat children under the age of 16, 




2. Family Members: Children aged between 5 and 15 years who have, or have had, 
a medical or dental condition requiring treatment over a period of at least six 
months within the last two years, and adult parents/guardians who have attended 
at least two medical/dental appointments with the child.  
3. Key informants, such as policy makers, professional advisers, judges and lawyers, 
who have a role in the regulation and support of health professionals, or have a 
role in the development of the law, policy or practice on children giving informed 
consent to medical, surgical or dental treatment.  
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in a taped 
interview of around 30-45 minutes with Fiona Miller. The interview will be conducted at 
a time and venue convenient to you.  
 
Organisations who support children with their health conditions are also invited to pass 
on information about the study to families they consider might be interested in 
participating in the study. An information sheet for parents and a separate one for 
children will be provided which can be passed onto families. An advertisement flyer is 




What are the topics of discussion? 
Health professionals 
The discussion will follow your procedures from when you meet with the child patient 
and his/her family and impart information, through to obtaining consent and carrying 
out/prescribing the treatment. The questions will also explore any issues and concerns 
relating to this process, and the regulation of it in professional practice guidelines and in 
law.  
 
Children and Family Members     
With the consent of a parent/guardian, Fiona would like to speak with children aged 
between 5 and 15 years. She would also like to first speak with one or both of the 
child’s parents/guardians who have attended with the child at two or more appointments 
with health practitioners. Discussions will focus on children’s and adults’ perspectives of 
the interactions children have had with health professionals, including the explanations 
given, consent processes and how decisions are taken on the child’s treatment. Fiona is 
aiming to speak with 10 children and 10-20 parents/guardians in the Wellington and 
Hutt Valley areas.  
 
Key Informants            
Discussion will explore the regulation and policy regarding children under 16 consenting 




What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be 
Made of it?     
The information to be collected will be your responses to the questions about consent 
processes, together with brief demographic data regarding your gender, ethnicity, age-
range, locality, and for professionals, your role and length of professional experience. 
With your agreement the research interview will be taped so that key themes can be 
identified, and relevant quotes and examples of practice can be retrieved, for inclusion in 
the doctoral thesis and journal publications.  
Only Fiona and her supervisors will have access to the information you and the other 
participants provide. The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only 
they will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be 
retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the 
participants [such as contact details and audio tapes after they have been transcribed] will 
be destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the 
research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
 
An overview of the key themes emerging through all the interviews with participants will 
be analysed. Anonymous quotes and examples of practice will also be included to 
illustrate these themes. No individual or their location will be identified without their 
consent.  
 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your 
anonymity. 
 
You will be offered a copy of your interview summary and will have the opportunity to 
correct or withdraw any information you provide at any time in the period following the 
interview and prior to conclusion of the thesis or publication of any journal articles. 
 
At the conclusion of the project, Fiona will be pleased to provide you with a copy of a 
summary of the research findings and any journal articles written. In addition, she is very 
willing to attend any continuing professional development seminars to discuss the 
findings with you and your colleagues. 
 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Participants Do if They Want to Take Part or Have any 
Questions? If you would like to take part or if you have any questions about our 
project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either:- 
Fiona Miller           and/or                                 Associate Professor Nicola Taylor 
Work: 04 801 5156 (Mon, Wed, Fri) Children’s Issues Centre, University of 
Otago 
Cell: 021 0297 4568 University Telephone Number:    (09) 373 
9717 
Email:milfi176@student.otago.ac.nz Email: nicola.taylor@otago.ac.nz    
	
	 296	
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human 
Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 














































  Adult’s Consent Form                                                    
 
 
                     Reference 13/279 
          23 December 2013 
 
  
Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am 
free to request further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information [e.g. audio-recordings] will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project, but any raw data on which the results of the project 
depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve 
my anonymity.  
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................    ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)      
 (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any 






  Appendix D 
 
Letter to Health Professionals 
 
                                                                                 Reference 13/279 
                              23 December 2013 
 
   
Dear Health Practitioner,              
Research Project: Consent to Medical and Dental Treatment  
by Children Under 16 Years of Age 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in the research I am undertaking for my PhD at the 
University of Otago, Faculty of Law, under the supervision of Associate Professor 
Nicola Taylor and Professor Mark Henaghan. The research is about the involvement of 
children under the age of 16 years in consent processes and decision-making regarding 
medical, surgical and dental treatment. This is with a view to considering whether the 
current law and policy is adequate or in need of amendment.  
I would like to interview a diverse range of health practitioners, such as General 
Practitioners, hospital doctors, nurses and dentists and school nurses who treat children, 
and also support organisations who work with children who have health conditions. I 
have enclosed information about my study and am writing to invite you to take part in a 
30-45 minute taped interview with me. I can interview you at a time and place that is 
most convenient to you. Strict guidelines regarding confidentiality will be observed so 
that every endeavour will be made to ensure you remain anonymous. This study has been 
approved by the Human Ethics Committee at the University of Otago. 
Please phone or email me if you would like to take part in the study or if you have any 
questions. 
I appreciate your consideration of my request.  










 Appendix E 
 
 Letter to Key Stakeholders 
 
Reference 13/279 
            23 December 2013 
 
  
Dear Stakeholder,              
Research Project about Consent to Medical and Dental Treatment 
by Children Under 16 Years of Age 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in the research I am undertaking for my PhD at the 
University of Otago, Faculty of Law under the supervision of Associate Professor Nicola 
Taylor and Professor Mark Henaghan. The research is about the involvement of children 
under the age of 16 years in consent processes and decision-making regarding medical, 
surgical and dental treatment. This is with a view to considering whether the current law 
and policy is adequate or in need of amendment.  
I intend to interview a wide range of health professionals, families, children, and 
professionals who have a role in the development of the law, practice or policy on 
children giving informed consent. I have enclosed information about the study and am 
writing to invite you to participate in a taped interview with me at a time and place that is 
most convenient to you. The interview would take about 30-45 minutes. 
Strict guidelines regarding confidentiality will be observed so that every endeavour will be 
made to ensure you remain anonymous. This study has been approved by the Human 
Ethics Committee at the University of Otago. 
Please phone or email me if you would like to take part or if you have any questions. 
I appreciate your consideration of my request.  
Yours sincerely, 
Fiona Miller                              and/or  Associate Professor Nicola Taylor 
Work: 04 801 5156 (Mon, Wed, Fri) Children’s Issues Centre, 
University of Otago 
Cell: 021 0297 4568 University Telephone Number: (09) 373 
9717 






	 	 Appendix F 
 
Letter to Parents 
	
Reference 13/279 
23 December 2013 
          
              
  
 
Dear Parent(s) or Guardian(s), 
Research Project about Consent to Medical and Dental Treatment  
by Children Under 16 Years of Age 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in the research I am undertaking for my PhD at the 
University of Otago under the supervision of Associate Professor Nicola Taylor and 
Professor Mark Henaghan.  You must have a child between 5 and 15 years who has a 
health condition, either medical or dental. I am very grateful to you for giving me your 
time and considering whether just you, or you and your child, would like to take part in 
this research. It may be that a support organisation that you or your child consults with 
has sent you details of the research of my behalf, or you have heard about the research 
and have asked me for more information. 
I believe it is really important to hear from families and children about their experiences 
of consulting with health professionals in the management and decision-making of your 
child’s health condition. I would like to hear about such things as how involved you feel 
your child is, or should be, in discussions and consent processes with health 
professionals, and how decisions on the management of your child’s health are taken. 
This will be an important part of my research in considering whether the law needs to be 
changed. 
I have enclosed information that gives details of my study and am inviting you to 
consider taking part in an interview with me of around 30-45 minutes duration. I would 
also like you to consider whether your child might be able to participate in the study too.  
The interviews could take place at your home or at another place suitable for you or your 
child. Please note that what I am told will be confidential and will not be passed onto 
your healthcare professionals or any other organisation.  
Strict guidelines regarding confidentiality will be observed so that every endeavour will be 
made to ensure you remain anonymous. If you agree to take part I will ask you to sign a 
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consent form, and to agree to your child’s participation by signing a separate consent 
form on their behalf. I will also check before I interview your child that your child is 
happy to take part – they have a consent form to sign too.  
This study has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee at the University of 
Otago. 
Please phone or email me if you would like to take part or if you have any questions.  
I appreciate your consideration of my request.  




Fiona Miller, PhD Student   and/or Associate Professor Nicola Taylor 
Work: 04 801 5156 (Mon, Wed, Fri) Children’s Issues Centre, University of Otago 
Mobile: 021 0297 4568   University Telephone Number: (09) 373 9717 




























  Appendix G 
 
Parents’ Consent Form  
 
Reference 13/279 




Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARENTS/GUARDIANS ON BEHALF OF THEIR 
CHILD 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am 
free to request further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My child’s participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
2. I am free to withdraw my child from the project at any time without any 
disadvantage; 
3. Personal identifying information, such as audio-recordings will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project 
depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve 
my child’s anonymity. 
5.  The researchers will contact me prior to my child being interviewed. 
 
I agree for my child to take part in this project. 
 
.............................................................................    ............................... 
      (Signature of parent/guardian)      (Date) 
 
Name:……………………………………………………… Ph: ……………………… 
 
Address:……………………………………………………  Email:……………………. 
 





  Appendix H 
 
Children/Young People’s Information Sheet 
 
Reference 13/279 




Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
 
Thanks for taking the time to read this to learn more about my study and to see whether 
or not you would like to take part. If you do decide to – that’s great, thank you! But if 
you would rather not, that is fine. Whether you agree to take part or not is completely up 
to you. 
 
Why am I doing the study? 
I am Fiona Miller and I am studying at the University of Otago. I am studying about 
children consenting (agreeing) to medical or dental treatment. What this means is, when 
you go to the hospital, doctor or dentist, are you asked what you think about receiving 
any treatment?  
I think it is really important that children and young people get to have their say. So 
that’s why I want to talk to you – so I can find out what you think. That way we may be 
able to help adults, like doctors, nurses and dentists, think how it could be better for 
children and young people, and help to make things better for other children and young 
people. 
Who is taking part? 
I would like to talk to 10 children and young people between the ages of 5 and 15 years.  
I will also be talking to some adults such as Mums and Dads, doctors, dentists and nurses. 
I may not be talking to your doctor, dentist or nurse though. 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
I will meet you and your family, probably at your home, but I can meet you somewhere 
else if that is best. I will talk to you about whether your doctor, nurse or dentist tell you 
what treatment you need and what you think about that. I will talk to you for about 30 
minutes. You can say as much or as little as you want to. You can stop at any time and if 
you feel you don’t want to take part anymore, that’s not a problem. I can talk to you on 
your own or you can have an adult with you. 
 
What will happen with what we talk about?                                          
I may take some notes of what we talk about and our discussion will also be recorded to 
make sure I don’t miss anything important. 
What we talk about will be confidential (private). I won’t tell anyone what you say. 
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What you and all the other children and young people tell me will be written in a report 
that others can read, but this will not have anyone’s name in it that could identify you. 
The results of the study might also be shown at meetings or talks but this won’t show 
any of the names of the children who took part. 
 
Can you change your mind if you decide later that you don’t want to take part? 
Yes, if you change your mind you can tell me and we can stop. 
 
What if you have questions about the study? 
 
If you have any questions you can contact either: 
Fiona Miller     and/or Associate Professor Nicola Taylor 
Work: 04 801 5156 (Mon, Wed, Fri) Children’s Issues Centre, University of Otago 
Mobile: 021 0297 4568   University Telephone Number: (09) 373 9717 
Email:milfi176@student.otago.ac.nz Email: nicola.taylor@otago.ac.nz    
 



































 Appendix I 
 
Children/Young People’s Consent Form 
 
Reference 13/279 
23 December 2013 
  
  
Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
CONSENT FORM FOR CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 
 
I have been told about this study and understand what it is about. All my questions have 
been answered in a way that makes sense. 
I know that: 
1. Participation in this study is voluntary, which means that I do not have to take part 
if I don’t want to and nothing will happen to me. I can also stop taking part at any 
time and don’t have to give a reason. 
 
2. Anytime I want to stop, that’s okay. 
 
3. Fiona will audio-record me so that she can remember what I say, but the recording 
will be erased after the study has ended. 
 
4. If I don’t want to answer some of the questions, that’s fine. 
 
5. If I have any worries or if I have any other questions, then I can talk about these 
with Fiona. 
 
6. The paper and computer file with my answers will only be seen by Fiona and the 
people  she is working with. They will keep whatever I say private. 
 
7. Fiona will write up the results from this study for her University course. The results 
may also be written up in journals and talked about at conferences. My name will 
not be on anything the researchers write up about this study. 
I agree to take part in the study. 
 
.............................................................................  ............................... 












Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
  
Interview schedule for GPs, Hospital Doctors, Nurses and Dentists, 
and School Nurses: 
 




1. What are the range of procedures you carry out or treatment you prescribe for 
children. 
2. Estimate the number of children in the last year you consulted with as patients? 
3. On average how many children do you estimate you consult with as patients each 
year? 
4. What is the age range of children you consult with? 
 
  Consultation with children:  
 Tell me about your process when you consult with children as patients?  
Prompt: 
5. What type of information do you impart? 
6. What ways are used to explain treatment or procedures to children?  
7. How do you give children an opportunity to take part in the discussion or ask 
questions?  
8. At what age would you bring children into the discussion? 
9. Describe a consultation with a child that sticks in your mind?  
 
 Assessing competency: 
 What are the triggers or cues that signal to you that a child may be competent to 
consent to treatment? 
       Prompts: 
10. What are the most important factors for you when considering whether to assess 
a child’s competence? 
 
     What is your process when you are alerted that a child may be competent to 
consent? 
11. How much time do you spend assessing competency? 




    What is your process when you have assessed a child as being competent to 
consent? 
     Prompts: 
13. How does it differ from when a child is incompetent?  
14. How many children in a year do you estimate you assess as being competent to 
consent? 
15. What is the age range? 
16. What is the youngest age some of your patients could make sensible decisions 
about proposed treatment/procedure?  
17. What does informed consent mean for you in your practice? 
 
    Obtaining Consent: 
    What is your process for obtaining consent to carrying out procedures or 
prescribing treatment for children? 
    Prompts: 
18. How is the consent actually given or the decision actually made? 
19. Tell me about a situation that sticks in your mind where the child has given 
consent or has actively been involved in the process? 
 
Challenging situations where there has been disagreement about 
treatment/procedure: 
 
Describe a situation where either there has been disagreement between you and 
the parents or between the adult and child? 
   
Prompts: 
20. What was the child’s involvement? 
21. How was it resolved? 
22. If you have not experienced this what do you think you would do such a 
situation? 
 
Describe a situation where a child between the ages of 5-15 years of age has 
refused the treatment or procedure you are attempting to administer?  
   
Prompts: 
23. How did you deal with this? 
24. What was the child’s involvement is discussions? 
25. How was it resolved? 
26. After you have prescribed treatment, or carried out the procedure, what follow 
up discussions do you have with the parent and child about the degree of 
compliance by the child, for example taking the medication? 
27. Describe a situation where the parent has indicated difficulty in this respect? How 
has it been resolved? 
28. Who do you think should have the final decision on the treatment or procedure? 
29. Do you think there is a different standard of competency required for a child 
who is indicating consent to the proposed treatment from a child that is refusing? 
If so what is the difference?  
 
 Your views on the regulation of children consenting 
30. What is your understanding of how your professional guidance and the law 
regulate children under 16 years of age consenting to treatment? 
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31. Where does that knowledge come from? 
32. Do you think that your professional guidance and/or the law are clear on your 
obligations in respect of children under 16 years of age consenting/refusing 
treatment?  
33. What issues have arisen for you in your practice relating to children under 16 years 
of age consenting to treatment? 
34. Do you have any views on what changes would make the situation better for your 
practice? 
35. Do you think that children should have the right to consent to medical/dental 
treatment? If so what would be the criteria for doing so?  
36. Do you think that children should have the right to refuse medical/dental 
treatment? If so what would be the criteria for doing so? 
37. How do you feel about children consenting or refusing medical/dental 
treatment/procedure?  
38. Is there any professional development that would be helpful in this area of 
children consenting to treatment? 
39. Do you have any advice to give other professionals in New Zealand or 
internationally? 
40. What advice/message would you like to give to parents and/or children? 
41. Is there anything else you would like to raise about the consent process or 
children under 16 giving consent? 
42. Please advise your gender, ethnicity, age-range (30-40; 41-50; 51-60; 61-70; 70+), 


































Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
 
  Interview Question for Parents 
Background 
 




1. How old is your child now? 
2. How are decisions in your household made and what decisions in your household 
does your child make? 




Tell me about your child’s health. 
 
Prompts: 
4. What health condition does your child have? 
5. How old was your child when first diagnosed? 
6. What sorts of health professionals has your child seen for their health condition? 
7. Can you give me a timeline of what treatment/procedures your child had has, with 
whom and where? 
8. How many times has your child been seen by health professional(s) about their 
condition in the last two years? 
9. When was the last time they saw a health professional? 
10. How many times has your child been to hospital for their health condition? 
Talking with Health Professionals 
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11. Do the health professionals spend time talking to your child about their health?  
12. In what ways has your child’s health condition, treatment options and 
risks/benefits of treatment been explained to your child, for example verbal 
explanations, written material, audio/visual? 
13. How participative is your child in discussions?  
14. How do you think your child feels when he/she is talked to directly by a health 
professional? 
15. How do you feel about health professionals talking directly to your child? 
16. What would assist in your child becoming more involved in consultations? 
17. Who do you think has contributed the most to your child’s understanding of their 
health condition? 
18. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent does your child understand their health 
condition and how to mange it? (1 no understanding 10 full understanding) 
19. What bits does your child appear to understand and what bits do they not 
understand? 
Health care decisions 
 





20. How are those decisions taken? 
21. How involved do you think your child is in the decisions? 
22. What sorts of decisions do you make and what if any does your child make? 
23. Tell me about a time when you feel your child was included in discussions and 
decision-making? 
24. Have you and your child had disagreements about treatment/procedures? Tell me 
about that? 
25. How do you and your child work out disagreements about what treatment he/she 
should have, or whether he/she should have any treatment? 
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26. Do you think children under the age of 16 should be able to give their consent for 
medical treatment if the health professional thinks they understand what is 
involved? 
27. Do you think YOUR child should give consent to medical treatment if the health 
professional thinks he/she understands what is involved and why? How would you 
feel about them consenting? 
28. Have your views or feelings on the question of your child consenting to treatment 
changed since your child was diagnosed? If so in what way(s)? 
29. At what age do you think children should be able to consent to medical treatment? 
30. Do you think children under the age of 16 should be able to refuse medical 
treatment if the health professional thinks they understand what is involved by 
doing so and understand the consequences?  
31. At what age should children be able to so refuse?  
32. If you could give advice to give health professionals what would it be? 





























 Appendix L 
 




Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
 
Hi, I’m Fiona Miller. I am studying at the University of Otago in Dunedin. I am 
talking with children aged between 5 and 15 years, and their families, about children 
consenting (agreeing) to medical or dental treatment. What this means is when you go 
to the hospital or doctor are you asked what you think about the treatment you are 
having? 
Your Mum/Dad/other adult has said that it is okay for me to ask you if you would 
like to help me with my study. I’ll also be talking to your Mum/Dad/other adult but I 
think it is really important that children and young people get to have their say about 
it all too. So that’s why I want to talk to you – so I can find out what you think. That 
way we may be able to help adults like doctors, nurses and dentists think how it could 
be better for children and young people, and help to make things better for other 
children and young people. 
Everything you say to me will be private, just between you and me, and I won’t tell 
Mum, Dad, or anyone else in your family what you tell me. Also, I will not tell your 
doctor, dentists or any nurses that you see. I will be talking to the people I work with 
about what we talk about but they won’t know your real name, because you can 
choose a fake name. What I want to know is what you think so there are no right or 
wrong answers, and if there are any questions that you don’t want to answer just tell 
me. Sometimes children/young people have a lot to say about some things and 
nothing to say about other things so you can say as much or as little as you want to 
and it’s okay if you don’t have answers – just say you don’t know. You don’t have to 
talk to me if you don’t want to and you can tell me if you want to stop at any time and 
we will.  
What you and everyone else tell me will be written in a report that others can read. 
This will not have anyone’s names, and nobody will know it was you who said 
anything in the report because I’ll use your fake name. It is okay if you change your 
mind after you talk with me. If that happens before the report is written I will not use 
anything you have said. 
[Ask child/young person if they are happy to talk to you. Ask child/young person 
what fake name they would like. Show child/young person the consent form and 
ask them to sign it. Explain that we are going through a consent process. This is 
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them agreeing to taking part in my study. Explain that the doctor, nurse or dentist 
has to get consent either from a parent/guardian and/or from them. This is one 
of the things we will be talking about. Explain audio recorder and give child the 
option of turning it off if they want to.] 
 
Warm up questions- 
1.  How old are you; where were you born; what school do you go to; what do you 
like to do after school and at weekends; who lives with you in your home. 
2.  What choices are you allowed to make in your home, for example, what you have 
for lunch/dinner, what television shows you watch or what activities you do? 
3.  What jobs or responsibilies do you have at home? 
4.  What jobs or responsibilities do you have at school? 
 
Health 
 I’d like to talk to you about going to see the doctor (or dentist or nurse) or when you 
go to hospital for (cancer/diabetes/asthma/other). Tell me about what happens when 
you go to see the doctor or dentist or when you go to hospital. 
  
Prompts: 
5.  Who do you go with? 
6.  Do you usually see the same doctor/nurse/dentist? Can you remember who 
you’ve seen? Who do you like seeing the best? What is good about her/him? 
7.  Mum/Dad tells me that you have seen Doctor/Nurse/Dentist X. Tell me about 
that? 
8. Does he/she talk to you or just to who you go with? How does that make you feel? 
9. Mum/Dad tells me that you have also seen….Tell me about that? 
10. Who has explained what treatment/procedure you need? How did they explain it 
to you? For example pictures, a leaflet or show a video? 
11. Did you understand it all? 
12. Did you get a chance to ask questions? 
13. What bits did you understand? Were there any bits that you didn’t understand? 
14. Who has helped you understand the treatment/procedure the most? 
15. Have you ever seen a doctor/nurse/dentist on your own? If so how old were you 
and what was it for? 
16. Do you think children should be allowed to see a doctor/nurse/dentist on their 
own?  
17. What do you think would be good about seeing the doctor/nurse/dentist on 
your own, and what would be bad? 
 
Consent to treatment: 
 
Tell me about how it is decided what treatment you are to have. 
18. Mum/Dad tells me that you have had treatment x/procedure y. Were you asked 
what you thought about having that treatment? 
19. Who agreed that you were to have that treatment?  
20. Were you asked if you agreed? Who asked you? 
21. Do you feel you were included in agreeing to the treatment? 
22. Mum/Dad tells me that you have also had…Tell me about who agreed to that? 
Were you asked? Did you feel included in agreeing to have it? 
23. Who do you think should agree to what treatment/procedures children have? 
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24. How old do you think children should be to get a say in what happens to them at 
hospital, or when they go to the doctor or see the dentist? 
25. What would be good about that? What would be bad? 
26. Can you think of any situations/reasons children go to see a doctor or dentist 
and they can say they don’t want the treatment? 
27. Is there an age when children should be able to say to the doctor or dentist that 
they don’t want the treatment? 
28. If you could give advice to doctors, nurses or dentists what would it be? 
29. If you could give advice to other chidren about seeing the doctor, nurse or 







































Appendix M  
 




Children and Health Professionals: Partners in Health Care? 
   
Interview Questions for Key Stakeholders  
 




What issues have arisen for your organisation on the question of children 
consenting to medical or dental treatment? 
 
Prompts: 
1.   How were those issues resolved? 
2.    How often in your experience has an issue been raised by one of your members 
about an issue of children participating in, or consenting to, medical or dental 
treatment? 
3.   What is your role in this area? Any other issues in this area for your organisation? 
 
Regulation of children Consenting: Medical, Dental, Nursing Councils and 
Paediatric Society 
 
Do you think your members will be aware of their professional practice guidance 





4.   What do you base this on? 
5.   How satisfied do you think your members are with the current situation of the 
law and guidance on children consenting or refusing medical/dental treatment? 
How do you gauge this? 
6.   How does your organisation facilitate discussion with your members on this 
issue? 
7.   What is your organisation’s role in raising awareness of this issue with parents 
and  children? 
8.    Do you think there is a need to raise awareness of this issue? Why? 
 
 




What is your view of the current regulation of children under 16 
consenting/refusing treatment? 
       
       Prompts: 
 
9. What is your organisation’s view on whether children should have the right in law 
to consent (and refuse) to medical or dental treatment? 
10.  What do you think the law should be for children consenting to medical or 
dental treatment? 
11. Is there any professional development, training or supports that would be helpful 
to you or your members in this area of children consenting to medical or dental 
treatment? 
12.  Do you have any advice to give health professionals, parent or children    
regarding this area? 
13. Is there anything else you would like to raise about the consent process or 
children under 16 giving consent? 
14. What are your ethnicity, age-range (30-40; 41-50; 51-60; 61-70; 70+), professional 































 Appendix N  
 




Request for Treatment/Procedure(s) 
 
I, [          ] (patient, parent, guardian, person care and welfare attorney) request that the 
following procedure/treatment be performed on me/my child/personal lacking capacity 
to give consent. 
 
[                                     ](name of patient if different from the above name)  
 
[                                     ] Description of treatment/procedure(s) 
 
I understand the nature, benefits and risks of the above treatment and/or procedure(s). 
I have had explained to me the alternatives treatment and/or procedure(s) available, 
including not having any treatment. I have had the opportunity to ask my questions 
about the above treatment and/or procedure(s). I am aware that I may ask for more 
information at any time and that my health information may be used for quality auditing 
purposes. 
 
I agree that if during the treatment/procedure(s) there is an unexpected finding or event 
additional procedures deemed to be essential might be carried out. 
 
I agree to my blood being taken for testing in the event of a staff member being 
exposed to my blood or body fluid. 
 
I understand the nature, benefits and risks of receiving blood components/blood 
products and agree to receiving these if clinically necessary and in my own best interests. 
………………………………………………………..YES  NO  N/A 
 
I understand and agree that written, electronic, radiographic, video, sound and 
photographic records may be made and stored, and may be referred to at a later date for 
teaching purposes and/or for Ethics committee approved  
research. 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. YES  
NO  N/A 
 
I understand that this treatment is being carried out in a teaching hospital and agree to 
observation of and participation in my treatment and/or procedure(s) by students under 
appropriate supervision. ………………………………… YES  NO  N/A 
 
I understand that following this treatment/procedure(s), I may be sedated and should 
not drive a motor vehicle, operate machinery or potentially dangerous appliances, drink 
alcohol or make important legal or financial decisions for at least 18 hours afterwards. 




I understand that tissue removed during the treatment/procedure(s) may be submitted 
for pathological examination, kept and referred to at a later date for clinical purposes, 
audit, teaching and for Ethics Committee approved research. I understand that the tissue 
may be returned to me if I wish (a Tissue Return Form (X DHB) or a Body Part Chain 
of Custody Form (X DHB)is required.. YES  NO  N/A  
 
Signature of patient/parent/guardian/     Date 
personal care and welfare attorney 
 
Name of health professional [                   ]     Date 
Signature             Designation 
 
The treatment/procedure I intend to perform on [          ] is correctly described above. 
 
Name of person performing treatment/procedure(s) [             ] 
Signature                                                       Designation                                 
 Date 
 
Please turn over to add supporting relevant information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
